Radicalization of populism on the left and the right following the US presidential election
Yasushi Watanabe / Professor, Keio University
December 1, 2020
This unexpectedly close presidential race, and the continuation of the battle in court, mean that the rancor of those who supported Trump as the "savior of American democracy" will continue to fester. Two years from now there will be a mid-term election, and as soon as that is over, the 2012 presidential battle will begin. It has been some 30 years since intense partisan rivalry began, and there seems to be no easy way for it to be lessened.
What is worrisome is the growing distrust of the mainstream (the Establishment) within both parties and the radicalization of populism on both the left and the right. Moreover, both groups are trying to pull the United States in diametrically opposite directions.
Underlying the distrust of the mainstream are structural factors such as the disintegration of the middle class, the widening of the disparities, and the changing racial composition. It is closely linked to changes in the industrial structure and information environment, especially in terms of technological innovation, which is also seen in Europe.
The Biden administration can change the social atmosphere, if only by shunning words and actions that stir up division and confrontation, which has been Presdent Trump’s favorite ploy. If the COVID-19 and the employment situation are seen to improve, it will naturally increase the unifying influence of the new administration. It is essential to prioritize issues of high public concern and avoid dogmatism.
In that sense, the “twist” in Congress whereby the Republicans have a majority in the Senate is not necessarily a bad thing. It is because the Senate can deter, to some extent, left-leaning high-level appointments and policies (e.g., tax increases, more regulation, defense spending cuts, etc.). Fortunately, Mr. Biden is a politician who can also talk to Republicans. Of course, steering a course for reconciliation will not be easy. President Obama's middle-of-the-road approach has been criticized by Democrats as "too compromising" and "weak-kneed" and by Republicans as "uncompromising" and "dictatorial," which only deepened the division.
On the other hand, the "twist" is negative from the point of view of realizing the Biden administration's promises. The massive additional economic stimulus package, environmental and infrastructure investments, and expansion of the health care reform law (Obamacare) are expected to face fierce opposition from Senate Republicans.
On foreign affairs, Mr. Biden has criticized President Trump's “America First” approach as undermining the U.S. national interest, and has made clear his emphasis on multilateral cooperation and alliances. To put it simply, a return to the Obama line will be the keynote. But even here, there are concerns about the effects of national fragmentation. Although the two parties' positions are not so different in terms of their hard-line stance on China and emphasis on Japan, there is a big gap in the perception of the threat to the United States. While Democrats focus on COVID-19, climate change, and racial inequality, Republicans focus on China, international terrorism, and immigration and refugees. Thus the world itself seems to be perceived as a parallel world.
If this situation continues, there will be larger swings of the pendulum in terms of priorities each time the administration changes, making it difficult for the nation to maintain its strategic intentions. In other words, the U.S. fragmentation is not just a domestic political issue, but is becoming a source of instability in the international community.
What is even more noteworthy is the impact of populism on the left and right. Although at first glance they seem to be as different as water and oil, they share a commonality in that they tend to lean toward protectionism and isolationism, a backlash against the mainstream that has promoted globalization. Younger generations, such as millennials, also tend to value international cooperation, but are generally skeptical of interventionism. These inward-looking trends need to be monitored closely.
Mr. Biden's policy toward Japan will be more stable than Trump's, who could not shake off his distrust of alliances. His position on the Paris Agreement on climate change, the Iranian nuclear agreement, the World Health Organization (WHO) and other issues are also in line with Japan's.
The U.S. economy and finances have been damaged by COVID-19, and the U.S. will likely ask Japan to share a greater burden in terms of both trade and defense. However, Japan and the United States share accumulated wisdom, experience, and human resources to deal with these issues.
In fact, the challenge for Japan will be to navigate the waters between the U.S. and China as they stand at loggerheads. Mr. Biden is also proposing to strengthen cooperation with the allies in terms of policy toward China. However, there is some uncertainty as to how far the Biden administration can maintain its hard-line approach to China, as it seeks results on global issues (such as the environment, nuclear non-proliferation, and infectious diseases) for which China's cooperation is essential. Conversely, the United States may well be wary of deepening economic relations between Japan and China.
With regard to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), there are strong concerns on the left within the Democratic Party, and a return to the TPP in its current form is unlikely to be forthcoming soon. Nevertheless, Biden must be well aware of the strategic significance of the TPP, which was a cornerstone of the Obama administration's Asia policy.
Foreign affairs may not be a high priority for the new administration, as it has a host of domestic issues to deal with, such as COVID-19 and economic recovery. In addition, it will take about six months for high-level appointments to be finalized. In the meantime, I would like to reiterate to the U.S. side the importance of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Initiative (FOIP) that Japan is promoting.
