War of the Pacific - The Japanese Side of the Story
ITO Teruhiko / Professor Emeritus, Wako University
July 25, 2013
Since 1945, the four months from May to August have held a special meaning for Germany and Japan, even to this day. On May 7, Germany surrendered to the Allied Forces, and on the next day U.S. President Harry S. Truman urged Japan to accept an unconditional surrender. On August 2, the United States, The United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union reached a final decision on their division and occupation of Germany at the Potsdam Conference. And on August 15, the Emperor made a radio broadcast proclaiming Japan’s defeat to his people and the entire world. During this time, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki took place on August 6 and 9 .
It is now 68 years since those days. Neither Germany nor Japan show any signs of the devastations of that war, nor do they face any imminent danger to their respective national security. Judging from their economic track record, neither the Germans nor the Japanese are likely to be threatened by starvation, and their respective societies are for the most part steady. Based on their activities for international cooperation, there is no reason why either Germany or Japan should be talked about behind their backs by other countries. Yet, when it comes to dealing with its nearest neighbors - China and South Korea, Japan’s efforts have only produced frosty diplomatic relationships, even though its historical and cultural exchange with the two countries go back at least 1,700 years. It seems as if China and South Korea have joined hands in a united diplomatic offensive against Japan.
Several overlapping diplomatic issues between Japan, China and South Korea have nurtured a detrimental mood so that none of them can now afford to step back. The two issues of sovereignty over disputed islands - Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands with China and the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands with South Korea – may differ in nature, but the three countries have no choice other than to maintain the status quo while each claiming territorial rights. With respect to the Senkaku Islands, the “status quo” means the state when it was private property, up to September 2012, when the Japanese government at the time nationalized the islands. Find a nongovernment benefactor to repurchase the islands, and the dialogue between Japan and China should resume. Japan need only to continue listing the islands on its official territorial map of the Geospatial Information Authority. Japan would lose face, but it would lose little else except for some fishery rights. It would be no big deal for Japan if the islands are left unattended.
With South Korea, there is the additional issue of the comfort women. No other issue has caused the Japanese government to apologize so frequently to a foreign country over its misconduct during the Pacific War. The government has established the Asian Women’s Fund in cooperation with a private domestic organization for the purpose of paying reparations to Korean women. And yet, South Korea has remained unforgiving.
Hate campaigns against Japan are the staple of South Korean mass media. As recently as May this year, the JoongAng Daily, a quality newspaper, published a commentary claiming it was by “God’s grace” that the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As might be expected, this drew sharp protests from Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the paper had no choice but to carry a rebuttal statement from the Japanese side.
Yet, I feel there is an issue that undermines Japan's spiritual and cultural independence as a nation at a different level altogether from the territorial disputes over uninhabited islands and the comfort women during wartime. At issue here is the fact that the governments of China and South Korea protest each time a high-ranking Japanese dignitary pays respect to the Yasukuni Shrine. This has occasionally derailed diplomatic efforts as a consequence. It began in 1978, when fourteen Class A war criminals prosecuted by the Tokyo Tribunal following the Pacific War were enshrined at Yasukuni.
Yasukuni is a Shinto shrine built in 1879 on the order of Emperor Meiji, who wished to console the souls of soldiers who lost their lives in the shadows of Japan’s modernization. In later years however, Emperor Showa, the grandson of Emperor Meiji, stopped worshipping at Yasukuni once he discovered that Class A war criminals were enshrined there. Since then, no visits have been made to Yasukuni by members of the Imperial family. That may have been an insightful decision. Then again, even after it was stripped of state protection and is now no more than only one of tens of thousands of Shinto shrines in Japan, Yasukuni remains dedicated to the five million or so souls that were lost to war since the Meiji era. Every year, about a million surviving relatives gather at Yasukuni to be at one with the soul of a great-grandfather, grandfather, father or brother who died on the frontlines. For them it makes no difference whether the soul of Tojo Hideki, who was executed for his wartime deeds, is enshrined there. And it is the same for top government officials who had lost family members to the war. It should be treated as a matter of personal faith.
