The Chinese Catholic Church under the Xi Administration: Reading the Future of the Catholic Church’s “Sinicization”
UENO Kagefumi / Civilizational Thinker
March 6, 2018
For the Vatican (hereinafter referred to as Rome), which has been distressed by a decline in its European believers, China with its population of 1.3 billion is highly alluring in terms of the potential it presents for increasing its followership. Rome has thus kept up talks with Beijing with a view to improving relations with China - such as resuming diplomatic relations and smoothing out church-related issues. The “sinicization” of religions per se, propounded by General Secretary Xi Jinping in his work report at the 19th National Party Congress of the Communist Party of China in October 2017, must have disconcerted Rome. This essay looks at the future of the Chinese Catholic Church under the Xi Administration.
First, a word on the current picture. The Catholic Church in China is supposed to submit to the supervision of the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association (CCPA), an organization tied to the Beijing Government. In reality, however, two distinct types of churches coexist in China: “underground” churches that stay out of the CCPA, evading its control and adhering only to the Papal will, and “official” churches under the CCPA’s control（*1）.
The Chinese Authority would prefer to draw the underground churches into its orbit. But their resistance is so strong that Beijing has been abstaining from steamrollering its way through (although sporadic arm-twisting is seen, such as the detainment of clerics and destruction of church buildings). Rome, for its part, would like to support the underground churches, but the “wall” built by Chinese Authority prevents it from doing so. Both Rome and Beijing have had little success in sorting out the conflicting status quo---a peculiar equilibrium wherein two divergent groups of churches exist side by side.
How far does Xi intend to push ahead the sinicization of the Catholic Church? Does he want to completely sever it from Rome, as Henry VIII of Britain did nearly five centuries ago, and transform it into something else entirely (complete sinicization)? So long as “official” churches are concerned, sinicization has already been achieved, inasmuch as they are not under the Papal umbrella; the remaining targets are underground churches. An ordinary view may be that Beijing will resort to strong-arm tactics to cut these churches’ ties with Rome. I am of the view, however, that Xi will refrain from aiming for complete sinicization and let things be as they are, for reasons that I set forth later.
One issue that epitomizes the paradox between official and underground churches is the issue of who has the authority to appoint bishops. As a universal church, the Roman Catholic Church decrees that bishops worldwide are to be exclusively appointed by Pope himself. Beijing, meanwhile, does not recognize the Papal authority on the matter, positioning the appointment of bishops as an internal affair. And so, Rome and Beijing remain at odds over the appointment of bishops; they are currently locked in negotiations in hopes of working out a narrow compromise that is acceptable to both parties.
While that may be the case by official version, the reality looks somewhat different. As of the end of 2017, China had about 100 bishops, out of whom 65 belonged to official churches and 36 to underground churches. But of the 65 CCPA-ordained bishops, 60 were also recognized by Rome. This grayness, whereby 90 percent of “official” bishops are dually approved by Rome and Beijing, may be the key to reading the future of the Chinese Catholic Church.
Looking beneath the surface, here are what we see:
● Most “gray” bishops are first appointed by Beijing and later confirmed by Rome. Beijing condones Rome’s confirmation of bishops whom it has already appointed.
● Many gray bishops value their ties with the Pope, even though being under CCPA supervision.
● The Xi administration has not appointed any bishops whom Rome might find unagreeable.
● A not-insignificant number of believers frequent both official and underground churches.
Thus, more “intermingling” is taking place between the Beijing and Rome sides than one might expect---which the general secretary seem to accept. It may well be that Beijing has a reason to be prepared to care about Rome as long as the basic principle of sinicization is warranted(*2). Although the Xi administration is now tightening its control across the board, including on religious matters (a trend that is certain to go further), with regard to the Catholic Church, it has been surprisingly soft-handed, allowing things to stand in their present “gray” state, and is expected to stay the course. But that is about as far as it can go as it has to meet both the conflicting demands of sinicization and care for Rome. Crucial issues like the status of underground churches may well remain nebulous for the time being (*3).
The very lack of diplomatic ties or a channel of dialogue between China and Rome (the Vatican) is unsound, including the fact that Rome has no means of directly making claim to Beijing. If dialogue with Rome makes Beijing a bit more accommodating about religion (though the chances are slim), that would be a lucky break. As the first step toward normalization, it is to be hoped that a compromise can be reached on the issue of who appoints bishops in China, thereby narrowing a sense of distance between the Two.
(*1) Of the roughly 12 million Catholics in China, it is estimated that 6–8 million belong to “unofficial” churches, compared to 4–6 million, “official” churches.
