North Korea’s Nuclear Capability: The Fundamental Question Confronting Japan
KAWATO Akio / Former Japanese Ambassador to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan
May 15, 2018
It has been announced that US President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un will meet for talks in mid June. In terms of their unpredictability, these are two of what we might call the greatest stars on the international political stage today. Almost anything can be expected from their meeting.
On March 26, however, when Kim surprised the world by meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, we saw the introduction of one constant to the anything-goes situation on the Korean Peninsula. Their summit made it clear that the Beijing-Pyongyang relationship remains unshakeable for the time being.
Why did Xi, who by all accounts was not fond of Kim, accept him at this juncture? The answer probably lies in China’s fear of what Trump might do. “Trump is the kind of person who does not hesitate pulling America back from the Korean peninsula,” Xi may well have thought. “This could give North Korea a free hand, prompting them to take a hostile stance against China, just as the medieval kingdom of Goguryeo once did against the Sui and Tang Dynasties. We need to bring Kim Jong-un firmly to our side to avoid this peril.” This seems a likely reason for Xi’s invitation of Kim to Beijing.
If, as a result of this maneuvering, we see a continuation of the standoff between North Korea and China on the one hand and South Korea and the United States on the other, what should we expect from the Kim-Trump talks? The most they are likely to produce is a vague agreement along the lines of a halt to North Korean ICBM testing; a scaling back of the joint military exercises carried out by South Korean and US forces; further efforts by both sides to denuclearize North Korea; and, matching the pace of those efforts, the launch of discussions on relaxing sanctions on the North. Other questions, like whether Pyongyang will allow international inspections of its nuclear weapons program or whether it will give up its nuclear missiles that are not ICBMs (questions that both Japan and South Korea find of vital importance), are just as likely to be kicked down the road for later discussion. Even this smaller package would be enough for Trump to use as a record of success in coming elections.
Now that North Korea has secured a summit meeting with the US president and improved relations with Beijing, it sees much less value in engagement with Japan. Even if Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pushes through with a visit to North Korea, he will find it difficult to make any headway on the issue of abducted Japanese nationals, making it impossible in turn to explain the value of his visit to the Japanese public. All Japan can do now is quietly await its next chance to make a meaningful diplomatic move.
There are now vigorous fears in Japan that “Trump may betray us”—that through his single-minded focus on heading off the threat of intercontinental missiles, he will turn a blind eye to the mid- and short-range projectiles that remain a threat to Japan and South Korea. We must note, however, that even if this does come to pass, the actual situation will have changed little from where we already are. Just a few years ago, the North Koreans had no ICBMs, but they were equipped with a number of mid- and short-range Rodong and Taepodong missiles. Japan’s stance at the time was that the US nuclear umbrella was sufficient deterrent against their use.
If a similar situation arises once again, Japan now has more options to handle it. First, it could develop its own deterrent capability. The quickest and most effective way to do so would be to equip its submarine fleet with cruise missiles. Second, it could ask the United States to bolster the nuclear umbrella—in short, by having the American military’s cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads, just as the US Department of Defense’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review indicates. (Current Tomahawk cruise missiles used to be mounted with a nuclear warhead, but they were dismantled under the Obama administration based on the decision by the Bush (junior) administration).
The emergence of a true wildcard, however, such as an announcement at the US-North Korea summit that a formal peace treaty ending the Korean War would be accompanied by the withdrawal of US forces from the peninsula, would be a game-changer for the Far East. South Korea would be isolated in security terms, and would likely seek to address the situation by forging cooperative ties, or even pursuing reunification, with North Korea. This would result in the emergence of a major nuclear power with a GDP larger than Russia’s.
Japan has no way to prevent such a situation from coming about. This does not mean the time has come to panic, though. The Korean Peninsula has long been a key diplomatic counterpart for Japan, alongside China. The ebbs and flows in Sino-Japanese ties have been accompanied by shifts in ties between Japan and Korea, sometimes growing closer and at other times more distant, or even antagonistic. Japan and the nations of the neighboring peninsula are not locked in an eternal pattern of hostile opposition. Indeed, it will more likely be China and Russia that present the key security concerns for a newly united Korea.
