May 13, 2010

In the March-April issue of the Foreign Affairs magazine, Professor Niall Ferguson of Harvard University wrote that China's GDP will surpass that of the United States by 2027 according to one estimate, while others say that won't happen until 2040. Professor Nishimura Yoshimasa of Waseda University, in his lectures and elsewhere, has predicted that by 2020 the Chinese economy will expand beyond that of the United States to four times the size of the Japanese economy in terms of Purchasing Power Parity compared with levels in 2000. By the time this happens, China's desire to maintain a balance with the United States would have increased Chinese military spending to ten times that of Japan.

How are we to deal with a China that is becoming a superpower? Since the Meiji era, Japan has confronted China based on the approach laid out in "Datsu-A Ron (Argument for Leaving Asia)" published in 1885. The author of "Datsu-A Ron" argued that "it is better for us to leave the ranks of Asian nations and cast our lot with civilized nations of the West… Thos [who] are intimate with bad friends are also regarded bad, therefore I will deny those bad Asian friends from my heart."* The presumption then was that there was no hope of further development in China or in the Korean Peninsula. Today we are faced with a need to fundamentally revise this approach.

How are we to deal with a China that is becoming a Leviathan? The obvious course is to depend on the United States based on the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In his major work "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy," Henry Kissinger explored the extent to which we could rely on a 'nuclear umbrella.' Kissinger pointed out that when faced with an impending all-out war, few Americans would be absolutely convinced of the necessity of intervening, even if Europe itself was at stake, and there was a danger that people may begin to feel that regions outside the western hemisphere weren’t worth fighting for. Hans Morgenthau also voiced his doubts against the reliability of the 'nuclear umbrella' in his book Politics Among Nations. Furthermore, in a Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper article dated June 25, 1986, former CIA Director Stansfield Turner said that the idea of the United States firing nuclear missiles at the Soviet Union on behalf of Japan or Europe was a delusion, and argued that the United States has never provided a 'nuclear umbrella' for its allies.

If so, what about the case of the Senkaku Islands, a major point of dispute between Japan and China? The United States has stated its stance that the Senkaku Islands are currently under dispute and that it will ultimately take no side on issues of sovereignty. Walter Mondale, while serving as U.S. Ambassador to Japan, said the Security Treaty does not obligate the U.S. Forces to intervene in this issue. While his comments were not fully endorsed by his government, that still leaves us with no guarantee the U.S. Forces will fight alongside the Japan Defense Forces in any conflict over the islands. The United States has no doubt learned from Thucydides the lesson of Athens, destroyed as a result of offering military support to its ally Corinth, recounted in the classic "History of the Peloponnesian War." The United States is thus unlikely to risk being dragged into war against a superpower by helping its ally.

It is against such a backdrop that Japan must deal with Chinese military might. At present, there is a 1 to 10 gap in the military spending of Japan and the United States. This gap is unlikely to narrow in future. Considering that China will aim to equal the United States, the military power gap between Japan and China is expected to widen to more than 1 to 10. How are we to deal with such a future? One option would be to reinforce our defenses around the Senkaku Islands. However, we should realize that generally speaking, there is no way we can counter the Chinese through force. I am fond of playing the strategic game of Go, and believe the fastest way to mastering the game is to discard unrealistic options as quickly as possible, even if they seem desirable. It would be fine if Japan did have a military option. But no such option exists.

Well then, what should we do? We do have one advantage. In its 2008 annual report on China's military power, the U.S. Department of Defense wrote: The survival of the existing government plays a decisive role in shaping China's strategic future. Until now, the Communist Party has depended on economic success and nationalism to justify its claim to government. However, there are inherent risks on both fronts. While the Chinese government has manipulated the public to arouse nationalistic sentiments through anti-Japanese demonstrations and other means, it is aware that such protests can get out of hand. To maintain economic growth, Chinese leaders have begun to strengthen bilateral relations and multilateral policy coordination on a global scale.

Military attack severs any economic relationship with the enemy country. China's exports to Japan exceed 10 trillion yen each year. Taking military action against Japan would deprive China of the Japanese market and have a devastating effect on the Chinese economy.

Deterrence only works as long as the attacking country receives a greater blow than any advantages it hopes to gain from the attack. Attacking Japan would derail the Chinese economy and put pressure on its leadership. While we tend to consider deterrence from a military perspective, if we could forge closer economic ties to create a situation in which the Chinese government would be unable to pursue a military option in fear of losing the economic relationship, that would also constitute a worthy deterrent.

With no military options at hand, this is perhaps Japan's only course of action. Forming stronger economic ties with China and encouraging its leaders to understand the full political implications of losing the Japanese market seems to be the most realistic deterrent for Japan. And it also matches the course adopted by the Japanese after World War II. For Japan, the most desirable strategy would be to aim for maximum effect with the minimum effort.

