High-Speed Railway Deals: Why did Japan lose in Indonesia and win in India?
CHINO Keiko / Journalist
January 28, 2016
"Knocking on a stone bridge and still not crossing it" is an expression used to describe the cautious Japanese. But there is another expression: "No need to fear, we can all cross together." These two expressions, at once contradictory, sprang to my mind with respect to Japanese companies and their growing recent interest in Asian infrastructure (AI) projects.
There is nothing new about demand for such projects. Yet, suddenly everyone seems to be racing to cross the "AI bridge." The establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) led by China has no doubt acted as a catalyst. Against this backdrop, Japan lost out to China in a bid to export its bullet train system to Indonesia, while clinching a deal with India. News of this contrasting outcome last year generated much talk. Let us reexamine the lessons we have learned from this failure and success.
The project in India covers approximately 500 kilometers between Mumbai and Ahmedabad. Of the total cost of about 1.8 trillion yen, Japan will provide up to 1.46 trillion yen in government loans. In other words, almost all of the project will be financed by yen loans, under exceedingly favorable terms of a repayment period of 50 years including a grace period of 15 years, and an annual interest rate of 0.1 percent, according to press reports.
Meanwhile, the project in Indonesia covers 140 kilometers between Jakarta and Bandung. Japan expressed its intention of extending 140 billion yen in loans during a visit by Indonesian President Joko Widodo, but to no avail. Though details of the Chinese offer are unknown, the terms of their agreement must have been exceptional.
When I visited Jakarta in November after the deal fell through, I encountered a number of arguments from both sides. Some faulted Japan for being arrogant in its handling of a deal that was originally proposed by Indonesia as the customer. Others said there was nothing they could do since it was the President's decision, and that everyone in Indonesia from ministers to citizens owed Japan an apology. Yet others claimed that the Chinese plan of laying a railroad across mountainous highlands in just three years without even conducting a preliminary survey was simply unfeasible, and that sooner or later they will beg Japan for help. Then there were those who questioned the very need for a high-speed railway in that region, and others who pointed out that the aim of the project was to secure reelection for the President. The local debate was clamorous. So much so that, at the risk of being indiscreet, I must say the local reaction was quite amusing. It was clearly not the end of the matter; we should keep a close watch for further developments.
The first lesson I would like to point out is the importance of top-level diplomacy. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo looked friendly and at ease with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, while he came across as awkward and formal in his relationship with President Joko. The larger the project, the more the outcome depends on top leaders. In that sense, the latest results seem to have been dictated by the relative levels of intimacy between the leaders.
However, top-level diplomacy is not enough. Japan has historically enjoyed a strong bond with Indonesia, the greatest pro-Japanese country. Yet, the relationship had reached a hiatus in recent years and ties between politicians had weakened. When push comes to shove, the accumulation of such relationships is what counts. It was a powerful reminder that to strengthen relations we must maintain a diligent effort without taking the past for granted.
Thirdly, it was now apparent that we are no longer in a world where yen loans, or ODA (Official Development Assistance), works as an omnipotent tool for gaining the gratitude of other countries. Indonesia is the biggest recipient of Japanese aid, but in 2004 its repayment exceeded the amount of aid it receives each year. Even at low interest rates, loan repayment becomes a heavy burden. This is one of the reasons most developing countries today expect more from private investment than government aid. In that vein, Japan's 140 billion yen proposal had no effect on Indonesia.
The fourth point to keep in mind is that Japan and China are expected to continue competing for AI projects in the coming years. It would hardly be beneficial for Japan to see the Indonesian case recur with each future project. Given that this is a different kind of game from territorial issues on land and at sea where national interests collide, Japan should avoid engaging in a war of attrition and instead make a greater effort towards working in symbiosis and tactical cooperation with China.
It is no longer possible to compete with China's strength in quantity in terms of "quantity," nor is it worthwhile. Japan should trust its competence and play from its strengths.
Having said so, hard-selling Japan's strengths and virtues is probably not a good idea. That is the fifth lesson. Bullet trains may be safe and comfortable, featuring the highest levels of technology in all respects, including its operational system, but not every country in the world needs a high-speed railway system. Circumstances differ with each country. The key lies in understanding and responding to the needs of each customer. Working on the presumption that a country needs a bullet train can only lead to failure.