If the Koreas do reunify, the United States may end its involvement on the Korean Peninsula, but it will probably seek to maintain its military presence in Japan. Without their bases on Japanese territory, the Americans would find it impossible to defend Taiwan and considerably more difficult to maintain a presence in the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and areas extending to the Middle East. And if Japan were to weaken or walk away from its alliance with the United States, leaning toward China instead, then Washington would lose much of its standing in East Asia as a whole. Thus the Japan-US alliance is likely to be maintained as long as Japan so wishes. Tokyo, therefore, should act on the premise that the deterrence under the Japan-US alliance will remain in place, boosting its international standing through enhanced armament to defend itself and using this standing to underpin its moves in the East Asian power games.
The North Koreans and Donald Trump have similar habits: after delivering a steady stream of abuse, to engage in diplomacy at the eleventh hour, eventually making reasonable deals. Japan, meanwhile, has to give thought to all possible outcomes, doing what it can to prevent those that are least beneficial for it and avoiding panic at all costs.
Akio Kawato is a former Japanese Ambassador to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
On March 26, however, when Kim surprised the world by meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, we saw the introduction of one constant to the anything-goes situation on the Korean Peninsula. Their summit made it clear that the Beijing-Pyongyang relationship remains unshakeable for the time being.
Why did Xi, who by all accounts was not fond of Kim, accept him at this juncture? The answer probably lies in China’s fear of what Trump might do. “Trump is the kind of person who does not hesitate pulling America back from the Korean peninsula,” Xi may well have thought. “This could give North Korea a free hand, prompting them to take a hostile stance against China, just as the medieval kingdom of Goguryeo once did against the Sui and Tang Dynasties. We need to bring Kim Jong-un firmly to our side to avoid this peril.” This seems a likely reason for Xi’s invitation of Kim to Beijing.
If, as a result of this maneuvering, we see a continuation of the standoff between North Korea and China on the one hand and South Korea and the United States on the other, what should we expect from the Kim-Trump talks? The most they are likely to produce is a vague agreement along the lines of a halt to North Korean ICBM testing; a scaling back of the joint military exercises carried out by South Korean and US forces; further efforts by both sides to denuclearize North Korea; and, matching the pace of those efforts, the launch of discussions on relaxing sanctions on the North. Other questions, like whether Pyongyang will allow international inspections of its nuclear weapons program or whether it will give up its nuclear missiles that are not ICBMs (questions that both Japan and South Korea find of vital importance), are just as likely to be kicked down the road for later discussion. Even this smaller package would be enough for Trump to use as a record of success in coming elections.
Now that North Korea has secured a summit meeting with the US president and improved relations with Beijing, it sees much less value in engagement with Japan. Even if Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pushes through with a visit to North Korea, he will find it difficult to make any headway on the issue of abducted Japanese nationals, making it impossible in turn to explain the value of his visit to the Japanese public. All Japan can do now is quietly await its next chance to make a meaningful diplomatic move.
There are now vigorous fears in Japan that “Trump may betray us”—that through his single-minded focus on heading off the threat of intercontinental missiles, he will turn a blind eye to the mid- and short-range projectiles that remain a threat to Japan and South Korea. We must note, however, that even if this does come to pass, the actual situation will have changed little from where we already are. Just a few years ago, the North Koreans had no ICBMs, but they were equipped with a number of mid- and short-range Rodong and Taepodong missiles. Japan’s stance at the time was that the US nuclear umbrella was sufficient deterrent against their use.
If a similar situation arises once again, Japan now has more options to handle it. First, it could develop its own deterrent capability. The quickest and most effective way to do so would be to equip its submarine fleet with cruise missiles. Second, it could ask the United States to bolster the nuclear umbrella—in short, by having the American military’s cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads, just as the US Department of Defense’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review indicates. (Current Tomahawk cruise missiles used to be mounted with a nuclear warhead, but they were dismantled under the Obama administration based on the decision by the Bush (junior) administration).
