The Light and Shade of Koizumi Diplomacy
FUKUHARA Koichi / Former Chief Editorial Writer of Kyodo News Agency
August 6, 2004
The latest Upper House elections passed a half-term verdict on Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, as the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost to the Democratic Party. Thanks to the legacy of LDP's overwhelming victory three years' ago, the governing LDP-Komei Party coalition was able to maintain a safe majority in the Upper House, thus preserving the Koizumi administration. Even so, rather than expressing their hopes for the prime minister's policies, voters expressed a stronger concern over his ability to deliver.
In the area of diplomacy, the stark contrast between the merits and demerits, or light and shade, of Koizumi's flamboyant summit diplomacy has become ever more pronounced, as exemplified by the state of Japan-U.S. relations that the administration boasts as being at its historic best due to the solid friendship between Koizumi and U.S. President George Bush, Koizumi’s meeting with North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-Il that produced the landmark Pyongyang Declaration, and deterioration in Japan's political relations with China caused by Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.
Ever since taking office, Koizumi has given full support to foreign policies pursued by President Bush, and has actively sought to dispatch the Self Defense Forces in the Iraq War. Praised by President Bush as a "friend and powerful leader" during the summit meeting of major countries that preceded the Upper House elections, Koizumi was quick to proclaim that Japan's Self Defense Forces will participate in the multi-national force that was to take over from the American-British occupying forces once the United States transferred sovereignty to Iraq.
Koizumi's message to Bush - an important decision that was made without commensurate discussion at home – worked to the LDP's disadvantage in the elections, although the prime minister himself claimed it was the right course of action that deepened U.S. trust and raised Japan's standing. However, as doubts over the U.S. cause for the Iraq War spread throughout the world and Bush's prospects for reelection become uncertain, support for Koizumi's U.S. diplomacy has rapidly waned.
Also prior to the Upper House elections, the Prime Minister paid another visit to Pyongyang to call on Kim Jong-Il to normalize bilateral relations while Koizumi was in office, and reconfirmed the Pyongyang Declaration of 2002 that upheld a one-time resolution of all outstanding issues and normalization of relations. While strongly criticized by his peers within the LDP who retain a deep-rooted distrust of North Korea and by victims of North Korean abductions, some summit participants as well as South Korea and China voiced their approval, and the move had the effect of temporarily boosting the domestic approval rating for the administration.
The six-nation talks on the North Korean nuclear program that began in August last year in Beijing, though plagued with difficulties, have made gradual progress, and some point out that it may yet develop into an effective future framework for international discussion for Northeast Asia. Will Koizumi be able to take advantage of this major trend and build a track record towards the ultimate goal of normalizing relations with North Korea? Considering that the Bush administration is apparently unchanged in its mistrust and harsh stance towards North Korea, this issue poses a significant touchstone for Koizumi diplomacy.
Meanwhile, under circumstances in which the rapid growth of the Chinese economy increases the importance of regional cooperation in Asia, the negative effects of Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine are likely to spread, rather than subside. While more than a few Japanese prime ministers have paid their respects to the shrine, Koizumi is the only one who has continued to do so even after Chinese and South Korean protests have made it a diplomatic issue.
While his stance has won considerable support among the Japanese, it is doubtful whether his official comment that he feels no qualms about honoring Class-A war criminals along with other war dead has worked to enhance international understanding and trust towards Japan, or strengthen his hand in Asian diplomacy. Japan accepted the outcome of the War Crime Trials under the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the common understanding at the time was that by recognizing the responsibility of Class-A war criminals the Emperor was absolved of responsibility for the war.
Emperor Showa (Hirohito) often paid his respects at the Yasukuni Shrine on ceremonial occasions up to 1975, but stopped doing so after Class-A war criminals were jointly honored at the shrine. Though the reason was never publicly disclosed, consideration towards public opinion abroad must have played a significant part in that decision.
Former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro - Koizumi's role model in summit diplomacy – was famous for his close friendship with the late former U.S. President Ronald Reagan, but he was also careful in cultivating good relations with Japan's Asian neighbors. He chose South Korea for his first official visit as prime minister and left an impression by attempting to deliver his greetings in Korean. In 1983 Nakasone gave China's then General Secretary Hu Yaobang a family welcome upon his visit to Japan, and realizing that his official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 1985 placed the Chinese leader in a difficult spot in domestic politics, gave up doing so the next year, explaining his position through a comment disclosed by his Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotoda Masaharu.
