Diplomacy to meet the requirements of national interest and alliance
NISHIKAWA Megumi / Journalist
March 19, 2015
Japan finds itself in an era where it requires a high degree of diplomatic prowess to ensure that its national interest and its alliance relations are coordinated and the right balance is struck between them.
The immediate question confronting us is Ukraine. Russia's incorporation of Crimea as its territory drove the United States to lead the sanctions against Russia. As Russia lent its support to the pro-Russian forces in East Ukraine, the sanctions were gradually stepped up. However, the European Union decided on sanctions somewhat looser than those of the United States, and Japan has taken even lighter, pro forma sanctions.
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been deepening his relations with President Putin, bearing in mind the need to break the stalemate on the territorial issue with Russia. The pro-forma sanctions are indicative of the diplomatic dilemma of Japan trying to find its bearings between the conflicting demands of "maintaining the relations with Russia" and "acting in concert with allies".
Though it has become less apparent since the recent toughening of North Korea's stance, the issue of the abduction of Japanese nationals has caused Japan to take a somewhat nuanced approach to North Korea, compared to its allies. In spring last year, when North Korea expressed its readiness to re-investigate the facts on Japanese abductees, albeit with certain conditions, Japan and North Korea were drawn a little closer. South Korea, for its part, expressed its concern that Japan was putting its national interest first and neglecting the overall interest (i.e. the nuclear and missile issues).
Any country can face the dilemma between national interest and alliance, depending on the developments on the international scene. However, the country that comes up in my mind is Germany, because it is similar to Japan in terms of the circumstances under which it has found itself. Defeated in the Second World War, both Japan and Germany were "special countries" whose loyalty to their allies was a matter of keen concern to the international community.
Germany is in a delicate position with respect to the Ukraine issue. It depends on Russia for 35% of the natural gas it consumes every year, and German businesses invest 20 billion Euros in Russia. Chancellor Merkel is making energetic diplomatic efforts to find areas of convergence in the conflict between the West and Russia. She herself must be conscious that caution is required lest her efforts be regarded as Russo-German collaboration.
Since the Euro crisis erupted, Germany has been accused of "putting Germany's national interest first and neglecting the interest of the alliance".
Without heeding the plea of Southern European countries for a growth strategy, it provided support only in exchange for their commitment of adherence to the rules on fiscal discipline. This was based on German's own bitter experience of hyperinflation, but appeared to others to be a "self-centered obsession with its national interest". Grievance has been building up among them over the fact that Germany's supremacy as the sole economic winner has been sustained by its exports to the EU member countries. They argue, "Germans should consume more and boost their domestic demand."
Germany is stubborn, to be sure. But, in fairness, those criticisms are somewhat excessive. At the same time, underlying these excessive criticisms is some wariness about "Germany beginning to go it alone" or "Germany beginning to forget its loyalty to its allies". This is something that Japan should not fail to notice. Japan and Germany sought regional hegemony in the Second World War, and became loyal allies of the United States in the postwar years. However, if their actions should give rise to suspicion about their loyalty to their allies, excessive criticisms could be mercilessly heaped upon them.
In post-Second World War years, Japan linked itself directly with the United States and built its alliance relationship. In contrast, Germany was incorporated into the structure of European integration, and has been linked with the United States not directly but through the medium of Europe. Whereas Japan has had to depend totally on the United States for its security, Germany has had a wider range of political and diplomatic options because of its vantage point in Europe. What demonstrated this clearly was the difference in the Japanese and German responses to the Iraq War in 2003. Germany, together with France, strongly criticized the United States. Japan, for its part, went ahead to "support" the United States. The differences in the sense of distance from the United States and the regional settings in which they are placed were manifested in this contrasting stances toward the United States between the two countries which otherwise share a lot in common.
It would be unrealistic to talk about Japan distancing itself from the United States in the current tough security environment of East Asia. At the same time, the Northern Territory issue with Russia and the issue of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea are too important to be left simmering. The domestic public opinion in Japan calls increasingly for the resolution of these issues. What is needed now is to stretch the limits of the possible to find ways to meet the requirements of cooperating with the United States and of protecting Japan's national interest. This has to be done without playing into the hands of those who voice the alarmist propaganda about "Japan going it alone" or "Japan disregarding the postwar regime".
