The Structure of Arab Mistrust of the U.S. and the Obama Administration
KITAMURA Fumio / Journalist
January 26, 2009
On January 20, Barack Obama became the first African-American President of the United States. The emergence of a young President advocating "change" has been well received in Japan. A poll by the Asahi Shimbun newspaper showed that as much as 79% of the respondents welcomed Obama's electoral victory.
However, ahead of the Obama administration lies the negative legacy of unilateral diplomacy left behind by the Bush administration. The deepening state of confusion in the Middle East is likely to hang heavily on the shoulders of the new President. Confidence in the United States has deteriorated to an all-time low in the region. The first task of the Obama administration will be to dismantle the structure of Arab mistrust. The nature of its involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations will serve as an important test.
Direct U.S. involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict began in the mid-1970's. It was Egyptian President Anwar Sadat who invited the United States to the Middle East. Immediately following the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Sadat realized it was impossible to overwhelm Israel by military force, and that the only way to resolve the conflict was through a dialogue with the inveterate enemy. Sadat abandoned the course of military confrontation and entrusted the United States with the role of an "impartial mediator" in seeking a resolution to the conflict.
The United States provides both military and economic support to Israel. Thus Sadat hoped to use U.S. persuasion to force Israel to retreat from the territories it occupied since the Six-Day War of 1967 - the West Bank of the Jordan River, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights - and to create a Palestinian state in that area. In return for U.S. mediation in the peace process, Sadat revoked military cooperation with the Soviet Union and in 1979 Egypt became the first Arab nation to sign a peace treaty with Israel.
However, the United States held back from presenting Israel with an effective solution, which gave Israel time to continue building Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. Sadat was branded a traitor in the Arab world and assassinated by an Islamic extremist in October 1981. In the eyes of the Arab people, the United States had all but abandoned its role as an impartial mediator. Notably, as the Bush administration became more blatant in its pro-Israeli policy, the structure of mistrust of the United States became firmly entrenched in the Arab world.
Even so, faint signs that may presage a resolution to the deadlock had begun to appear in autumn 2008. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said in an interview with a leading national newspaper that "Israel must retreat from most parts of the West Bank of the Jordan River, as well as East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights (Syrian territory)." Though Ormelt will step down after the general elections in February, no other Prime Minister before him had ever commented so clearly on Israel’s intentions of abandoning the occupied territories.
This gave rise to subtle changes within the Palestinian National Authority as well. Hamas, the Islamic fundamentalist organization that effectively controls the Gaza Strip, had been criticized as a "terrorist organization" by the Bush administration. Accordingly, President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority had refused to speak with Hamas. However, with the impending departure of the Bush administration, Abbas has expressed his intentions of opening a dialogue with Hamas on the formation of a coalition government. Since the end of last year, the situation has turned an unfortunate corner in the form of a violent clash between Hamas and Israel. Hamas nevertheless enjoys strong support from the people, not only in Gaza but throughout the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Area including the West Bank. It would be difficult for Abbas to ignore this reality.
The Bush administration repeatedly expressed full support for Israel in its armed conflict against Hamas. The ceasefire between Hamas and Israel lasted six months before the latest fighting caused its collapse. Even during the ceasefire, Israel had maintained its blockade of the Gaza Strip with tacit approval from the Bush administration. And although U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice paid repeated visits to the Middle East, the content of her negotiations remains undisclosed.
The Arab world will not trust the United States unless the Obama administration includes policies for recovering Palestinian rights into the basic framework of its Middle East policy. As its first step in regaining trust, the new administration must signal with greater clarity and transparency a different approach to Middle East peace from that of the previous administration. In the hearts of the Arab people, the plight of the Palestinians is felt as their own. The Palestinian issue harbors rebellion among the oppressed people in the Arab world. I sincerely hope that the gravity of the Palestinian issue will be firmly recognized by the Obama administration.
The writer is a former Professor of Shukutoku University and former London Bureau Chief and Cairo Bureau Chief of the Yomiuri Shimbun.
