The Future of the Kyoto Protocol
HARA Takeshi / Professor, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University
February 28, 2005
The Kyoto Protocol, which aims to moderate the progress of global warming, took effect on February 16. For over two centuries since the Industrial Revolution, we have been discharging greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, and this latest attempt at regulating emissions through legally-binding controls amounts to a grand experiment for an industrial civilization. As host nation, Japan made a committed effort for the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, and harbors a sense of discontent towards the United States for abandoning the Framework Convention on Climate Change due to the current administration's judgment on U.S. national interests, while sympathizing with Russia for ratifying the Treaty.
We shall not forget the scene at the conference center for the Third Conference of Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change held in 1997, where the Kyoto Protocol was formulated, and where around fifty Americans – members of the U.S. Senate and Congress, and of the oil and automobile industries belonging to the Global Climate Coalition – stood guard to make sure the U.S. government stayed its course on "zero reductions."
Then again, upon self-reflection we find that Japan is in no position to freely criticize America, either. True, the Japanese government moved swiftly, developing a domestic legal system aimed at stemming the tide of global warming by 1998. Thus the Law for Promoting Measures on Global Warming, the Law for Rational Use of Energy and the Law for Recycling Home Appliances were enacted.
Nevertheless, after seven years Japan's annual emissions of greenhouse gases has increased; rising by 7.6% in 2002 compared with 1990, the benchmark year adopted by the Kyoto Protocol. Under the Protocol, Japan is committed to reduce its emissions by 6% by 2010 from 1990 levels. In comparison, greenhouse gas emissions have risen by 13% in the United States against its reduction target of 7%, while they have fallen by 2.5% for the entire European Union, where the United Kingdom and France have already achieved their reduction targets of 8%, and where Germany has succeeded in reducing emissions by 18.5% against its target of 21%.
There are two reasons why Japan has been unable to reduce its greenhouse gases.
The first reason is related to the fact that while Japan has been responsible for producing roughly 13% of the world's GNP, its carbon dioxide emissions have remained at around 4.2% of the total global output. In other words, the oil shock had made a model student of Japan in terms of energy conservation and technological innovation, and efforts to further reduce greenhouse gases will result in comparatively higher costs than other countries. Such is the thinking of Japanese industries as well as of the government, bureaucracy and governing political party that represent their interests.
The second relates to Japan's policy of placing the construction of 20 additional nuclear power plants by 2010 at the center of its countermeasures for global warming. Under the current social climate in which new construction projects are being denied without exception due to direct votes cast by local inhabitants, accomplishing this goal would be next to impossible. Meanwhile, with respect to government policy for 2010 on utilizing biomass as an alternative to fossil fuel - the greatest source of greenhouse gases, the European Union is aiming to fulfill 8.5% of its primary energy needs and the United States 6.6% of its supply. In contrast, Japan's target is set at a mere 1% of its energy needs. The Japanese archipelago is covered by 25 million hectares of forest from which thinned wood is generated for disposal, and this alone amounts to as much as 3.9 million tons of biomass each year.
Japan, with abundant technology and funding, possesses the ability to come within reach of its Treaty targets - once policy is given a direction. Legal controls accorded by the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, together with opportunities provided by the market economy, will no doubt cause a qualitative change in the direction of Japanese policy.
In the near future, Japan will realize a model policy based on legal controls and market opportunity, by means of industry-specific carbon dioxide reduction measures drafted by the government and an environmental tax system developed through measures such as the introduction of a carbon tax currently being debated by the Tax Commission.
The writer is a Professor at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University.
We shall not forget the scene at the conference center for the Third Conference of Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change held in 1997, where the Kyoto Protocol was formulated, and where around fifty Americans – members of the U.S. Senate and Congress, and of the oil and automobile industries belonging to the Global Climate Coalition – stood guard to make sure the U.S. government stayed its course on "zero reductions."
Then again, upon self-reflection we find that Japan is in no position to freely criticize America, either. True, the Japanese government moved swiftly, developing a domestic legal system aimed at stemming the tide of global warming by 1998. Thus the Law for Promoting Measures on Global Warming, the Law for Rational Use of Energy and the Law for Recycling Home Appliances were enacted.
