Navigating Conflicting Signals Sent Out by Japan, the United States and China
TAKAHARA Akio / Professor, University of Tokyo
February 13, 2014
Since last summer and through fall, signs of a thaw began appearing in the relationship between Japan and China, which had been frigid since September 2012. In economic exchanges, the formal rank of the Chinese delegation visiting Japan was raised, and a large-scale Japanese delegation also visited China. Chinese patrol vessels continue to intrude into Japan's territorial sea around the Senkaku Islands, yet with less frequency since October.
It was amid this growing trend for improved relations that the "Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference" was held in Beijing on October 24 and 25. There, President Xi Jinping presented China's conciliatory and amicable policies for neighborhood diplomacy. Along with the existing principles of "helping, stabilizing and enriching neighbors," he also appealed for the new idea of forging "intimate, sincere, benefiting and tolerant" relationships.
However, that was followed only a month later on November 23 by China's designation of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). The move was disputed since it overlapped with the ADIZ of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, and was designated to include the Senkaku Islands and other reefs hotly contested between China and South Korea. But that was not all. The international community reacted to the public notice issued by the Ministry of National Defense, which required the submission of flight plans even from commercial aircraft not bound for Chinese airspace, and declared it will resort to force to implement emergency defensive measures should the aircraft fail to comply. The designation of the ADIZ made it increasingly evident that China's long-term goal lay in eliminating the U.S. forces from the East China Sea.
What was behind the timing of China's ADIZ designation? It so transpires that two days before its announcement, on November 21, U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice gave a speech in Washington, D.C. on Asian policy, in which she spoke of activating the "new model of major-power relations" advocated by China, managing competition and deepening cooperation. According to one American scholar, hearing such conciliatory words reminiscent of those uttered at the start of the administration of President Barack Obama in 2009 had led China to decide that the United States would not object too strongly to its ADIZ.
In reality, the U.S. government issued statements by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, and immediately flew two B-52 strategic bombers to the disputed airspace. Yet, following his meeting with President Xi Jinping on December 4, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden spoke to reporters about the "new model of major-power relations" without voicing criticism of China's ADIZ.
What makes both China and the United States send out such conflicting signals? Perhaps it is caused by the contradiction that exists between their diplomatic policy of seeking benefits through economic and other forms of cooperation and their national defense policy of seeking to expand or maintain their spheres of influence. In any case, the U.S.-China relationship has been relatively free of stress, due to their clearly stated intentions of increasing mutual cooperation as well as to the existing gap in military might and geographic distance.
That cannot be said about the relationship between Japan and China. Last year, Japan implemented measures on its national security by establishing the National Security Council, revising its National Defense Program Outline and formulating its National Security Strategy. However, the current administration lacks a long-term diplomatic strategy based on the reality that China will forever remain a neighbor. Although it has called for a summit meeting with China, the visit to the Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe disappointed even the United States government and at once placed Japan on the defensive in the area of diplomacy.
As long as China continues to espouse might, Japan has no choice but to seek to maintain the balance of power. However, we should at the same time present a vision for the future and work with other countries towards the creation of a regional order based not on might but on the rule of law. China makes its move after isolating its opponent. Unless Japan makes a diplomatic effort, the possibility of a clash will only grow.
Akio Takahara is Professor at the Graduate School of Law and Politics at the University of Tokyo. The article first appeared in the Shinano Mainichi Shimbun Newspaper dated January 20th 2014.
It was amid this growing trend for improved relations that the "Peripheral Diplomacy Work Conference" was held in Beijing on October 24 and 25. There, President Xi Jinping presented China's conciliatory and amicable policies for neighborhood diplomacy. Along with the existing principles of "helping, stabilizing and enriching neighbors," he also appealed for the new idea of forging "intimate, sincere, benefiting and tolerant" relationships.
However, that was followed only a month later on November 23 by China's designation of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ). The move was disputed since it overlapped with the ADIZ of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, and was designated to include the Senkaku Islands and other reefs hotly contested between China and South Korea. But that was not all. The international community reacted to the public notice issued by the Ministry of National Defense, which required the submission of flight plans even from commercial aircraft not bound for Chinese airspace, and declared it will resort to force to implement emergency defensive measures should the aircraft fail to comply. The designation of the ADIZ made it increasingly evident that China's long-term goal lay in eliminating the U.S. forces from the East China Sea.
