Expansion of Anti-Japan Sentiments Indicates Contradiction in China's Market Economy
WATANABE Toshio / President of Takushoku University
June 3, 2005
A phenomenon I had long feared has finally broken loose. The Japanese Embassy in Beijing and Consulate in Shanghai were intimidated by stone-throwing Chinese mobs. With all likelihood, such anti-Japan demonstrations will spread from the coastal cities to the Northeastern regions and further inland.
The security authorities have shown no signs of suppressing the rioting mob, which leads us to conclude that the Party condones and tacitly approves such acts.
This was apparent during the Japan-China Foreign Ministers'meeting that took place on April 17, when Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing refused to admit to responsibility and instead persisted in faulting the Japanese government for having offended the Chinese people. Quite obviously, China intends to use the anti-Japan demonstrations in its pursuit of hard-line diplomacy as a means for extracting a compromise out of Japan.
Today's anti-Japan movement has its origins in the Patriotic Education campaign heralded by the Jiang Zhemin administration in 1994. In an attempt to create a nationalistic climate, a determined effort was made to firmly establish anti-Japanese education, and bases for patriotic education, such as the Memorial Hall of the Chinese People's War Resistance Against Japanese Aggression near Lugouqiao Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge), were constructed nationwide to spur animosity towards Japan.
It was nothing more than a strategy concocted by Jiang Zhemin to reinforce his political base to cover his lack of authority and connections in comparison with Deng Xiaoping. The latest incident is an indication that this anti-Japan strategy has reached the grassroots of the Chinese people.
Here, we must question what caused the anti-Japan movement to manifest itself. China's move to a market-oriented economy accelerated since 1992, generating winners on the one hand, while breeding a vast colony of losers. Among its 240 million city workers, 30 million are estimated to be unemployed, and another 100 million-plus continues to migrate from inland farming villages into the coastal cities. The frustration of the socially discontent had reached a critical point.
For the discontented, anti-Japan movement serves as an outlet for venting their frustration. Victory over Japanese aggression is the most important rationale in appealing the legitimacy of Communist rule, and patriotism is synonymous with anti-Japan sentiments. Suppressing people who uphold "patriotism should not be punished" as their slogan would be tantamount to denying the legitimacy of the Party itself.
Political exploitation of anti-Japan sentiments belies the fragile state of the current Chinese government. The anti-Japan brand of nationalism is a convenient theme for recovering a unifying force in a China that wavers in the process of its transition to a market-based economy. In stark contrast, the anti-Japan "card" was never used during the times of Deng Xiaoping, who boasted a strong political base.
Nevertheless, one cannot exclude the risk that the arrows of anti-Japan sentiment released by the frustrated losers of China's market economy could change direction and start flying against the current government, which stands on fragile footing. Even as political relations become frigid, Japan's trade surplus with China grows and Japanese companies have been making inroads into China at a considerable pace. While the current atmosphere could be described as "politically cool, but economically hot," there is no guarantee the situation will become both politically and economically "cool." For Japanese corporations, business development in China is obviously related to politics. The latest round of anti-Japan riots should teach us a lesson on judging the political risks involved when doing business in China.
Who will end up paying for the contradiction inherent in a "socialist market economy"? Today, China has become an engine of global economic growth. Its handling of the latest incidents will serve as a litmus test that will reveal whether China is genuinely pursuing a market economy.
The idea of an East Asian Community centered on Japan, China and South Korea is most likely an illusion. Any "community" -- as long as it calls itself that -- must be able to paint a bright enough outlook on the future path towards sharing political and security frameworks, as well as value systems and social principles among many countries. The latest anti-Japan riots and the response of the Chinese government have dramatically demonstrated the difficulties involved when two major countries seek to inhabit the same "community."
The writer is President of Takushoku University. This article first appeared in the April 20 edition of the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper.
The security authorities have shown no signs of suppressing the rioting mob, which leads us to conclude that the Party condones and tacitly approves such acts.
This was apparent during the Japan-China Foreign Ministers'meeting that took place on April 17, when Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing refused to admit to responsibility and instead persisted in faulting the Japanese government for having offended the Chinese people. Quite obviously, China intends to use the anti-Japan demonstrations in its pursuit of hard-line diplomacy as a means for extracting a compromise out of Japan.
Today's anti-Japan movement has its origins in the Patriotic Education campaign heralded by the Jiang Zhemin administration in 1994. In an attempt to create a nationalistic climate, a determined effort was made to firmly establish anti-Japanese education, and bases for patriotic education, such as the Memorial Hall of the Chinese People's War Resistance Against Japanese Aggression near Lugouqiao Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge), were constructed nationwide to spur animosity towards Japan.