The words of that same Mr. Nakasone, pointing out that the greatest concern with regard to Koizumi diplomacy lies in his East Asian policy, "Japan's most important long-term issue," carries much weight.
The writer is former Professor of Iwate University and former Chief Editorial Writer of Kyodo News Agency.
In the area of diplomacy, the stark contrast between the merits and demerits, or light and shade, of Koizumi's flamboyant summit diplomacy has become ever more pronounced, as exemplified by the state of Japan-U.S. relations that the administration boasts as being at its historic best due to the solid friendship between Koizumi and U.S. President George Bush, Koizumi’s meeting with North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-Il that produced the landmark Pyongyang Declaration, and deterioration in Japan's political relations with China caused by Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.
Ever since taking office, Koizumi has given full support to foreign policies pursued by President Bush, and has actively sought to dispatch the Self Defense Forces in the Iraq War. Praised by President Bush as a "friend and powerful leader" during the summit meeting of major countries that preceded the Upper House elections, Koizumi was quick to proclaim that Japan's Self Defense Forces will participate in the multi-national force that was to take over from the American-British occupying forces once the United States transferred sovereignty to Iraq.
Koizumi's message to Bush - an important decision that was made without commensurate discussion at home – worked to the LDP's disadvantage in the elections, although the prime minister himself claimed it was the right course of action that deepened U.S. trust and raised Japan's standing. However, as doubts over the U.S. cause for the Iraq War spread throughout the world and Bush's prospects for reelection become uncertain, support for Koizumi's U.S. diplomacy has rapidly waned.
Also prior to the Upper House elections, the Prime Minister paid another visit to Pyongyang to call on Kim Jong-Il to normalize bilateral relations while Koizumi was in office, and reconfirmed the Pyongyang Declaration of 2002 that upheld a one-time resolution of all outstanding issues and normalization of relations. While strongly criticized by his peers within the LDP who retain a deep-rooted distrust of North Korea and by victims of North Korean abductions, some summit participants as well as South Korea and China voiced their approval, and the move had the effect of temporarily boosting the domestic approval rating for the administration.
The six-nation talks on the North Korean nuclear program that began in August last year in Beijing, though plagued with difficulties, have made gradual progress, and some point out that it may yet develop into an effective future framework for international discussion for Northeast Asia. Will Koizumi be able to take advantage of this major trend and build a track record towards the ultimate goal of normalizing relations with North Korea? Considering that the Bush administration is apparently unchanged in its mistrust and harsh stance towards North Korea, this issue poses a significant touchstone for Koizumi diplomacy.
Meanwhile, under circumstances in which the rapid growth of the Chinese economy increases the importance of regional cooperation in Asia, the negative effects of Koizumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine are likely to spread, rather than subside. While more than a few Japanese prime ministers have paid their respects to the shrine, Koizumi is the only one who has continued to do so even after Chinese and South Korean protests have made it a diplomatic issue.
While his stance has won considerable support among the Japanese, it is doubtful whether his official comment that he feels no qualms about honoring Class-A war criminals along with other war dead has worked to enhance international understanding and trust towards Japan, or strengthen his hand in Asian diplomacy. Japan accepted the outcome of the War Crime Trials under the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and the common understanding at the time was that by recognizing the responsibility of Class-A war criminals the Emperor was absolved of responsibility for the war.
Emperor Showa (Hirohito) often paid his respects at the Yasukuni Shrine on ceremonial occasions up to 1975, but stopped doing so after Class-A war criminals were jointly honored at the shrine. Though the reason was never publicly disclosed, consideration towards public opinion abroad must have played a significant part in that decision.
Former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro - Koizumi's role model in summit diplomacy – was famous for his close friendship with the late former U.S. President Ronald Reagan, but he was also careful in cultivating good relations with Japan's Asian neighbors. He chose South Korea for his first official visit as prime minister and left an impression by attempting to deliver his greetings in Korean. In 1983 Nakasone gave China's then General Secretary Hu Yaobang a family welcome upon his visit to Japan, and realizing that his official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 1985 placed the Chinese leader in a difficult spot in domestic politics, gave up doing so the next year, explaining his position through a comment disclosed by his Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotoda Masaharu.