(*2) Whether to impress on the global community its reconciliation with the Holy See or to get the latter to “sever” diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Beijing needs Rome’s cooperation.
(*3) Continuation of the status quo means that occasional “harassments,” such as clerics being detained and churches being demolished, will continue as well.
UENO Kagefumi is former Ambassador to the Holy See.
First, a word on the current picture. The Catholic Church in China is supposed to submit to the supervision of the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association (CCPA), an organization tied to the Beijing Government. In reality, however, two distinct types of churches coexist in China: “underground” churches that stay out of the CCPA, evading its control and adhering only to the Papal will, and “official” churches under the CCPA’s control（*1）.
The Chinese Authority would prefer to draw the underground churches into its orbit. But their resistance is so strong that Beijing has been abstaining from steamrollering its way through (although sporadic arm-twisting is seen, such as the detainment of clerics and destruction of church buildings). Rome, for its part, would like to support the underground churches, but the “wall” built by Chinese Authority prevents it from doing so. Both Rome and Beijing have had little success in sorting out the conflicting status quo---a peculiar equilibrium wherein two divergent groups of churches exist side by side.
How far does Xi intend to push ahead the sinicization of the Catholic Church? Does he want to completely sever it from Rome, as Henry VIII of Britain did nearly five centuries ago, and transform it into something else entirely (complete sinicization)? So long as “official” churches are concerned, sinicization has already been achieved, inasmuch as they are not under the Papal umbrella; the remaining targets are underground churches. An ordinary view may be that Beijing will resort to strong-arm tactics to cut these churches’ ties with Rome. I am of the view, however, that Xi will refrain from aiming for complete sinicization and let things be as they are, for reasons that I set forth later.
One issue that epitomizes the paradox between official and underground churches is the issue of who has the authority to appoint bishops. As a universal church, the Roman Catholic Church decrees that bishops worldwide are to be exclusively appointed by Pope himself. Beijing, meanwhile, does not recognize the Papal authority on the matter, positioning the appointment of bishops as an internal affair. And so, Rome and Beijing remain at odds over the appointment of bishops; they are currently locked in negotiations in hopes of working out a narrow compromise that is acceptable to both parties.
While that may be the case by official version, the reality looks somewhat different. As of the end of 2017, China had about 100 bishops, out of whom 65 belonged to official churches and 36 to underground churches. But of the 65 CCPA-ordained bishops, 60 were also recognized by Rome. This grayness, whereby 90 percent of “official” bishops are dually approved by Rome and Beijing, may be the key to reading the future of the Chinese Catholic Church.
Looking beneath the surface, here are what we see:
● Most “gray” bishops are first appointed by Beijing and later confirmed by Rome. Beijing condones Rome’s confirmation of bishops whom it has already appointed.
● Many gray bishops value their ties with the Pope, even though being under CCPA supervision.
● The Xi administration has not appointed any bishops whom Rome might find unagreeable.
● A not-insignificant number of believers frequent both official and underground churches.
Thus, more “intermingling” is taking place between the Beijing and Rome sides than one might expect---which the general secretary seem to accept. It may well be that Beijing has a reason to be prepared to care about Rome as long as the basic principle of sinicization is warranted(*2). Although the Xi administration is now tightening its control across the board, including on religious matters (a trend that is certain to go further), with regard to the Catholic Church, it has been surprisingly soft-handed, allowing things to stand in their present “gray” state, and is expected to stay the course. But that is about as far as it can go as it has to meet both the conflicting demands of sinicization and care for Rome. Crucial issues like the status of underground churches may well remain nebulous for the time being (*3).
The very lack of diplomatic ties or a channel of dialogue between China and Rome (the Vatican) is unsound, including the fact that Rome has no means of directly making claim to Beijing. If dialogue with Rome makes Beijing a bit more accommodating about religion (though the chances are slim), that would be a lucky break. As the first step toward normalization, it is to be hoped that a compromise can be reached on the issue of who appoints bishops in China, thereby narrowing a sense of distance between the Two.
(*1) Of the roughly 12 million Catholics in China, it is estimated that 6–8 million belong to “unofficial” churches, compared to 4–6 million, “official” churches.
(*2) Whether to impress on the global community its reconciliation with the Holy See or to get the latter to “sever” diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Beijing needs Rome’s cooperation.
(*3) Continuation of the status quo means that occasional “harassments,” such as clerics being detained and churches being demolished, will continue as well.