Finally, the Japanese do not quit midway once we accept a job. We bear full responsibility until completion. We seek to forge a lasting relationship of trust. Japan must not forget to continue appealing this virtue to the outside world.
Keiko Chino is Guest Columnist of the Sankei Shimbun Newspaper.
There is nothing new about demand for such projects. Yet, suddenly everyone seems to be racing to cross the "AI bridge." The establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) led by China has no doubt acted as a catalyst. Against this backdrop, Japan lost out to China in a bid to export its bullet train system to Indonesia, while clinching a deal with India. News of this contrasting outcome last year generated much talk. Let us reexamine the lessons we have learned from this failure and success.
The project in India covers approximately 500 kilometers between Mumbai and Ahmedabad. Of the total cost of about 1.8 trillion yen, Japan will provide up to 1.46 trillion yen in government loans. In other words, almost all of the project will be financed by yen loans, under exceedingly favorable terms of a repayment period of 50 years including a grace period of 15 years, and an annual interest rate of 0.1 percent, according to press reports.
Meanwhile, the project in Indonesia covers 140 kilometers between Jakarta and Bandung. Japan expressed its intention of extending 140 billion yen in loans during a visit by Indonesian President Joko Widodo, but to no avail. Though details of the Chinese offer are unknown, the terms of their agreement must have been exceptional.
When I visited Jakarta in November after the deal fell through, I encountered a number of arguments from both sides. Some faulted Japan for being arrogant in its handling of a deal that was originally proposed by Indonesia as the customer. Others said there was nothing they could do since it was the President's decision, and that everyone in Indonesia from ministers to citizens owed Japan an apology. Yet others claimed that the Chinese plan of laying a railroad across mountainous highlands in just three years without even conducting a preliminary survey was simply unfeasible, and that sooner or later they will beg Japan for help. Then there were those who questioned the very need for a high-speed railway in that region, and others who pointed out that the aim of the project was to secure reelection for the President. The local debate was clamorous. So much so that, at the risk of being indiscreet, I must say the local reaction was quite amusing. It was clearly not the end of the matter; we should keep a close watch for further developments.
The first lesson I would like to point out is the importance of top-level diplomacy. Prime Minister Abe Shinzo looked friendly and at ease with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, while he came across as awkward and formal in his relationship with President Joko. The larger the project, the more the outcome depends on top leaders. In that sense, the latest results seem to have been dictated by the relative levels of intimacy between the leaders.
However, top-level diplomacy is not enough. Japan has historically enjoyed a strong bond with Indonesia, the greatest pro-Japanese country. Yet, the relationship had reached a hiatus in recent years and ties between politicians had weakened. When push comes to shove, the accumulation of such relationships is what counts. It was a powerful reminder that to strengthen relations we must maintain a diligent effort without taking the past for granted.
Thirdly, it was now apparent that we are no longer in a world where yen loans, or ODA (Official Development Assistance), works as an omnipotent tool for gaining the gratitude of other countries. Indonesia is the biggest recipient of Japanese aid, but in 2004 its repayment exceeded the amount of aid it receives each year. Even at low interest rates, loan repayment becomes a heavy burden. This is one of the reasons most developing countries today expect more from private investment than government aid. In that vein, Japan's 140 billion yen proposal had no effect on Indonesia.
The fourth point to keep in mind is that Japan and China are expected to continue competing for AI projects in the coming years. It would hardly be beneficial for Japan to see the Indonesian case recur with each future project. Given that this is a different kind of game from territorial issues on land and at sea where national interests collide, Japan should avoid engaging in a war of attrition and instead make a greater effort towards working in symbiosis and tactical cooperation with China.
It is no longer possible to compete with China's strength in quantity in terms of "quantity," nor is it worthwhile. Japan should trust its competence and play from its strengths.