The words of that same Mr. Nakasone, pointing out that the greatest concern with regard to Koizumi diplomacy lies in his East Asian policy, "Japan's most important long-term issue," carries much weight.
The writer is former Professor of Iwate University and former Chief Editorial Writer of Kyodo News Agency.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
小泉外交の光と影
福原 亨一 / 元共同通信論説委員長
2004年 8月 6日
小泉首相の業績を中間評価する参院選で自民党は民主党に敗れた。三年前の参院選で自民党が大勝した遺産があるので、自民・公明の連立与党はなお安定多数を維持し、小泉政権が続いているが、有権者は首相の政策への期待よりも実行力への疑問をより強く表明した。
外交面でいえば「小泉・ブッシュの固い友情で史上最高」と政権が自賛する日米関係をはじめ、画期的な日朝平壌宣言を生んだ金正日総書記との会談、靖国神社参拝で冷え込む日中政治関係——など華やかな小泉首脳外交の明暗、光と影の対照がくっきりと浮かんできた。
首相は就任以来、ブッシュ大統領の外交路線を全面的に支持し、イラク戦争への自衛隊派兵も積極的に推進した。参院選前の主要国首脳会議（サミット）では、大統領から「私の友人、強力なリーダー」と持ち上げられ、米国がイラクに主権を移譲し、米英占領軍を多国籍軍に切り替えると自衛隊もこれに参加するといち早く表明した。
十分な国内論議もないまま重大な決定をブッシュに伝えたことは，選挙で自民党にマイナスに働いたが、首相は米国の信頼を深め，日本の地位を高める当然の措置だったと主張する。しかし米国の唱えたイラク戦争の大義に国際的な疑問が広がり，ブッシュ再選も確実とはいえない情勢になると、首相の対米外交を評価する声は急速に低くなっている。
首相は参院選前に平壌を再訪して「自分の在任中に，正常化を実現しよう」と金正日に呼びかけ、懸案一括解決・国交正常化を謳った一昨年の平壌宣言を再確認した。北朝鮮への不信が根深い自民党内や拉致被害者からの批判は強かったが、サミットに参加した首脳の一部や韓国，中国からは評価され、国内の内閣支持率を一時的に高める効果もあった。
昨年８月北京で始まった北朝鮮の核に関する六か国協議は難航しながらも徐々に進展を見せ、将来は東北アジアの有力な国際協議の枠組みに発展する可能性を指摘する声も出ている。首相がこの大きな流れに呼応する形で、日朝正常化の大目標に向け実績を積んでいけるか。ブッシュ政権の金正日に対する不信、厳しい態度は変わっていないと伝えられるだけに、小泉外交の大きな試金石である。
中国経済の急成長をきっかけにアジアの地域協力が改めて重視される情勢になると、首相の靖国神社参拝のマイナス効果は薄らぐより広がる恐れがある。靖国に参拝した戦後の首相は少なくないが、中国、韓国の抗議で外交問題になった後も参拝を続けるのは小泉首相が初めてだ。
首相の態度は国内では相当の支持を得ているが、「A級戦犯の合祀に抵抗感を覚えない」という首相の公式発言が国際的に理解され、日本の信用を高め、アジア外交を強化するものか極めて疑わしい。日本は講和条約で戦犯裁判の結果を受け入れたし、A級戦犯の責任を認めることで天皇の戦争責任論が消えた、というのが当時の常識ではなかったか。
昭和天皇は昭和50年まで靖国神社例大祭等の機会にしばしば親拝されたが、A級戦犯の合祀後は天皇親拝は行われていない。その理由は公表されていないが、海外世論への配慮が大きいに違いあるまい。
