The U.S. Should Put Its Own Fiscal House In Order
ONO Goro / Professor Emeritus, Saitama University
November 10, 2010
Dogged by concerns of a double dip recession, governments of developed countries have sought to devalue their currencies to bolster their exports, and emerging countries have fought back by adopting a devaluation policy of their own. As a result, the world is faced with a Prisoner's Dilemma caused by a ruinous competition for cheaper currencies.
Led by the United States, the developed countries are trying to pin the blame on emerging countries by forcing them to raise the value of their currencies, mainly targeting China and the yuan. Such a move has spawned a deep mistrust between the developed countries and emerging countries that can only be a detriment to the global economy.
In dealing with the current situation, the world has much to learn from Japan's past experience when it was faced with a similar situation as a country that was then closer to today's emerging camp. To learn from Japan, it is essential to consider its case with a historical perception that is often neglected out of diffidence toward the United States. While quantitative analysis may be the preferred methodology of the times, it is only useful in a postmortem under ceteris paribus -- all other things being equal or held constant -- conditions. It is useless in the current situation, where a reconsideration of the very preconditions are in order.
From a historical perspective, in both instances the creation of the economic bubble and the confusion that followed in its wake were caused by the way the United States managed its economy in complete neglect of fiscal discipline and the massive excess liquidity that was created as a result.
That is not to say that emerging countries may guide their currencies toward levels far lower than their actual market value. That would spell mutual ruin. Except in cases requiring temporary refuge from emergencies, foreign exchange rates should be dictated by actual market values to the greatest extent possible.
Then again, if we tolerate the inflation and economic bubble caused by excessive liquidity generated by the United States, both developed and emerging countries will inevitably experience what Japan went through during its "lost two decades." The United States should therefore stop meddling with the currency of emerging countries and begin by restoring discipline to its own finances. That is indeed the responsibility of a country that has benefited greatly from seigniorage – gains derived by the difference between short- and long-term interest rates - as the holder of a key currency.
At the time, Japan had already reached the stage of economic maturity and was losing its growth momentum, and so embraced the excess liquidity created by the U.S. economy as "good fortune," allowing itself to fall into the bubble. And it was only natural that the superficial demand created by the bubble evaporated when the bubble burst.
Even so, many economists – just as they are doing so now – addressed the gap in demand and supply caused by the collapse of the bubble by advocating a path based on the myth of Japan's past success, calling for the "creation of effective demand through fiscal initiatives" and "expansion of capital investment through low or zero interest rates." Thus they led the country into economic turmoil. At the time, I published my opinion in the economic journals, insisting that "Keynesian policies are ineffective in a mature economy and will only invite financial collapse, and low interest rates will postpone structural reforms." So in my view, the predicament we face today is exactly as expected.
The United States and China have both sought to "learn from Japan's mistakes." However, the U.S. government seems to be moving in the opposite direction from where they should be headed by deciding that the cause of the mistake was "too little too slow." Meanwhile, despite U.S. criticism, China's policy – although problematic from the standpoint of international cooperation – shows it has learned well from Japan's mistakes.
Two decades ago, the United States caused the Soviet Union to collapse and acquired the power to decide the conditions of international politics and economics as the sole hegemon of the world. This enabled the United States to cultivate its financial and related industries in detachment from its real economy and maintain superficial growth, even after the economy had matured and lost its growth potential.
However, we have since seen the steady development of the European Union, the emergence of several new powers and the growing international presence of numerous developing countries. Today, in a rapidly evolving multi-polar, multi-value world, even the United States is no longer a superpower that can unilaterally set the conditions. The United States must accept this fact and act with moderation in compliance with new conditions being established by the progressively multi-polar world, simply as one of the major powers.
Let me also add that the United States should humbly accept that its own brand of democracy and market economy are no longer universal, and embrace a system that offers greater universality for the future world. Such a system is likely to have a flexible structure built around basic conditions that are shared around the world, while allowing for a certain degree of individual differences. At the same time, newly emerging countries and developing countries that are heading down the same road as Japan and the United States should learn from these precedents and start moving in a direction that is more universally acceptable. That said, perhaps it is Japan itself that needs to learn from its own lesson and to promptly correct its stance of blindly following the United States.
