Historical Reconciliation and the Perception Gap between Japan and Europe
NISHIKAWA Megumi / Journalist
May 12, 2015
Not so long ago, experts from Japan and Europe met in Tokyo for a dialogue titled "Japan and Europe: Creating Together a Better Future―Rule-Based and Prosperous."
Japan and Europe have both seen their security environment deteriorate, as China rises in East Asia and Russia interferes with Ukraine in Europe. Experts from either side spoke of the need for closer cooperation between Japan and Europe in broad areas including politics, economy and culture.
Throughout the dialogue, there was but one point that set the two sides apart, and that was their perception towards reconciliation with neighboring countries. One British participant expressed his view that a symbolic gesture was necessary to bring about a turning point in the reconciliation process. He cited the case of Chancellor Willy Brandt of what was then West Germany, who fell on his knees in front of the ghetto monument in Warsaw upon his visit to Poland in 1970, and suggested that Prime Minister Abe Shinzo should pay a similar visit to Nanjing, China, to issue an apology.
To this the Japanese participants responded as follows: "Unlike in Europe, in East Asia we cannot even agree on the historical facts. For example, China claims that as many as 300,000 fell victim in the Nanjing Massacre, but that figure is simply inconceivable," and "in Asia, historical issues are intertwined with justifications for history, politics and ethics." They argued that Japan and Europe could not be treated the same way due to the differences in their circumstances.
A few months before the Japan-Europe dialogue, a symposium between Japanese and French experts was held to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the founding of La Maison Franco-Japonaise, which has served as center of bilateral cultural exchange over the years.
Here too, the topic turned to history. A French participant said that "while Japan claims to have apologized, China and Korea do not see it that way, and therein lies the real issue." A Japanese participant responded by pointing out that "South Korea should give fair recognition to Japan's efforts to date, however insufficient they may have been. Otherwise, the sense of frustration will only grow within Japan and give way to the rise of ultra-rightists, which would ultimately be harmful for South Korea as well." He also said "we must create an East Asian model of reconciliation, instead of seeking to emulate the European model."
In past discussions on this topic, the usual formula was to cite the Franco-German relationship as an analogy for the Japanese-Korean relationship, and conclude by saying: "let us be guided by the postwar reconciliation between France and Germany in seeking reconciliation between Japan and Korea." During my time as a correspondent in Paris from the 1980s to the 1990s, I myself felt envious of the close relationship that existed between France and West Germany, and had proposed modeling the Japanese-Korean relationship after the Franco-German relationship in my own newspaper columns.
However, in recent years the view that "Japan and Europe cannot be treated the same with respect to historical reconciliation" has been gaining ground in forums of intellectual discussion in Japan. And such an opinion is being voiced not by persons who lean towards rightist rhetoric, but by knowledgeable persons of sound judgment.
Why should this be? We could certainly point to the fact that Japan's history issue with China and South Korea has taken a turn for the worse. However, I believe there is a more profound reason behind this. Among Japanese born before and during World War II, there was a tendency to set aside the differences between Japan and Europe to speak idealistically about reconciliation out of a sense of atonement. Now, a new generation of pragmatists has given rise to the idea that historical reconciliation should be seen from a more realistic perspective. There is now a growing perception that it is unrealistic to speak of reconciliation outside the given political environment, that such an approach is actually having the opposite effect.
Take the relationship between Japan and South Korea, for example. Japan and South Korea did not engage in war as sovereign nations on equal terms, as was the case between France and Germany. In fact, the relationship between Japan and South Korea has more in common with that of France and Algeria, which is the relationship between a former colonial master and its colonial subject. France occupied Algeria in 1830 and kept the country annexed as part of its territory for 132 years. Japan also annexed the Korean Peninsula in 1910 and made it part of its territory for thirty-five years. If so, Japan and South Korea should look to the relationship between France and Algeria, rather than seeking guidance from the relationship between France and Germany.
We should further note that Franco-German reconciliation was not based on German apology alone, but was paired with French tolerance. Historical reconciliation becomes possible only through the cooperative effort between aggressor and victim. The Japanese have begun to doubt whether such a political climate exists in East Asia.
On a recent visit to Japan, Chancellor Angela Merkel touched on Germany's historical reconciliation with its neighbors during her meeting with Prime Minister Abe. Commenting on her remarks, Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio may have been reflecting the popular sentiment in Japan when he said it would be "inappropriate to make a simple comparison between Japan and Germany, considering the different circumstances under which the two countries sought to deal with postwar issues and the different set of neighboring countries they face."