Having said so, hard-selling Japan's strengths and virtues is probably not a good idea. That is the fifth lesson. Bullet trains may be safe and comfortable, featuring the highest levels of technology in all respects, including its operational system, but not every country in the world needs a high-speed railway system. Circumstances differ with each country. The key lies in understanding and responding to the needs of each customer. Working on the presumption that a country needs a bullet train can only lead to failure.
Finally, the Japanese do not quit midway once we accept a job. We bear full responsibility until completion. We seek to forge a lasting relationship of trust. Japan must not forget to continue appealing this virtue to the outside world.
Keiko Chino is Guest Columnist of the Sankei Shimbun Newspaper.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
インドとインドネシア、高速鉄道受注の明暗を分けたもの
千野境子 / ジャーナリスト
2016年 1月 28日
日本について、石橋を叩いても渡らないという表現がある。また皆で渡れば怖くないというのもある。最近のアジアインフラ（AI）事業への日本企業の関心の高まりに、一見矛盾するこの２つの表現が思わず頭に浮かんだ。
需要は今、急に発生したわけでもないのに、皆競ってさながらAI橋を渡り出している。中国主導のアジアインフラ銀行（AIIB）の発足も触媒役に違いない。そうした中で新幹線方式の輸出が昨年、インドネシアで中国に競り負け、インドでは商談成立という対照的な結果を見せ、話題を呼んだ。失敗と成功の教訓をあらためて考えてみたい。
両者は、インドがムンバイとアーメダバード間約500㌔。日本は総事業費約1兆８千億円のうち最大で約1兆4600億円の円借款を供与する。つまりほとんどが円借款の事業で、報道によれば供与条件は償還期間50年（据え置き期間15年）で年利が0.1％と破格の待遇だ。
一方インドネシアはジャカルタとバンドン間約140㌔。日本はジョコ同国大統領が訪日した際に1400億円の円借款供与を表明するなどしたが、功を奏さなかった。中国側の詳細は分からないが、破格の条件だったのだろう。
決着後の11月にジャカルタを訪れると①もともとインドネシア側が頼んできた案件なのに失礼千万②大統領の決断だから仕方ない。インドネシア側は閣僚から国民まで日本に申し訳ないと思っている③事前調査もせず、山間の高地に僅か3年で敷く中国案は不可能④いずれ日本に泣きついてくる⑤そもそもあの区間に高速鉄道は要らない⑥事業は大統領の再選目当て――等々、問題をめぐって地元では喧々囂囂、不謹慎を承知で言えば大変面白かった。一件落着ではない。今後も目が離せない。
教訓として指摘したいのは、第1に首脳外交の重要性だ。安倍首相とモディ印首相は見るからに親密そうだが、ジョコとは何かぎこちなく儀礼的な印象だ。巨大プロジェクトになればなるほどトップ次第だ。その意味で今回は首脳の緊密度の差が明暗を分けた気がする。
しかし首脳外交だけでは足りない。もともとインドネシアは最大の親日国で歴史的紐帯も強いにもかかわらず、近年は政治家同士のパイプが細くなるなど関係が停滞気味だった。イザと言う時に、こうした蓄積がモノを言う。関係強化には過去に安住せず、日々の不断の努力が必要なことを痛感させた。
第3に円借款つまりODA（政府開発援助）が感謝される万能の時代ではなくなったことも示した。インドネシアはODAの最大の受入国だが、2004年に返済額が毎年供与される円借款を上回るほど膨れ上がった。例え低利でも債務返済は重荷となる。それもあって今、途上国の多くは援助より民間投資への期待が大きい。インドネシアも1400億円の効き目はなかったことになる。
