A Proposal for Japan's National Security Policy
MAGOSAKI Ukeru / Formerly professor at the Defense Academy
April 28, 2009
On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched a Taepodon missile. The launching attracted the heightened attention of the Japanese people, due to the information error about the launch committed by the Japanese government the day before and to discussions whether are appropriate countermeasures by the U.N. Security Council (which turned out to be the Chairman's statement). I would like to make a few suggestions, as the launch brought forth fundamental issues with regard to Japanese security problems.
Within the defense budget, we find the amount earmarked for missile defense (MD) has reached nearly 100 billion yen annually, as it forms the nucleus of our defense policy. But this huge amount has been increasing without substantial discussions as to whether, or to what extent, the measures would be effective.
This time, the Taepodon missile attracted a lot of attention in Japan, but this missile is not aimed at Japan. It is said that more than 200 Nodong missiles have already been deployed against Japan. Their launching pads are equipped with mobile wheeled vehicles or underground silos and it is almost impossible to detect the launching beforehand. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry wrote in 2001 in his essay "Be prepared against coming attacks" that, historically speaking, the probability of bringing down in-coming bombers would be somewhere around 3-30% and it would be difficult to argue persuasively that defense against ballistic missiles would be easier than shooting down enemy bombers. He warned then that if you give top priority to missile defense within defense policy, you would make the same mistake as the French, who thought that the Maginot Line would prevent the German army from invading France.
More importantly, North Korea is not Japan's only potential adversary. How to deal with Chinese and/or Russian military strength is no less intractable, but Japan's missile defense system in progress would be totally ineffective against Chinese and/or Russian nuclear weapons. Accordingly, our national security policy should not place missile defense at its center.
Among defense concepts, one scenario envisions the attack of enemy bases. However, if you study Japan's present military defense preparedness you will immediately find out that it has no capability of effectively attacking enemy bases.
The Second World War experience has taught us that the best policy to deter the enemy from attacking us would be to demonstrate how well prepared we are, ready and able to counterattack even more severely.
The military threat posed by Russia, China and North Korea is centered on nuclear attacks. We have to think hard about how to cope with this threat. One of our options could be to go nuclear. Japan, however, would be very vulnerable in a nuclear war with its political and economic centers much more concentrated in particular areas, whereas in Russia and China they are scattered around their vast territories. Furthermore, to what extent Japan can rely upon the U.S. nuclear power is a big question. As Henry Kissinger pointed out in his chef-d'oeuvre "Nuclear War and Diplomacy," the United States may find it worthless to defend allied countries except for those in the Western hemisphere if the American mainland is faced with the danger of retaliation by enemy nuclear attacks. Thus, it must be concluded that it would be difficult for Japan to convince Russia, China and North Korea that the attacker would face more severe military retaliation than its initial attack. Well, then, what should we do? Is there any other way possible for Japan?
As a matter of fact, if we examine fields other than military history, we can find ways to persuade them that "the attackers would suffer greater damage than they inflict in the long run." Today, the Chinese Communist Party is maintaining their regime on the peoples' expectation that it will provide them with high economic profits. China nowadays exports goods worth more than 10-trillion yen annually and a lot of Chinese are involved in the export business. If you calculate the benefit gained by attacking Japan and the economic losses to be suffered wherefrom, the latter would be far greater than the former.
If we expand our conjecture into the field of economics beyond military matters, we see the means by which we can certainly make an enemy realize that "the attacking party will suffer greater retaliation." If we can substantially advance Sino-Japanese economic relations, thus increasing our mutual economic dependence, we may be able to convince the Chinese people that the destruction of Japan-China relationship would be unbearably disadvantageous to them. The same can apply to North Korea as well. Rather than putting more emphasis on the MD, the feasibility of which is not very high, we should endeavor to develop a larger layer of people in North Korea who believe the worsening of Japan-North Korea relations would work to their disadvantage. This is in fact the best way to secure deterrence. If this argument is accepted, it becomes necessary to radically change our strategy towards North Korea.
The writer is formerly professor at the Defense Academy, Ambassador to Iran and Director-General of the Department of International Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Within the defense budget, we find the amount earmarked for missile defense (MD) has reached nearly 100 billion yen annually, as it forms the nucleus of our defense policy. But this huge amount has been increasing without substantial discussions as to whether, or to what extent, the measures would be effective.
This time, the Taepodon missile attracted a lot of attention in Japan, but this missile is not aimed at Japan. It is said that more than 200 Nodong missiles have already been deployed against Japan. Their launching pads are equipped with mobile wheeled vehicles or underground silos and it is almost impossible to detect the launching beforehand. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry wrote in 2001 in his essay "Be prepared against coming attacks" that, historically speaking, the probability of bringing down in-coming bombers would be somewhere around 3-30% and it would be difficult to argue persuasively that defense against ballistic missiles would be easier than shooting down enemy bombers. He warned then that if you give top priority to missile defense within defense policy, you would make the same mistake as the French, who thought that the Maginot Line would prevent the German army from invading France.