Once there were calls to create an organization for East Asia modeled after the European Union (EU), which would unite the region in the areas of politics, economy and principles. These days, that idea seems to have died away. Instead, East Asia is focusing its resources on developing economic ties and expanding the network of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) centered on liberalization of trade and protection of investment and intellectual property. While it is true that the appeal of the EU has faded in the wake of the euro crisis, we could also see this as confirmation of an obvious fact, that ultimately, a region can only give rise to whatever suits itself best. And a similar process is underway with respect to our perception towards historical reconciliation.
Megumi Nishikawa is contributing editor of Mainichi Shimbun newspaper. This article was originally published in the April 2015 issue of "Asia Jiho."
Japan and Europe have both seen their security environment deteriorate, as China rises in East Asia and Russia interferes with Ukraine in Europe. Experts from either side spoke of the need for closer cooperation between Japan and Europe in broad areas including politics, economy and culture.
Throughout the dialogue, there was but one point that set the two sides apart, and that was their perception towards reconciliation with neighboring countries. One British participant expressed his view that a symbolic gesture was necessary to bring about a turning point in the reconciliation process. He cited the case of Chancellor Willy Brandt of what was then West Germany, who fell on his knees in front of the ghetto monument in Warsaw upon his visit to Poland in 1970, and suggested that Prime Minister Abe Shinzo should pay a similar visit to Nanjing, China, to issue an apology.
To this the Japanese participants responded as follows: "Unlike in Europe, in East Asia we cannot even agree on the historical facts. For example, China claims that as many as 300,000 fell victim in the Nanjing Massacre, but that figure is simply inconceivable," and "in Asia, historical issues are intertwined with justifications for history, politics and ethics." They argued that Japan and Europe could not be treated the same way due to the differences in their circumstances.
A few months before the Japan-Europe dialogue, a symposium between Japanese and French experts was held to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the founding of La Maison Franco-Japonaise, which has served as center of bilateral cultural exchange over the years.
Here too, the topic turned to history. A French participant said that "while Japan claims to have apologized, China and Korea do not see it that way, and therein lies the real issue." A Japanese participant responded by pointing out that "South Korea should give fair recognition to Japan's efforts to date, however insufficient they may have been. Otherwise, the sense of frustration will only grow within Japan and give way to the rise of ultra-rightists, which would ultimately be harmful for South Korea as well." He also said "we must create an East Asian model of reconciliation, instead of seeking to emulate the European model."
In past discussions on this topic, the usual formula was to cite the Franco-German relationship as an analogy for the Japanese-Korean relationship, and conclude by saying: "let us be guided by the postwar reconciliation between France and Germany in seeking reconciliation between Japan and Korea." During my time as a correspondent in Paris from the 1980s to the 1990s, I myself felt envious of the close relationship that existed between France and West Germany, and had proposed modeling the Japanese-Korean relationship after the Franco-German relationship in my own newspaper columns.
However, in recent years the view that "Japan and Europe cannot be treated the same with respect to historical reconciliation" has been gaining ground in forums of intellectual discussion in Japan. And such an opinion is being voiced not by persons who lean towards rightist rhetoric, but by knowledgeable persons of sound judgment.
Why should this be? We could certainly point to the fact that Japan's history issue with China and South Korea has taken a turn for the worse. However, I believe there is a more profound reason behind this. Among Japanese born before and during World War II, there was a tendency to set aside the differences between Japan and Europe to speak idealistically about reconciliation out of a sense of atonement. Now, a new generation of pragmatists has given rise to the idea that historical reconciliation should be seen from a more realistic perspective. There is now a growing perception that it is unrealistic to speak of reconciliation outside the given political environment, that such an approach is actually having the opposite effect.
Take the relationship between Japan and South Korea, for example. Japan and South Korea did not engage in war as sovereign nations on equal terms, as was the case between France and Germany. In fact, the relationship between Japan and South Korea has more in common with that of France and Algeria, which is the relationship between a former colonial master and its colonial subject. France occupied Algeria in 1830 and kept the country annexed as part of its territory for 132 years. Japan also annexed the Korean Peninsula in 1910 and made it part of its territory for thirty-five years. If so, Japan and South Korea should look to the relationship between France and Algeria, rather than seeking guidance from the relationship between France and Germany.
We should further note that Franco-German reconciliation was not based on German apology alone, but was paired with French tolerance. Historical reconciliation becomes possible only through the cooperative effort between aggressor and victim. The Japanese have begun to doubt whether such a political climate exists in East Asia.
On a recent visit to Japan, Chancellor Angela Merkel touched on Germany's historical reconciliation with its neighbors during her meeting with Prime Minister Abe. Commenting on her remarks, Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio may have been reflecting the popular sentiment in Japan when he said it would be "inappropriate to make a simple comparison between Japan and Germany, considering the different circumstances under which the two countries sought to deal with postwar issues and the different set of neighboring countries they face."