The writer is Professor Emeritus at Saitama University
Led by the United States, the developed countries are trying to pin the blame on emerging countries by forcing them to raise the value of their currencies, mainly targeting China and the yuan. Such a move has spawned a deep mistrust between the developed countries and emerging countries that can only be a detriment to the global economy.
In dealing with the current situation, the world has much to learn from Japan's past experience when it was faced with a similar situation as a country that was then closer to today's emerging camp. To learn from Japan, it is essential to consider its case with a historical perception that is often neglected out of diffidence toward the United States. While quantitative analysis may be the preferred methodology of the times, it is only useful in a postmortem under ceteris paribus -- all other things being equal or held constant -- conditions. It is useless in the current situation, where a reconsideration of the very preconditions are in order.
From a historical perspective, in both instances the creation of the economic bubble and the confusion that followed in its wake were caused by the way the United States managed its economy in complete neglect of fiscal discipline and the massive excess liquidity that was created as a result.
That is not to say that emerging countries may guide their currencies toward levels far lower than their actual market value. That would spell mutual ruin. Except in cases requiring temporary refuge from emergencies, foreign exchange rates should be dictated by actual market values to the greatest extent possible.
Then again, if we tolerate the inflation and economic bubble caused by excessive liquidity generated by the United States, both developed and emerging countries will inevitably experience what Japan went through during its "lost two decades." The United States should therefore stop meddling with the currency of emerging countries and begin by restoring discipline to its own finances. That is indeed the responsibility of a country that has benefited greatly from seigniorage – gains derived by the difference between short- and long-term interest rates - as the holder of a key currency.
At the time, Japan had already reached the stage of economic maturity and was losing its growth momentum, and so embraced the excess liquidity created by the U.S. economy as "good fortune," allowing itself to fall into the bubble. And it was only natural that the superficial demand created by the bubble evaporated when the bubble burst.
Even so, many economists – just as they are doing so now – addressed the gap in demand and supply caused by the collapse of the bubble by advocating a path based on the myth of Japan's past success, calling for the "creation of effective demand through fiscal initiatives" and "expansion of capital investment through low or zero interest rates." Thus they led the country into economic turmoil. At the time, I published my opinion in the economic journals, insisting that "Keynesian policies are ineffective in a mature economy and will only invite financial collapse, and low interest rates will postpone structural reforms." So in my view, the predicament we face today is exactly as expected.
The United States and China have both sought to "learn from Japan's mistakes." However, the U.S. government seems to be moving in the opposite direction from where they should be headed by deciding that the cause of the mistake was "too little too slow." Meanwhile, despite U.S. criticism, China's policy – although problematic from the standpoint of international cooperation – shows it has learned well from Japan's mistakes.
Two decades ago, the United States caused the Soviet Union to collapse and acquired the power to decide the conditions of international politics and economics as the sole hegemon of the world. This enabled the United States to cultivate its financial and related industries in detachment from its real economy and maintain superficial growth, even after the economy had matured and lost its growth potential.
However, we have since seen the steady development of the European Union, the emergence of several new powers and the growing international presence of numerous developing countries. Today, in a rapidly evolving multi-polar, multi-value world, even the United States is no longer a superpower that can unilaterally set the conditions. The United States must accept this fact and act with moderation in compliance with new conditions being established by the progressively multi-polar world, simply as one of the major powers.
Let me also add that the United States should humbly accept that its own brand of democracy and market economy are no longer universal, and embrace a system that offers greater universality for the future world. Such a system is likely to have a flexible structure built around basic conditions that are shared around the world, while allowing for a certain degree of individual differences. At the same time, newly emerging countries and developing countries that are heading down the same road as Japan and the United States should learn from these precedents and start moving in a direction that is more universally acceptable. That said, perhaps it is Japan itself that needs to learn from its own lesson and to promptly correct its stance of blindly following the United States.
