Koizumi "Magic" Brings Overwhelming Victory to LDP
KITAMURA Fumio / Journalist
October 21, 2005
On September 11, Japan's general election gave the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 296 seats, far exceeding the majority required in the 480-seat House of Representatives. Together with the 31 seats won by coalition partner Komeito Party, the ruling LDP coalition captured seats representing two-thirds of the House. The LDP is wallowing in the euphoria of a victory that "wasn't expected to be won by such a large margin," in the words of LDP Secretary General Takebe Tsutomu. However, the election results have been dogged by a great irony, since the LDP owed its landslide victory to a Prime Minister who pledged to dismantle his own party.
That Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro was the decisive factor in bringing about the election results is beyond doubt. Controversial words and deeds being the Prime Minister's trademark, he succeeded in focusing the election on the single issue of privatizing the postal service, and presented it as a simple conflict between "reformist" candidates who supported the government's privatization bill and "old-guard" candidates who opposed it. LDP candidates who came out against the bill in the House of Representatives prior to the election were stripped of party endorsement. In an additional blow, the LDP gave its official endorsement to well-known personalities with high media profiles -- many of them women -- to run as party candidates in anti-Koizumi electorates. The mass media came to call these new faces Prime Minister Koizumi's "assassins."
The election campaign took on the guise of a vendetta, and tabloid TV shows amused and entertained by tirelessly pursuing the "assassin" hoopla, altogether ignoring any debate on policy issues. Never before has election coverage been transformed into so much entertainment. While ridiculing what it called the "theatrical election," it was undeniably the mass media that was taken in by the Koizumi strategy. At the moment, there is not a single political leader in either the ruling coalition or the opposition who could challenge the Prime Minister's authority. True to the maxim "people make history and history makes people," Mr. Koizumi has indeed been given the opportunity of opening a chapter to a "new history" for Japan. More importantly, though, we should note that it was Japan's past "history" -- the negative legacy of Japanese politics -- that propelled Mr. Koizumi to the seat of power.
In advanced western nations, it is change of governments that injects dynamism to politics. In contrast, Japanese politics has been dominated by a prolonged rule of the LDP to the extent of being considered an anomaly. The LDP, while allowing for the co-existence of various internal factions, had more or less managed to remain in the set of power since the party was founded in 1955. The factions were composed of LDP lawmakers lobbying on behalf of specific interest groups, and were categorized into groups concerned with postal, agriculture, construction and other issues. If a political party is defined as a group of politicians who gather under common principles, the LDP could not have been farther from such an ideal - hence, criticism of its being a "pre-modern political group."
Professor Gerald Curtis of Columbia University in the United States, an expert on Japanese politics, explains that each faction acts as a conduit for relaying the demands of the interest groups they represent to the state level, and that the LDP was expected to play a coordinating role between conflicting special interests. Professor Curtis further analyzes that the LDP remained safely in power as long as it functioned as a coordinator, and that in turn worked to stabilize Japanese politics. Thus the personal quality required of an LDP president -- Prime Minister -- was not decisive leadership based on foresight, but the ability to coordinate and keep the special interest groups equally satisfied. The Economist of London once published a scathing editorial on this Japanese system titled: "A Leader Does not Lead."
However, open discussion hinders the wheeling and dealing coordination process. Thus backroom consultations among politicians, bureaucrats and industry leaders becomes a necessity. And this in turn gives rise to corruption - to collusion among politicians, bureaucracy and industry, and to lobbying for vested interests through bribery. To the outside world, the true nature of Japanese politics remained enigmatic and esoteric. Beneath the "Revisionist" argument against Japan that grew into a formidable chorus in Europe and the United States in the 1990s, there was a deep undercurrent of discomfort with Japan's process of coordination through backroom consultations.
Pursuing the realistic picture of interest coordination leads us to the distribution of tax revenues stored in the national treasury. Such a system was made possible by Japan's phenomenal economic expansion. However, the bursting of the economic bubble sent Japan plunging into a serious state of stagnation, which dramatically reduced financial revenues that had funded pork-barrel politics. Despite the circumstances, the LDP recklessly continued to dole out large-scale financing packages under the pretense of public works aimed at economic recovery. Its opaque interest coordination process also remained intact. Corruption cases rooted in backroom collusion were brought to light one after the other. Meanwhile, corporate restructuring generated massive unemployment. The Japanese people directed their frustration and anger towards LDP government, and the party suffered a freefall in the electoral polls.