If I may draw an abrupt conclusion, herein lies the crucial difference between postwar Germany and postwar Japan. After its defeat, Japan did not go through any "denazification" phase. War criminals were impeached and heavyweights in the military establishment were purged from office at the orders of General Douglas MacArthur, the head of the U.S. occupational forces. However, no efforts were made at the time to penalize ordinary Japanese citizens as in Germany, where its citizens were classified into either sympathizers or opponents of the Nazi Party. Looking at it from another perspective, Germany sought and succeeded in establishing that it was the abnormal group of Nazis who were to be blamed for launching and expanding the war to conquer Europe and for instigating a plan to exterminate the Jewish and Romani peoples, that ordinary innocent Germans had nothing to do with all this, and subsequently getting this view accepted as international opinion.
General Tojo Hideki of the Imperial Japanese Army, the principal member among the fourteen Class A war criminals, was executed. Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsuoka Yosuke, who had been a “friend” of Adolf Hitler and German Minister of Foreign Affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop, died of illness before his sentence. For most Japanese living today, they are merely some dead old men from the past. It is difficult to find any reason to stop people from paying their respects at Yasukuni Shrine, even if the souls of those war criminals may still be drifting about the place. It seems extraordinary that the governments of other countries should be poking their fingers into such acts of faith.
Japan imported most of its ancient culture from China and Korea. We acquired the basic elements of culture – Chinese characters, Buddhism and iron manufacturing – from our two neighboring countries, and the world knows we proudly admit to our indebtedness. It is estimated that a quarter of the Japanese are of Korean ancestry and one-tenths of Chinese ancestry. The remainder is composed of indigenous peoples and an influx from the northern regions of Okhotsk and Siberia and from the southern regions including Indonesia. The worship of Shinto shrines is a northern tradition that has nothing to do with either Chinese or Korean culture, but the fact does not justify nor entitle them to find fault with the Japanese custom of visiting the Yasukuni Shrine.
Up until the rise of the Asian movement for independence in the aftermath of the Pacific War, the whole of Asia had been colonized by the Western powers, with the exceptions of Japan, the Republic of China and Thailand. How did the former colonial masters greet their slave laborers after retreating from the colonies? Having little knowledge, I must say I have no idea.
Teruhiko Ito is Professor Emeritus in international relations at Wako University.
It is now 68 years since those days. Neither Germany nor Japan show any signs of the devastations of that war, nor do they face any imminent danger to their respective national security. Judging from their economic track record, neither the Germans nor the Japanese are likely to be threatened by starvation, and their respective societies are for the most part steady. Based on their activities for international cooperation, there is no reason why either Germany or Japan should be talked about behind their backs by other countries. Yet, when it comes to dealing with its nearest neighbors - China and South Korea, Japan’s efforts have only produced frosty diplomatic relationships, even though its historical and cultural exchange with the two countries go back at least 1,700 years. It seems as if China and South Korea have joined hands in a united diplomatic offensive against Japan.
Several overlapping diplomatic issues between Japan, China and South Korea have nurtured a detrimental mood so that none of them can now afford to step back. The two issues of sovereignty over disputed islands - Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands with China and the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands with South Korea – may differ in nature, but the three countries have no choice other than to maintain the status quo while each claiming territorial rights. With respect to the Senkaku Islands, the “status quo” means the state when it was private property, up to September 2012, when the Japanese government at the time nationalized the islands. Find a nongovernment benefactor to repurchase the islands, and the dialogue between Japan and China should resume. Japan need only to continue listing the islands on its official territorial map of the Geospatial Information Authority. Japan would lose face, but it would lose little else except for some fishery rights. It would be no big deal for Japan if the islands are left unattended.