The emergence of a true wildcard, however, such as an announcement at the US-North Korea summit that a formal peace treaty ending the Korean War would be accompanied by the withdrawal of US forces from the peninsula, would be a game-changer for the Far East. South Korea would be isolated in security terms, and would likely seek to address the situation by forging cooperative ties, or even pursuing reunification, with North Korea. This would result in the emergence of a major nuclear power with a GDP larger than Russia’s.
Japan has no way to prevent such a situation from coming about. This does not mean the time has come to panic, though. The Korean Peninsula has long been a key diplomatic counterpart for Japan, alongside China. The ebbs and flows in Sino-Japanese ties have been accompanied by shifts in ties between Japan and Korea, sometimes growing closer and at other times more distant, or even antagonistic. Japan and the nations of the neighboring peninsula are not locked in an eternal pattern of hostile opposition. Indeed, it will more likely be China and Russia that present the key security concerns for a newly united Korea.
If the Koreas do reunify, the United States may end its involvement on the Korean Peninsula, but it will probably seek to maintain its military presence in Japan. Without their bases on Japanese territory, the Americans would find it impossible to defend Taiwan and considerably more difficult to maintain a presence in the South China Sea, the Indian Ocean, and areas extending to the Middle East. And if Japan were to weaken or walk away from its alliance with the United States, leaning toward China instead, then Washington would lose much of its standing in East Asia as a whole. Thus the Japan-US alliance is likely to be maintained as long as Japan so wishes. Tokyo, therefore, should act on the premise that the deterrence under the Japan-US alliance will remain in place, boosting its international standing through enhanced armament to defend itself and using this standing to underpin its moves in the East Asian power games.