However, ahead of the Obama administration lies the negative legacy of unilateral diplomacy left behind by the Bush administration. The deepening state of confusion in the Middle East is likely to hang heavily on the shoulders of the new President. Confidence in the United States has deteriorated to an all-time low in the region. The first task of the Obama administration will be to dismantle the structure of Arab mistrust. The nature of its involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations will serve as an important test.
Direct U.S. involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict began in the mid-1970's. It was Egyptian President Anwar Sadat who invited the United States to the Middle East. Immediately following the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Sadat realized it was impossible to overwhelm Israel by military force, and that the only way to resolve the conflict was through a dialogue with the inveterate enemy. Sadat abandoned the course of military confrontation and entrusted the United States with the role of an "impartial mediator" in seeking a resolution to the conflict.
The United States provides both military and economic support to Israel. Thus Sadat hoped to use U.S. persuasion to force Israel to retreat from the territories it occupied since the Six-Day War of 1967 - the West Bank of the Jordan River, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights - and to create a Palestinian state in that area. In return for U.S. mediation in the peace process, Sadat revoked military cooperation with the Soviet Union and in 1979 Egypt became the first Arab nation to sign a peace treaty with Israel.
However, the United States held back from presenting Israel with an effective solution, which gave Israel time to continue building Jewish settlements in the occupied territories. Sadat was branded a traitor in the Arab world and assassinated by an Islamic extremist in October 1981. In the eyes of the Arab people, the United States had all but abandoned its role as an impartial mediator. Notably, as the Bush administration became more blatant in its pro-Israeli policy, the structure of mistrust of the United States became firmly entrenched in the Arab world.
Even so, faint signs that may presage a resolution to the deadlock had begun to appear in autumn 2008. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said in an interview with a leading national newspaper that "Israel must retreat from most parts of the West Bank of the Jordan River, as well as East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights (Syrian territory)." Though Ormelt will step down after the general elections in February, no other Prime Minister before him had ever commented so clearly on Israel’s intentions of abandoning the occupied territories.
This gave rise to subtle changes within the Palestinian National Authority as well. Hamas, the Islamic fundamentalist organization that effectively controls the Gaza Strip, had been criticized as a "terrorist organization" by the Bush administration. Accordingly, President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority had refused to speak with Hamas. However, with the impending departure of the Bush administration, Abbas has expressed his intentions of opening a dialogue with Hamas on the formation of a coalition government. Since the end of last year, the situation has turned an unfortunate corner in the form of a violent clash between Hamas and Israel. Hamas nevertheless enjoys strong support from the people, not only in Gaza but throughout the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Area including the West Bank. It would be difficult for Abbas to ignore this reality.
The Bush administration repeatedly expressed full support for Israel in its armed conflict against Hamas. The ceasefire between Hamas and Israel lasted six months before the latest fighting caused its collapse. Even during the ceasefire, Israel had maintained its blockade of the Gaza Strip with tacit approval from the Bush administration. And although U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice paid repeated visits to the Middle East, the content of her negotiations remains undisclosed.
The Arab world will not trust the United States unless the Obama administration includes policies for recovering Palestinian rights into the basic framework of its Middle East policy. As its first step in regaining trust, the new administration must signal with greater clarity and transparency a different approach to Middle East peace from that of the previous administration. In the hearts of the Arab people, the plight of the Palestinians is felt as their own. The Palestinian issue harbors rebellion among the oppressed people in the Arab world. I sincerely hope that the gravity of the Palestinian issue will be firmly recognized by the Obama administration.
