Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and Japan's Role
KOMIZO Yasuyoshi / Former Ambassador to Kuwait
February 2, 2021
On 22 January this year, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) entered into force. However, those countries which have not joined the TPNW remain beyond the reach of this treaty, and the nuclear weapon states and those states who rely on extended deterrence under the nuclear umbrella oppose the TPNW. Nevertheless, once the TPNW has come into force, nuclear weapon states and their allies will not be able to ignore it. The fact that the treaty was adopted with the blessing of 122 countries in the negotiating conference under the auspices of the United Nations General Assembly, and that it has now entered into force, is proof that there is a growing awareness in the international community of the urgent need to ban nuclear weapons.
Japan has made the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty the axis of its security policy, relying for much of its security on the extended deterrence of the United States. On the other hand, as the only nation to have suffered atomic bomb attacks in war, Japan has for many years taken the lead in proposing resolutions calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons at the United Nations General Assembly, and has won the support of many countries. There is a considerable gap between reality and the ideal. Many countries are aware of the situation surrounding Japan, which shares its borders with China and Russia, nuclear-weapon states with different political regimes from Japan, and is also under the existential nuclear threat from North Korea. They have, therefore, shown understanding that Japan needs to focus on a realistic response while, as the only country to have been attacked by atomic bombs, ultimately aiming for a world without nuclear weapons. However, Japan's opposition to the treaty has led some countries and civil society organizations which call for the elimination of nuclear weapons, to suspect that Japan pursues a world without nuclear weapons not as an achievable goal with political will and policy commitment, but onｌｙ as an empty promise.
It would be difficult for Japan to conclude the TPNW immediately. But it would be wrong for Japan, the only country to have been hit by atomic bombs, to simply oppose and criticize the treaty. The TPNW aims to ban nuclear weapons from a humanitarian perspective. This is the long-cherished ardent wish of the hibakusha (atomic bomb victims) of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In addition, Japan has placed its priority on human security.
Even with the TPMW in place, effectively moving towards a world without nuclear weapons would depend on whether the international community as a whole could join forces to that end, transcending individual interests. A fundamental shift in thinking of how we can transform a confrontational security environment into a cooperative one is also required. And as the maintenance of peace is essential for sustainable growth, resolution of poverty and disparities as well contributes to the reduction of the cause of conflict and the maintenance of peace. In this sense, one could say that United Nations’ promotion of SDGs supports the maintenance of peace and progress in disarmament. With such a broad perspective and new ideas, Japan can constructively play a role in fostering a cooperative international environment that makes disarmament possible.
1) What Japan should do immediately is to participate as an observer in the first meeting of the State Parties, which will be convened within one year from the entry into force of the treaty, and to project Japan’s activities and ideas toward a world without nuclear weapons. The first meeting is likely to be held in Austria, but holding future meetings in Hiroshima or Nagasaki could also be considered.
2) When participating as an observer, Japan should place its priority on frank dialogue and listen attentively to the views of supporters of the treaty. There must be new discoveries, and there are many things Japan can offer.
a) The testimonies of the hibakusha of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with their universal and humanitarian message that "no one else should undergo such misery" have been the force that has prevented the use of nuclear weapons and have formed an important basis for the appeal for the abolition of nuclear weapons. It is necessary to continue to disseminate the awareness of the inhumanity of nuclear weapons. Japan should facilitate visits by people from around the world to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and provide opportunities for international conferences to promote nuclear disarmament as well as broad civil society debates on peacemaking.
b) Japan should present the activities and recommendations of the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, launched by Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida in 2017.
c) Verification measures for the elimination of nuclear weapon programmes under of the TPMW are to be worked out at the meeting of the State Parties. Japan has participated in several activities to develop verification measures for nuclear disarmament in which both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states participate, such as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) and the Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament (GGE). It would be a good idea to introduce these activities to the extent that they can be made public.
d) Japan's contributions related to the universalization of the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the promotion of participation in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) also deserve to be made known. Japan could also propose strengthening Article 3 of the TPNW regarding safeguards.
e) Japan's contribution to further strengthening of legal norms and international cooperation on nuclear terrorism, nuclear security measures and nuclear material control should also be introduced.
f) Japan should put forward its own ideas to apply its universal vision of the Preamble and Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution in the practices of international community. For this purpose, in addition to close US-Japan dialogue, Japan should also engage in continual conversations with Russia, China, the Korean Peninsula, ASEAN countries and others to formulate workable ideas.