With South Korea, there is the additional issue of the comfort women. No other issue has caused the Japanese government to apologize so frequently to a foreign country over its misconduct during the Pacific War. The government has established the Asian Women’s Fund in cooperation with a private domestic organization for the purpose of paying reparations to Korean women. And yet, South Korea has remained unforgiving.
Hate campaigns against Japan are the staple of South Korean mass media. As recently as May this year, the JoongAng Daily, a quality newspaper, published a commentary claiming it was by “God’s grace” that the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As might be expected, this drew sharp protests from Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the paper had no choice but to carry a rebuttal statement from the Japanese side.
Yet, I feel there is an issue that undermines Japan's spiritual and cultural independence as a nation at a different level altogether from the territorial disputes over uninhabited islands and the comfort women during wartime. At issue here is the fact that the governments of China and South Korea protest each time a high-ranking Japanese dignitary pays respect to the Yasukuni Shrine. This has occasionally derailed diplomatic efforts as a consequence. It began in 1978, when fourteen Class A war criminals prosecuted by the Tokyo Tribunal following the Pacific War were enshrined at Yasukuni.
Yasukuni is a Shinto shrine built in 1879 on the order of Emperor Meiji, who wished to console the souls of soldiers who lost their lives in the shadows of Japan’s modernization. In later years however, Emperor Showa, the grandson of Emperor Meiji, stopped worshipping at Yasukuni once he discovered that Class A war criminals were enshrined there. Since then, no visits have been made to Yasukuni by members of the Imperial family. That may have been an insightful decision. Then again, even after it was stripped of state protection and is now no more than only one of tens of thousands of Shinto shrines in Japan, Yasukuni remains dedicated to the five million or so souls that were lost to war since the Meiji era. Every year, about a million surviving relatives gather at Yasukuni to be at one with the soul of a great-grandfather, grandfather, father or brother who died on the frontlines. For them it makes no difference whether the soul of Tojo Hideki, who was executed for his wartime deeds, is enshrined there. And it is the same for top government officials who had lost family members to the war. It should be treated as a matter of personal faith.
If I may draw an abrupt conclusion, herein lies the crucial difference between postwar Germany and postwar Japan. After its defeat, Japan did not go through any "denazification" phase. War criminals were impeached and heavyweights in the military establishment were purged from office at the orders of General Douglas MacArthur, the head of the U.S. occupational forces. However, no efforts were made at the time to penalize ordinary Japanese citizens as in Germany, where its citizens were classified into either sympathizers or opponents of the Nazi Party. Looking at it from another perspective, Germany sought and succeeded in establishing that it was the abnormal group of Nazis who were to be blamed for launching and expanding the war to conquer Europe and for instigating a plan to exterminate the Jewish and Romani peoples, that ordinary innocent Germans had nothing to do with all this, and subsequently getting this view accepted as international opinion.
General Tojo Hideki of the Imperial Japanese Army, the principal member among the fourteen Class A war criminals, was executed. Minister of Foreign Affairs Matsuoka Yosuke, who had been a “friend” of Adolf Hitler and German Minister of Foreign Affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop, died of illness before his sentence. For most Japanese living today, they are merely some dead old men from the past. It is difficult to find any reason to stop people from paying their respects at Yasukuni Shrine, even if the souls of those war criminals may still be drifting about the place. It seems extraordinary that the governments of other countries should be poking their fingers into such acts of faith.
Japan imported most of its ancient culture from China and Korea. We acquired the basic elements of culture – Chinese characters, Buddhism and iron manufacturing – from our two neighboring countries, and the world knows we proudly admit to our indebtedness. It is estimated that a quarter of the Japanese are of Korean ancestry and one-tenths of Chinese ancestry. The remainder is composed of indigenous peoples and an influx from the northern regions of Okhotsk and Siberia and from the southern regions including Indonesia. The worship of Shinto shrines is a northern tradition that has nothing to do with either Chinese or Korean culture, but the fact does not justify nor entitle them to find fault with the Japanese custom of visiting the Yasukuni Shrine.