UENO Kagefumi is former Ambassador to the Holy See.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
習政権下の中国カトリック教会(カトリック教会「中国化」の行末)
上野 景文 / 文明論考家
2018年 3月 6日
欧州におけるカトリック教徒数の減少に苦慮しているローマ・バチカン(以下、ローマ)にとり、１３億人を擁する中国は、信徒数拡大と言う観点から高い魅力を有する。このため、ローマは、中国との関係改善（外交関係復活、教会関連懸案改善）を目して、かねてより北京と協議を続けて来ている。それだけに、昨年１０月の第１９次共産党大会における報告演説の中で、習総書記が宗教の『中国化』を唱えたことは、ローマに懸念を与えたようだ。以下本稿では、習政権下における中国カトリック教会の今後を占う。
先ず、現状につき一言。中国のカトリック教会は、北京政府系の中国カトリック愛国会（ＣＣＰＡ）による監督管理に服するものとされている。が、実際には、それを嫌ってＣＣＰＡに属さず、あくまでローマ法王に従うことを旨とする「地下教会」と、ＣＣＰＡの管理に服する「公認教会」という、二つの異質な教会が併存する（注１）。
当局としては、「地下教会」を傘下に入れたいところであるが、「地下教会」の抵抗が強く、北京は「ゴリ押し」を控えている（聖職者拘束、教会破壊など、局地的「締め付け」は散発しているが）。他方、ローマは「地下教会」支援をしたい思いではあるが、当局の「壁」があってままならない。異質な二つの教会が併存するこの矛盾（奇妙な均衡）を、ローマも北京も整理出来ずにいる。
では、習はどこまでカトリック教会の「中国化」を進めるつもりか？英国のヘンリー８世が５世紀近く前にそうしたように、ローマから完全に切り離し、「別人格の教会」にするつもりか（＝「完全な中国化」）。「公認教会」については、ローマ法王の傘下にはないと言う意味で、「中国化」は達成済みだ。残る課題は「地下教会」の「中国化」だ。北京は同教会をローマから切り離すべく、今後「ゴリ押し」すると見るのが常識的であろう。が、私は、以下に述べる事情もあり、習総書記は「完全な中国化」は控え、現状を維持するものと見る。
ところで、「公認教会」と「地下教会」間の矛盾を象徴する懸案として、司教任命権の問題がある。ローマ・カトリック教会の場合、「普遍教会」と言う立場から、全世界の司教をローマ法王が任命するものとされている。これに対し、北京は、司教任命はあくまで国内問題と位置付け、法王の任命権は認めていない。と言う次第で、司教任命権を巡るローマと北京の立場は相容れない（目下、双方が呑み得るギリギリのラインを探るべく、交渉継続中）。
建前論ではそう言うことになるが、実態は少し異る。昨年末現在、中国には凡そ百人の司教がいる（うち65名が公認系、３６名が地下系）。ところが、この６５名のうち６０名はローマからも認知されている。公認系司教の９割はローマ、北京から「二重」に認知を受けているというこの「グレー性」に、中国カトリック教会の今後を占う鍵がある。一皮めくってみよう。
●「グレー」な司教は、先ず北京が任命し、ローマが追認したケースが大半だ。北京は、自分達が任命した司教をローマが追認することは大目に見ている。
●「グレー」な司教の多くは、ＣＣＰＡの管理下にいながら、ローマ法王との繋がりを大切にしている。
●習政権は、ローマに配慮してか、ローマが拒否感を持つような司教を一人も任命していない。
●少なからざる信徒が、公認系、地下系の両教会に出入りしている。
そう、北京・ローマ間では「相互乗り入れ」が存外進んでいる。それも、総書記容認の下に。ひょっとすると、北京には、「中国化」の大枠さへ守られれば、「ローマに配慮」しても良いとの秘めた思惑（注２）があるのかも知れない。目下、宗教を含む万事に統制色を強めつつある習政権（今後更に強まること必至）ではあるが、カトリック教会に関しては、意外にも強硬策は控え、「グレー」な現状を容認、その姿勢は今後も維持するものと目される。「中国化」と「ローマへの配慮」と言う矛盾する要請を同時に満たすとなると、その辺が限界で、「地下教会」の処遇など核心に触れる問題は、当分手つかずと見られる（注３）。
そもそも、中国とローマ（バチカン）の間に外交関係なり、対話のパイプがないと言う現状は、ローマが中国に直かに「物申す」機会を奪っていると言う意味で、不健全と言える。正常化への第一歩として、司教任命権問題につき妥協が成立し、もって、両者間の距離感が縮まることが期待される。国際社会はこの点にもっと関心を払って良い。