Yasushi Watanabe is a professor at Keio University. This is a summary of an article that appeared in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun on November 27, 2020.
What is worrisome is the growing distrust of the mainstream (the Establishment) within both parties and the radicalization of populism on both the left and the right. Moreover, both groups are trying to pull the United States in diametrically opposite directions.
Underlying the distrust of the mainstream are structural factors such as the disintegration of the middle class, the widening of the disparities, and the changing racial composition. It is closely linked to changes in the industrial structure and information environment, especially in terms of technological innovation, which is also seen in Europe.
The Biden administration can change the social atmosphere, if only by shunning words and actions that stir up division and confrontation, which has been Presdent Trump’s favorite ploy. If the COVID-19 and the employment situation are seen to improve, it will naturally increase the unifying influence of the new administration. It is essential to prioritize issues of high public concern and avoid dogmatism.
In that sense, the “twist” in Congress whereby the Republicans have a majority in the Senate is not necessarily a bad thing. It is because the Senate can deter, to some extent, left-leaning high-level appointments and policies (e.g., tax increases, more regulation, defense spending cuts, etc.). Fortunately, Mr. Biden is a politician who can also talk to Republicans. Of course, steering a course for reconciliation will not be easy. President Obama's middle-of-the-road approach has been criticized by Democrats as "too compromising" and "weak-kneed" and by Republicans as "uncompromising" and "dictatorial," which only deepened the division.
On the other hand, the "twist" is negative from the point of view of realizing the Biden administration's promises. The massive additional economic stimulus package, environmental and infrastructure investments, and expansion of the health care reform law (Obamacare) are expected to face fierce opposition from Senate Republicans.
On foreign affairs, Mr. Biden has criticized President Trump's “America First” approach as undermining the U.S. national interest, and has made clear his emphasis on multilateral cooperation and alliances. To put it simply, a return to the Obama line will be the keynote. But even here, there are concerns about the effects of national fragmentation. Although the two parties' positions are not so different in terms of their hard-line stance on China and emphasis on Japan, there is a big gap in the perception of the threat to the United States. While Democrats focus on COVID-19, climate change, and racial inequality, Republicans focus on China, international terrorism, and immigration and refugees. Thus the world itself seems to be perceived as a parallel world.
If this situation continues, there will be larger swings of the pendulum in terms of priorities each time the administration changes, making it difficult for the nation to maintain its strategic intentions. In other words, the U.S. fragmentation is not just a domestic political issue, but is becoming a source of instability in the international community.
What is even more noteworthy is the impact of populism on the left and right. Although at first glance they seem to be as different as water and oil, they share a commonality in that they tend to lean toward protectionism and isolationism, a backlash against the mainstream that has promoted globalization. Younger generations, such as millennials, also tend to value international cooperation, but are generally skeptical of interventionism. These inward-looking trends need to be monitored closely.
Mr. Biden's policy toward Japan will be more stable than Trump's, who could not shake off his distrust of alliances. His position on the Paris Agreement on climate change, the Iranian nuclear agreement, the World Health Organization (WHO) and other issues are also in line with Japan's.
The U.S. economy and finances have been damaged by COVID-19, and the U.S. will likely ask Japan to share a greater burden in terms of both trade and defense. However, Japan and the United States share accumulated wisdom, experience, and human resources to deal with these issues.
In fact, the challenge for Japan will be to navigate the waters between the U.S. and China as they stand at loggerheads. Mr. Biden is also proposing to strengthen cooperation with the allies in terms of policy toward China. However, there is some uncertainty as to how far the Biden administration can maintain its hard-line approach to China, as it seeks results on global issues (such as the environment, nuclear non-proliferation, and infectious diseases) for which China's cooperation is essential. Conversely, the United States may well be wary of deepening economic relations between Japan and China.
With regard to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), there are strong concerns on the left within the Democratic Party, and a return to the TPP in its current form is unlikely to be forthcoming soon. Nevertheless, Biden must be well aware of the strategic significance of the TPP, which was a cornerstone of the Obama administration's Asia policy.
Foreign affairs may not be a high priority for the new administration, as it has a host of domestic issues to deal with, such as COVID-19 and economic recovery. In addition, it will take about six months for high-level appointments to be finalized. In the meantime, I would like to reiterate to the U.S. side the importance of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Initiative (FOIP) that Japan is promoting.