These are just a few exemplary ideas, but I hope they will help Japan build bridges between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. I also hope that it they can facilitate open and frank dialogue with the countries in the TPNW circle.
(This article is part of an essay published in the "Kasumigaseki-kai". The author takes full responsibility for the wording and content of this article, and this article does not represent the views of any particular organization. The author worked for the IAEA for a total of nine years, and as Secretary General, Mayors for Peace (2013-19), participated in a series of meetings ranging from the International Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons to negotiating sessions for the TPNW.)
Japan has made the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty the axis of its security policy, relying for much of its security on the extended deterrence of the United States. On the other hand, as the only nation to have suffered atomic bomb attacks in war, Japan has for many years taken the lead in proposing resolutions calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons at the United Nations General Assembly, and has won the support of many countries. There is a considerable gap between reality and the ideal. Many countries are aware of the situation surrounding Japan, which shares its borders with China and Russia, nuclear-weapon states with different political regimes from Japan, and is also under the existential nuclear threat from North Korea. They have, therefore, shown understanding that Japan needs to focus on a realistic response while, as the only country to have been attacked by atomic bombs, ultimately aiming for a world without nuclear weapons. However, Japan's opposition to the treaty has led some countries and civil society organizations which call for the elimination of nuclear weapons, to suspect that Japan pursues a world without nuclear weapons not as an achievable goal with political will and policy commitment, but onｌｙ as an empty promise.
It would be difficult for Japan to conclude the TPNW immediately. But it would be wrong for Japan, the only country to have been hit by atomic bombs, to simply oppose and criticize the treaty. The TPNW aims to ban nuclear weapons from a humanitarian perspective. This is the long-cherished ardent wish of the hibakusha (atomic bomb victims) of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In addition, Japan has placed its priority on human security.
Even with the TPMW in place, effectively moving towards a world without nuclear weapons would depend on whether the international community as a whole could join forces to that end, transcending individual interests. A fundamental shift in thinking of how we can transform a confrontational security environment into a cooperative one is also required. And as the maintenance of peace is essential for sustainable growth, resolution of poverty and disparities as well contributes to the reduction of the cause of conflict and the maintenance of peace. In this sense, one could say that United Nations’ promotion of SDGs supports the maintenance of peace and progress in disarmament. With such a broad perspective and new ideas, Japan can constructively play a role in fostering a cooperative international environment that makes disarmament possible.
1) What Japan should do immediately is to participate as an observer in the first meeting of the State Parties, which will be convened within one year from the entry into force of the treaty, and to project Japan’s activities and ideas toward a world without nuclear weapons. The first meeting is likely to be held in Austria, but holding future meetings in Hiroshima or Nagasaki could also be considered.
2) When participating as an observer, Japan should place its priority on frank dialogue and listen attentively to the views of supporters of the treaty. There must be new discoveries, and there are many things Japan can offer.
a) The testimonies of the hibakusha of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with their universal and humanitarian message that "no one else should undergo such misery" have been the force that has prevented the use of nuclear weapons and have formed an important basis for the appeal for the abolition of nuclear weapons. It is necessary to continue to disseminate the awareness of the inhumanity of nuclear weapons. Japan should facilitate visits by people from around the world to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and provide opportunities for international conferences to promote nuclear disarmament as well as broad civil society debates on peacemaking.