Once there were calls to create an organization for East Asia modeled after the European Union (EU), which would unite the region in the areas of politics, economy and principles. These days, that idea seems to have died away. Instead, East Asia is focusing its resources on developing economic ties and expanding the network of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) centered on liberalization of trade and protection of investment and intellectual property. While it is true that the appeal of the EU has faded in the wake of the euro crisis, we could also see this as confirmation of an obvious fact, that ultimately, a region can only give rise to whatever suits itself best. And a similar process is underway with respect to our perception towards historical reconciliation.
Megumi Nishikawa is contributing editor of Mainichi Shimbun newspaper. This article was originally published in the April 2015 issue of "Asia Jiho."
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
歴史和解における日欧の相違
西川 恵 / ジャーナリスト
2015年 5月 12日
少し前のことになるが、東京都内で「日欧が創る未来 法の支配と繁栄を目指して」と題した日欧対話がもたれた。
東アジアでは中国の台頭、欧州部ではロシアによるウクライナへの干渉と、日欧共に安全保障環境が悪化するなか、政治、経済、文化など多様な分野で日欧の協力強化の必要性が双方の識者から提起された。
そのなかで唯一、隔たりを感じさせたのが周辺諸国との和解に対する認識だった。ある英国の識者は、１９７０年にポーランドを訪問した西独（当時）のブラント首相が、首都ワルシャワのゲットー記念碑の前でひざまずいた出来事を引き、「安倍晋三首相も中国・南京に行き、謝罪すべきではないか」と述べ、象徴的な行為こそ和解の転換になるとの考えを示した。
日本の識者はこう応じた。「欧州と異なり、東アジアでは歴史的事実そのものについて合意がない。例えば中国は南京虐殺の犠牲者が30万人というが、有り得ない数字だ」「アジアでは歴史問題が、歴史や政治や道徳の正当化とも結びついている」。日欧を同列に扱うには状況が異なると反論したのだ。
この日欧対話の数カ月前、日仏会館創立90周年を記念して、日仏の識者によるシンポジウムがもたれた。
ここでも歴史問題に話が及び、フランスの識者が「日本は謝罪していると言うが、中韓がそう見てないのが問題なのだ」と述べた。これに対し日本側識者は「韓国は不十分ながらも日本が積み上げてきたものをフェアに評価すべきだ。そうでないとフラストレーションが日本国内で高まり、極右などが出てきて、結局は韓国にとってもよくない」と指摘し、「欧州の和解を真似るのでなく、東アジアの和解モデルを作るべきだ」と語った。
以前だとこの種の対話では、仏独関係を日韓関係のアナロジーに使い「仏独の戦後和解を日韓和解の参考にしよう」というのがお定まりの結論だった。私自身、１９８０年代から90年代にかけパリ特派員だった時、フランスと西独の緊密な関係を羨ましく思い、コラムで「仏独関係を日韓関係にしよう」と書いたこともある。
しかしこの数年、「歴史和解で日欧を同列に論じることはできない」との意見が日本の論壇で強まっている。それも右翼的な言辞を弄する人間でなく、良識ある識者から出てきている。
なぜか。中韓との歴史問題がこじれていることもあるが、もっと深いところでの理由があるように思う。戦前、戦中世代は贖罪意識もあって、日欧の違いはとりあえず横において、理想論で和解を語る傾向があった。しかしよりリアリスティックな世代が登場し、歴史和解を現実に即して見ていくべきだとの考えが生まれている。所与の政治環境を離れたところで和解を語っても非現実的で、逆効果でしかないとの認識が強まっている。
例えば日韓関係。日本と韓国は仏独のように主権国家同士として戦争をした訳ではない。日韓はむしろフランスとアルジェリアの、旧宗主国と植民地の関係に近い。フランスは１８３０年にアルジェリアを占領してから１３２年間、国土の一部として併合した。日本も１９１０年から35年間、朝鮮半島を併合した。そうであれば日韓が参考にすべきは仏独関係ではなく、むしろフランスとアルジェリアの関係となる。