Yasushi Watanabe is a professor at Keio University. This is a summary of an article that appeared in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun on November 27, 2020.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
大統領選後 左右のポピュリズム 先鋭化
渡辺 靖 / 慶応義塾大学教授
2020年 12月 1日
今回予想以上の接戦となり、しかも法廷闘争が続くことで、トランプ氏こそ「米民主主義の救世主」とみなす支持者の怨恨は残り続ける。2年後には中間選挙があり、それが終われば直ちに24年の大統領選が始動する。党派対立が激化し始めてから既に30年ほどたつが、こうした傾向は容易に好転しないだろう。
筆者が懸念するのは両党内で主流派（エスタブリッシュメント）への不信が増大し、左派と右派それぞれのポピュリズム（大衆迎合主義）が先鋭化している点だ。しかも両派が正反対の方向へ米国を引っ張ろうとしている。
主流派への不信の根底には中間層の瓦解・格差拡大、人種構成の変化など構造的要因が横たわる。それは技術革新を中心とした産業構造や情報環境の変化と密接に結びついており、欧州でもみられる現象だ。
バイデン政権となって、トランプ氏のように分断や対立をあおる言動を封印するだけでも社会の雰囲気は変わる。コロナの感染状況や雇用情勢が改善すれば、おのずと政権の求心力は高まるだろう。国民の関心が高い課題を優先し、教条主義を排することが肝要だ。
その意味では、共和党が議会上院の多数派を占める「ねじれ」現象は必ずしも悪い話ではない。左派色の強い高官人事や政策（増税や規制強化、国防費削減など）を上院がある程度抑止できるからだ。幸いバイデン氏は共和党とも話ができる政治家だ。もちろん融和へ向けたかじ取りは容易ではない。中道路線を模索したオバマ氏は民主党内から「妥協しすぎ」「弱腰」、共和党からは「非妥協的」「独裁者」と批判され、分断はかえって深まった。
他方、「ねじれ」現象はバイデン政権の公約実現という観点からはマイナスだ。巨額の追加経済対策や環境・インフラ投資、医療保険制度改革法（オバマケア）の拡充は上院の共和党から猛反発が予想される。
外交に関してバイデン氏はトランプ流の米国第一主義が米国の国益を損ねたと批判し、多国間協調や同盟重視の姿勢を鮮明にしている。端的にいえば、オバマ路線への回帰が基調になろう。もっとも、ここでも分断化の影響が懸念される。対中強硬や日本重視という点では両党の立場はさほど変わらないが、米国にとっての脅威認識には大きなズレがある。民主党支持者がコロナ、気候変動、人種不平等などを重視するのに対し、共和党支持者は中国や国際テロ、移民・難民に注目する。世界の見え方そのものがパラレルワールドの様相を呈している。
この状況が続けば、政権交代のたびに優先課題の振れ幅が大きくなり、国家としての戦略的意思の継続が困難になる。つまり米国の分断状況は単なる内政問題ではなく、国際社会の不安定要因になりつつある。
さらに注目すべきは左右のポピュリズムの影響だ。一見、水と油のようでいて、グローバル化を推進してきた主流派への反発、すなわち保護貿易や孤立主義に傾きがちな点は共通する。またミレニアル世代などの若い世代も、国際協調を重んじる傾向があるが、総じて介入主義には懐疑的だ。こうした内向き傾向は注視する必要がある。
同盟関係への不信感を拭いきれなかったトランプ氏に比べると、バイデン氏の対日政策はより安定性を増すだろう。温暖化対策の国際枠組み「パリ協定」やイラン核合意、世界保健機関（WHO）などを巡る立場も日本と軌を一にする。
コロナ禍で米国の経済や財政は傷んでおり、その分、通商と防衛の両面で日本の負担増を求めてくるだろう。しかし日米間にはそれらと向き合う知恵や経験、人材が蓄積されている。
むしろ課題は米中対立のはざまでのかじ取りだろう。バイデン氏は対中政策に関しても同盟国との連携強化を打ち出している。しかし中国の協力が欠かせないグローバルな課題（環境、核不拡散、感染症など）での成果を求めるバイデン政権が、どこまで対中強硬路線を堅持できるか不安も残る。逆に、米国は日中の経済関係の深化を警戒するだろう。
環太平洋経済連携協定（TPP）については民主党内左派の懸念が強く、現行内容のまま、直ちに復帰とはならないだろう。とはいえバイデン氏は、オバマ政権のアジア政策の要だったTPPの戦略的意義も十分認識しているはずだ。
