The First Sino-Russian Joint Military Exercises and Their Impact on the Japan-U.S. Relationship
MAGOSAKI Ukeru / Professor, National Defense Academy
October 11, 2005
China and Russia carried out their first joint military exercises this year on China's Shandong Peninsula and in the Yellow Sea area. Starting on August 18, the week-long exercises involved 10,000 troops. These military exercises alone do not mean that the two countries now have a system of responding militarily to a common enemy. The two countries share a long border, which means they have inherent, strategically-conflicting elements. They are not expected to share a common military strategy in the near future. However, China and Russia, which had military conflicts in the 60's and 70's, have come as far as conducting joint military exercises; they seem to have deepened their recognition that strengthening their relationship on various issues, including military cooperation, is beneficial for both their countries. The political and military significance of this event is not to be underestimated.
After military tensions tightened across the Taiwan Strait in 1996, China moved closer to Russia, and that same year, the two countries agreed to establish a "strategic partnership for the security, stability, and economic prosperity of the Pacific region." Since then, the following international situation, and foreign and domestic situations of both countries have made it more important now than in 1996 for the two countries to strengthen their relationship:
(1) Under the Bush administration, the United States has consolidated its position as the world's sole superpower, both politically and militarily.
(2) The Putin administration of Russia, saddled with the Chechen problem and economic woes, is increasingly wary of the U.S.
(3) The second Bush administration includes those who support a hard line policy against China.
Under these circumstances, China and Russia have both found merit in conducting joint military exercises. First, they wanted to show their opposition to the unipolar military supremacy of the U.S., especially when applied to the Far East. Second, they wanted to use every opportunity to show that they would prevent Taiwan from seeking independence, even resorting to arms if necessary. Third, China used the occasion to buy arms from Russia to promote mutual cooperation—Russia secured a market for its arms, and China was able to buy high-tech arms which are hard to get. Whether these moves have an actual impact or not is an open question, but their political and diplomatic significance cannot be ignored.
Let us take Uzbekistan in Central Asia as an example. Ever since 9/11, the U.S. had a military base in Uzbekistan, but on July 29 this year, Uzbek President Islam Karimov asked the U.S. to leave. His primary reason was fear that the continued existence of the U.S. military base will give Islamic extremists who oppose its existence an excuse to gain power. He also feared U.S. pressure for democratization. When he made that move, he was certainly aware of the Sino-Russian military cooperation in opposition to U.S. supremacy, and he must have assumed that his move will have the support of China and Russia.
How is the U.S. going to respond to the Sino-Russian joint military exercises? For the time being, the U.S. government is taking a wait-and-see attitude, trying to play down the significance of the exercises. But the impact of these exercises on U.S. policy goes much deeper than what appears on the surface. Peter Brookes of the Heritage Foundation suggests the U. S. take the following steps:
(1) take these exercises into account when planning the U.S. military strategy (specifically, in the Quadrennial Defense Review)
(2) strengthen the U.S.-Japan relationship
(3) strengthen the U.S.-India relationship
(4) develop a long-term, favorable U.S.-Russia relationship
The second point, the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan relationship is in accord with the current trend. The U.S. has more reason than ever to strengthen its relationship with Japan, and Japan, for its part, will cooperate with the U.S. in response.
The writer is Professor at Japan's National Defense Academy and former Japanese Ambassador to Iran.
After military tensions tightened across the Taiwan Strait in 1996, China moved closer to Russia, and that same year, the two countries agreed to establish a "strategic partnership for the security, stability, and economic prosperity of the Pacific region." Since then, the following international situation, and foreign and domestic situations of both countries have made it more important now than in 1996 for the two countries to strengthen their relationship:
(1) Under the Bush administration, the United States has consolidated its position as the world's sole superpower, both politically and militarily.
(2) The Putin administration of Russia, saddled with the Chechen problem and economic woes, is increasingly wary of the U.S.
(3) The second Bush administration includes those who support a hard line policy against China.
Under these circumstances, China and Russia have both found merit in conducting joint military exercises. First, they wanted to show their opposition to the unipolar military supremacy of the U.S., especially when applied to the Far East. Second, they wanted to use every opportunity to show that they would prevent Taiwan from seeking independence, even resorting to arms if necessary. Third, China used the occasion to buy arms from Russia to promote mutual cooperation—Russia secured a market for its arms, and China was able to buy high-tech arms which are hard to get. Whether these moves have an actual impact or not is an open question, but their political and diplomatic significance cannot be ignored.
Let us take Uzbekistan in Central Asia as an example. Ever since 9/11, the U.S. had a military base in Uzbekistan, but on July 29 this year, Uzbek President Islam Karimov asked the U.S. to leave. His primary reason was fear that the continued existence of the U.S. military base will give Islamic extremists who oppose its existence an excuse to gain power. He also feared U.S. pressure for democratization. When he made that move, he was certainly aware of the Sino-Russian military cooperation in opposition to U.S. supremacy, and he must have assumed that his move will have the support of China and Russia.
How is the U.S. going to respond to the Sino-Russian joint military exercises? For the time being, the U.S. government is taking a wait-and-see attitude, trying to play down the significance of the exercises. But the impact of these exercises on U.S. policy goes much deeper than what appears on the surface. Peter Brookes of the Heritage Foundation suggests the U. S. take the following steps:
(1) take these exercises into account when planning the U.S. military strategy (specifically, in the Quadrennial Defense Review)
(2) strengthen the U.S.-Japan relationship
(3) strengthen the U.S.-India relationship
(4) develop a long-term, favorable U.S.-Russia relationship
The second point, the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan relationship is in accord with the current trend. The U.S. has more reason than ever to strengthen its relationship with Japan, and Japan, for its part, will cooperate with the U.S. in response.