第4にAI事業は今後も日中受注競争が予想される。その度にインドネシア版が再燃するのは日本にとって果たして有益だろうか。国益がかかる領土・領海問題とは違うのだから、出来るだけ消耗戦は避け、棲み分けや限定的協力を目指す努力がもっとあってよい。
量の中国に量で対抗することはもはや無理だし意味のあることでもない。日本は日本の強みに自信を持ち、そこに軸足を置くべきだ。
第5に、しかし日本の強みや良さの押し売りは考え物だ。新幹線は安全・快適で運行システムなど万事高い技術を誇るが、世界のすべてが新幹線仕様を欲しているわけではない。やはりお国の事情というものがある。客のニーズを知り、それに応えることが基本だ。最初に新幹線ありきでは失敗する。
最後に日本は仕事を途中で投げ出さない。一度引き受けたら、最後まで責任を持つ。末永くお付き合いをし、信頼関係を築く。このような日本の良さを対外メッセージとして送り続けることも忘れてはならない。
(筆者は産經新聞客員論説委員。）
需要は今、急に発生したわけでもないのに、皆競ってさながらAI橋を渡り出している。中国主導のアジアインフラ銀行（AIIB）の発足も触媒役に違いない。そうした中で新幹線方式の輸出が昨年、インドネシアで中国に競り負け、インドでは商談成立という対照的な結果を見せ、話題を呼んだ。失敗と成功の教訓をあらためて考えてみたい。
両者は、インドがムンバイとアーメダバード間約500㌔。日本は総事業費約1兆８千億円のうち最大で約1兆4600億円の円借款を供与する。つまりほとんどが円借款の事業で、報道によれば供与条件は償還期間50年（据え置き期間15年）で年利が0.1％と破格の待遇だ。
一方インドネシアはジャカルタとバンドン間約140㌔。日本はジョコ同国大統領が訪日した際に1400億円の円借款供与を表明するなどしたが、功を奏さなかった。中国側の詳細は分からないが、破格の条件だったのだろう。
決着後の11月にジャカルタを訪れると①もともとインドネシア側が頼んできた案件なのに失礼千万②大統領の決断だから仕方ない。インドネシア側は閣僚から国民まで日本に申し訳ないと思っている③事前調査もせず、山間の高地に僅か3年で敷く中国案は不可能④いずれ日本に泣きついてくる⑤そもそもあの区間に高速鉄道は要らない⑥事業は大統領の再選目当て――等々、問題をめぐって地元では喧々囂囂、不謹慎を承知で言えば大変面白かった。一件落着ではない。今後も目が離せない。
教訓として指摘したいのは、第1に首脳外交の重要性だ。安倍首相とモディ印首相は見るからに親密そうだが、ジョコとは何かぎこちなく儀礼的な印象だ。巨大プロジェクトになればなるほどトップ次第だ。その意味で今回は首脳の緊密度の差が明暗を分けた気がする。
しかし首脳外交だけでは足りない。もともとインドネシアは最大の親日国で歴史的紐帯も強いにもかかわらず、近年は政治家同士のパイプが細くなるなど関係が停滞気味だった。イザと言う時に、こうした蓄積がモノを言う。関係強化には過去に安住せず、日々の不断の努力が必要なことを痛感させた。
第3に円借款つまりODA（政府開発援助）が感謝される万能の時代ではなくなったことも示した。インドネシアはODAの最大の受入国だが、2004年に返済額が毎年供与される円借款を上回るほど膨れ上がった。例え低利でも債務返済は重荷となる。それもあって今、途上国の多くは援助より民間投資への期待が大きい。インドネシアも1400億円の効き目はなかったことになる。
第4にAI事業は今後も日中受注競争が予想される。その度にインドネシア版が再燃するのは日本にとって果たして有益だろうか。国益がかかる領土・領海問題とは違うのだから、出来るだけ消耗戦は避け、棲み分けや限定的協力を目指す努力がもっとあってよい。
量の中国に量で対抗することはもはや無理だし意味のあることでもない。日本は日本の強みに自信を持ち、そこに軸足を置くべきだ。
第5に、しかし日本の強みや良さの押し売りは考え物だ。新幹線は安全・快適で運行システムなど万事高い技術を誇るが、世界のすべてが新幹線仕様を欲しているわけではない。やはりお国の事情というものがある。客のニーズを知り、それに応えることが基本だ。最初に新幹線ありきでは失敗する。
最後に日本は仕事を途中で投げ出さない。一度引き受けたら、最後まで責任を持つ。末永くお付き合いをし、信頼関係を築く。このような日本の良さを対外メッセージとして送り続けることも忘れてはならない。
(筆者は産經新聞客員論説委員。）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