Megumi Nishikawa is contributing editor of Mainichi Shimbun newspaper.
The immediate question confronting us is Ukraine. Russia's incorporation of Crimea as its territory drove the United States to lead the sanctions against Russia. As Russia lent its support to the pro-Russian forces in East Ukraine, the sanctions were gradually stepped up. However, the European Union decided on sanctions somewhat looser than those of the United States, and Japan has taken even lighter, pro forma sanctions.
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been deepening his relations with President Putin, bearing in mind the need to break the stalemate on the territorial issue with Russia. The pro-forma sanctions are indicative of the diplomatic dilemma of Japan trying to find its bearings between the conflicting demands of "maintaining the relations with Russia" and "acting in concert with allies".
Though it has become less apparent since the recent toughening of North Korea's stance, the issue of the abduction of Japanese nationals has caused Japan to take a somewhat nuanced approach to North Korea, compared to its allies. In spring last year, when North Korea expressed its readiness to re-investigate the facts on Japanese abductees, albeit with certain conditions, Japan and North Korea were drawn a little closer. South Korea, for its part, expressed its concern that Japan was putting its national interest first and neglecting the overall interest (i.e. the nuclear and missile issues).
Any country can face the dilemma between national interest and alliance, depending on the developments on the international scene. However, the country that comes up in my mind is Germany, because it is similar to Japan in terms of the circumstances under which it has found itself. Defeated in the Second World War, both Japan and Germany were "special countries" whose loyalty to their allies was a matter of keen concern to the international community.
Germany is in a delicate position with respect to the Ukraine issue. It depends on Russia for 35% of the natural gas it consumes every year, and German businesses invest 20 billion Euros in Russia. Chancellor Merkel is making energetic diplomatic efforts to find areas of convergence in the conflict between the West and Russia. She herself must be conscious that caution is required lest her efforts be regarded as Russo-German collaboration.
Since the Euro crisis erupted, Germany has been accused of "putting Germany's national interest first and neglecting the interest of the alliance".
Without heeding the plea of Southern European countries for a growth strategy, it provided support only in exchange for their commitment of adherence to the rules on fiscal discipline. This was based on German's own bitter experience of hyperinflation, but appeared to others to be a "self-centered obsession with its national interest". Grievance has been building up among them over the fact that Germany's supremacy as the sole economic winner has been sustained by its exports to the EU member countries. They argue, "Germans should consume more and boost their domestic demand."
Germany is stubborn, to be sure. But, in fairness, those criticisms are somewhat excessive. At the same time, underlying these excessive criticisms is some wariness about "Germany beginning to go it alone" or "Germany beginning to forget its loyalty to its allies". This is something that Japan should not fail to notice. Japan and Germany sought regional hegemony in the Second World War, and became loyal allies of the United States in the postwar years. However, if their actions should give rise to suspicion about their loyalty to their allies, excessive criticisms could be mercilessly heaped upon them.
In post-Second World War years, Japan linked itself directly with the United States and built its alliance relationship. In contrast, Germany was incorporated into the structure of European integration, and has been linked with the United States not directly but through the medium of Europe. Whereas Japan has had to depend totally on the United States for its security, Germany has had a wider range of political and diplomatic options because of its vantage point in Europe. What demonstrated this clearly was the difference in the Japanese and German responses to the Iraq War in 2003. Germany, together with France, strongly criticized the United States. Japan, for its part, went ahead to "support" the United States. The differences in the sense of distance from the United States and the regional settings in which they are placed were manifested in this contrasting stances toward the United States between the two countries which otherwise share a lot in common.
It would be unrealistic to talk about Japan distancing itself from the United States in the current tough security environment of East Asia. At the same time, the Northern Territory issue with Russia and the issue of Japanese nationals abducted by North Korea are too important to be left simmering. The domestic public opinion in Japan calls increasingly for the resolution of these issues. What is needed now is to stretch the limits of the possible to find ways to meet the requirements of cooperating with the United States and of protecting Japan's national interest. This has to be done without playing into the hands of those who voice the alarmist propaganda about "Japan going it alone" or "Japan disregarding the postwar regime".