What was behind the timing of China's ADIZ designation? It so transpires that two days before its announcement, on November 21, U.S. National Security Advisor Susan Rice gave a speech in Washington, D.C. on Asian policy, in which she spoke of activating the "new model of major-power relations" advocated by China, managing competition and deepening cooperation. According to one American scholar, hearing such conciliatory words reminiscent of those uttered at the start of the administration of President Barack Obama in 2009 had led China to decide that the United States would not object too strongly to its ADIZ.
In reality, the U.S. government issued statements by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, and immediately flew two B-52 strategic bombers to the disputed airspace. Yet, following his meeting with President Xi Jinping on December 4, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden spoke to reporters about the "new model of major-power relations" without voicing criticism of China's ADIZ.
What makes both China and the United States send out such conflicting signals? Perhaps it is caused by the contradiction that exists between their diplomatic policy of seeking benefits through economic and other forms of cooperation and their national defense policy of seeking to expand or maintain their spheres of influence. In any case, the U.S.-China relationship has been relatively free of stress, due to their clearly stated intentions of increasing mutual cooperation as well as to the existing gap in military might and geographic distance.
That cannot be said about the relationship between Japan and China. Last year, Japan implemented measures on its national security by establishing the National Security Council, revising its National Defense Program Outline and formulating its National Security Strategy. However, the current administration lacks a long-term diplomatic strategy based on the reality that China will forever remain a neighbor. Although it has called for a summit meeting with China, the visit to the Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe disappointed even the United States government and at once placed Japan on the defensive in the area of diplomacy.
As long as China continues to espouse might, Japan has no choice but to seek to maintain the balance of power. However, we should at the same time present a vision for the future and work with other countries towards the creation of a regional order based not on might but on the rule of law. China makes its move after isolating its opponent. Unless Japan makes a diplomatic effort, the possibility of a clash will only grow.
Akio Takahara is Professor at the Graduate School of Law and Politics at the University of Tokyo. The article first appeared in the Shinano Mainichi Shimbun Newspaper dated January 20th 2014.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