新政権にはコロナ対策や経済立て直しなど国内の課題が山積しており、外交問題の優先順位は高くないかもしれない。加えて、高官人事が固まるには半年程度を要するだろう。この間、日本が推進する「自由で開かれたインド太平洋（FOIP）」構想の重要性を改めて米国側にインプットしておきたい。
筆者は慶應義塾大学教授。本稿は２０２０年１１月２７日付日本経済新聞に掲載された記事の要約である。
筆者が懸念するのは両党内で主流派（エスタブリッシュメント）への不信が増大し、左派と右派それぞれのポピュリズム（大衆迎合主義）が先鋭化している点だ。しかも両派が正反対の方向へ米国を引っ張ろうとしている。
主流派への不信の根底には中間層の瓦解・格差拡大、人種構成の変化など構造的要因が横たわる。それは技術革新を中心とした産業構造や情報環境の変化と密接に結びついており、欧州でもみられる現象だ。
バイデン政権となって、トランプ氏のように分断や対立をあおる言動を封印するだけでも社会の雰囲気は変わる。コロナの感染状況や雇用情勢が改善すれば、おのずと政権の求心力は高まるだろう。国民の関心が高い課題を優先し、教条主義を排することが肝要だ。
その意味では、共和党が議会上院の多数派を占める「ねじれ」現象は必ずしも悪い話ではない。左派色の強い高官人事や政策（増税や規制強化、国防費削減など）を上院がある程度抑止できるからだ。幸いバイデン氏は共和党とも話ができる政治家だ。もちろん融和へ向けたかじ取りは容易ではない。中道路線を模索したオバマ氏は民主党内から「妥協しすぎ」「弱腰」、共和党からは「非妥協的」「独裁者」と批判され、分断はかえって深まった。
他方、「ねじれ」現象はバイデン政権の公約実現という観点からはマイナスだ。巨額の追加経済対策や環境・インフラ投資、医療保険制度改革法（オバマケア）の拡充は上院の共和党から猛反発が予想される。
外交に関してバイデン氏はトランプ流の米国第一主義が米国の国益を損ねたと批判し、多国間協調や同盟重視の姿勢を鮮明にしている。端的にいえば、オバマ路線への回帰が基調になろう。もっとも、ここでも分断化の影響が懸念される。対中強硬や日本重視という点では両党の立場はさほど変わらないが、米国にとっての脅威認識には大きなズレがある。民主党支持者がコロナ、気候変動、人種不平等などを重視するのに対し、共和党支持者は中国や国際テロ、移民・難民に注目する。世界の見え方そのものがパラレルワールドの様相を呈している。
この状況が続けば、政権交代のたびに優先課題の振れ幅が大きくなり、国家としての戦略的意思の継続が困難になる。つまり米国の分断状況は単なる内政問題ではなく、国際社会の不安定要因になりつつある。
さらに注目すべきは左右のポピュリズムの影響だ。一見、水と油のようでいて、グローバル化を推進してきた主流派への反発、すなわち保護貿易や孤立主義に傾きがちな点は共通する。またミレニアル世代などの若い世代も、国際協調を重んじる傾向があるが、総じて介入主義には懐疑的だ。こうした内向き傾向は注視する必要がある。
同盟関係への不信感を拭いきれなかったトランプ氏に比べると、バイデン氏の対日政策はより安定性を増すだろう。温暖化対策の国際枠組み「パリ協定」やイラン核合意、世界保健機関（WHO）などを巡る立場も日本と軌を一にする。
コロナ禍で米国の経済や財政は傷んでおり、その分、通商と防衛の両面で日本の負担増を求めてくるだろう。しかし日米間にはそれらと向き合う知恵や経験、人材が蓄積されている。
むしろ課題は米中対立のはざまでのかじ取りだろう。バイデン氏は対中政策に関しても同盟国との連携強化を打ち出している。しかし中国の協力が欠かせないグローバルな課題（環境、核不拡散、感染症など）での成果を求めるバイデン政権が、どこまで対中強硬路線を堅持できるか不安も残る。逆に、米国は日中の経済関係の深化を警戒するだろう。
環太平洋経済連携協定（TPP）については民主党内左派の懸念が強く、現行内容のまま、直ちに復帰とはならないだろう。とはいえバイデン氏は、オバマ政権のアジア政策の要だったTPPの戦略的意義も十分認識しているはずだ。
新政権にはコロナ対策や経済立て直しなど国内の課題が山積しており、外交問題の優先順位は高くないかもしれない。加えて、高官人事が固まるには半年程度を要するだろう。この間、日本が推進する「自由で開かれたインド太平洋（FOIP）」構想の重要性を改めて米国側にインプットしておきたい。
筆者は慶應義塾大学教授。本稿は２０２０年１１月２７日付日本経済新聞に掲載された記事の要約である。
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