How to Negotiate with Someone "Living in Another World" -- Merkel's East European Diplomacy
ITO Takayuki / Professor Emeritus, Waseda University
March 31, 2015
"It was like talking with someone living in another world." That was how German Chancellor Angela Merkel described her impression of a phone conversation she had with Russian President Vladimir Putin in March last year. And in November, when the G20 Summit meeting was held in Australia, she condemned Putin saying he "tramples with his feet on international law" and that his thinking on spheres of influence seemed atavistic, according to the Economist.
A physicist by training, Merkel was the introverted daughter of a Protestant pastor who had been involved in neither politics nor diplomacy. Her interest in politics was aroused as the liberalization of East Germany unfolded. It so happened that the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) was looking for a female activist from the East German bloc at the time, and she caught the eye of then Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Rising quickly, Merkel was elected to the Bundestag in the year of German reunification, and appointed Minister for Women and Youth the following year.
After filling various important posts, she became Chancellor in 2005, though her role in foreign policy was limited. According to German political tradition, the coalition government was to offer the post of Foreign Minister to the junior coalition partner. Thus, the post went to the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) in Merkel's first government, to the Free Democratic Party (FDP) in her second, and again to the SPD in her third government.
It was only since the crisis in Ukraine that Merkel began to demonstrate significant diplomatic initiative. She was exceptional among Western leaders for having an intimate understanding of East European affairs. She had won numerous Russian language speech contests held in East Germany and had gained firsthand experience in Russia and Ukraine, long before entering politics. She could also converse with Putin in Russian. When trouble reared its head over the Ukraine crisis, Merkel became the focus of expectation among Western countries, including the United States.
Merkel's East European diplomacy is characterized by a pursuit for a diplomatic solution and a hardline policy of sanctions. Observers in Japan have tended to read pacifism into her former approach, but that is slightly off the mark. While a member of the opposition party, she supported the U.S. intervention in Iraq, which suggests that she is not against military intervention per se.
Generally speaking, in German politics the President handles the moral aspects of diplomacy, while the Chancellor takes charge of the practical aspects. During her recent visit to Japan, Merkel stressed the importance of historical perception and cordial relations with neighboring countries, which was interpreted as being implicitly critical of Prime Minister Abe's diplomatic policies. In all likelihood, she was simply making an obvious statement in her capacity as Chancellor of Germany, with no further intentions. In the same vein, she sought to persuade Ukrainian leaders to accept the simple fact that there can be no military victory against Russia, meaning there was no military solution.
Merkel is also well aware of the limits of international law, which is only effective when enforced by power. And in the absence of such binding power, the theory of influence championed by Russia would be a closer reflection of reality. "We waited forty years for the Berlin Wall to fall, and the Baltic states sixty years for their independence," Merkel told a German newspaper. Perhaps she meant to tell the Ukrainians that they too, must be patient.
It is a fine line that separates such cold logic from cynicism. While they wait, Ukraine will remain a divided state, much like Germany was in the past. Pro-Russian right-wing nationalists in the European Parliament have recently proposed dividing Ukraine between Europe and Russia in the name of "peace and unity of Europe."
Merkel suddenly embarked on her negotiation campaign in early February, rushing between the capital cities of East and West Europe without sleep or rest for eight days to wrap up the Minsk II agreement. Sandra Kalniete, the previous Foreign Minister of Latvia, spoke critically of Minsk II during her recent visit to Japan, describing the agreement as a product of panic. Polish newspapers have also reported recently that the ceasefire was hastily drawn up after Putin threatened war.
Before Minsk II, Merkel had repeatedly declined to play the role of mediator. She has habitually referred to her aversion to doing what in hindsight would prove undoable. So there must have been some prospect of a resolution that prompted her to action.
The policy of sanctions is unpopular both in Germany and within the European Union. In Germany, opposition has been voiced by the business community, the SPD and former citizens of East Germany. Countries far from Russia are also unenthusiastic about incurring losses from the sanctions. Fully aware of such opposition, Merkel nevertheless chose to remain a strong proponent of sanctions.
Just before the Minsk negotiations, Merkel met President Barack Obama in Washington and declared that while she was opposed to the idea of arming Ukraine, it would cause no harm to the alliance should the United States decide to go ahead. In effect, she had warned Putin that after her would come the United States.
Never one to be taken lightly, Merkel has clearly sought to make use of both sanctions and U.S. military might. And should neither of them succeed, her stance is that she can live with the idea of Ukraine as a divided state. This was Merkel’s negotiating style with an opponent who seemed to be "living in another world."