また仏独和解はドイツの謝罪だけでなく、フランスの寛容さとセットになっている。加害国と被害国が共に努力してこそ歴史和解は可能だが、その政治的環境が東アジアにはあるのかとの思いが日本側に生まれている。
最近来日したメルケル独首相が安倍晋三首相との首脳会談で、ドイツと周辺国の歴史和解に触れたことに絡み、岸田文雄外相が「日本とドイツでは…どういう状況下で戦後処理に取り組んだか、どの国が隣国なのかが異なり、単純に比較することは適当ではない」と述べたのもそうした思いの吐露だろう。
以前、欧州連合（ＥＵ）のような政治・経済・理念の統合組織を東アジアにも、と言われた。しかし最近はとんと聞かなくなった。むしろ東アジアは経済に特化し、貿易の自由化や投資・知的財産の保護などを中心とした経済連携協定（ＥＰＡ）の網を広げていくことに注力している。ユーロ危機でＥＵが色あせたこともあるが、結局はその地域にはそこに合ったものしかできないという当たり前のことが確認されたともいえる。歴史和解についての認識も似たプロセスをたどっている。
（筆者は毎日新聞客員編集委員、本稿は「アジア時報」２０１５年４月号に掲載された。）
東アジアでは中国の台頭、欧州部ではロシアによるウクライナへの干渉と、日欧共に安全保障環境が悪化するなか、政治、経済、文化など多様な分野で日欧の協力強化の必要性が双方の識者から提起された。
そのなかで唯一、隔たりを感じさせたのが周辺諸国との和解に対する認識だった。ある英国の識者は、１９７０年にポーランドを訪問した西独（当時）のブラント首相が、首都ワルシャワのゲットー記念碑の前でひざまずいた出来事を引き、「安倍晋三首相も中国・南京に行き、謝罪すべきではないか」と述べ、象徴的な行為こそ和解の転換になるとの考えを示した。
日本の識者はこう応じた。「欧州と異なり、東アジアでは歴史的事実そのものについて合意がない。例えば中国は南京虐殺の犠牲者が30万人というが、有り得ない数字だ」「アジアでは歴史問題が、歴史や政治や道徳の正当化とも結びついている」。日欧を同列に扱うには状況が異なると反論したのだ。
この日欧対話の数カ月前、日仏会館創立90周年を記念して、日仏の識者によるシンポジウムがもたれた。
ここでも歴史問題に話が及び、フランスの識者が「日本は謝罪していると言うが、中韓がそう見てないのが問題なのだ」と述べた。これに対し日本側識者は「韓国は不十分ながらも日本が積み上げてきたものをフェアに評価すべきだ。そうでないとフラストレーションが日本国内で高まり、極右などが出てきて、結局は韓国にとってもよくない」と指摘し、「欧州の和解を真似るのでなく、東アジアの和解モデルを作るべきだ」と語った。
以前だとこの種の対話では、仏独関係を日韓関係のアナロジーに使い「仏独の戦後和解を日韓和解の参考にしよう」というのがお定まりの結論だった。私自身、１９８０年代から90年代にかけパリ特派員だった時、フランスと西独の緊密な関係を羨ましく思い、コラムで「仏独関係を日韓関係にしよう」と書いたこともある。
しかしこの数年、「歴史和解で日欧を同列に論じることはできない」との意見が日本の論壇で強まっている。それも右翼的な言辞を弄する人間でなく、良識ある識者から出てきている。
なぜか。中韓との歴史問題がこじれていることもあるが、もっと深いところでの理由があるように思う。戦前、戦中世代は贖罪意識もあって、日欧の違いはとりあえず横において、理想論で和解を語る傾向があった。しかしよりリアリスティックな世代が登場し、歴史和解を現実に即して見ていくべきだとの考えが生まれている。所与の政治環境を離れたところで和解を語っても非現実的で、逆効果でしかないとの認識が強まっている。
例えば日韓関係。日本と韓国は仏独のように主権国家同士として戦争をした訳ではない。日韓はむしろフランスとアルジェリアの、旧宗主国と植民地の関係に近い。フランスは１８３０年にアルジェリアを占領してから１３２年間、国土の一部として併合した。日本も１９１０年から35年間、朝鮮半島を併合した。そうであれば日韓が参考にすべきは仏独関係ではなく、むしろフランスとアルジェリアの関係となる。
また仏独和解はドイツの謝罪だけでなく、フランスの寛容さとセットになっている。加害国と被害国が共に努力してこそ歴史和解は可能だが、その政治的環境が東アジアにはあるのかとの思いが日本側に生まれている。
最近来日したメルケル独首相が安倍晋三首相との首脳会談で、ドイツと周辺国の歴史和解に触れたことに絡み、岸田文雄外相が「日本とドイツでは…どういう状況下で戦後処理に取り組んだか、どの国が隣国なのかが異なり、単純に比較することは適当ではない」と述べたのもそうした思いの吐露だろう。
以前、欧州連合（ＥＵ）のような政治・経済・理念の統合組織を東アジアにも、と言われた。しかし最近はとんと聞かなくなった。むしろ東アジアは経済に特化し、貿易の自由化や投資・知的財産の保護などを中心とした経済連携協定（ＥＰＡ）の網を広げていくことに注力している。ユーロ危機でＥＵが色あせたこともあるが、結局はその地域にはそこに合ったものしかできないという当たり前のことが確認されたともいえる。歴史和解についての認識も似たプロセスをたどっている。
（筆者は毎日新聞客員編集委員、本稿は「アジア時報」２０１５年４月号に掲載された。）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