The writer is Professor Emeritus at Saitama University
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
米国はまず自国の財政規律を正せ
小野五郎 / 埼玉大学名誉教授
2010年 11月 10日
二番底さえ取り沙汰される経済の沈滞を受け、先進各国政府は輸出力強化のために自国通貨引下げ措置を図り、それに対抗して新興国でも自国通貨安政策を導入したため、今や「囚人のジレンマ」的共倒れを伴う通貨安競争が引き起こされている。
そこで米国をはじめとする先進諸国は責任を専ら中国の元高など新興国側に取らせようとして、今や先進国側と新興国側との間に世界経済にとって百害あって一利なしというべき根強い不信感が芽生え始めている。
今の状況は、かつて類似の状況に陥った時、新興国の立場に近かった日本の経験から学ぶべき点が多い。それも、米国に対する遠慮から、ともすれば軽視されがちな歴史的認識としてとらえることが不可欠である。それに対して、昨今ともすれば重用されがちな計量的な手法は、あくまでセテリス・パリブス（与件不変）下における事後分析にすぎず、現下のように与件そのものの再吟味が必要な問題に対しては有用ではない。
歴史的視点からすると、前回も今回も、バブル発生や崩壊後の経済混乱のそもそもの発端は、米国の財政規律を無視した経済運営と結果として生じた過大な過剰流動性にある。
もちろん、だからといって新興国側が共倒れに向かうような自国通貨を実勢から離れた安値に誘導していいというわけではない。一時的な緊急避難を別とすれば、為替レートはできるかぎり市場における実勢に基づいて決定されるべきである。
しかし、米国発の過剰流動性から生じるインフレやバブルを容認すれば、先進国側も新興国側も日本の「失われた二十年」の再来となることは必定である。したがって、米国は、新興国通貨に対してとやかく言う前に、自らの財政規律こそ正すべきである。また、それが膨大なセニョレッジ（長短金利差益）を享受してきた基軸通貨国としての責務でもある。
当時すでに成熟期に入り自ら成長余力を失いつつあった日本は、米国の過剰流動性をむしろ「もっけの幸い」と容認しバブルに陥ってしまった。また、バブルで作られた見掛け上の需要は、その崩壊とともに当然消え失せることになった。
ところが、今回同様バブル崩壊後に生じた「需給ギャップ」について、多数のエコノミストは「財政出動による有効需要創出」「低金利ないしゼロ金利による設備投資の増大」という過去の成功神話にそのまま追従すべきことを提唱し日本経済を混迷に導いてしまった。逆から言えば、あの時点で「成熟経済にはケインズ政策は効かず財政破綻を招くだけだし、低金利は構造改革を遅らせてしまう」と経済誌で主張していた私からすれば、今の結果は予想したとおりのことが起こったにすぎない。
その点、同じ「日本の失敗に学べ」でも、米国政府は「対応の遅れが失敗の原因」だとしてむしろ取るべき方向と逆の対応をしていると言えるし、米国が非難している中国の政策は国際協調という点で問題はあるが日本の失敗からはよく学んでいると言うべきである。
ところで、二十年前にソ連邦を崩壊させた米国は、世界で唯一の覇権国として世界政治経済の与件を自らの意思で決定することも可能だった。だからこそ、成熟化が進み成長余力を失った後も、実体経済から遊離した金融産業などを育成することによって見掛け上の成長を維持し続けることができたのである。
しかし、その後、ＥＵが着実に発展し、多数の新興国が台頭さらには無数の後発国が国際的発言力を増している現在、多極化と多価値化が急速に進み、米国といえども一国だけで与件を設定しうる超大国たりえなくなった。したがって、米国はその事実を認め、単なる一大国の立場から多極化の下で構築される新しい与件に従って節度ある行動をすることが求められる。
付言すれば、米国は、もはや自国の民主主義や市場経済に普遍性はないことを謙虚に認め、これからの世界にとってより普遍性がある姿を自らも受け入れるべきである。それは多分、全世界が基本事項を一にしつつ、それなりの独自性を併せ持つという柔軟な構造になるものと思われる。また、それと同時に、これから日本や米国の歩んだと同じ道を自らも歩むことになる新興国や後発国も、そうした先例によく学び今からより普遍性のある方向を模索すべきである。もっとも、かく言う日本自身が、そうした自覚を欠いたままいまだに米国に追従している姿勢を、まずは早急に改めるべきではあるが。