Minsk is probably the very first case in which Germany took the leading role among Western countries in negotiations with Russia. And it is perhaps commensurate with the weight carried by Germany in today's international politics. Some have suggested giving Merkel the Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts. Yet, the Minsk accord is still fraught with the dangers of a collapse. How is a country to survive without recourse to its military power in a world where the idea of a sphere of influence continues to gain ground? Each country is pressed to come up with an answer.
Takayuki Ito is Professor Emeritus at Waseda University.
A physicist by training, Merkel was the introverted daughter of a Protestant pastor who had been involved in neither politics nor diplomacy. Her interest in politics was aroused as the liberalization of East Germany unfolded. It so happened that the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) was looking for a female activist from the East German bloc at the time, and she caught the eye of then Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Rising quickly, Merkel was elected to the Bundestag in the year of German reunification, and appointed Minister for Women and Youth the following year.
After filling various important posts, she became Chancellor in 2005, though her role in foreign policy was limited. According to German political tradition, the coalition government was to offer the post of Foreign Minister to the junior coalition partner. Thus, the post went to the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) in Merkel's first government, to the Free Democratic Party (FDP) in her second, and again to the SPD in her third government.
It was only since the crisis in Ukraine that Merkel began to demonstrate significant diplomatic initiative. She was exceptional among Western leaders for having an intimate understanding of East European affairs. She had won numerous Russian language speech contests held in East Germany and had gained firsthand experience in Russia and Ukraine, long before entering politics. She could also converse with Putin in Russian. When trouble reared its head over the Ukraine crisis, Merkel became the focus of expectation among Western countries, including the United States.
Merkel's East European diplomacy is characterized by a pursuit for a diplomatic solution and a hardline policy of sanctions. Observers in Japan have tended to read pacifism into her former approach, but that is slightly off the mark. While a member of the opposition party, she supported the U.S. intervention in Iraq, which suggests that she is not against military intervention per se.
Generally speaking, in German politics the President handles the moral aspects of diplomacy, while the Chancellor takes charge of the practical aspects. During her recent visit to Japan, Merkel stressed the importance of historical perception and cordial relations with neighboring countries, which was interpreted as being implicitly critical of Prime Minister Abe's diplomatic policies. In all likelihood, she was simply making an obvious statement in her capacity as Chancellor of Germany, with no further intentions. In the same vein, she sought to persuade Ukrainian leaders to accept the simple fact that there can be no military victory against Russia, meaning there was no military solution.
Merkel is also well aware of the limits of international law, which is only effective when enforced by power. And in the absence of such binding power, the theory of influence championed by Russia would be a closer reflection of reality. "We waited forty years for the Berlin Wall to fall, and the Baltic states sixty years for their independence," Merkel told a German newspaper. Perhaps she meant to tell the Ukrainians that they too, must be patient.
It is a fine line that separates such cold logic from cynicism. While they wait, Ukraine will remain a divided state, much like Germany was in the past. Pro-Russian right-wing nationalists in the European Parliament have recently proposed dividing Ukraine between Europe and Russia in the name of "peace and unity of Europe."
Merkel suddenly embarked on her negotiation campaign in early February, rushing between the capital cities of East and West Europe without sleep or rest for eight days to wrap up the Minsk II agreement. Sandra Kalniete, the previous Foreign Minister of Latvia, spoke critically of Minsk II during her recent visit to Japan, describing the agreement as a product of panic. Polish newspapers have also reported recently that the ceasefire was hastily drawn up after Putin threatened war.
Before Minsk II, Merkel had repeatedly declined to play the role of mediator. She has habitually referred to her aversion to doing what in hindsight would prove undoable. So there must have been some prospect of a resolution that prompted her to action.
The policy of sanctions is unpopular both in Germany and within the European Union. In Germany, opposition has been voiced by the business community, the SPD and former citizens of East Germany. Countries far from Russia are also unenthusiastic about incurring losses from the sanctions. Fully aware of such opposition, Merkel nevertheless chose to remain a strong proponent of sanctions.
Just before the Minsk negotiations, Merkel met President Barack Obama in Washington and declared that while she was opposed to the idea of arming Ukraine, it would cause no harm to the alliance should the United States decide to go ahead. In effect, she had warned Putin that after her would come the United States.
Never one to be taken lightly, Merkel has clearly sought to make use of both sanctions and U.S. military might. And should neither of them succeed, her stance is that she can live with the idea of Ukraine as a divided state. This was Merkel’s negotiating style with an opponent who seemed to be "living in another world."
Minsk is probably the very first case in which Germany took the leading role among Western countries in negotiations with Russia. And it is perhaps commensurate with the weight carried by Germany in today's international politics. Some have suggested giving Merkel the Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts. Yet, the Minsk accord is still fraught with the dangers of a collapse. How is a country to survive without recourse to its military power in a world where the idea of a sphere of influence continues to gain ground? Each country is pressed to come up with an answer.