b) Japan should present the activities and recommendations of the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, launched by Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida in 2017.
c) Verification measures for the elimination of nuclear weapon programmes under of the TPMW are to be worked out at the meeting of the State Parties. Japan has participated in several activities to develop verification measures for nuclear disarmament in which both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states participate, such as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) and the Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament (GGE). It would be a good idea to introduce these activities to the extent that they can be made public.
d) Japan's contributions related to the universalization of the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the promotion of participation in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) also deserve to be made known. Japan could also propose strengthening Article 3 of the TPNW regarding safeguards.
e) Japan's contribution to further strengthening of legal norms and international cooperation on nuclear terrorism, nuclear security measures and nuclear material control should also be introduced.
f) Japan should put forward its own ideas to apply its universal vision of the Preamble and Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution in the practices of international community. For this purpose, in addition to close US-Japan dialogue, Japan should also engage in continual conversations with Russia, China, the Korean Peninsula, ASEAN countries and others to formulate workable ideas.
These are just a few exemplary ideas, but I hope they will help Japan build bridges between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states. I also hope that it they can facilitate open and frank dialogue with the countries in the TPNW circle.
(This article is part of an essay published in the "Kasumigaseki-kai". The author takes full responsibility for the wording and content of this article, and this article does not represent the views of any particular organization. The author worked for the IAEA for a total of nine years, and as Secretary General, Mayors for Peace (2013-19), participated in a series of meetings ranging from the International Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons to negotiating sessions for the TPNW.)
