November 7, 2007

Last September when the then Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made his policy speech at the extraordinary session of the Diet, he strongly questioned if Japan could abandon its international responsibility, widely acclaimed abroad, by stopping the fuel-supplying operation of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces(MSDF) vessels in the Indian Ocean in accordance with the special anti-terrorism law. A few days later, however, he abruptly resigned from Premiership even just before the Opposition's questions began; he simply said that "It has become difficult for me to promote my policies."

The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) quickly held an election and on September 23 elected, as its new leader, the former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda, who defeated LDP Secretary-General Taro Aso. A new government was sworn in on September 26. Mr. Fukuda said, "The government has lost the trust of the people, so this is a back-to-the-wall government in which no mistakes are allowed." He appointed many faction leaders to important positions both in the party and in the administration, and kept most of the ministers of the Abe cabinet.

The new lineup, though seen as an effort to avoid strife over party and cabinet posts and strengthen the defense, was generally received favorably for the time being. However, it cannot be denied that the new cabinet lacks freshness and appeal with little hope for new policies. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), in control of the Upper House since July elections, is bent on further shaking the government and forcing the dissolution of the Lower House before next summer. With the strength of the government and opposition in the divided Diet hanging in balance it is very difficult to foresee what the future has in store for Japan's domestic politics.

A year ago, when Mr. Abe inherited a two-thirds majority in the Lower House from former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, he paraded his youth as "the first prime minister born after the war" and advocated constitutional revision. Why was the Abe government, which started out with so much fanfare, so short-lived and why did it come to such an inglorious end?

First of all, the political asset inherited from the Koizumi government was grand in appearance but it involved so many structural and policy inconsistencies that it was difficult to manage for Mr. Abe, who did not have the charisma of Mr. Koizumi.

Secondly, surrounding himself with his staff, Mr. Abe dreamed of leading a Prime Minister-led government modeled on the U.S. presidency, but under Japan's parliamentary system of government, it was difficult to coordinate policies within the ruling party and with the various ministries, and he could not maintain the momentum of power.

Thirdly, Mr. Abe's favorite slogans such as "a beautiful country" and "ending the post-war regime" were vague in substance and did not have the impact to materialize and promote actual policies.

In short, "the post-war regime," having continued for 60 years under a constitution extolling peace and democracy, had come to suit the mentality of the Japanese people and Japan's political traditions, and it was a much stronger force than Mr. Abe thought.

Mr. Koizumi's structural reform was also a fierce power struggle within the LDP as exemplified in his words, "I am prepared to destroy the old LDP that resists reform." In the deliberations of the postal reform bill in the Upper House, some LDP members rebelled and the bill was defeated. Mr. Koizumi then dissolved the Lower House high-handedly, focusing only on whether or not this bill should become law. For LDP candidates who had opposed the bill, he sent in so-called "assassin" candidates to stand against them. With these most unusual strong measures he succeeded in swaying public opinion and won a landslide victory, winning two-thirds of the Lower House seats. This "will of the people," so clearly-demonstrated, split those who had opposed the bill in the Upper House, and the postal reform bill was passed into law. Mr. Koizumi's political prestige reached its zenith, and the voices of his opponents in the party weakened and turned inward.

Mr. Abe, who had served as the Cabinet Secretary and LDP Secretary-General in the Koizumi administration, and who had been Mr. Koizumi's chosen successor, won a decisive victory in the LDP party elections in September 2006, and the Abe administration took off most smoothly.

In only a year, the Abe government achieved remarkable results in improving diplomatic relations with Asian neighbors, which had soured because of Mr. Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni shrine. Mr. Abe also succeeded in passing the Fundamental Law of Education, the amendment to the Government Officials Act, and the promotion of the Defense Agency to the Defense Ministry, all laws with strong ideological coloring dear to his heart. But repeated gaffes by cabinet ministers, unclear source and use of political funds, sloppy management of pensions, and other issues erupted one after another, and support for the Abe cabinet nose-dived.

In early 2007, Mr. Abe declared that he would make constitutional revision the focal point of the Upper House elections in the summer. In May, he railroaded the referendum bill, which stipulates the procedure for constitutional revision. The opposition parties, who were working on the understanding that that law would be decided by non-partisan agreement, reacted with fierce opposition. Thus the move towards constitutional revision, which had appeared to have started moving on a much broader foundation than before, has taken a big step backward instead, thanks to Mr. Abe's hasty management.

In the Upper House election in July, the first national election under Mr. Abe, the LDP suffered a crushing defeat and lost control of the Upper House. Mr. Abe's prestige plummeted, and the hope of constitutional revision by the Abe government was dashed.

Insisting that "My policies are supported by the people," Mr. Abe decided to continue as prime minister. But when the Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries he appointed in his cabinet reshuffle was forced to resign over a political fund scandal after only a week, Mr. Abe was completely demoralized. On top of that, the very tight schedule of his overseas trips left him in very poor health. He returned to Japan, exhausted both mentally and physically, and came to announce his resignation.