The North Koreans and Donald Trump have similar habits: after delivering a steady stream of abuse, to engage in diplomacy at the eleventh hour, eventually making reasonable deals. Japan, meanwhile, has to give thought to all possible outcomes, doing what it can to prevent those that are least beneficial for it and avoiding panic at all costs.
Akio Kawato is a former Japanese Ambassador to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
北朝鮮の核――日本にとっての問題の本質
河東哲夫 / 元駐ウズベキスタン大使兼タジキスタン大使
2018年 5月 15日
6月中旬、米国のトランプ大統領と北朝鮮の金正恩委員長が会談をすることになっている。予測不能という点では、今どきの国際政治の二大スターとも言うべきご両人。両者の「会談」の結果は何でもありだ。
しかし、3月26日金正恩が習近平・中国国家主席と電撃的に会談したことで、その何でもあり得た朝鮮半島の情勢に、一つの定数が現れた。つまり右会談によって、北朝鮮・中国の提携には当面揺るぎがないことが明らかになったのだ。
金正恩を嫌っていたはずの習近平が、なぜ今彼を受け入れたのか？ それは中国が、トランプを警戒しているからだろう。「彼だったら、朝鮮半島から手を引いて、高句麗が昔隋、唐に敵対したような方向に、北朝鮮を仕向けようとするかもしれない。ここで金正恩を手なずけて中国に引き付けておかないと危なくてしょうがない」。習近平はそう思って、金正恩を中国に呼び寄せたのではないだろうか？
この結果、北朝鮮＋中国vs. 韓国＋米国という対立構造が続くのであれば、トランプ・金の「会談」では、「北朝鮮はICBMのこれ以上の実験を控える。米韓は共同軍事演習の規模を縮小する。両国は北朝鮮の更なる非核化、及び右とペースを合わせての制裁緩和へ向けての話し合いを開始する」程度の（漠然たる）合意がせいぜいだろう。北朝鮮の核兵器への査察とか、ICBM以外の核ミサイルの廃棄とか（日本、韓国はこれに切実な関心を持っている）は、「今後の詰め」に丸投げされることになるが、トランプにはこれでも選挙で十分使えるタマになる。
北朝鮮が米国との首脳会談の約束、そして中国との関係改善というカードをせしめた今、日本が北朝鮮に対して有する価値は低くなった。今安倍総理が北朝鮮を無理して訪問しても、拉致問題での成果は難しく、それでは日本国内での説明はできなくなるだろう。だから日本は静かに、次の効果的な出番を待つしかない。
日本では、「トランプが裏切って」、ICBMの脅威を防ぐことばかりに関心を向け、日本・韓国にとって脅威となる中距離・短距離核ミサイルを放置するのを危惧する声が強い。しかし実際にそのようになったとしても、情勢はこれまでと大して変わっていないことに注目する必要がある。つまり数年前は北朝鮮のICBMはなく、他方、中距離・短距離のノドン、テッポウドンは多数配備されていて、日本はこれを米国の核の傘で抑止できると言っていたのである。
今回同じ状況が戻ってきたら、日本は自前の抑止力を持つか（潜水艦に巡航ミサイルを搭載するのが最も速く、最も効果的）、米国の核の傘を少し強化してもらう、つまり米国自身が最近の核戦略レヴューで言っているように、巡航ミサイルのトマホークに核弾頭を再装備してもらう（ブッシュ・ジュニア時代の決定に基づき、オバマ時代に撤去されている）だけで十分対処できるだろう。
しかし万一、米朝首脳会談で「朝鮮戦争の平和条約を結ぶ。米軍は韓国から撤退する」という合意が何かの拍子でできたら、それは極東情勢のゲーム・チェンジを意味する。その時韓国は、安全保障上孤立することとなり、それを埋め合わせるために北朝鮮との提携、あるいは統合に向け踏み出すだろう。それは、ロシア以上のGDPを持つ核大国が地域に誕生することを意味する。
日本は、そのような状況が生じるのを止めることはできない。しかしパニックに陥る必要はない。朝鮮半島は古来、中国と並ぶ日本外交の主要な相手。日中関係の消長に応じて、日朝関係もある時は緊密に、またある時は疎遠・敵対的となった。日本と朝鮮半島の国々は、常なる敵対を運命づけられているわけではないのである。朝鮮が統一されれば、その統一朝鮮にとって、安全保障上の懸念の種はむしろ中国、ロシアとなるだろう。
朝鮮が統一する場合、米国は朝鮮半島への関与はやめるだろうが、日本での軍事プレゼンスは維持したいところだろう。日本の基地がなければ、台湾防衛は不可能になるし、南シナ海、インド洋、中東方面の軍事プレゼンスを維持することも難しくなる。またもし日本が米国との同盟関係を薄めるか破棄して中国寄りに傾けば、米国は東アジアでの地歩を大きく失う。従って日本が望む限り、日米同盟は維持されるだろう。