Nevertheless, after seven years Japan's annual emissions of greenhouse gases has increased; rising by 7.6% in 2002 compared with 1990, the benchmark year adopted by the Kyoto Protocol. Under the Protocol, Japan is committed to reduce its emissions by 6% by 2010 from 1990 levels. In comparison, greenhouse gas emissions have risen by 13% in the United States against its reduction target of 7%, while they have fallen by 2.5% for the entire European Union, where the United Kingdom and France have already achieved their reduction targets of 8%, and where Germany has succeeded in reducing emissions by 18.5% against its target of 21%.
There are two reasons why Japan has been unable to reduce its greenhouse gases.
The first reason is related to the fact that while Japan has been responsible for producing roughly 13% of the world's GNP, its carbon dioxide emissions have remained at around 4.2% of the total global output. In other words, the oil shock had made a model student of Japan in terms of energy conservation and technological innovation, and efforts to further reduce greenhouse gases will result in comparatively higher costs than other countries. Such is the thinking of Japanese industries as well as of the government, bureaucracy and governing political party that represent their interests.
The second relates to Japan's policy of placing the construction of 20 additional nuclear power plants by 2010 at the center of its countermeasures for global warming. Under the current social climate in which new construction projects are being denied without exception due to direct votes cast by local inhabitants, accomplishing this goal would be next to impossible. Meanwhile, with respect to government policy for 2010 on utilizing biomass as an alternative to fossil fuel - the greatest source of greenhouse gases, the European Union is aiming to fulfill 8.5% of its primary energy needs and the United States 6.6% of its supply. In contrast, Japan's target is set at a mere 1% of its energy needs. The Japanese archipelago is covered by 25 million hectares of forest from which thinned wood is generated for disposal, and this alone amounts to as much as 3.9 million tons of biomass each year.
Japan, with abundant technology and funding, possesses the ability to come within reach of its Treaty targets - once policy is given a direction. Legal controls accorded by the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, together with opportunities provided by the market economy, will no doubt cause a qualitative change in the direction of Japanese policy.
In the near future, Japan will realize a model policy based on legal controls and market opportunity, by means of industry-specific carbon dioxide reduction measures drafted by the government and an environmental tax system developed through measures such as the introduction of a carbon tax currently being debated by the Tax Commission.