The writer is a former Professor of Shukutoku University and former London Bureau Chief and Cairo Bureau Chief of the Yomiuri Shimbun.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
中東の「対米不信の構造」とオバマ新政権
北村文夫 / ジャーナリスト
2009年 1月 26日
バラク・オバマ氏が１月２０日、アフリカ系アメリカ人として初の大統領に就任した。「変革」を唱える若き新大統領の登場は日本国内でも歓迎され、朝日新聞の世論調査では「オバマ氏勝利はよかった」との回答率が７９％に達した。
しかしオバマ政権の前途には、ブッシュ前政権下の単独主義外交の負の遺産が立ちはだかる。新大統領の肩に重くのしかかるのは、混迷を深める中東情勢だろう。中東地域で米国への信頼度をかつてないほど低下している。オバマ政権はまず「対米不信の構造」を除去せねばならない。その重大な試金石になるのが、パレスチナ・イスラエル和平交渉への関与の仕方だと思う。
米国がパレスチナ・イスラエル紛争に直接関与しだしたのは、１９７０年代半ばのことだ。米国を中東に招き入れたのはサダト・エジプト大統領だった。７３年の第４次中東戦争の直後から、サダト氏は軍事力でイスラエルを圧倒するのは不可能で、宿敵との対話しか紛争解決への道はないと判断した。武力闘争路線を捨てたサダト氏は、紛争解決への「公平な仲介者」の役割を米国にゆだねた。
米国は軍事、経済両面でイスラエルを支えている。サダト氏の願いは、その米国の説得によって、６７年戦争の占領地（ヨルダン川西岸、ガザ地区、ゴラン高原）からイスラエルを撤退させ、そこにパレスチナ国家を建設することだった。米国による和平交渉関与への代償として、サダト氏はソ連との軍事協力を破棄し、７９年にはアラブ諸国で初めてイスラエルと平和条約を締結した。
しかし米国はイスラエルへの有効な説得策に乗り出さず、その間にイスラエルは占領地にユダヤ人入植地を建設し続けた。サダト氏はアラブ世界で「裏切り者」の罵声を浴び、８１年１０月にイスラム過激派の凶弾に倒れた。アラブ民衆の眼には、米国は「公平な仲介者」の役割を放棄しているかのように映った。ことにブッシュ前政権が親イスラエル方針をより露骨に打ち出すにつれ、アラブ世界で「対米不信の構造」が固定化した。
しかし２００８年秋から、膠着状態打開を予感させるかすかな兆しが見えてきた。イスラエルのエフド・オルメルト首相は国内有力紙とのインタビューで「ヨルダン川西岸のほとんどすべての地域、さらに東エルサレム、ゴラン高原（シリア領）から撤退せねばならない」と述べた。オルメルト氏は２月の総選挙で首相の座を去るが、これほど明確に占領地放棄の方針に言及したイスラエル首相はかつていなかった。
パレスチナ自治政府内部でも微妙な変化が生まれた。ブッシュ前政権はガザ地区を実効支配するイスラム原理主義組織ハマスを「テロ組織」と非難し、これに同調したアッバス・パレスチナ自治政府議長もハマスとの対話を拒否してきた。しかしアッバス氏はブッシュ政権退陣が迫るにつれ、ハマスと連立政府樹立の話し合いに入る方針を表明した。昨年末からハマスとイスラエルの武力衝突という不幸な状況が生まれたが、ガザ地区だけでなくヨルダン川西岸を含めたパレスチナ暫定自治区でハマスは民衆の強い支持を受けている。アッバス氏はこの現実を無視することはできまい。
ブッシュ前政権はイスラエル・ハマス戦闘に関してもイスラエル全面支持を繰り返した。ハマス・イスラエル間で６カ月間続いた停戦は、今回の戦闘で破綻した。その停戦期間中にもイスラエルはガザ地区封鎖を継続していたが、ブッシュ前政権はこれを黙認してきた。またライス前国務長官は中東歴訪を繰り返したものの、その交渉者の中身の公表は拒否された。