The writer is former Director-General of the Department of International Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

*Note: Translation from Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Datsu-A_Ron

2010年 5月 13日

中国の軍事的脅威にどう対抗するか
孫崎　享 元外務省国際情報局長

フォーリン・アフェアーズ誌2010年３・4月号でフェルグソン・ハーバード大学教授は「ある予測では中国のGDPは2027年に米国を越える。（別の人は）2040年まではそれは起こらないだろう（という）」と記述した。また、西村吉正早稲田大学教授は、講演等で2000年購買力平価ベースで2020年には中国は米国を上回り日本の4倍の経済規模になると予測している。この際、米国との均衡を求める中国の軍事費は日本の10倍以上になると予測される。

この大国化する中国に如何に対応するか。明治以降、日本は中国、朝鮮半島が発展する可能性はないとの前提で、「その（亜細亜）伍を脱して西欧の文明国と進退を共にし、西洋人が之に接するの風に従いて処分すべき。我が心に於て亜細亜東方の悪友を謝断すものなり」（「脱亜論」1885年）との考えで中国に対峙してきたが、今、対応を根本的に改める必要がある。

巨大化する中国にどう対応するか。当然日米安保条約を基礎に米国に依存する道が考えられる。キッシンジャーは、代表的著書『核兵器と外交政策』の中で、「核の傘」はどこまで信頼に耐えるかを議論し、「 全面戦争という破局に直面したとき、ヨーロッパといえども、全面戦争に値すると（米国の中で）誰が確信しうるか、 西半球以外の地域は争う価値がないように見えてくる危険がある」と指摘し、モーゲンソーも著書『国際政治』で「核の傘」の信頼性に疑念を表明している。さらに、元CIA長官ターナーは「アメリカが日本や欧州のためにソ連に向けて核を発射すると思うのは幻想である」と述べ、米国が同盟国に「核の傘」を提供してきたことはないと論じている（1986年6月25日付読売新聞）。

では日中の争点である尖閣列島はどうであろうか。米国は尖閣列島に対して、「尖閣の主権は係争中である。米国は最終的な主権問題に立場をとらない」との立場をとる。「米国軍は安保条約で（尖閣列島をめぐる）論争に介入を義務づけられるものではない」とのモンデール駐日大使（当時）の発言は全面的に肯定はされていないが、かといって、米国軍が尖閣列島で自衛隊と共に戦うという保障はない。トゥキュディデスの『戦史』でアテネの滅亡が同盟国コリントを軍事支援したことを学んでいる米国が、日中間にあって、同盟国を助けるため結果として大国との戦争に巻き込まれる間違いを犯すとは考えにくい。

この中、日本は中国の軍事力にどう対応したら良いのか。現在日米の軍事予算は1対１０の格差がある。多分縮まらない。中国は米国と同等を目指すから、将来日中の軍事力は1対10以上開く。この中我々はどう対処するか。尖閣諸島周辺の防衛を強めるという道はあるが、全体としてみればまず軍事的対抗手段はないことを認識すべきである。私は囲碁を少しするが、望ましくても実現の可能性の無い手は早く考慮の対象から外す、それが上達の道であると思っている。日本に軍事的に対抗する道があればいい。しかし、その道はない。

ではどうするのか。一つの拠り所がある。米国国防省年次報告「中国の軍事力二〇〇八年」は次のように記述した。
「中国においては、政権の生き残りが中国の戦略的展望を形成している。中国共産党は政権の正当性の基盤として、経済的な成果とナショナリズムに依存してきた。しかしそれぞれが危険性をはらんでいる。
中国政府は世論を操作し反日デモなどで愛国心をかき立ててきたが、抗議が始まれば制御困難になることに気づいている。
中国の経済成長を維持するために、中国の指導者などは二国間関係及び多国間の政治的協調を世界規模で強化している」

軍事攻撃の際は相手国との経済関係が途絶える。中国の対日輸出は年間一〇兆円以上にのぼる。対日軍事行動の際には日本市場を失うことで、中国経済に壊滅的な打撃を与える。

抑止力とは、攻撃した国が攻撃することで得る利益以上に大きい打撃を受けることで成立する。日本を攻撃することにより中国経済がおかしくなり、これが中国指導部を揺さぶる。抑止力というと軍事的抑止力しか考えないが、経済的結びつきを強化し、軍事的行動でこの経済的結びつきを失うことは中国の政権に耐えられない状況を作る、これも立派な抑止力である。

軍事力で対抗する日本として、多分この道しかない。経済的結びつきを強め、日本市場を失うことが中国政治にどれ位大きい影響を与えるかを中国要人に理解させていくこと、これが最も実現性のある抑止力と思う。かつ第二次大戦以降の日本の生き方に合っている。無理なく最大の効果を目指す、それが日本にとっての望ましい戦略である。

（筆者は元外務省国際情報局長）