(注１)カトリック教徒数は凡そ12百万人、うち、6-8百万人が非公認系、4-６百万人が公認系と見られる。
(注２)「ローマ法王との融和」を国際的に演出するため、或いは、台湾との外交関係を「切って」貰うためには、ローマの協力が必要。
(注３)「現状」が続くと言うことは、聖職者拘束、教会破壊などの「嫌がらせ」も散発的に続くと言うこと。
筆者は元バチカン大使
先ず、現状につき一言。中国のカトリック教会は、北京政府系の中国カトリック愛国会（ＣＣＰＡ）による監督管理に服するものとされている。が、実際には、それを嫌ってＣＣＰＡに属さず、あくまでローマ法王に従うことを旨とする「地下教会」と、ＣＣＰＡの管理に服する「公認教会」という、二つの異質な教会が併存する（注１）。
当局としては、「地下教会」を傘下に入れたいところであるが、「地下教会」の抵抗が強く、北京は「ゴリ押し」を控えている（聖職者拘束、教会破壊など、局地的「締め付け」は散発しているが）。他方、ローマは「地下教会」支援をしたい思いではあるが、当局の「壁」があってままならない。異質な二つの教会が併存するこの矛盾（奇妙な均衡）を、ローマも北京も整理出来ずにいる。
では、習はどこまでカトリック教会の「中国化」を進めるつもりか？英国のヘンリー８世が５世紀近く前にそうしたように、ローマから完全に切り離し、「別人格の教会」にするつもりか（＝「完全な中国化」）。「公認教会」については、ローマ法王の傘下にはないと言う意味で、「中国化」は達成済みだ。残る課題は「地下教会」の「中国化」だ。北京は同教会をローマから切り離すべく、今後「ゴリ押し」すると見るのが常識的であろう。が、私は、以下に述べる事情もあり、習総書記は「完全な中国化」は控え、現状を維持するものと見る。
ところで、「公認教会」と「地下教会」間の矛盾を象徴する懸案として、司教任命権の問題がある。ローマ・カトリック教会の場合、「普遍教会」と言う立場から、全世界の司教をローマ法王が任命するものとされている。これに対し、北京は、司教任命はあくまで国内問題と位置付け、法王の任命権は認めていない。と言う次第で、司教任命権を巡るローマと北京の立場は相容れない（目下、双方が呑み得るギリギリのラインを探るべく、交渉継続中）。
建前論ではそう言うことになるが、実態は少し異る。昨年末現在、中国には凡そ百人の司教がいる（うち65名が公認系、３６名が地下系）。ところが、この６５名のうち６０名はローマからも認知されている。公認系司教の９割はローマ、北京から「二重」に認知を受けているというこの「グレー性」に、中国カトリック教会の今後を占う鍵がある。一皮めくってみよう。
●「グレー」な司教は、先ず北京が任命し、ローマが追認したケースが大半だ。北京は、自分達が任命した司教をローマが追認することは大目に見ている。
●「グレー」な司教の多くは、ＣＣＰＡの管理下にいながら、ローマ法王との繋がりを大切にしている。
●習政権は、ローマに配慮してか、ローマが拒否感を持つような司教を一人も任命していない。
●少なからざる信徒が、公認系、地下系の両教会に出入りしている。
そう、北京・ローマ間では「相互乗り入れ」が存外進んでいる。それも、総書記容認の下に。ひょっとすると、北京には、「中国化」の大枠さへ守られれば、「ローマに配慮」しても良いとの秘めた思惑（注２）があるのかも知れない。目下、宗教を含む万事に統制色を強めつつある習政権（今後更に強まること必至）ではあるが、カトリック教会に関しては、意外にも強硬策は控え、「グレー」な現状を容認、その姿勢は今後も維持するものと目される。「中国化」と「ローマへの配慮」と言う矛盾する要請を同時に満たすとなると、その辺が限界で、「地下教会」の処遇など核心に触れる問題は、当分手つかずと見られる（注３）。
そもそも、中国とローマ（バチカン）の間に外交関係なり、対話のパイプがないと言う現状は、ローマが中国に直かに「物申す」機会を奪っていると言う意味で、不健全と言える。正常化への第一歩として、司教任命権問題につき妥協が成立し、もって、両者間の距離感が縮まることが期待される。国際社会はこの点にもっと関心を払って良い。
(注１)カトリック教徒数は凡そ12百万人、うち、6-8百万人が非公認系、4-６百万人が公認系と見られる。
(注２)「ローマ法王との融和」を国際的に演出するため、或いは、台湾との外交関係を「切って」貰うためには、ローマの協力が必要。
(注３)「現状」が続くと言うことは、聖職者拘束、教会破壊などの「嫌がらせ」も散発的に続くと言うこと。
筆者は元バチカン大使
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