More importantly, North Korea is not Japan's only potential adversary. How to deal with Chinese and/or Russian military strength is no less intractable, but Japan's missile defense system in progress would be totally ineffective against Chinese and/or Russian nuclear weapons. Accordingly, our national security policy should not place missile defense at its center.
Among defense concepts, one scenario envisions the attack of enemy bases. However, if you study Japan's present military defense preparedness you will immediately find out that it has no capability of effectively attacking enemy bases.
The Second World War experience has taught us that the best policy to deter the enemy from attacking us would be to demonstrate how well prepared we are, ready and able to counterattack even more severely.
The military threat posed by Russia, China and North Korea is centered on nuclear attacks. We have to think hard about how to cope with this threat. One of our options could be to go nuclear. Japan, however, would be very vulnerable in a nuclear war with its political and economic centers much more concentrated in particular areas, whereas in Russia and China they are scattered around their vast territories. Furthermore, to what extent Japan can rely upon the U.S. nuclear power is a big question. As Henry Kissinger pointed out in his chef-d'oeuvre "Nuclear War and Diplomacy," the United States may find it worthless to defend allied countries except for those in the Western hemisphere if the American mainland is faced with the danger of retaliation by enemy nuclear attacks. Thus, it must be concluded that it would be difficult for Japan to convince Russia, China and North Korea that the attacker would face more severe military retaliation than its initial attack. Well, then, what should we do? Is there any other way possible for Japan?
As a matter of fact, if we examine fields other than military history, we can find ways to persuade them that "the attackers would suffer greater damage than they inflict in the long run." Today, the Chinese Communist Party is maintaining their regime on the peoples' expectation that it will provide them with high economic profits. China nowadays exports goods worth more than 10-trillion yen annually and a lot of Chinese are involved in the export business. If you calculate the benefit gained by attacking Japan and the economic losses to be suffered wherefrom, the latter would be far greater than the former.
If we expand our conjecture into the field of economics beyond military matters, we see the means by which we can certainly make an enemy realize that "the attacking party will suffer greater retaliation." If we can substantially advance Sino-Japanese economic relations, thus increasing our mutual economic dependence, we may be able to convince the Chinese people that the destruction of Japan-China relationship would be unbearably disadvantageous to them. The same can apply to North Korea as well. Rather than putting more emphasis on the MD, the feasibility of which is not very high, we should endeavor to develop a larger layer of people in North Korea who believe the worsening of Japan-North Korea relations would work to their disadvantage. This is in fact the best way to secure deterrence. If this argument is accepted, it becomes necessary to radically change our strategy towards North Korea.