The writer is Professor at Japan's National Defense Academy and former Japanese Ambassador to Iran.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
初の中ロ合同軍事演習と日米関係
孫崎 享 / 防衛大学校 教授
2005年 10月 11日
本年8月18日から約一週間中ソ双方は中国山東半島、黄海海域で、一万人規模の初の合同軍事演習を実施した。勿論、この軍事演習をもって、中ロ双方が連携して共通の敵に対して軍事的に対応する態勢が出来たことを意味しない。広大な国境線を持つ中ロは戦略的対立要素を内蔵する。中ロ双方が共通の軍事戦略を持つ時期は近い将来予想されない。しかし、60年代、70年代軍事衝突まで持った中ロが合同軍事演習を有するまでに至ったこと、更に両国が軍事を含め個別の事象毎に関係強化を図る動きをとることが自己の利益につながるとの認識を更に強化したことの政治的、軍事的意味合いは決して少なくない。
1996年台湾での軍事緊張後、中国はロシアに接近、同年「太平洋地域の安保、安定、経済的進歩のための戦略的パートナーシップの構築」に合意した。その後の国際情勢、中ロの内外情勢をみると、1996年以上に中ロが関係強化をめざす環境が生じた。
（１） ブッシュ政権樹立後、米国の政治軍事的一極支配体制が一段と促進
（２） ロシアのプーチン政権はチェチェン、経済等で対米警戒心増加
（３） ブッシュ政権第2期目から米国政権内に対中国強行路線が台頭
これを踏まえ、中ロ双方が合同軍事演習という形で(1)米国の一極軍事支配体制、特にその極東地域への適用への反対意思表明、（２）台湾問題において台湾独立を軍事的手段に求めても阻止する姿勢をあらゆる機会を捉え、意思表明、（３）中国のロシア製武器購入による協力促進（ロシア側からは市場確保、中国側からは入手困難なハイテク武器購入）にメリットを見出したといえる。
こうした動きは実態的にどこまで影響力を持つかについては疑問があるが、政治、外交面では無視しえない影響がある。
例を中央アジア、ウズベキスタンで見てみよう。９・１１事件後米国はウズベキスタンに軍事基地構築を図ってきたが、本年7月29日カリモフ大統領は米国に米軍基地撤回を求めた。この要請の一義的理由は（１）米軍基地存続によって自国内のイスラム過激派勢力の増大を恐れる、（２）米国の民主化圧力に対する警戒心にあるが、中ロが米国一極支配体制への反発を強め軍事協力を図っている、従って中ロはウズベキスタン側につくとの判断があったとみられる。
さて、こうした中ロ軍事合同演習に対し、米国はどう対応するか。現時点では米国政府は冷静に静観とし、プレイダウンの方向に動いている。しかし、今次合同演習は表面以上に米国戦略に影響を与えるものとみられる。ヘリテージ・ファンデーションのピーター・ブルックスの下記提言が興味深い。
（１） 米国戦略への反映（具体的にはＱＤＲへの反映）
（２） 日米関係強化
（３） 米印関係強化
（４） 長期的に対ロ関係改善模索
この中、（２）の日米関係強化は現在の動向と一致する。米国にとり日米関係強化の動機が一段と強まり、日本もこれに呼応する対応をとろう。
（筆者は防衛大学校教授。元駐イラン大使。）
1996年台湾での軍事緊張後、中国はロシアに接近、同年「太平洋地域の安保、安定、経済的進歩のための戦略的パートナーシップの構築」に合意した。その後の国際情勢、中ロの内外情勢をみると、1996年以上に中ロが関係強化をめざす環境が生じた。
（１） ブッシュ政権樹立後、米国の政治軍事的一極支配体制が一段と促進
（２） ロシアのプーチン政権はチェチェン、経済等で対米警戒心増加
（３） ブッシュ政権第2期目から米国政権内に対中国強行路線が台頭
これを踏まえ、中ロ双方が合同軍事演習という形で(1)米国の一極軍事支配体制、特にその極東地域への適用への反対意思表明、（２）台湾問題において台湾独立を軍事的手段に求めても阻止する姿勢をあらゆる機会を捉え、意思表明、（３）中国のロシア製武器購入による協力促進（ロシア側からは市場確保、中国側からは入手困難なハイテク武器購入）にメリットを見出したといえる。
こうした動きは実態的にどこまで影響力を持つかについては疑問があるが、政治、外交面では無視しえない影響がある。
例を中央アジア、ウズベキスタンで見てみよう。９・１１事件後米国はウズベキスタンに軍事基地構築を図ってきたが、本年7月29日カリモフ大統領は米国に米軍基地撤回を求めた。この要請の一義的理由は（１）米軍基地存続によって自国内のイスラム過激派勢力の増大を恐れる、（２）米国の民主化圧力に対する警戒心にあるが、中ロが米国一極支配体制への反発を強め軍事協力を図っている、従って中ロはウズベキスタン側につくとの判断があったとみられる。
さて、こうした中ロ軍事合同演習に対し、米国はどう対応するか。現時点では米国政府は冷静に静観とし、プレイダウンの方向に動いている。しかし、今次合同演習は表面以上に米国戦略に影響を与えるものとみられる。ヘリテージ・ファンデーションのピーター・ブルックスの下記提言が興味深い。
（１） 米国戦略への反映（具体的にはＱＤＲへの反映）
（２） 日米関係強化
（３） 米印関係強化
（４） 長期的に対ロ関係改善模索
この中、（２）の日米関係強化は現在の動向と一致する。米国にとり日米関係強化の動機が一段と強まり、日本もこれに呼応する対応をとろう。
（筆者は防衛大学校教授。元駐イラン大使。）
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