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
「核兵器禁止条約」と日本の役割
小溝 泰義 / 元駐クウェート大使
2021年 2月 2日
本年1月22日に「核兵器禁止条約」（以下「禁止条約」）が発効した。しかし、「禁止条約」に参加しない国に条約の禁止規定は及ばず、核兵器国およびその拡大抑止に依存する核の傘下国は「禁止条約」に反対している。とは言え「禁止条約」が発効すれば、核兵器国およびその同盟国も、これを無視できまい。「禁止条約」が国連総会の下の条約交渉会議で122カ国の賛成により採択され、かつ発効するということは、国際社会に核兵器の禁止が急務だとの認識が広がっている証しだからだ。
わが国は、日米安全保障条約を安全保障政策の基軸に据え、米国の拡大抑止に安全保障の多くを依存する一方、唯一の戦争被爆国として、国連総会の場で長年にわたり核兵器廃絶決議を主導し、多くの国々の賛同を得てきた。現実と「理想」には相当の開きがある。多くの国々は、中国、ロシアという体制の異なる核兵器国と国境を接し、また、北朝鮮の核問題も身近に抱える我が国の事情を認識し、わが国が唯一の戦争被爆国として究極的には「核兵器のない世界」を目指しつつ現実的な対応を重視することに理解を示してきた。しかし、「禁止条約」に対する日本の反対姿勢を目にした国々や核廃絶を求める市民社会の諸団体の中には、わが国が掲げる「核兵器のない世界」との「理想」は、政治的意思と政策の伴う現実目標ではなく、単なる空念仏ではないかとの疑念が生じてもいる。
わが国が今すぐ「禁止条約」を締結するのは困難だろう。しかし唯一の戦争被爆国であるわが国が「禁止条約」に反対し批判するだけなのは、おかしいと思う。「禁止条約」は、人道的視点から核兵器の禁止を目指すものだ。これは広島・長崎の被爆者の悲願でもある。また、わが国は、従来から、人間の安全保障に力を注いできた。
「禁止条約」ができても、実際に核兵器のない世界に向かうには、個別の利害関係を超えて国際社会全体が協力し得るか否かが問われる。対立的な安全保障環境をいかに協調的な環境に転換するかという基本的な発想の転換も必要だ。そして、平和の維持は、持続的成長に不可欠であると同時に、貧困や格差の解消は、紛争の原因を軽減し平和の維持に貢献する。その意味で、国連のSDGsの推進は、平和の維持や軍縮の進展を支えるものだと言える。このように広い視野と新しい発想で、軍縮を可能とする協調的な国際環境を醸成するためにわが国が果たすべき役割は大きい。
(1）日本がすぐにすべきことは、「禁止条約」発効後1年以内に開かれる「締約国の会合」にオブザーバー参加し、核兵器のない世界に向けたわが国の活動やアイデアを発信することだ。第1回会合は、オーストリア開催が予定されているようだが、将来の会合を、広島や長崎で開催することを検討しても良い。
(2）オブザーバー参加の際、率直な対話を重視し、条約支持者の意見もよく聞くべきだ。新たな発見もあるに違いない。そして、日本が発信するにふさわしい事項は多い。
（a）広島、長崎の被爆者の被爆証言と「このような悲惨な思いを他の誰にもさせてはならない」との普遍的・人道的メッセージが核兵器の使用を防ぐ力となり、核兵器廃絶を目指す重要なよりどころとなってきた。核兵器の非人道性の認識の発信は今後とも必要。広島、長崎に世界の人々の訪問を促進し、また、核軍縮促進のための国際会議や市民社会による平和創出への幅広い議論の場を提供すべきだ。
（b）２０１７年に岸田文雄外務大臣が立ち上げた「核軍縮の実質的な進展のための賢人会議」の活動や提言を紹介する。
（c）「禁止条約」の核廃棄に関する検証措置規定は、「締約国の会合」で具体化を図る予定だ。わが国は、核兵器国と非核兵器国が共に参加する核軍縮の検証措置の具体化のためのいくつかの活動に参加している。核軍縮検証のための国際パートナーシップ（IPNDV）や核軍縮検証に関する政府専門家会合（GGE）などである。これら活動につき、公表可能な範囲で紹介するのも一案。
（d）国際原子力機関（IAEA）の追加議定書の普遍化や、包括的核実験禁止条約（CTBT）の参加促進に関するわが国の実績も紹介に値する。また、保障措置に関する「禁止条約」第3条の強化を提案する。
（e）核テロ、核セキュリティ対策、核物質管理等の法的規範および国際協力を一層強化するためのわが国の貢献を紹介する。
（f）日本国憲法前文及び第9条の普遍的ビジョンを国際社会に展開する独自のアイデアを発信すべきだ。このために、緊密な日米対話に加え、ロシア、中国、朝鮮半島、ASEAN諸国等とも対話を重ね、実践的なアイデアを練るべきだ。