Takayuki Ito is Professor Emeritus at Waseda University.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
「別世界の住人」との交渉術 メルケルの東方外交
伊東 孝之 / 早稲田大学名誉教授
2015年 3月 31日
「別世界の人間と話しているようだ」。２０１４年３月、ドイツ首相のメルケルがロシア大統領のプーチンに電話したときの印象である。11月オーストラリアでＧ20首脳会議が開かれたとき、「プーチンは国際法を踏みにじっている。その勢力圏構想は先祖返り現象だ」と非難した。
本来政治とも外交とも縁のなかった内気なプロテスタント牧師の娘、物理学者メルケルは、東独自由化の中で政治に目覚めた。それがたまたま、女性でかつ東独出身の活動家を求めていたキリスト教民主同盟（ＣＤＵ）のコール首相の目にとまった。メルケルは早くもドイツ統一の年に連邦議会議員、翌年に婦人青少年相となった。
以後重要ポストを歴任して、２００５年には首相となったが、外交政策では大きな役割を演じることがなかった。ドイツの伝統では、連立内閣の外相ポストは通常連立相手の政党に委ねられる。第一次内閣では社会民主党（ＳＰＤ）、第二次では自由民主党（ＦＤＰ）、第三次では再びＳＰＤだった。
メルケルが大きな外交的イニシアティブを発揮したのは、ウクライナ危機以後である。西側諸国の首脳の中では例外的に東方世界に通じていた。東独でのロシア語弁論大会で何度も優勝し、政界に入るずっと前からロシアやウクライナで現地体験を積んでいた。プーチンともロシア語で話すことができた。厄介なウクライナ危機が起こったとき、米国を含む西側諸国の期待は彼女に集まった。
メルケルの東方外交を特徴づけたのは、外交的解決の追求と強硬な制裁政策である。前者を日本では平和主義と受けとめる向きがあるが、少し違う。メルケルは野党時代にアメリカのイラク介入に賛成しているから、原則的な軍事介入反対論者ではない。
一般にドイツの政治では大統領が外交の道義的側面を、首相が現実的側面を代表する。メルケルが来日した際に歴史認識の重要性や隣国との友好関係を説いて、暗に安部外交を批判したと言われるが、ドイツの首相として当然のことを言ったまでで、他意はなかっただろう。メルケルがウクライナの指導者に説いたのは、軍事的にはロシアに勝てない、つまり解決とはならないという単純な事実である。
メルケルは国際法主義の限界もよくわきまえている。国際法はそれを強制する力があってはじめて有効だ。強制力がない場合、ロシアの提唱する勢力圏主義の方が現実に適っている。国内紙に、われわれはベルリンの壁が崩れるまで40年、バルト諸国は自由を得るまで60年も待ったと語っている。ウクライナ人も待て、と言いたかったのだろう。
その冷徹な姿勢は冷笑主義と紙一重である。待っている間、ウクライナはかつてのドイツのように分割されたままとなる。親露的な欧州議会の民族派議員は最近、「欧州の平和と統一のために」と称して、ロシアとの間でウクライナを分割することを提案している。
メルケルは２月はじめに急に交渉に乗り出し、８日間不眠不休で東西の首都を駆けまわって、ミンスク合意をまとめ上げた。ミンスク合意はパニックの産物だ、と先日来日したラトビアの前外相カルニエテが批判的に語った。最近のポーランド紙も、直前にプーチンから戦争となると脅かされて、慌てて停戦案をまとめたと書いている。
ミンスクの前にメルケルは何度も仲介を断っている。あとからできないことが分かるようなことはしたくない、というのが口癖だ。おそらくなんらかの目途が立ったので動いたのだろう。
制裁政策はドイツ国内でも欧州連合（ＥＵ）内でも不人気である。国内では財界、社会民主党、旧東独住民が反対している。ロシアから遠く離れている諸国も制裁政策で損をすることに乗り気でない。それを知りつつ、メルケルはあえて強硬に制裁を唱えてきた。
ミンスク交渉直前にワシントンでオバマ大統領に会ったとき、自分はウクライナへの武器供与に反対だが、たとえ米国がそれに踏み切ったとしても同盟関係が損なわれることはないと語った。プーチンに、自分の次には米国が出てくるぞというシグナルを送ったのだろう。
見るとおり、メルケルは制裁もアメリカの軍事力もしたたかに利用しようとしている。しかし、それが功を奏さなかった場合、ウクライナの分割もありという姿勢のように見える。これがメルケル流の「別世界の住人」との交渉術である。