首脳外交の大先輩・中曽根元首相は故レーガン大統領との親密な「ロン・ヤス」関係で有名だが、アジア隣邦への配慮も周到だった。首相として最初の外遊先に韓国を選び、韓国語のあいさつを試みて感銘を呼んだ。83年来日した中国の胡耀邦総書記を家族ぐるみで接待し、85年自らの靖国公式参拝が胡耀邦を苦境に立たせたと知るや、翌年の参拝を断念し、後藤田官房長官談話でその立場を内外に説明した。
その中曽根氏が、小泉外交で最も懸念されるのは「日本で一番大事な長期的問題である東アジア政策」だ、と指摘する言葉は重い。
（筆者は元岩手大学教授、元共同通信論説委員長。）
外交面でいえば「小泉・ブッシュの固い友情で史上最高」と政権が自賛する日米関係をはじめ、画期的な日朝平壌宣言を生んだ金正日総書記との会談、靖国神社参拝で冷え込む日中政治関係——など華やかな小泉首脳外交の明暗、光と影の対照がくっきりと浮かんできた。
首相は就任以来、ブッシュ大統領の外交路線を全面的に支持し、イラク戦争への自衛隊派兵も積極的に推進した。参院選前の主要国首脳会議（サミット）では、大統領から「私の友人、強力なリーダー」と持ち上げられ、米国がイラクに主権を移譲し、米英占領軍を多国籍軍に切り替えると自衛隊もこれに参加するといち早く表明した。
十分な国内論議もないまま重大な決定をブッシュに伝えたことは，選挙で自民党にマイナスに働いたが、首相は米国の信頼を深め，日本の地位を高める当然の措置だったと主張する。しかし米国の唱えたイラク戦争の大義に国際的な疑問が広がり，ブッシュ再選も確実とはいえない情勢になると、首相の対米外交を評価する声は急速に低くなっている。
首相は参院選前に平壌を再訪して「自分の在任中に，正常化を実現しよう」と金正日に呼びかけ、懸案一括解決・国交正常化を謳った一昨年の平壌宣言を再確認した。北朝鮮への不信が根深い自民党内や拉致被害者からの批判は強かったが、サミットに参加した首脳の一部や韓国，中国からは評価され、国内の内閣支持率を一時的に高める効果もあった。
昨年８月北京で始まった北朝鮮の核に関する六か国協議は難航しながらも徐々に進展を見せ、将来は東北アジアの有力な国際協議の枠組みに発展する可能性を指摘する声も出ている。首相がこの大きな流れに呼応する形で、日朝正常化の大目標に向け実績を積んでいけるか。ブッシュ政権の金正日に対する不信、厳しい態度は変わっていないと伝えられるだけに、小泉外交の大きな試金石である。
中国経済の急成長をきっかけにアジアの地域協力が改めて重視される情勢になると、首相の靖国神社参拝のマイナス効果は薄らぐより広がる恐れがある。靖国に参拝した戦後の首相は少なくないが、中国、韓国の抗議で外交問題になった後も参拝を続けるのは小泉首相が初めてだ。
首相の態度は国内では相当の支持を得ているが、「A級戦犯の合祀に抵抗感を覚えない」という首相の公式発言が国際的に理解され、日本の信用を高め、アジア外交を強化するものか極めて疑わしい。日本は講和条約で戦犯裁判の結果を受け入れたし、A級戦犯の責任を認めることで天皇の戦争責任論が消えた、というのが当時の常識ではなかったか。
昭和天皇は昭和50年まで靖国神社例大祭等の機会にしばしば親拝されたが、A級戦犯の合祀後は天皇親拝は行われていない。その理由は公表されていないが、海外世論への配慮が大きいに違いあるまい。
首脳外交の大先輩・中曽根元首相は故レーガン大統領との親密な「ロン・ヤス」関係で有名だが、アジア隣邦への配慮も周到だった。首相として最初の外遊先に韓国を選び、韓国語のあいさつを試みて感銘を呼んだ。83年来日した中国の胡耀邦総書記を家族ぐるみで接待し、85年自らの靖国公式参拝が胡耀邦を苦境に立たせたと知るや、翌年の参拝を断念し、後藤田官房長官談話でその立場を内外に説明した。
その中曽根氏が、小泉外交で最も懸念されるのは「日本で一番大事な長期的問題である東アジア政策」だ、と指摘する言葉は重い。
（筆者は元岩手大学教授、元共同通信論説委員長。）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