以上、断片的なアイデアに過ぎないが、わが国が核兵器国と非核兵器国の橋渡しをし、「禁止条約」のサークルとも胸襟を開いて対話するための一助になれば幸いである。
（本稿は「霞関会」の論壇に掲載された論考の一部で、文責は筆者に属し、特定の団体の見解を代弁するものではない。筆者はIAEAに通算9年勤務し、また、平和首長会議事務総長（2013-19年）として「核兵器の人道的影響に関する国際会議」から「禁止条約」交渉会議に至る一連の諸会合に参加した）
わが国は、日米安全保障条約を安全保障政策の基軸に据え、米国の拡大抑止に安全保障の多くを依存する一方、唯一の戦争被爆国として、国連総会の場で長年にわたり核兵器廃絶決議を主導し、多くの国々の賛同を得てきた。現実と「理想」には相当の開きがある。多くの国々は、中国、ロシアという体制の異なる核兵器国と国境を接し、また、北朝鮮の核問題も身近に抱える我が国の事情を認識し、わが国が唯一の戦争被爆国として究極的には「核兵器のない世界」を目指しつつ現実的な対応を重視することに理解を示してきた。しかし、「禁止条約」に対する日本の反対姿勢を目にした国々や核廃絶を求める市民社会の諸団体の中には、わが国が掲げる「核兵器のない世界」との「理想」は、政治的意思と政策の伴う現実目標ではなく、単なる空念仏ではないかとの疑念が生じてもいる。
わが国が今すぐ「禁止条約」を締結するのは困難だろう。しかし唯一の戦争被爆国であるわが国が「禁止条約」に反対し批判するだけなのは、おかしいと思う。「禁止条約」は、人道的視点から核兵器の禁止を目指すものだ。これは広島・長崎の被爆者の悲願でもある。また、わが国は、従来から、人間の安全保障に力を注いできた。
「禁止条約」ができても、実際に核兵器のない世界に向かうには、個別の利害関係を超えて国際社会全体が協力し得るか否かが問われる。対立的な安全保障環境をいかに協調的な環境に転換するかという基本的な発想の転換も必要だ。そして、平和の維持は、持続的成長に不可欠であると同時に、貧困や格差の解消は、紛争の原因を軽減し平和の維持に貢献する。その意味で、国連のSDGsの推進は、平和の維持や軍縮の進展を支えるものだと言える。このように広い視野と新しい発想で、軍縮を可能とする協調的な国際環境を醸成するためにわが国が果たすべき役割は大きい。
(1）日本がすぐにすべきことは、「禁止条約」発効後1年以内に開かれる「締約国の会合」にオブザーバー参加し、核兵器のない世界に向けたわが国の活動やアイデアを発信することだ。第1回会合は、オーストリア開催が予定されているようだが、将来の会合を、広島や長崎で開催することを検討しても良い。
(2）オブザーバー参加の際、率直な対話を重視し、条約支持者の意見もよく聞くべきだ。新たな発見もあるに違いない。そして、日本が発信するにふさわしい事項は多い。
（a）広島、長崎の被爆者の被爆証言と「このような悲惨な思いを他の誰にもさせてはならない」との普遍的・人道的メッセージが核兵器の使用を防ぐ力となり、核兵器廃絶を目指す重要なよりどころとなってきた。核兵器の非人道性の認識の発信は今後とも必要。広島、長崎に世界の人々の訪問を促進し、また、核軍縮促進のための国際会議や市民社会による平和創出への幅広い議論の場を提供すべきだ。
（b）２０１７年に岸田文雄外務大臣が立ち上げた「核軍縮の実質的な進展のための賢人会議」の活動や提言を紹介する。
（c）「禁止条約」の核廃棄に関する検証措置規定は、「締約国の会合」で具体化を図る予定だ。わが国は、核兵器国と非核兵器国が共に参加する核軍縮の検証措置の具体化のためのいくつかの活動に参加している。核軍縮検証のための国際パートナーシップ（IPNDV）や核軍縮検証に関する政府専門家会合（GGE）などである。これら活動につき、公表可能な範囲で紹介するのも一案。
（d）国際原子力機関（IAEA）の追加議定書の普遍化や、包括的核実験禁止条約（CTBT）の参加促進に関するわが国の実績も紹介に値する。また、保障措置に関する「禁止条約」第3条の強化を提案する。
（e）核テロ、核セキュリティ対策、核物質管理等の法的規範および国際協力を一層強化するためのわが国の貢献を紹介する。
（f）日本国憲法前文及び第9条の普遍的ビジョンを国際社会に展開する独自のアイデアを発信すべきだ。このために、緊密な日米対話に加え、ロシア、中国、朝鮮半島、ASEAN諸国等とも対話を重ね、実践的なアイデアを練るべきだ。
以上、断片的なアイデアに過ぎないが、わが国が核兵器国と非核兵器国の橋渡しをし、「禁止条約」のサークルとも胸襟を開いて対話するための一助になれば幸いである。
（本稿は「霞関会」の論壇に掲載された論考の一部で、文責は筆者に属し、特定の団体の見解を代弁するものではない。筆者はIAEAに通算9年勤務し、また、平和首長会議事務総長（2013-19年）として「核兵器の人道的影響に関する国際会議」から「禁止条約」交渉会議に至る一連の諸会合に参加した）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