Up until the rise of the Asian movement for independence in the aftermath of the Pacific War, the whole of Asia had been colonized by the Western powers, with the exceptions of Japan, the Republic of China and Thailand. How did the former colonial masters greet their slave laborers after retreating from the colonies? Having little knowledge, I must say I have no idea.
Teruhiko Ito is Professor Emeritus in international relations at Wako University.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
日本の言い分
伊藤光彦 / 和光大学名誉教授
2013年 7月 25日
１９４５年以来、ドイツと日本にとって５月から８月までの４カ月は特別の日々であり続けている。今日に至るまで。５月７日、ドイツが連合国に降伏、翌８日、トルーマンが日本に無条件降伏を勧告。８月２日、ポツダム会議で米英仏ソによるドイツの分割占領統治が確定。15日、日本の天皇は敗戦を国民と全世界にラジオ放送で告げた。広島、長崎への原爆投下は８月６、９日である。
あの日々から68年が過ぎた。ドイツと日本に、戦争の惨禍の跡はない。国防上の差し迫った危険もないようである。経済実績からみて、両国民とも飢餓に脅かされることはなかろう。社会はおおむね安定している。国際協力の実績にも他国から後ろ指をさされるような怠りはないはずである。だが今日の日本は地理的に最も近く、歴史的、文化的関係では少なくとも１７００年にわたる交流実績を持つ中国および韓国と、国家レベルではまったく冷ややかな付き合いしかできていない。中、韓両国は対日外交攻撃で共同戦線を張ったかのようである。
いくつかの外交上の問題が重なり合って、日本も中国、韓国も後に退けない悪しき雰囲気が醸成されている。島の領有権問題（対中では尖閣列島、対韓では竹島）は双方で性格が違うが、３当事国はそれぞれ領有権を主張しつつ、現状status quoの維持を続ける他に道はない。尖閣についての現状とは昨年９月に当時の日本政府がこの島を国有化する前の状態（私有土地だった）である。誰か民間の篤志家に買い取ってもらう。そこから両国の対話は復活するだろう。竹島は日本国土院の公式領土地図に載せ続けるだけでよい。面子を別にすれば、日本にとって多少の漁業権益損失以外、放置して影響のない島だ。
韓国との間には、これに加え戦場慰安婦の問題がある。日本政府が太平洋戦争中の不祥事で外国(人）に詫びた回数がこれほど多い問題はない。国内民間団体との協力で政府は財団法人「アジア女性基金」をつくった。韓国女性にお詫び金を払うためである。それでもなお韓国は許していない。
韓国マスコミの売り物は「日本憎悪キャンペーン」である。本年５月にも、韓国の高級紙とされる中央日報は「広島、長崎（原爆投下）は"神の恩寵"であった」とのエッセーを掲載した。これはさすがに日本外務省の強い抗議を受け、日本側の反論文章を掲載せざるを得なかったが。
しかし筆者は、無人島の領有権や戦場慰安婦の問題とは違うレベルで日本という国の精神的・文化的独立性を脅かしていると憂える一事がある。中国、韓国の当局が、日本側閣僚級要人の靖国神社参拝をその都度激しく非難することだ。その結果として外交が頓挫することがある。これは太平洋戦争の東京裁判Ａ級戦犯14人が靖国に合祀された78年以後からである。