オバマ新政権がその中東政策の基本骨格に、パレスチナ人の権利回復策を含めない限り、アラブ世界が米国を信頼することはないだろう。信頼回復への第一歩として、前政権とは異なる中東和平アプローチをより明確に、より透明に示さねばならない。アラブ民衆の胸中では、自らの苦境とパレスチナ人の困窮が一体化されている。パレスチナ人問題はアラブ世界で非抑圧者の反抗心を培養しているといえる。パレスチナ問題がもつこの重みを、オバマ政権がしっかりと認識してくれることを願う。
（筆者は元淑徳大学教授、元読売新聞カイロ支局長、ロンドン総局長）
しかしオバマ政権の前途には、ブッシュ前政権下の単独主義外交の負の遺産が立ちはだかる。新大統領の肩に重くのしかかるのは、混迷を深める中東情勢だろう。中東地域で米国への信頼度をかつてないほど低下している。オバマ政権はまず「対米不信の構造」を除去せねばならない。その重大な試金石になるのが、パレスチナ・イスラエル和平交渉への関与の仕方だと思う。
米国がパレスチナ・イスラエル紛争に直接関与しだしたのは、１９７０年代半ばのことだ。米国を中東に招き入れたのはサダト・エジプト大統領だった。７３年の第４次中東戦争の直後から、サダト氏は軍事力でイスラエルを圧倒するのは不可能で、宿敵との対話しか紛争解決への道はないと判断した。武力闘争路線を捨てたサダト氏は、紛争解決への「公平な仲介者」の役割を米国にゆだねた。
米国は軍事、経済両面でイスラエルを支えている。サダト氏の願いは、その米国の説得によって、６７年戦争の占領地（ヨルダン川西岸、ガザ地区、ゴラン高原）からイスラエルを撤退させ、そこにパレスチナ国家を建設することだった。米国による和平交渉関与への代償として、サダト氏はソ連との軍事協力を破棄し、７９年にはアラブ諸国で初めてイスラエルと平和条約を締結した。
しかし米国はイスラエルへの有効な説得策に乗り出さず、その間にイスラエルは占領地にユダヤ人入植地を建設し続けた。サダト氏はアラブ世界で「裏切り者」の罵声を浴び、８１年１０月にイスラム過激派の凶弾に倒れた。アラブ民衆の眼には、米国は「公平な仲介者」の役割を放棄しているかのように映った。ことにブッシュ前政権が親イスラエル方針をより露骨に打ち出すにつれ、アラブ世界で「対米不信の構造」が固定化した。
しかし２００８年秋から、膠着状態打開を予感させるかすかな兆しが見えてきた。イスラエルのエフド・オルメルト首相は国内有力紙とのインタビューで「ヨルダン川西岸のほとんどすべての地域、さらに東エルサレム、ゴラン高原（シリア領）から撤退せねばならない」と述べた。オルメルト氏は２月の総選挙で首相の座を去るが、これほど明確に占領地放棄の方針に言及したイスラエル首相はかつていなかった。
パレスチナ自治政府内部でも微妙な変化が生まれた。ブッシュ前政権はガザ地区を実効支配するイスラム原理主義組織ハマスを「テロ組織」と非難し、これに同調したアッバス・パレスチナ自治政府議長もハマスとの対話を拒否してきた。しかしアッバス氏はブッシュ政権退陣が迫るにつれ、ハマスと連立政府樹立の話し合いに入る方針を表明した。昨年末からハマスとイスラエルの武力衝突という不幸な状況が生まれたが、ガザ地区だけでなくヨルダン川西岸を含めたパレスチナ暫定自治区でハマスは民衆の強い支持を受けている。アッバス氏はこの現実を無視することはできまい。
ブッシュ前政権はイスラエル・ハマス戦闘に関してもイスラエル全面支持を繰り返した。ハマス・イスラエル間で６カ月間続いた停戦は、今回の戦闘で破綻した。その停戦期間中にもイスラエルはガザ地区封鎖を継続していたが、ブッシュ前政権はこれを黙認してきた。またライス前国務長官は中東歴訪を繰り返したものの、その交渉者の中身の公表は拒否された。
オバマ新政権がその中東政策の基本骨格に、パレスチナ人の権利回復策を含めない限り、アラブ世界が米国を信頼することはないだろう。信頼回復への第一歩として、前政権とは異なる中東和平アプローチをより明確に、より透明に示さねばならない。アラブ民衆の胸中では、自らの苦境とパレスチナ人の困窮が一体化されている。パレスチナ人問題はアラブ世界で非抑圧者の反抗心を培養しているといえる。パレスチナ問題がもつこの重みを、オバマ政権がしっかりと認識してくれることを願う。
（筆者は元淑徳大学教授、元読売新聞カイロ支局長、ロンドン総局長）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