It was nothing more than a strategy concocted by Jiang Zhemin to reinforce his political base to cover his lack of authority and connections in comparison with Deng Xiaoping. The latest incident is an indication that this anti-Japan strategy has reached the grassroots of the Chinese people.
Here, we must question what caused the anti-Japan movement to manifest itself. China's move to a market-oriented economy accelerated since 1992, generating winners on the one hand, while breeding a vast colony of losers. Among its 240 million city workers, 30 million are estimated to be unemployed, and another 100 million-plus continues to migrate from inland farming villages into the coastal cities. The frustration of the socially discontent had reached a critical point.
For the discontented, anti-Japan movement serves as an outlet for venting their frustration. Victory over Japanese aggression is the most important rationale in appealing the legitimacy of Communist rule, and patriotism is synonymous with anti-Japan sentiments. Suppressing people who uphold "patriotism should not be punished" as their slogan would be tantamount to denying the legitimacy of the Party itself.
Political exploitation of anti-Japan sentiments belies the fragile state of the current Chinese government. The anti-Japan brand of nationalism is a convenient theme for recovering a unifying force in a China that wavers in the process of its transition to a market-based economy. In stark contrast, the anti-Japan "card" was never used during the times of Deng Xiaoping, who boasted a strong political base.
Nevertheless, one cannot exclude the risk that the arrows of anti-Japan sentiment released by the frustrated losers of China's market economy could change direction and start flying against the current government, which stands on fragile footing. Even as political relations become frigid, Japan's trade surplus with China grows and Japanese companies have been making inroads into China at a considerable pace. While the current atmosphere could be described as "politically cool, but economically hot," there is no guarantee the situation will become both politically and economically "cool." For Japanese corporations, business development in China is obviously related to politics. The latest round of anti-Japan riots should teach us a lesson on judging the political risks involved when doing business in China.
Who will end up paying for the contradiction inherent in a "socialist market economy"? Today, China has become an engine of global economic growth. Its handling of the latest incidents will serve as a litmus test that will reveal whether China is genuinely pursuing a market economy.
The idea of an East Asian Community centered on Japan, China and South Korea is most likely an illusion. Any "community" -- as long as it calls itself that -- must be able to paint a bright enough outlook on the future path towards sharing political and security frameworks, as well as value systems and social principles among many countries. The latest anti-Japan riots and the response of the Chinese government have dramatically demonstrated the difficulties involved when two major countries seek to inhabit the same "community."