日米中の「相反する信号」
高原 明生 / 東京大学教授
2014年 2月 13日
2012年9月以来、冷え込んでいた日中関係だが、昨年の夏から秋にかけて、緊張緩和の兆しが現れた。経済の領域では、日本を訪問する中国からの代表団の格式が上がり、また日本からの大型代表団も訪中を果たした。中国の巡視船による尖閣諸島の領海侵入は続いているが、10月以来その頻度は下がった。
関係改善の流れの中で、10月24－25日に北京で開かれたのが「周辺外交工作座談会」であった。そこで習近平国家主席は、融和的で友好的な近隣外交方針を提示した。「隣国と睦み、隣国を安んじ、隣国を富ませる」等の既存方針とともに、「親、誠、恵、容」という新しい理念の実現を訴えた。
ところが、その一か月後、11月23日に行われたのは防空識別圏の設定だった。それが問題視された理由は、日韓台の防空識別圏と重なり、尖閣諸島や中韓で争いのある暗礁を覆う形で設定されたことだけではない。自国の領空に向かっていない民間航空機にも飛行計画の提出を求め、指示に従わなければ武力で防御的な緊急措置を講じるとした国防部の公告は国際的な反発を招いた。防空識別圏の設定によって、中国が東シナ海からの米軍の排除を長期的な狙いとしていることが一層明らかになったのである。
では、中国はなぜこのタイミングで防空識別圏を設置したのか。実は、発表二日前の11月21日、ワシントンでライス安全保障担当大統領補佐官がアジア政策演説を行い、中国が提唱した「新型大国関係」の作動と競合の管理および協力の深化を唱えていた。ある在米の研究者によれば、2009年のオバマ政権発足時のような融和的な言葉を聞いて、防空識別圏を設定しても米国は強く反応しないと中国は判断したのだという。
しかし、実際には、中国を非難する国務長官と国防長官の声明が発せられたほか、米国はすぐにB52戦略爆撃機二機を問題の空域に飛ばした。ところが12月4日、習近平主席と会談したバイデン副大統領は、記者たちの前で「新型大国間協力」について語り、防空識別圏批判は口にしなかった。
このように、中国からも米国からも「相反する信号」が発せられるのはなぜか。それは、経済を中心として、協力による利益を得ようとする外交政策と、勢力圏を拡張ないし維持しようとする国防政策とが矛盾するからだと考えられる。ただ、米中関係は、協力を拡大しようとする双方の意志が明瞭であり、なおかつ軍事的な力量の差や地理的な遠さもあって、まださほど緊張していない。
問題は日中関係だが、日本は昨年、国家安全保障会議の設立や防衛大綱の改訂、国家安全保障戦略の決定など国防上の措置を取った。だが、中国が永遠の隣人であるという現実から出発した、長期的な外交戦略が今の内閣には欠けている。そればかりか、日本は首脳会談を呼びかけながら、安倍首相の靖国神社参拝によって米国にすら失望され、一気に外交上、守勢に回ることとなった。
今の中国が力を信奉する以上、日本は力の均衡の維持に努めざるをえない。だが同時に、将来ビジョンを示し、力ではなく規範に基づく地域秩序を諸国とともに目指すべきだ。中国は相手を孤立させた上で動く。日本の外交努力がなければ、衝突の可能性は高まる。
（筆者は東京大学大学院法学政治学研究科教授。本稿は2014年1月20日付信濃毎日新聞に掲載された。）
関係改善の流れの中で、10月24－25日に北京で開かれたのが「周辺外交工作座談会」であった。そこで習近平国家主席は、融和的で友好的な近隣外交方針を提示した。「隣国と睦み、隣国を安んじ、隣国を富ませる」等の既存方針とともに、「親、誠、恵、容」という新しい理念の実現を訴えた。
ところが、その一か月後、11月23日に行われたのは防空識別圏の設定だった。それが問題視された理由は、日韓台の防空識別圏と重なり、尖閣諸島や中韓で争いのある暗礁を覆う形で設定されたことだけではない。自国の領空に向かっていない民間航空機にも飛行計画の提出を求め、指示に従わなければ武力で防御的な緊急措置を講じるとした国防部の公告は国際的な反発を招いた。防空識別圏の設定によって、中国が東シナ海からの米軍の排除を長期的な狙いとしていることが一層明らかになったのである。
では、中国はなぜこのタイミングで防空識別圏を設置したのか。実は、発表二日前の11月21日、ワシントンでライス安全保障担当大統領補佐官がアジア政策演説を行い、中国が提唱した「新型大国関係」の作動と競合の管理および協力の深化を唱えていた。ある在米の研究者によれば、2009年のオバマ政権発足時のような融和的な言葉を聞いて、防空識別圏を設定しても米国は強く反応しないと中国は判断したのだという。
しかし、実際には、中国を非難する国務長官と国防長官の声明が発せられたほか、米国はすぐにB52戦略爆撃機二機を問題の空域に飛ばした。ところが12月4日、習近平主席と会談したバイデン副大統領は、記者たちの前で「新型大国間協力」について語り、防空識別圏批判は口にしなかった。
このように、中国からも米国からも「相反する信号」が発せられるのはなぜか。それは、経済を中心として、協力による利益を得ようとする外交政策と、勢力圏を拡張ないし維持しようとする国防政策とが矛盾するからだと考えられる。ただ、米中関係は、協力を拡大しようとする双方の意志が明瞭であり、なおかつ軍事的な力量の差や地理的な遠さもあって、まださほど緊張していない。
問題は日中関係だが、日本は昨年、国家安全保障会議の設立や防衛大綱の改訂、国家安全保障戦略の決定など国防上の措置を取った。だが、中国が永遠の隣人であるという現実から出発した、長期的な外交戦略が今の内閣には欠けている。そればかりか、日本は首脳会談を呼びかけながら、安倍首相の靖国神社参拝によって米国にすら失望され、一気に外交上、守勢に回ることとなった。
今の中国が力を信奉する以上、日本は力の均衡の維持に努めざるをえない。だが同時に、将来ビジョンを示し、力ではなく規範に基づく地域秩序を諸国とともに目指すべきだ。中国は相手を孤立させた上で動く。日本の外交努力がなければ、衝突の可能性は高まる。
（筆者は東京大学大学院法学政治学研究科教授。本稿は2014年1月20日付信濃毎日新聞に掲載された。）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