This change in leadership was not only tragic for Abe the politician. It exposed the defects of Japanese politics and provided material for reflection; the real reason behind the Prime Minister's resignation was not made public, an acting prime minister was not named, and two weeks passed without an actual prime minister. Such a regrettable state of affairs could have invited question, distrust and even slight on Japan abroad.

Of the two candidates who competed to succeed Mr. Abe, Mr. Fukuda was highly critical of Mr. Abe, saying, "Mr. Abe should have stepped down when he lost the Upper House election, so he made a mistake." On the other hand, the position of Mr. Aso, who stood as a candidate to carry on the policies of the Abe government, was different. Mr. Aso had supported Mr. Abe's wish to continue as prime minister in July and was appointed LDP Secretary-General. Even after he was told of Mr. Abe's wish to resign in September, Mr. Aso had tried to stop him, saying, "This is not the time to resign." He deplored Mr. Abe's weakness, saying, "A leader must be able to bear the loneliness of the position."

During the election for LDP leadership, Mr. Aso proved popular with his brisk and lively way of speaking and his tough views appealing to people's nationalism. He got more votes than expected and consolidated his position as a post-Fukuda favorite. But Mr. Abe himself later had to apologize to the people and admit that he had "resigned at the worst possible moment." So a question remains as to whether Mr. Aso as LDP Secretary-General could not have taken more appropriate steps.

On September 9, Mr. Abe had a talk with President Bush in Sydney, where the APEC summit was being held, and said that he would do his best to extend the fueling operation by the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) in the Indian Ocean. He then explained to the Japanese people that "the extension of the special anti-terrorist law was an international pledge." In his heart Mr. Abe was already leaning towards resigning, and he seems to have thought of offering his own resignation as a condition and appeal to Ichiro Ozawa, the leader of the opposition DPJ, to keep the "international pledge."

At a time when Mr. Bush's Iraq War policy is a subject of serious debate even in the United States, and Mr. Bush himself has lost his prestige, the DPJ seems to think that a Japanese opposition party is not obliged to cooperate with that war. On the contrary, the DPJ is using its opposition to the special anti-terrorist law to leverage its policy and strategy. This seems to show that there was still a huge gap between Mr. Abe's idea and reality.

If "getting rid of the post-war regime" advocated by Mr. Abe only means constitutional revision, one could say Mr. Abe's departure has effectively put an end to this slogan. But look at Japan today, a country with a democratic constitution but without change of power between major political parties for over half a century, a country unquestioningly entrusting all of its diplomacy and security to one country if these are aspects of the post-war regime, "getting rid of the post-war regime" is a slogan which is still useful in thinking about the issues facing Japan.

The Writer is former Chief Editorial Writer for Kyodo News Agency.

2007年 11月 7日

安倍首相は９月10日、臨時国会の所信表明演説でテロ対策特別措置法に基づく自衛艦のインド洋での給油活動について「（国際社会から高い評価を受けている活動から）撤退して国際社会における責任を放棄してよいのか」と強く主張した。ところが12日、演説に対する代表質問が始まる直前に「政策の推進は困難になった」として唐突に首相辞任を表明した。

自民党は急いで総裁選挙を行い、23日、福田元官房長官が麻生自民党幹事長を破って当選、26日に新政権が発足した。福田首相は「政権が国民の信頼を失い、これ以上の失敗は許されない背水の陣」と称し、多くの派閥指導者を党と政府の要職につけ、安倍内閣の閣僚の大半を閣内に留めた。　
　
人事抗争を回避し、守りを固めた新態勢は世論からひとまず好意的に受け止められたが、新鮮味に欠け、新政策に期待を集めるほどの魅力も乏しい。７月の選挙で参院の主導権を握った民主党はさら政府を揺さぶり、来年夏までには衆院解散・総選挙に追い込む構えだから、与野党の勢力が拮抗してきた今後の政局は予断を許さない。

一年前、小泉元首相から衆院議席の三分の二を占める大勢力を継承し、「戦後生まれの初の首相」と若さを誇示し、憲法改正の主張を掲げて華々しくスタートした安倍政権がかくも短命で、惨めな終幕を迎えたのはなぜか。

第一に、小泉政権から継承した政治資産の見かけは壮大でも、組織的、政策的に多くの矛盾を内包し、小泉氏のような強烈な個性を持たない安倍氏には管理困難だった。　　

第二に、安倍氏は周辺にスタッフを集め、大統領型の「官邸主導政治」を夢見たが、議院内閣制度の下では与党や各省庁との調整が難しく政権の求心力を維持できなかった。

第三に、安倍氏の愛した「美しい国へ」「戦後レジームからの脱却」などのスローガンは内容があいまいで、政策を具体化し、推進する迫力を伴わなかった。

要約すれば、平和と民主をうたう憲法のもとで60年の経験を積んだ「戦後レジーム」はそれなりに日本の国民性、政治伝統に適合し、安倍氏が考えたよりも強い生命力を持っていたというべきだろう。