The writer is a Professor at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
京都議定書の展望
原 剛 / 早稲田大学大学院教授
2005年 2月 28日
地球温暖化の進行を緩和するための京都議定書が2月16日に発効した。産業革命から200余年、大気中に排出され続けてきた温室効果ガスに、法的な縛りをもつ排出規制の網をかぶせる産業文明の大実験である。1997年、議長国として京都議定書の採択に尽力した日本は、現政権による「国益の判断」の違いから、「気候変動枠組み条約」を離脱したアメリカに反感を、条約を批准したロシアに好感を抱いている。
京都議定書を作成した97年の第三回条約締結国会議の会場には50人前後の米国上下両院議員や、石油、自動車産業界などによる「地球気候連盟」の業界人が陣取り、米政府が「ゼロ削減」を貫徹するよう見張っていた光景を私たちは忘れない。
しかしわが身を顧みるとき、果たして日本はアメリカを手放しで批判することができるだろうか。確かに日本政府は温暖化を遅らせるため、98年までに国内の法体系を素早く作り上げた。地球温暖化対策推進法、エネルギーの使用の合理化に関する法律、家庭用機器再商品化法などである。
しかし７年経った現在、日本の温室効果ガスの年間発生量は京都議定書が基準とする90年から02年まですでに7.6％増えている。議定書では2010年までに日本は90年比6％の削減義務を負っている。ちなみに7％減の目標を負う米国は13％増、ＥＵ諸国全体で2.5％減、8％減を目指す英、仏はすでに目標を達成、21％の削減を掲げる独は18.5％に成功している。
日本が温室効果ガスを減らすことができない主な理由は２つある。
第一に世界のＧＮＰ総額の13％前後を生産し続けてきた日本の二酸化炭素排出量が世界の総排出量の4.2％程度にとどまっていること。すなわち日本は石油危機を契機に省エネ、技術の刷新に成功した優等生であり、これ以上、温室効果ガスを減らすのは他国に比べコスト高になる、という産業界およびその利益を代弁する政府、官庁、政権与党の考えである。
第二に温暖化緩和対策の中心に、日本は2010年までに原子力発電所を20基増設する政策を据えていることである。この目標は新しい原発立地計画が住民の直接投票でことごとく否定される社会状況で、ほとんど実現不能となってきている。しかし、たとえば温室効果ガスの最大発生源である化石燃料に代わるバイオマスの2010年までの利用の政策を比較すると、ＥＵは一次エネルギー需要の8.5％、米国は6.6％の供給を目標としているのに対し、日本は1％程度にとどまる。日本列島の2500万ヘクタールの森林から生産され、廃棄されている間伐材などのバイオマスだけで、実に年間390万トンにのぼる。
しかし、いったん政策の方向が決まると技術、資金とも豊富な日本は、条約目標に接近する実力を備えている。京都議定書の発効は「法的な規制」と、市場経済による「機会の提供」を介して、日本の政策の方向を質的に変えることになるだろう。
すなわち政府により原案がまとめられた、産業種類別の二酸化炭素削減策と、税制に関する審議会で討議されている炭素税の導入を例とする環境税体系の構築が、「法的な規制」と「機会の提供」による政策の例として、間もなく現実のものとなろう。
（筆者は早稲田大学大学院アジア太平洋研究科教授。）
京都議定書を作成した97年の第三回条約締結国会議の会場には50人前後の米国上下両院議員や、石油、自動車産業界などによる「地球気候連盟」の業界人が陣取り、米政府が「ゼロ削減」を貫徹するよう見張っていた光景を私たちは忘れない。
しかしわが身を顧みるとき、果たして日本はアメリカを手放しで批判することができるだろうか。確かに日本政府は温暖化を遅らせるため、98年までに国内の法体系を素早く作り上げた。地球温暖化対策推進法、エネルギーの使用の合理化に関する法律、家庭用機器再商品化法などである。
しかし７年経った現在、日本の温室効果ガスの年間発生量は京都議定書が基準とする90年から02年まですでに7.6％増えている。議定書では2010年までに日本は90年比6％の削減義務を負っている。ちなみに7％減の目標を負う米国は13％増、ＥＵ諸国全体で2.5％減、8％減を目指す英、仏はすでに目標を達成、21％の削減を掲げる独は18.5％に成功している。
日本が温室効果ガスを減らすことができない主な理由は２つある。
第一に世界のＧＮＰ総額の13％前後を生産し続けてきた日本の二酸化炭素排出量が世界の総排出量の4.2％程度にとどまっていること。すなわち日本は石油危機を契機に省エネ、技術の刷新に成功した優等生であり、これ以上、温室効果ガスを減らすのは他国に比べコスト高になる、という産業界およびその利益を代弁する政府、官庁、政権与党の考えである。
第二に温暖化緩和対策の中心に、日本は2010年までに原子力発電所を20基増設する政策を据えていることである。この目標は新しい原発立地計画が住民の直接投票でことごとく否定される社会状況で、ほとんど実現不能となってきている。しかし、たとえば温室効果ガスの最大発生源である化石燃料に代わるバイオマスの2010年までの利用の政策を比較すると、ＥＵは一次エネルギー需要の8.5％、米国は6.6％の供給を目標としているのに対し、日本は1％程度にとどまる。日本列島の2500万ヘクタールの森林から生産され、廃棄されている間伐材などのバイオマスだけで、実に年間390万トンにのぼる。
しかし、いったん政策の方向が決まると技術、資金とも豊富な日本は、条約目標に接近する実力を備えている。京都議定書の発効は「法的な規制」と、市場経済による「機会の提供」を介して、日本の政策の方向を質的に変えることになるだろう。
すなわち政府により原案がまとめられた、産業種類別の二酸化炭素削減策と、税制に関する審議会で討議されている炭素税の導入を例とする環境税体系の構築が、「法的な規制」と「機会の提供」による政策の例として、間もなく現実のものとなろう。
（筆者は早稲田大学大学院アジア太平洋研究科教授。）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