日本は日米同盟を抑止力とし、自主防衛能力を強化して自己の国際的地位を高め、その力を足場に東アジアでのパワー・ゲームに対処すればいいのである。
北朝鮮とトランプは、悪口雑言の限りを尽くして瀬戸際外交を展開し、その実常識的なところで手を打つのが手口。とは言え、あらゆる場合を想定し、日本にとって望ましくない展開は事前に抑え、パニックにだけは陥らないようにしておこう。
（筆者は元駐ウズベキスタン大使兼タジキスタン大使）
しかし、3月26日金正恩が習近平・中国国家主席と電撃的に会談したことで、その何でもあり得た朝鮮半島の情勢に、一つの定数が現れた。つまり右会談によって、北朝鮮・中国の提携には当面揺るぎがないことが明らかになったのだ。
金正恩を嫌っていたはずの習近平が、なぜ今彼を受け入れたのか？ それは中国が、トランプを警戒しているからだろう。「彼だったら、朝鮮半島から手を引いて、高句麗が昔隋、唐に敵対したような方向に、北朝鮮を仕向けようとするかもしれない。ここで金正恩を手なずけて中国に引き付けておかないと危なくてしょうがない」。習近平はそう思って、金正恩を中国に呼び寄せたのではないだろうか？
この結果、北朝鮮＋中国vs. 韓国＋米国という対立構造が続くのであれば、トランプ・金の「会談」では、「北朝鮮はICBMのこれ以上の実験を控える。米韓は共同軍事演習の規模を縮小する。両国は北朝鮮の更なる非核化、及び右とペースを合わせての制裁緩和へ向けての話し合いを開始する」程度の（漠然たる）合意がせいぜいだろう。北朝鮮の核兵器への査察とか、ICBM以外の核ミサイルの廃棄とか（日本、韓国はこれに切実な関心を持っている）は、「今後の詰め」に丸投げされることになるが、トランプにはこれでも選挙で十分使えるタマになる。
北朝鮮が米国との首脳会談の約束、そして中国との関係改善というカードをせしめた今、日本が北朝鮮に対して有する価値は低くなった。今安倍総理が北朝鮮を無理して訪問しても、拉致問題での成果は難しく、それでは日本国内での説明はできなくなるだろう。だから日本は静かに、次の効果的な出番を待つしかない。
日本では、「トランプが裏切って」、ICBMの脅威を防ぐことばかりに関心を向け、日本・韓国にとって脅威となる中距離・短距離核ミサイルを放置するのを危惧する声が強い。しかし実際にそのようになったとしても、情勢はこれまでと大して変わっていないことに注目する必要がある。つまり数年前は北朝鮮のICBMはなく、他方、中距離・短距離のノドン、テッポウドンは多数配備されていて、日本はこれを米国の核の傘で抑止できると言っていたのである。
今回同じ状況が戻ってきたら、日本は自前の抑止力を持つか（潜水艦に巡航ミサイルを搭載するのが最も速く、最も効果的）、米国の核の傘を少し強化してもらう、つまり米国自身が最近の核戦略レヴューで言っているように、巡航ミサイルのトマホークに核弾頭を再装備してもらう（ブッシュ・ジュニア時代の決定に基づき、オバマ時代に撤去されている）だけで十分対処できるだろう。
しかし万一、米朝首脳会談で「朝鮮戦争の平和条約を結ぶ。米軍は韓国から撤退する」という合意が何かの拍子でできたら、それは極東情勢のゲーム・チェンジを意味する。その時韓国は、安全保障上孤立することとなり、それを埋め合わせるために北朝鮮との提携、あるいは統合に向け踏み出すだろう。それは、ロシア以上のGDPを持つ核大国が地域に誕生することを意味する。
日本は、そのような状況が生じるのを止めることはできない。しかしパニックに陥る必要はない。朝鮮半島は古来、中国と並ぶ日本外交の主要な相手。日中関係の消長に応じて、日朝関係もある時は緊密に、またある時は疎遠・敵対的となった。日本と朝鮮半島の国々は、常なる敵対を運命づけられているわけではないのである。朝鮮が統一されれば、その統一朝鮮にとって、安全保障上の懸念の種はむしろ中国、ロシアとなるだろう。
朝鮮が統一する場合、米国は朝鮮半島への関与はやめるだろうが、日本での軍事プレゼンスは維持したいところだろう。日本の基地がなければ、台湾防衛は不可能になるし、南シナ海、インド洋、中東方面の軍事プレゼンスを維持することも難しくなる。またもし日本が米国との同盟関係を薄めるか破棄して中国寄りに傾けば、米国は東アジアでの地歩を大きく失う。従って日本が望む限り、日米同盟は維持されるだろう。
日本は日米同盟を抑止力とし、自主防衛能力を強化して自己の国際的地位を高め、その力を足場に東アジアでのパワー・ゲームに対処すればいいのである。
北朝鮮とトランプは、悪口雑言の限りを尽くして瀬戸際外交を展開し、その実常識的なところで手を打つのが手口。とは言え、あらゆる場合を想定し、日本にとって望ましくない展開は事前に抑え、パニックにだけは陥らないようにしておこう。
（筆者は元駐ウズベキスタン大使兼タジキスタン大使）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