おそらくミンスク会談はドイツがロシアとの交渉において西側の主役となった最初の例だろう。たしかにそれは今日の国際政治においてドイツが占める比重に見合ったものかも知れない。メルケルにノーベル平和賞を、という声も挙がっている。しかし、ミンスク合意はまだ破綻のおそれを秘めている。勢力圏主義が台頭している世界で、自らの軍事力なしにいかに平和を保つか。どの国も必死で考えることを迫られている。
（筆者は早稲田大学名誉教授）
本来政治とも外交とも縁のなかった内気なプロテスタント牧師の娘、物理学者メルケルは、東独自由化の中で政治に目覚めた。それがたまたま、女性でかつ東独出身の活動家を求めていたキリスト教民主同盟（ＣＤＵ）のコール首相の目にとまった。メルケルは早くもドイツ統一の年に連邦議会議員、翌年に婦人青少年相となった。
以後重要ポストを歴任して、２００５年には首相となったが、外交政策では大きな役割を演じることがなかった。ドイツの伝統では、連立内閣の外相ポストは通常連立相手の政党に委ねられる。第一次内閣では社会民主党（ＳＰＤ）、第二次では自由民主党（ＦＤＰ）、第三次では再びＳＰＤだった。
メルケルが大きな外交的イニシアティブを発揮したのは、ウクライナ危機以後である。西側諸国の首脳の中では例外的に東方世界に通じていた。東独でのロシア語弁論大会で何度も優勝し、政界に入るずっと前からロシアやウクライナで現地体験を積んでいた。プーチンともロシア語で話すことができた。厄介なウクライナ危機が起こったとき、米国を含む西側諸国の期待は彼女に集まった。
メルケルの東方外交を特徴づけたのは、外交的解決の追求と強硬な制裁政策である。前者を日本では平和主義と受けとめる向きがあるが、少し違う。メルケルは野党時代にアメリカのイラク介入に賛成しているから、原則的な軍事介入反対論者ではない。
一般にドイツの政治では大統領が外交の道義的側面を、首相が現実的側面を代表する。メルケルが来日した際に歴史認識の重要性や隣国との友好関係を説いて、暗に安部外交を批判したと言われるが、ドイツの首相として当然のことを言ったまでで、他意はなかっただろう。メルケルがウクライナの指導者に説いたのは、軍事的にはロシアに勝てない、つまり解決とはならないという単純な事実である。
メルケルは国際法主義の限界もよくわきまえている。国際法はそれを強制する力があってはじめて有効だ。強制力がない場合、ロシアの提唱する勢力圏主義の方が現実に適っている。国内紙に、われわれはベルリンの壁が崩れるまで40年、バルト諸国は自由を得るまで60年も待ったと語っている。ウクライナ人も待て、と言いたかったのだろう。
その冷徹な姿勢は冷笑主義と紙一重である。待っている間、ウクライナはかつてのドイツのように分割されたままとなる。親露的な欧州議会の民族派議員は最近、「欧州の平和と統一のために」と称して、ロシアとの間でウクライナを分割することを提案している。
メルケルは２月はじめに急に交渉に乗り出し、８日間不眠不休で東西の首都を駆けまわって、ミンスク合意をまとめ上げた。ミンスク合意はパニックの産物だ、と先日来日したラトビアの前外相カルニエテが批判的に語った。最近のポーランド紙も、直前にプーチンから戦争となると脅かされて、慌てて停戦案をまとめたと書いている。
ミンスクの前にメルケルは何度も仲介を断っている。あとからできないことが分かるようなことはしたくない、というのが口癖だ。おそらくなんらかの目途が立ったので動いたのだろう。
制裁政策はドイツ国内でも欧州連合（ＥＵ）内でも不人気である。国内では財界、社会民主党、旧東独住民が反対している。ロシアから遠く離れている諸国も制裁政策で損をすることに乗り気でない。それを知りつつ、メルケルはあえて強硬に制裁を唱えてきた。
ミンスク交渉直前にワシントンでオバマ大統領に会ったとき、自分はウクライナへの武器供与に反対だが、たとえ米国がそれに踏み切ったとしても同盟関係が損なわれることはないと語った。プーチンに、自分の次には米国が出てくるぞというシグナルを送ったのだろう。
見るとおり、メルケルは制裁もアメリカの軍事力もしたたかに利用しようとしている。しかし、それが功を奏さなかった場合、ウクライナの分割もありという姿勢のように見える。これがメルケル流の「別世界の住人」との交渉術である。
おそらくミンスク会談はドイツがロシアとの交渉において西側の主役となった最初の例だろう。たしかにそれは今日の国際政治においてドイツが占める比重に見合ったものかも知れない。メルケルにノーベル平和賞を、という声も挙がっている。しかし、ミンスク合意はまだ破綻のおそれを秘めている。勢力圏主義が台頭している世界で、自らの軍事力なしにいかに平和を保つか。どの国も必死で考えることを迫られている。
（筆者は早稲田大学名誉教授）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