While Mr. Koizumi had attracted attention in the past by his bold words and deeds, he was nevertheless given nicknames such as "eccentric" and "oddball" by the mass media and considered nothing but minor league within the party. The fact that the LDP has relegated the responsibility of reconstructing the party to a man upholding the outrageous slogan of "dismantling the LDP"is evidence that the system of Japanese-style politics has become defunct. In the September 11 elections, Prime Minister Koizumi won a landslide victory by adopting a strategy of offering flashy comments and actions that captured the moods of the media era and providing timely news for the media to gobble up. It was an election in which the political qualities verging on genius that only an "eccentric" prime minister can boast to possess were demonstrated to the best effect.
However, the "theatrical" election is not without its hidden pitfalls. The new parliament created by the election will carry the heavy responsibility of guiding the nation over a maximum period of four years to come. Japan is currently faced with important issues that include reconstructing its social security system to meet the low birthrate and aging population, reforming its education system, establishing relationships of trust with its neighboring Asian nations, pulling back its Self Defense Forces from Iraq, and above all, revising its Constitution. There was hardly any debate on these important issues during the course of the election, which revolved around the single issue of privatizing the postal system and which was directed as a vendetta drama.
It is the response to these issues that will serve as the touchstone for whether Japan can genuinely embark on a new "history" of self-transformation. Neither can we rule out the possibility that voters who practically handed a "carte blanche" to the LDP this time may one day come to regret their voting behavior.
The writer is a former Professor of Shukutoku University and former Senior Editor and London Bureau Chief of the Yomiuri Shimbun.
That Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro was the decisive factor in bringing about the election results is beyond doubt. Controversial words and deeds being the Prime Minister's trademark, he succeeded in focusing the election on the single issue of privatizing the postal service, and presented it as a simple conflict between "reformist" candidates who supported the government's privatization bill and "old-guard" candidates who opposed it. LDP candidates who came out against the bill in the House of Representatives prior to the election were stripped of party endorsement. In an additional blow, the LDP gave its official endorsement to well-known personalities with high media profiles -- many of them women -- to run as party candidates in anti-Koizumi electorates. The mass media came to call these new faces Prime Minister Koizumi's "assassins."
The election campaign took on the guise of a vendetta, and tabloid TV shows amused and entertained by tirelessly pursuing the "assassin" hoopla, altogether ignoring any debate on policy issues. Never before has election coverage been transformed into so much entertainment. While ridiculing what it called the "theatrical election," it was undeniably the mass media that was taken in by the Koizumi strategy. At the moment, there is not a single political leader in either the ruling coalition or the opposition who could challenge the Prime Minister's authority. True to the maxim "people make history and history makes people," Mr. Koizumi has indeed been given the opportunity of opening a chapter to a "new history" for Japan. More importantly, though, we should note that it was Japan's past "history" -- the negative legacy of Japanese politics -- that propelled Mr. Koizumi to the seat of power.
In advanced western nations, it is change of governments that injects dynamism to politics. In contrast, Japanese politics has been dominated by a prolonged rule of the LDP to the extent of being considered an anomaly. The LDP, while allowing for the co-existence of various internal factions, had more or less managed to remain in the set of power since the party was founded in 1955. The factions were composed of LDP lawmakers lobbying on behalf of specific interest groups, and were categorized into groups concerned with postal, agriculture, construction and other issues. If a political party is defined as a group of politicians who gather under common principles, the LDP could not have been farther from such an ideal - hence, criticism of its being a "pre-modern political group."
Professor Gerald Curtis of Columbia University in the United States, an expert on Japanese politics, explains that each faction acts as a conduit for relaying the demands of the interest groups they represent to the state level, and that the LDP was expected to play a coordinating role between conflicting special interests. Professor Curtis further analyzes that the LDP remained safely in power as long as it functioned as a coordinator, and that in turn worked to stabilize Japanese politics. Thus the personal quality required of an LDP president -- Prime Minister -- was not decisive leadership based on foresight, but the ability to coordinate and keep the special interest groups equally satisfied. The Economist of London once published a scathing editorial on this Japanese system titled: "A Leader Does not Lead."
However, open discussion hinders the wheeling and dealing coordination process. Thus backroom consultations among politicians, bureaucrats and industry leaders becomes a necessity. And this in turn gives rise to corruption - to collusion among politicians, bureaucracy and industry, and to lobbying for vested interests through bribery. To the outside world, the true nature of Japanese politics remained enigmatic and esoteric. Beneath the "Revisionist" argument against Japan that grew into a formidable chorus in Europe and the United States in the 1990s, there was a deep undercurrent of discomfort with Japan's process of coordination through backroom consultations.