靖国は国家近代化の陰で命を落とした武人らの霊を慰めるため明治天皇の意向により１８７９年に設立された神社である。しかしその孫の昭和天皇はＡ級戦犯合祀の事実を知って以後の参拝を止めた。以後、皇室からの参拝はない。それは一つの見識である。だが国家の庇護を失い日本国内に数万ある神社の一つに過ぎなくなった今も、靖国は明治時代以降の約５００万の戦没者の霊を祀る神社である。戦地で没した曾祖父、祖父、父、兄弟らの霊に出会うため年々百万を超す遺族がここに集う。彼らにとっては、戦犯刑死者の東条英機らの霊が祀られたから何かが変わったわけではない。親族に戦没者を持つ政権の要人にしても、参拝は個人の宗教上の判断に委ねられるべき問題である。
唐突な結論だが、ここがドイツと日本の戦後の決定的な相違点なのである。敗戦日本では「非ナチ化」（独語Entnazifizierung、英語denazification）はなかった。戦犯弾劾の他に軍人有力者の公職追放がマッカーサーの命令で行われたが、ドイツのように当時の国民を「ナチ」「非ナチ」に峻別することはなかった。別の見方をすれば、ドイツはあのヨーロッパ征服戦争の開戦と拡大遂行、ユダヤ、ロマ民族の絶滅作戦を、一般の罪なきドイツ人とは関係ないナチ異常集団のみの仕業であったと囲い込み、それを国際世論に定着させることを狙い成功したのである。
日本人にとっては、Ａ級戦犯14人の筆頭である陸軍大将東条英機（死刑）も、総統ヒトラーとナチス政権外相リベントロップRibbentropの「友人」だった外相松岡洋右（判決前に病死）も、今では、死んだどこかのお爺さんにすぎない。元戦犯たちの霊が漂っていようと、そのために靖国参拝を止めなければならない理由は見出し難い。このような宗教行為に他国の公権がくちばしを入れることは異常なことではなかろうか。
日本の古代文化はもっぱら中国と韓国から渡来した。日本は漢字、仏教、製鉄という文化の基礎を5～8世紀の間に隣接の両国から学んだ。その恩を日本は誇らしく世界に語っている。日本人の４分の１は韓国系、10分の１は中国系といわれる。残りは土着民の他に、北方オホーツク、シベリア方面からの、また南方インドネシア方面からの流入人種で構成されている。神社信仰が自らの文化と無縁の北方系だからといって、中国、韓国は日本人の靖国詣でに難癖をつける正当性も資格もない。
太平洋戦争終結後のアジア民族運動勃興まで、アジア諸国は日本、中華民国、タイの3国を除きすべてが欧米列強の植民地だった。彼ら宗主国がかつての植民地奴隷労働者たちに撤退後どんな挨拶をしたか、筆者は寡聞にして知らない。
（筆者は和光大学名誉教授・国際政治。）
あの日々から68年が過ぎた。ドイツと日本に、戦争の惨禍の跡はない。国防上の差し迫った危険もないようである。経済実績からみて、両国民とも飢餓に脅かされることはなかろう。社会はおおむね安定している。国際協力の実績にも他国から後ろ指をさされるような怠りはないはずである。だが今日の日本は地理的に最も近く、歴史的、文化的関係では少なくとも１７００年にわたる交流実績を持つ中国および韓国と、国家レベルではまったく冷ややかな付き合いしかできていない。中、韓両国は対日外交攻撃で共同戦線を張ったかのようである。
いくつかの外交上の問題が重なり合って、日本も中国、韓国も後に退けない悪しき雰囲気が醸成されている。島の領有権問題（対中では尖閣列島、対韓では竹島）は双方で性格が違うが、３当事国はそれぞれ領有権を主張しつつ、現状status quoの維持を続ける他に道はない。尖閣についての現状とは昨年９月に当時の日本政府がこの島を国有化する前の状態（私有土地だった）である。誰か民間の篤志家に買い取ってもらう。そこから両国の対話は復活するだろう。竹島は日本国土院の公式領土地図に載せ続けるだけでよい。面子を別にすれば、日本にとって多少の漁業権益損失以外、放置して影響のない島だ。