（筆者は埼玉大学名誉教授。）
そこで米国をはじめとする先進諸国は責任を専ら中国の元高など新興国側に取らせようとして、今や先進国側と新興国側との間に世界経済にとって百害あって一利なしというべき根強い不信感が芽生え始めている。
今の状況は、かつて類似の状況に陥った時、新興国の立場に近かった日本の経験から学ぶべき点が多い。それも、米国に対する遠慮から、ともすれば軽視されがちな歴史的認識としてとらえることが不可欠である。それに対して、昨今ともすれば重用されがちな計量的な手法は、あくまでセテリス・パリブス（与件不変）下における事後分析にすぎず、現下のように与件そのものの再吟味が必要な問題に対しては有用ではない。
歴史的視点からすると、前回も今回も、バブル発生や崩壊後の経済混乱のそもそもの発端は、米国の財政規律を無視した経済運営と結果として生じた過大な過剰流動性にある。
もちろん、だからといって新興国側が共倒れに向かうような自国通貨を実勢から離れた安値に誘導していいというわけではない。一時的な緊急避難を別とすれば、為替レートはできるかぎり市場における実勢に基づいて決定されるべきである。
しかし、米国発の過剰流動性から生じるインフレやバブルを容認すれば、先進国側も新興国側も日本の「失われた二十年」の再来となることは必定である。したがって、米国は、新興国通貨に対してとやかく言う前に、自らの財政規律こそ正すべきである。また、それが膨大なセニョレッジ（長短金利差益）を享受してきた基軸通貨国としての責務でもある。
当時すでに成熟期に入り自ら成長余力を失いつつあった日本は、米国の過剰流動性をむしろ「もっけの幸い」と容認しバブルに陥ってしまった。また、バブルで作られた見掛け上の需要は、その崩壊とともに当然消え失せることになった。
ところが、今回同様バブル崩壊後に生じた「需給ギャップ」について、多数のエコノミストは「財政出動による有効需要創出」「低金利ないしゼロ金利による設備投資の増大」という過去の成功神話にそのまま追従すべきことを提唱し日本経済を混迷に導いてしまった。逆から言えば、あの時点で「成熟経済にはケインズ政策は効かず財政破綻を招くだけだし、低金利は構造改革を遅らせてしまう」と経済誌で主張していた私からすれば、今の結果は予想したとおりのことが起こったにすぎない。
その点、同じ「日本の失敗に学べ」でも、米国政府は「対応の遅れが失敗の原因」だとしてむしろ取るべき方向と逆の対応をしていると言えるし、米国が非難している中国の政策は国際協調という点で問題はあるが日本の失敗からはよく学んでいると言うべきである。
ところで、二十年前にソ連邦を崩壊させた米国は、世界で唯一の覇権国として世界政治経済の与件を自らの意思で決定することも可能だった。だからこそ、成熟化が進み成長余力を失った後も、実体経済から遊離した金融産業などを育成することによって見掛け上の成長を維持し続けることができたのである。
しかし、その後、ＥＵが着実に発展し、多数の新興国が台頭さらには無数の後発国が国際的発言力を増している現在、多極化と多価値化が急速に進み、米国といえども一国だけで与件を設定しうる超大国たりえなくなった。したがって、米国はその事実を認め、単なる一大国の立場から多極化の下で構築される新しい与件に従って節度ある行動をすることが求められる。
付言すれば、米国は、もはや自国の民主主義や市場経済に普遍性はないことを謙虚に認め、これからの世界にとってより普遍性がある姿を自らも受け入れるべきである。それは多分、全世界が基本事項を一にしつつ、それなりの独自性を併せ持つという柔軟な構造になるものと思われる。また、それと同時に、これから日本や米国の歩んだと同じ道を自らも歩むことになる新興国や後発国も、そうした先例によく学び今からより普遍性のある方向を模索すべきである。もっとも、かく言う日本自身が、そうした自覚を欠いたままいまだに米国に追従している姿勢を、まずは早急に改めるべきではあるが。
（筆者は埼玉大学名誉教授。）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