Pursuing the realistic picture of interest coordination leads us to the distribution of tax revenues stored in the national treasury. Such a system was made possible by Japan's phenomenal economic expansion. However, the bursting of the economic bubble sent Japan plunging into a serious state of stagnation, which dramatically reduced financial revenues that had funded pork-barrel politics. Despite the circumstances, the LDP recklessly continued to dole out large-scale financing packages under the pretense of public works aimed at economic recovery. Its opaque interest coordination process also remained intact. Corruption cases rooted in backroom collusion were brought to light one after the other. Meanwhile, corporate restructuring generated massive unemployment. The Japanese people directed their frustration and anger towards LDP government, and the party suffered a freefall in the electoral polls.
While Mr. Koizumi had attracted attention in the past by his bold words and deeds, he was nevertheless given nicknames such as "eccentric" and "oddball" by the mass media and considered nothing but minor league within the party. The fact that the LDP has relegated the responsibility of reconstructing the party to a man upholding the outrageous slogan of "dismantling the LDP"is evidence that the system of Japanese-style politics has become defunct. In the September 11 elections, Prime Minister Koizumi won a landslide victory by adopting a strategy of offering flashy comments and actions that captured the moods of the media era and providing timely news for the media to gobble up. It was an election in which the political qualities verging on genius that only an "eccentric" prime minister can boast to possess were demonstrated to the best effect.
However, the "theatrical" election is not without its hidden pitfalls. The new parliament created by the election will carry the heavy responsibility of guiding the nation over a maximum period of four years to come. Japan is currently faced with important issues that include reconstructing its social security system to meet the low birthrate and aging population, reforming its education system, establishing relationships of trust with its neighboring Asian nations, pulling back its Self Defense Forces from Iraq, and above all, revising its Constitution. There was hardly any debate on these important issues during the course of the election, which revolved around the single issue of privatizing the postal system and which was directed as a vendetta drama.