韓国との間には、これに加え戦場慰安婦の問題がある。日本政府が太平洋戦争中の不祥事で外国(人）に詫びた回数がこれほど多い問題はない。国内民間団体との協力で政府は財団法人「アジア女性基金」をつくった。韓国女性にお詫び金を払うためである。それでもなお韓国は許していない。
韓国マスコミの売り物は「日本憎悪キャンペーン」である。本年５月にも、韓国の高級紙とされる中央日報は「広島、長崎（原爆投下）は"神の恩寵"であった」とのエッセーを掲載した。これはさすがに日本外務省の強い抗議を受け、日本側の反論文章を掲載せざるを得なかったが。
しかし筆者は、無人島の領有権や戦場慰安婦の問題とは違うレベルで日本という国の精神的・文化的独立性を脅かしていると憂える一事がある。中国、韓国の当局が、日本側閣僚級要人の靖国神社参拝をその都度激しく非難することだ。その結果として外交が頓挫することがある。これは太平洋戦争の東京裁判Ａ級戦犯14人が靖国に合祀された78年以後からである。
靖国は国家近代化の陰で命を落とした武人らの霊を慰めるため明治天皇の意向により１８７９年に設立された神社である。しかしその孫の昭和天皇はＡ級戦犯合祀の事実を知って以後の参拝を止めた。以後、皇室からの参拝はない。それは一つの見識である。だが国家の庇護を失い日本国内に数万ある神社の一つに過ぎなくなった今も、靖国は明治時代以降の約５００万の戦没者の霊を祀る神社である。戦地で没した曾祖父、祖父、父、兄弟らの霊に出会うため年々百万を超す遺族がここに集う。彼らにとっては、戦犯刑死者の東条英機らの霊が祀られたから何かが変わったわけではない。親族に戦没者を持つ政権の要人にしても、参拝は個人の宗教上の判断に委ねられるべき問題である。
唐突な結論だが、ここがドイツと日本の戦後の決定的な相違点なのである。敗戦日本では「非ナチ化」（独語Entnazifizierung、英語denazification）はなかった。戦犯弾劾の他に軍人有力者の公職追放がマッカーサーの命令で行われたが、ドイツのように当時の国民を「ナチ」「非ナチ」に峻別することはなかった。別の見方をすれば、ドイツはあのヨーロッパ征服戦争の開戦と拡大遂行、ユダヤ、ロマ民族の絶滅作戦を、一般の罪なきドイツ人とは関係ないナチ異常集団のみの仕業であったと囲い込み、それを国際世論に定着させることを狙い成功したのである。
日本人にとっては、Ａ級戦犯14人の筆頭である陸軍大将東条英機（死刑）も、総統ヒトラーとナチス政権外相リベントロップRibbentropの「友人」だった外相松岡洋右（判決前に病死）も、今では、死んだどこかのお爺さんにすぎない。元戦犯たちの霊が漂っていようと、そのために靖国参拝を止めなければならない理由は見出し難い。このような宗教行為に他国の公権がくちばしを入れることは異常なことではなかろうか。
日本の古代文化はもっぱら中国と韓国から渡来した。日本は漢字、仏教、製鉄という文化の基礎を5～8世紀の間に隣接の両国から学んだ。その恩を日本は誇らしく世界に語っている。日本人の４分の１は韓国系、10分の１は中国系といわれる。残りは土着民の他に、北方オホーツク、シベリア方面からの、また南方インドネシア方面からの流入人種で構成されている。神社信仰が自らの文化と無縁の北方系だからといって、中国、韓国は日本人の靖国詣でに難癖をつける正当性も資格もない。
太平洋戦争終結後のアジア民族運動勃興まで、アジア諸国は日本、中華民国、タイの3国を除きすべてが欧米列強の植民地だった。彼ら宗主国がかつての植民地奴隷労働者たちに撤退後どんな挨拶をしたか、筆者は寡聞にして知らない。
（筆者は和光大学名誉教授・国際政治。）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