小泉政権の構造改革は「抵抗する古い自民党はぶち壊す」という激しい党内闘争でもあり、郵政改革法案の参院審議では自民党の一部が反乱、法案は否決された。小泉氏はこの法案の是非に争点を絞って強引に衆院を解散し、法案に反対した自民党候補に「刺客」と呼ばれた対立候補を立てるなど異例の強硬策で世論をあおり、ついに議席の三分の二を奪う大勝利を収めた。この「民意」に押されて参院の反対派は切り崩され、郵政法案は成立した。小泉氏の政治的威信は絶頂に達し、反対派の声は弱まり内攻した。

小泉政権で官房長官、党幹事長を歴任し、小泉氏の意中の後継者であった安倍氏は昨年９月の党総裁選で大勝し、安倍政権は極めて順調にスタートした。

安倍政権の一年は、小泉氏の靖国神社参拝で行き詰まっていたアジア外交の改善で顕著な成果をあげた。さらに教育基本法、公務員法の改正、防衛庁の省昇格など安倍氏のこだわるイデオロギ−色の強い法律が相次いで成立した。しかし閣僚の失言やあいまいな政治資金、ずさんな年金などの問題が続出、内閣支持率は急速に下降した。

安倍氏は2007年早々、憲法改正を夏の参院選の争点にするとぶち上げ、５月には国民投票法案の成立を強行した。改憲の手続きを決める同法は超党派の話し合いで成立させる、と理解していた野党は猛反発し、これまでにない幅広い基盤で動き出すかに見えた憲法改正の機運は安倍氏の性急な采配で逆に大きく後退した。

安倍政権下で初の全国選挙となった７月の参院選で自民党は大敗し、参院の主導権を完全に失った。安倍氏の威信は急落し、安倍政権による改憲の夢は消え去った。

安倍氏は「政策は国民に理解されている」と強弁して首相続投を決意したものの、内閣改造で起用した農相が一週間後に政治資金問題で辞任に追い込まれて士気阻喪。さらに過酷な外遊日程に体調を崩し、心身ともに衰えた状態で帰国、辞意表明に至った。

今回の政権交代は政治家・安倍の悲運の物語にとどまらず、日本の政治の欠陥を暴露し、反省の材料も提供した。首相の辞意表明の真相が伏せられ、首相臨時代理もおかず、事実上の首相不在のまま二週間も過ぎたことは、海外から疑問、不信、軽蔑を招いたとしても仕方のない遺憾な事態だった。　
　　　
安倍後継を争った福田首相は「安倍氏は参院選敗北のときに辞意表明すべきだったのに時期を誤った」と厳しい認識を示した。一方、安倍続投を支持して党幹事長に起用され、安倍継承の立場を鮮明にして立候補した麻生氏は、安倍氏から辞任の意向を告げられた後も「辞任の時期ではない」と慰留、「最高指導者は孤独に耐える力が大切だ」と首相の弱気を嘆いた。

総裁選での麻生氏は歯切れのいい語り口、ナショナリズムに訴える強気の主張などが人気を集め、予想以上の得票を集めてポスト福田を狙う足場を固めた。しかし安倍氏自身が後に「最悪のタイミングでの辞任」と国民に謝罪せざるを得なくなるような事態に当たって与党幹事長としてより適切な措置はとれなかったのか疑問が残る。

安倍氏は９月９日、APEC首脳会議の開かれたシドニーでブッシュ大統領と会談、インド洋での自衛艦の給油延長に努力することを表明した後、国内向けに「特別措置法の延長は国際公約だ」と説明した。安倍氏の心情は既に辞任に傾いており、自らの辞任を条件に「国際公約」の尊重を小沢民主党代表に訴える考えだったようだ。

民主党が、ブッシュ大統領のイラク戦争は米国内でも深刻な議論の対象になり、ブッシュの威信が低下している時、日本の野党がその戦争に協力する義理はないと考え、むしろ自らの政権戦略のテコとして特別措置法に反対しようとしている状況を見れば、安倍氏の発想はやはり現実からずれていたようにみえる。

安倍氏の唱えた「戦後レジームからの脱却」が憲法改正だけを意味するならば、安倍退陣とともにこのスローガンは生命力を失った。しかし民主主義憲法を持ちながら、半世紀にわたって大政党間の本格的な政権交代が定着せず、外交安保を全面的に一国に依存して疑わないかのような状態を「戦後レジーム」の一側面ととらえるなら、このスローガンは日本の課題を考える手がかりとして有効性を保つだろう。

（筆者は元共同通信論説委員。）