It is the response to these issues that will serve as the touchstone for whether Japan can genuinely embark on a new "history" of self-transformation. Neither can we rule out the possibility that voters who practically handed a "carte blanche" to the LDP this time may one day come to regret their voting behavior.
The writer is a former Professor of Shukutoku University and former Senior Editor and London Bureau Chief of the Yomiuri Shimbun.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
自民党を圧勝させた小泉マジック
北村文夫 / ジャーナリスト
2005年 10月 21日
9月11日の総選挙で、自民党は衆議院総議席480の過半数をはるかに越す296議席を獲得した。連立政権を組む公明党の31議席を合わせ、与党が衆議院議席の三分の二以上を占めた。「これほどの大差になるとは思わなかった」と武部幹事長がもらすように、自民党は勝利への陶酔感にひたっている。だがこの選挙には、大いなるアイロニーがまといつく。それは「自民党をぶっこわす」と叫ぶ小泉首相が、圧勝への立役者となったことだ。
自民党大勝の決め手は、まぎれもなく小泉首相の存在だった。激烈な言動を売り物にする小泉首相は選挙争点を郵政民営化だけに絞り込み、民営化政府案への賛成候補を「改革派」、反対候補を「守旧派」という単純な図式をつくり上げるのに成功した。解散前の衆議院で政府案に反対した自民党員は、党公認候補の資格をはぎとられた。追い打ちをかけるように、自民党は反小泉派の選挙区にメディア露出度が高いいわゆる有名人（多くは女性）を党公認候補として送り込んだ。マスメディアはこれら新人候補を、小泉首相が差し向けた「刺客」と呼んだ。
総選挙はまるで恩讐ドラマのような様相をおび、テレビのワイドショーなどは政策論争そっちのけで「刺客」騒動をおもしろ、おかしく報じ続けた。総選挙報道がこれほど「娯楽番組」化したことはかつてない。マスメディアは「劇場型選挙」と揶揄したが、マメディアの方が小泉戦法の術中にはまり込んだのは否めない。いま小泉首相の権威に対抗できる政治指導者は、与野党のどこにも見当たらない。「人が歴史をつくり、歴史が人をつくる」という箴言を引用するなら、小泉氏は「新しい歴史」への章を開く可能性をつかんだ。それ以上に重視せねばならないのは、日本型政治の負の遺産という過去の「歴史」が、小泉氏を権力の頂点に押し上げたことだ。
欧米先進諸国では政権交代が、政治に新しいダイナミズムを注入してきた。それと対照的に自民党が長期支配を続ける日本政治は、異様なまでに特異な存在だった。自民党はさまざまな派閥を抱え込みながらも、1955年の結党以来ほぼ一貫して政権を掌握してきた。派閥を形成する自民党議員たちは、特定の利権集団の代弁者として、郵政族、農政族、建設族などと区分けされた。ある理念のもとに結集する政治家集団が政党であるなら、自民党はこうした政党理想像とはほど遠かった。「前近代的な政治集団」との評価もここから生まれた。
日本政治にくわしいジェラルド・カーティス教授（米コロンビア大学）によると、派閥はそれぞれの支持基盤である圧力集団の要求を国政レベルに伝える導管の役割を果たし、自民党はその利権争いをまるく収める機能を期待されていた。こうした調整機能がうまく作動する限り自民党政権は安泰で、それが日本政治の安定を支えてきたとカーティス教授は分析している。だから自民党総裁（首相）に求められる資質は、先見性をもつ明快な指導力ではなく、どの利権集団にも応分の満足感を与える調整能力となる。この日本型システムに対し、ロンドンのエコノミスト誌はかつて「指導者は指導しない」と題する辛辣な社説を掲げた。
ところが透明な公開議論をしたのでは、虚々実々の調整プロセスはうまくはかどらない。どうしても密室での政治家、官僚、業界の協議ということになる。そこから政界、官界、財界の癒着や、収贈賄による利益誘導という汚職が芽生えてくる。外国から見れば日本政治の実態は、ひどく分かりずらい秘儀めいたものだった。1990年代に欧米諸国で日本批判の大コーラスを呼び起こした「日本異質論」、「日本見直し論」の深層には、密室協議での調整プロセスへの違和感があった。
利権調整の実態を探るなら、国庫に収められたお金（税収）のばらまきにたどりつく。そうしたシステムを可能にさせたのは、日本経済の目覚ましい拡大だった。しかしバブル経済破綻で日本が深刻な停滞期に入るにつれ、ばらまき政治の原資となる財政収入は激減した。にもかかわらず、自民党は景気回復のための公共事業などと称して、大規模な財政支出を野放図に繰り返した。不透明な利権調整プロセスもそのまま残った。密室での癒着に起因する汚職事件も次々に露呈した。一方で企業リストラが多数の失業者を生み出した。国民の失望と怒りは自民党支配に向けられ、選挙での自民党の低落に歯止めがかからなくなった。
小泉氏はそれまで大胆な言動で注目を浴びながらも、マスメディアからは「変人」、「奇人」のニックネームを与えられ、自民党内ではあくまでも傍流の存在だった。その自民党が「自民党をぶっこわす」との乱暴なスローガンを掲げる小泉氏に党再生をゆだねたのは、日本型政治システムが機能不全に陥ったことを裏付ける。9月11日総選挙で、小泉首相はメディア時代の空気を敏感につかみとる派手な言動と、メディア受けする話題づくりという戦術で圧勝を勝ち取った。「変人」宰相だけがもち得る天才的とも呼べそうな政治資質が、遺憾なく発揮された選挙だった。