The writer is President of Takushoku University. This article first appeared in the April 20 edition of the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
「反日」拡大の意味ー中国「市場化」の矛盾表面化
渡辺利夫 / 拓殖大学学長
2005年 6月 3日
恐れていた事態がついに噴出したか、の感が深い。北京の日本大使館と上海の日本総領事館が、暴徒によって投石の威嚇を受けた。反日デモは、沿海諸都市から東北部、さらに内陸部へと波及する司能性が高い。
投石する暴徒に公安当局が威圧を加えている様子はない。威圧がなかったということは、党による許容、黙認があったと判断していいだろう。
実際、17日の日中外相会談において、李肇星外相は自国の責任を認めず、中国人民の心を傷つけた日本政府に間題ありとする対応に終始した。強硬外交により、日本の譲歩を引き出す手段として、反日運動を利用しようとする意図が透けてみえる。
現在に至る反日運動の起点は、1994年の江沢民政権による「愛国主義教育綱要」の発表にあった。愛国主義の雰囲気を醸成するため、反日教育を徹底させ、盧溝橋近くにある「抗日戦争記念館」のような「愛国主義教育基地」を全土に建設して、日本憎悪を駆り立てて来た。
権威と人脈において鄧小平氏に劣る江沢民氏が企図した政権基盤強化策にほかならない。反日が中国人の草の根にまで深く及んだことを、今回の事件は如実に示した。
問われるべきは、反日運動が顕在化した要因である。92年から加速した中国の市場経済化は、勝者を生み出す一方、膨大な数の敗者を群生させた。都市就業者2億4000万人のうち、失業者は3000万人と推計され、内陸部農村から沿海部都市に向けて流動する1億人超がこれに加わる。社会的不満層の鬱積は、臨界点に達していた。
反日は不満層の欝積の吐け口である。抗日戦争勝利こそ、共産党支配の正統性を世に訴える最も重要な根拠であり、愛国は反日と同義である。「愛国無罪」をスローガンに掲げる人々を抑圧することは、党の正統性の否定につながりかねない。
反日の政治的利用は、現在の中国政府の脆弱性を示すものであろう。市場経済化の過程で流動する中国において、求心力を回復するのに、反日愛国主義は格好のテーマである。対照的に、権力基盤の強い鄧小平の時代には、反日カードが切られることはなかった。だが、市場経済の敗者の鬱積によってわき起こる反日の矢が、脆弱な政権基盤の現政府の方に向きを変えるという危険性は排除できない。政治関係が冷え込む一方で、日本の対中貿易が拡大し、日本企業の対中進出も大きく伸びている。「政冷経熱」といわれるが、これが「政冷経冷」に転じないとは言えない。中国での日系企業の事業展開が、政治と無関係であるはずはない。今回の反日暴動を、中国の「政治リスク」をしかるべく評価するための教訓としてほしい。
「社会主義市場経済」の矛盾のツケは、誰が払うことになるのだろうか。中国は今や世界経済の牽引役ともなっている。今回の事態を中国がどのように収拾するかは、中国が真に市場化を志向しているか否かの試金石である。日中韓を中心に語られる「東アジア共同体」構想は、おそらく幻であろう。共同体と銘打つ以上、政治体制や安全保障の枠組み、価値観や杜会理念を多国間＜原文：「闇」＞で共有化するための道程が、多少とも明るい展望をもって描かれねばならない。今回の反日暴動と中国政府の対応は、二つの大国が同じ「共同体」の中に住まうことの難しさを、劇的な形で物語ったものといえよう。
（筆者は開発経済学者。この論文は４月２０日の読売新聞に掲載された。）
投石する暴徒に公安当局が威圧を加えている様子はない。威圧がなかったということは、党による許容、黙認があったと判断していいだろう。
実際、17日の日中外相会談において、李肇星外相は自国の責任を認めず、中国人民の心を傷つけた日本政府に間題ありとする対応に終始した。強硬外交により、日本の譲歩を引き出す手段として、反日運動を利用しようとする意図が透けてみえる。
現在に至る反日運動の起点は、1994年の江沢民政権による「愛国主義教育綱要」の発表にあった。愛国主義の雰囲気を醸成するため、反日教育を徹底させ、盧溝橋近くにある「抗日戦争記念館」のような「愛国主義教育基地」を全土に建設して、日本憎悪を駆り立てて来た。
権威と人脈において鄧小平氏に劣る江沢民氏が企図した政権基盤強化策にほかならない。反日が中国人の草の根にまで深く及んだことを、今回の事件は如実に示した。
問われるべきは、反日運動が顕在化した要因である。92年から加速した中国の市場経済化は、勝者を生み出す一方、膨大な数の敗者を群生させた。都市就業者2億4000万人のうち、失業者は3000万人と推計され、内陸部農村から沿海部都市に向けて流動する1億人超がこれに加わる。社会的不満層の鬱積は、臨界点に達していた。
反日は不満層の欝積の吐け口である。抗日戦争勝利こそ、共産党支配の正統性を世に訴える最も重要な根拠であり、愛国は反日と同義である。「愛国無罪」をスローガンに掲げる人々を抑圧することは、党の正統性の否定につながりかねない。
反日の政治的利用は、現在の中国政府の脆弱性を示すものであろう。市場経済化の過程で流動する中国において、求心力を回復するのに、反日愛国主義は格好のテーマである。対照的に、権力基盤の強い鄧小平の時代には、反日カードが切られることはなかった。だが、市場経済の敗者の鬱積によってわき起こる反日の矢が、脆弱な政権基盤の現政府の方に向きを変えるという危険性は排除できない。政治関係が冷え込む一方で、日本の対中貿易が拡大し、日本企業の対中進出も大きく伸びている。「政冷経熱」といわれるが、これが「政冷経冷」に転じないとは言えない。中国での日系企業の事業展開が、政治と無関係であるはずはない。今回の反日暴動を、中国の「政治リスク」をしかるべく評価するための教訓としてほしい。
「社会主義市場経済」の矛盾のツケは、誰が払うことになるのだろうか。中国は今や世界経済の牽引役ともなっている。今回の事態を中国がどのように収拾するかは、中国が真に市場化を志向しているか否かの試金石である。日中韓を中心に語られる「東アジア共同体」構想は、おそらく幻であろう。共同体と銘打つ以上、政治体制や安全保障の枠組み、価値観や杜会理念を多国間＜原文：「闇」＞で共有化するための道程が、多少とも明るい展望をもって描かれねばならない。今回の反日暴動と中国政府の対応は、二つの大国が同じ「共同体」の中に住まうことの難しさを、劇的な形で物語ったものといえよう。
（筆者は開発経済学者。この論文は４月２０日の読売新聞に掲載された。）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