Megumi Nishikawa is contributing editor of Mainichi Shimbun newspaper.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
国益と同盟を同時に追求する外交力を
西川 恵 / ジャーナリスト
2015年 3月 19日
国益と同盟関係をどう調整し、バランスをとっていくか。高い外交力が求められる時代と日本は向き合っている。
目下の課題はウクライナ問題だ。昨年３月、ロシアの自国領へのクリミア編入に、米国は対露制裁を主導した。その後、ウクライナ東部地域における親ロ派勢力に対するロシアの支援に、制裁は徐々に強化されたが、欧州連合（ＥＵ）は米国よりやや緩い制裁を決め、日本はＥＵよりもさらに軽い、形だけの制裁にとどめている。
安倍晋三首相はロシアとの領土問題打開を念頭に、プーチン大統領と関係を深めてきた。形だけの制裁に、「ロシアとの関係維持」と「同盟国との協調」の間で立ち位置を探る日本外交のジレンマが現れている。
現在は北朝鮮が強硬姿勢に転じたから曖昧になっているが、日本は拉致事件を抱えるが故に対北朝鮮でも他の同盟国と色合いを異にしている。昨春、北朝鮮側は拉致被害者の再調査に条件付きで応じる意向を示し日朝が接近したため、韓国から「日本は国益だけを優先し、全体の利益（核・ミサイル問題）をないがしろにしている」との懸念が示された。
同盟か国益かのジレンマは、国際情勢の趨勢次第でどの国にもある。しかし日本と似た国情にある点で、私の連想がいくのはドイツである。日本とドイツは第二次大戦の敗戦国として、同盟への忠誠心がより強く国際社会から意識される“特別な国”だからだ。
ドイツもウクライナ問題での立ち位置は難しい。毎年消費する天然ガスの35％をロシアに依存し、ドイツ企業の対ロ投資額は２００億ユーロに上る。いまメルケル独首相はエネルギッシュな外交で西側とロシアの対立の落としどころを探っているが、独ロ提携と見られないようにするする用心深さが求められていることはメルケル首相自身、感じていることだろう。
ユーロ危機勃発の時から、ドイツは「国益を優先し、同盟の利益を軽視している」と批判されてきた。同国は南欧諸国が求める成長路線に耳を貸さず、財政規律遵守の誓約を支援の引き換えにしてきた。超インフレに苦しんだ自身の歴史体験に根ざすものだが、他国には「国益にしか目がない」と映る。ドイツの経済的な１人勝ち状況が、ＥＵ加盟国への輸出に支えられている点にも不満が募っている。「ドイツはもっと消費して内需を喚起すべきだ」と。
ドイツのかたくなさは確かにあるが、公平に見るならば批判には過剰なものがある。ただその過剰な批判の底に「独り歩きし始めたドイツ」「同盟への忠誠心を忘れ始めたドイツ」への警戒心があることは日本も注意を要する。第二次大戦で地域覇権を求めた日本とドイツは、戦後、米国や欧州の忠実な同盟国となった。しかし忠誠心を疑わせるような言動があった時は、過敏ともいえる批判が容赦なく浴びせられるということなのだ。
戦後、日本は米国と直につながって同盟関係を構築してきた。ドイツは欧州統合組織の中に組み込まれ、ワンクッション距離を置いた形で米国とつながってきた。日本が安全保障を米国に全面依存せざるを得なかったのに対し、ドイツは欧州を得ることで政治・外交的な選択の幅を広げた。その結果が如実に表れたのが、03年のイラク戦争での日独両国の対応の違いだ。ドイツはフランスと共に厳しく米国を批判した。逆に日本は「対米支持」と踏み込んだ。米国との距離感と、日独の置かれた地域環境の違いが、似た国同士の対照的な対米スタンスとなって現れた。
東アジアの安全保障環境が厳しい中、日本の米国離れは非現実的な話だ。しかし一方で、北方領土や拉致問題はいつまでも放っておけない重要な課題で、国内世論からも解決への要請は高まっている。「独り歩きする日本」「戦後レジームを無視する日本」という警戒心やプロパガンダにつけ入る隙を与えず、対米協調と国益のギリギリの線を追求していく。そうした一段と高い日本外交が求められていることを、昨今のメルケル首相の巧みな外交を眺めながら思うのである。