しかし「劇場型」総選挙には、落とし穴がひそむ。総選挙が生んだ新国会は、長ければ四年間にわたって国の進路を決定する重責を担うはずだ。日本はいま、小子高齢化のもとでの社会保障制度再構築、教育制度改革、近隣アジア諸国との信頼関係の確立、イラク派遣の自衛隊撤退、そしてなによりも憲法改正といった重大な課題への対応を迫られている。だが郵政民営化を単一争点とし、恩讐ドラマで演出された今度の総選挙ではこれら重要課題はほとんど議論されなかった。
これらの問題にどのように対応するかが、日本を真に変革する「歴史」をつくれるかどうかの試金石になるだろう。自民党に白紙委任に近い信任を与えた有権者が、やがて自らの投票行動を後悔する可能性も排除できない。
（筆者は元淑徳大学教授、元読売新聞編集委員、ロンドン総局長）
自民党大勝の決め手は、まぎれもなく小泉首相の存在だった。激烈な言動を売り物にする小泉首相は選挙争点を郵政民営化だけに絞り込み、民営化政府案への賛成候補を「改革派」、反対候補を「守旧派」という単純な図式をつくり上げるのに成功した。解散前の衆議院で政府案に反対した自民党員は、党公認候補の資格をはぎとられた。追い打ちをかけるように、自民党は反小泉派の選挙区にメディア露出度が高いいわゆる有名人（多くは女性）を党公認候補として送り込んだ。マスメディアはこれら新人候補を、小泉首相が差し向けた「刺客」と呼んだ。
総選挙はまるで恩讐ドラマのような様相をおび、テレビのワイドショーなどは政策論争そっちのけで「刺客」騒動をおもしろ、おかしく報じ続けた。総選挙報道がこれほど「娯楽番組」化したことはかつてない。マスメディアは「劇場型選挙」と揶揄したが、マメディアの方が小泉戦法の術中にはまり込んだのは否めない。いま小泉首相の権威に対抗できる政治指導者は、与野党のどこにも見当たらない。「人が歴史をつくり、歴史が人をつくる」という箴言を引用するなら、小泉氏は「新しい歴史」への章を開く可能性をつかんだ。それ以上に重視せねばならないのは、日本型政治の負の遺産という過去の「歴史」が、小泉氏を権力の頂点に押し上げたことだ。
欧米先進諸国では政権交代が、政治に新しいダイナミズムを注入してきた。それと対照的に自民党が長期支配を続ける日本政治は、異様なまでに特異な存在だった。自民党はさまざまな派閥を抱え込みながらも、1955年の結党以来ほぼ一貫して政権を掌握してきた。派閥を形成する自民党議員たちは、特定の利権集団の代弁者として、郵政族、農政族、建設族などと区分けされた。ある理念のもとに結集する政治家集団が政党であるなら、自民党はこうした政党理想像とはほど遠かった。「前近代的な政治集団」との評価もここから生まれた。
日本政治にくわしいジェラルド・カーティス教授（米コロンビア大学）によると、派閥はそれぞれの支持基盤である圧力集団の要求を国政レベルに伝える導管の役割を果たし、自民党はその利権争いをまるく収める機能を期待されていた。こうした調整機能がうまく作動する限り自民党政権は安泰で、それが日本政治の安定を支えてきたとカーティス教授は分析している。だから自民党総裁（首相）に求められる資質は、先見性をもつ明快な指導力ではなく、どの利権集団にも応分の満足感を与える調整能力となる。この日本型システムに対し、ロンドンのエコノミスト誌はかつて「指導者は指導しない」と題する辛辣な社説を掲げた。
ところが透明な公開議論をしたのでは、虚々実々の調整プロセスはうまくはかどらない。どうしても密室での政治家、官僚、業界の協議ということになる。そこから政界、官界、財界の癒着や、収贈賄による利益誘導という汚職が芽生えてくる。外国から見れば日本政治の実態は、ひどく分かりずらい秘儀めいたものだった。1990年代に欧米諸国で日本批判の大コーラスを呼び起こした「日本異質論」、「日本見直し論」の深層には、密室協議での調整プロセスへの違和感があった。
利権調整の実態を探るなら、国庫に収められたお金（税収）のばらまきにたどりつく。そうしたシステムを可能にさせたのは、日本経済の目覚ましい拡大だった。しかしバブル経済破綻で日本が深刻な停滞期に入るにつれ、ばらまき政治の原資となる財政収入は激減した。にもかかわらず、自民党は景気回復のための公共事業などと称して、大規模な財政支出を野放図に繰り返した。不透明な利権調整プロセスもそのまま残った。密室での癒着に起因する汚職事件も次々に露呈した。一方で企業リストラが多数の失業者を生み出した。国民の失望と怒りは自民党支配に向けられ、選挙での自民党の低落に歯止めがかからなくなった。
小泉氏はそれまで大胆な言動で注目を浴びながらも、マスメディアからは「変人」、「奇人」のニックネームを与えられ、自民党内ではあくまでも傍流の存在だった。その自民党が「自民党をぶっこわす」との乱暴なスローガンを掲げる小泉氏に党再生をゆだねたのは、日本型政治システムが機能不全に陥ったことを裏付ける。9月11日総選挙で、小泉首相はメディア時代の空気を敏感につかみとる派手な言動と、メディア受けする話題づくりという戦術で圧勝を勝ち取った。「変人」宰相だけがもち得る天才的とも呼べそうな政治資質が、遺憾なく発揮された選挙だった。
しかし「劇場型」総選挙には、落とし穴がひそむ。総選挙が生んだ新国会は、長ければ四年間にわたって国の進路を決定する重責を担うはずだ。日本はいま、小子高齢化のもとでの社会保障制度再構築、教育制度改革、近隣アジア諸国との信頼関係の確立、イラク派遣の自衛隊撤退、そしてなによりも憲法改正といった重大な課題への対応を迫られている。だが郵政民営化を単一争点とし、恩讐ドラマで演出された今度の総選挙ではこれら重要課題はほとんど議論されなかった。
これらの問題にどのように対応するかが、日本を真に変革する「歴史」をつくれるかどうかの試金石になるだろう。自民党に白紙委任に近い信任を与えた有権者が、やがて自らの投票行動を後悔する可能性も排除できない。
（筆者は元淑徳大学教授、元読売新聞編集委員、ロンドン総局長）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