The writer is formerly professor at the Defense Academy, Ambassador to Iran and Director-General of the Department of International Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
日本の安全保障政策を考える
孫崎 享 / 元防衛大学校教授
2009年 4月 28日
４月５日、北朝鮮はテポドン・ミサイルを発射した。前日の日本政府の発射誤報騒ぎや国連安保理での対処の仕方（制裁決議か議長声明か） を巡る議論で、日本国民の関心を引いた。テポドン発射事件は日本の安全保障を考える際の根本問題を含んでいるだけに、ここで考えて見たい。
防衛費予算を見れば、ミサイル防衛は年間一千億円近い額を計上し、我が国防衛政策の核になっている。しかし、ミサイル防衛がどこまで有効かについてさしたる議論もないまま、巨額の予算計上に至っている。
今回日本国中でテポドン・ミサイルに関心がもたれたが、テポドン・ミサイルは日本向けではない。日本向けにはノドン・ミサイルが実戦配備され、その数２００以上といわれている。発射母体は移動式車両や地下サイロであり、基本的には発射前の把握はほぼ不可能である。ペリー元国防長官は２００１年、論文「次なる攻撃に備えよ」で、「歴史的に見て向かってくる爆撃機を撃墜できる格率は３～３０％であり、弾道ミサイル防衛が爆撃機を撃墜するより簡単だという議論を説得力を持って展開することは難しい」と述べ、ミサイル防衛を防衛の軸にすることは、フランスがマジノ線を築きドイツ軍の侵攻を防げると思ったと同じ 間違いを犯すことだと警告した。
更に重要なことは日本の仮想敵国は北朝鮮だけではない。中国、ロシアの軍事力にどう対応するかを考えなければならないが、現在進行中の我が国のミサイル防衛は中国・ロシアの核兵器に全く無力である。従って、我が国の安全保障政策はミサイル防衛を軸にすべきではない。
防衛の概念に敵基地攻撃という概念があるが、日本の現在の装備を検討すると有効な敵基地攻撃を出来る能力はない。
第二次大戦以降の軍事戦略において、他の国が軍事攻撃をしない最終的な担保は、攻撃すれば、攻撃した国が軍事的に攻撃以上の報復を受けることにある。
ロシア、中国、北朝鮮の軍事的脅威は核兵器である。これにどう対抗するかを考えねばならない。我が国が独自の核兵器を持つという選択肢もあるが、日本は政治経済の中心地が特定地域に集中し、核戦争では広大な面積に分散しているロシア・中国に比し圧倒的な脆弱性を持っている。さらに核の傘にどれ位依存できるかとなると、キッシンジャーは代表作『核兵器と外交』で、米国が同盟国を守ることで米国本土に報復される可能性が出る時には「西半球以外の地域は争う価値がないようにみえてくる」と記載している。こうして見てくると日本がロシア、中国、北朝鮮に「攻撃した国が軍事的に攻撃以上の報復を受けること」を担保する態勢を持つのは容易ではない。では我が国として道はないのか。
実は「攻撃した国が攻撃以上の報復を受ける」ことを軍事以外の分野に広げると、道はある。今日、中国共産党は国民に高い経済的利益を与えうるという期待の上に政権を維持している。中国は年間十兆円以上の額を日本に輸出し、この輸出に多くの人々が関与している。日本を攻撃し得られる利益と、攻撃により一般の中国人が被る経済的被害を計量すると、後者が圧倒的に大きい。
軍事を超え経済分野にまで拡大して考えると、「攻撃した国が攻撃以上の報復を受ける」ことを担保する手段がある。それは日中経済関係を飛躍的に発展させ、中国の中に、日中経済関係の破壊が彼らの利益に反する態勢を築き、これを中国国民に認識させることである。実はこのことは北朝鮮にも通ずる。実現可能性の低いミサイル防衛に賭けるより、北朝鮮内に日本との関係を悪化することがマイナスになる層を築くことが、実は最も頼りになる抑止政策となる。もしそうなら北朝鮮政策は根本的転換が必要となる。
（筆者は元防衛大学校教授、元駐イラン大使、元外務省国際情報局長）
防衛費予算を見れば、ミサイル防衛は年間一千億円近い額を計上し、我が国防衛政策の核になっている。しかし、ミサイル防衛がどこまで有効かについてさしたる議論もないまま、巨額の予算計上に至っている。
今回日本国中でテポドン・ミサイルに関心がもたれたが、テポドン・ミサイルは日本向けではない。日本向けにはノドン・ミサイルが実戦配備され、その数２００以上といわれている。発射母体は移動式車両や地下サイロであり、基本的には発射前の把握はほぼ不可能である。ペリー元国防長官は２００１年、論文「次なる攻撃に備えよ」で、「歴史的に見て向かってくる爆撃機を撃墜できる格率は３～３０％であり、弾道ミサイル防衛が爆撃機を撃墜するより簡単だという議論を説得力を持って展開することは難しい」と述べ、ミサイル防衛を防衛の軸にすることは、フランスがマジノ線を築きドイツ軍の侵攻を防げると思ったと同じ 間違いを犯すことだと警告した。
更に重要なことは日本の仮想敵国は北朝鮮だけではない。中国、ロシアの軍事力にどう対応するかを考えなければならないが、現在進行中の我が国のミサイル防衛は中国・ロシアの核兵器に全く無力である。従って、我が国の安全保障政策はミサイル防衛を軸にすべきではない。
防衛の概念に敵基地攻撃という概念があるが、日本の現在の装備を検討すると有効な敵基地攻撃を出来る能力はない。
第二次大戦以降の軍事戦略において、他の国が軍事攻撃をしない最終的な担保は、攻撃すれば、攻撃した国が軍事的に攻撃以上の報復を受けることにある。
ロシア、中国、北朝鮮の軍事的脅威は核兵器である。これにどう対抗するかを考えねばならない。我が国が独自の核兵器を持つという選択肢もあるが、日本は政治経済の中心地が特定地域に集中し、核戦争では広大な面積に分散しているロシア・中国に比し圧倒的な脆弱性を持っている。さらに核の傘にどれ位依存できるかとなると、キッシンジャーは代表作『核兵器と外交』で、米国が同盟国を守ることで米国本土に報復される可能性が出る時には「西半球以外の地域は争う価値がないようにみえてくる」と記載している。こうして見てくると日本がロシア、中国、北朝鮮に「攻撃した国が軍事的に攻撃以上の報復を受けること」を担保する態勢を持つのは容易ではない。では我が国として道はないのか。
実は「攻撃した国が攻撃以上の報復を受ける」ことを軍事以外の分野に広げると、道はある。今日、中国共産党は国民に高い経済的利益を与えうるという期待の上に政権を維持している。中国は年間十兆円以上の額を日本に輸出し、この輸出に多くの人々が関与している。日本を攻撃し得られる利益と、攻撃により一般の中国人が被る経済的被害を計量すると、後者が圧倒的に大きい。
軍事を超え経済分野にまで拡大して考えると、「攻撃した国が攻撃以上の報復を受ける」ことを担保する手段がある。それは日中経済関係を飛躍的に発展させ、中国の中に、日中経済関係の破壊が彼らの利益に反する態勢を築き、これを中国国民に認識させることである。実はこのことは北朝鮮にも通ずる。実現可能性の低いミサイル防衛に賭けるより、北朝鮮内に日本との関係を悪化することがマイナスになる層を築くことが、実は最も頼りになる抑止政策となる。もしそうなら北朝鮮政策は根本的転換が必要となる。
（筆者は元防衛大学校教授、元駐イラン大使、元外務省国際情報局長）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