（筆者は毎日新聞客員編集委員）
目下の課題はウクライナ問題だ。昨年３月、ロシアの自国領へのクリミア編入に、米国は対露制裁を主導した。その後、ウクライナ東部地域における親ロ派勢力に対するロシアの支援に、制裁は徐々に強化されたが、欧州連合（ＥＵ）は米国よりやや緩い制裁を決め、日本はＥＵよりもさらに軽い、形だけの制裁にとどめている。
安倍晋三首相はロシアとの領土問題打開を念頭に、プーチン大統領と関係を深めてきた。形だけの制裁に、「ロシアとの関係維持」と「同盟国との協調」の間で立ち位置を探る日本外交のジレンマが現れている。
現在は北朝鮮が強硬姿勢に転じたから曖昧になっているが、日本は拉致事件を抱えるが故に対北朝鮮でも他の同盟国と色合いを異にしている。昨春、北朝鮮側は拉致被害者の再調査に条件付きで応じる意向を示し日朝が接近したため、韓国から「日本は国益だけを優先し、全体の利益（核・ミサイル問題）をないがしろにしている」との懸念が示された。
同盟か国益かのジレンマは、国際情勢の趨勢次第でどの国にもある。しかし日本と似た国情にある点で、私の連想がいくのはドイツである。日本とドイツは第二次大戦の敗戦国として、同盟への忠誠心がより強く国際社会から意識される“特別な国”だからだ。
ドイツもウクライナ問題での立ち位置は難しい。毎年消費する天然ガスの35％をロシアに依存し、ドイツ企業の対ロ投資額は２００億ユーロに上る。いまメルケル独首相はエネルギッシュな外交で西側とロシアの対立の落としどころを探っているが、独ロ提携と見られないようにするする用心深さが求められていることはメルケル首相自身、感じていることだろう。
ユーロ危機勃発の時から、ドイツは「国益を優先し、同盟の利益を軽視している」と批判されてきた。同国は南欧諸国が求める成長路線に耳を貸さず、財政規律遵守の誓約を支援の引き換えにしてきた。超インフレに苦しんだ自身の歴史体験に根ざすものだが、他国には「国益にしか目がない」と映る。ドイツの経済的な１人勝ち状況が、ＥＵ加盟国への輸出に支えられている点にも不満が募っている。「ドイツはもっと消費して内需を喚起すべきだ」と。
ドイツのかたくなさは確かにあるが、公平に見るならば批判には過剰なものがある。ただその過剰な批判の底に「独り歩きし始めたドイツ」「同盟への忠誠心を忘れ始めたドイツ」への警戒心があることは日本も注意を要する。第二次大戦で地域覇権を求めた日本とドイツは、戦後、米国や欧州の忠実な同盟国となった。しかし忠誠心を疑わせるような言動があった時は、過敏ともいえる批判が容赦なく浴びせられるということなのだ。
戦後、日本は米国と直につながって同盟関係を構築してきた。ドイツは欧州統合組織の中に組み込まれ、ワンクッション距離を置いた形で米国とつながってきた。日本が安全保障を米国に全面依存せざるを得なかったのに対し、ドイツは欧州を得ることで政治・外交的な選択の幅を広げた。その結果が如実に表れたのが、03年のイラク戦争での日独両国の対応の違いだ。ドイツはフランスと共に厳しく米国を批判した。逆に日本は「対米支持」と踏み込んだ。米国との距離感と、日独の置かれた地域環境の違いが、似た国同士の対照的な対米スタンスとなって現れた。
東アジアの安全保障環境が厳しい中、日本の米国離れは非現実的な話だ。しかし一方で、北方領土や拉致問題はいつまでも放っておけない重要な課題で、国内世論からも解決への要請は高まっている。「独り歩きする日本」「戦後レジームを無視する日本」という警戒心やプロパガンダにつけ入る隙を与えず、対米協調と国益のギリギリの線を追求していく。そうした一段と高い日本外交が求められていることを、昨今のメルケル首相の巧みな外交を眺めながら思うのである。
（筆者は毎日新聞客員編集委員）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