Nuclear Crisis Reveals the True Strength of the Japanese People
ONO Goro / Professor Emeritus, Saitama University
April 6, 2011
Following the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, many of my foreign students have sent me mail with warm words of encouragement for the Japanese people. I would like to start by expressing my gratitude to the encouragement and support we received from abroad.
The media has been providing us with a variety of overseas commentary, including criticism against the lack of information disclosure by the Japanese government and the collapse of Japan’s technological safety myth, to accolades for the composure shown by the Japanese people amid a disaster of such magnitude and the courage demonstrated by on-site staff in the face of extreme danger. The Japanese response to criticism has been either objection or self-deprecation, while accolades have more or less been taken at face value. Aside from trying to determine the truth in such comments from abroad, responding subjectively will have no positive consequences either inside or outside Japan.
Taking an objective point of view as a Japanese national, I have begun to realize the true strength of Japan and my fellow Japanese people that emerged in the latest crisis. The negative aspects include the lack of leadership in politics and industry, tendency to avoid responsibility and conceal information in some circles, precedence of detail caused by sectionalism within organizations and specialized experts, and the blind spot created by massive automated systems. The positive aspects include Japan’s importance in the global economy, high level of awareness among individual Japanese and advanced capability of responding to unanticipated problems. Fully expecting objections, I would also like to add to this the high safety standards of Japanese nuclear power plants.
While I have been an opponent of nuclear power, I have had the experience of visiting experimental facilities for antiseismic nuclear reactors and nuclear power plants in operation in my past capacity as the head of general administration at a municipal trade bureau, where my duty included alleviating the anxiety of citizens opposed to nuclear power. I was also the first non-engineer to enter the reactor core during regular safety inspections. At the time, I was able to confirm the advanced level of Japanese antiseismic design for nuclear power systems, though I also became concerned about the extent of automation. I urged industry insiders of the need for a response policy against unanticipated events, but my warning went unanswered as “non-expert opinion.”
It is now clear from the latest accident that my impressions at the time were correct. While antiseismic capacity at the primary level proved sufficient against an earthquake of unanticipated scale, it was useless against a tsunami of unanticipated scale. That is why I wrote on my website immediately after learning of the accident that what we need was a decision to decommission the reactor and place priority on preventing radiation, instead of seeking to recover the reactor.
In case of an unanticipated event, a decision must be made at the top. The crisis would not have reached this level if top management at Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) had quickly decided to decommission the reactor instead of repeating the excuse that this was an unanticipated incident. As a private enterprise, TEPCO would have certainly wanted to avoid decommissioning the reactor, which would mean losing its massive financial investments. But if radioactive contamination occurs as a result, secondary damage would exceed such investments by a different order of magnitude. Putting economic calculations aside, it would more importantly save precious human lives.
If TEPCO did not have the decision-making capacity, the government should have made the decision instead. Unfortunately, Japan presently lacks both powerful leadership required at times of an emergency and competent generalists who can resolve complex issues. True, the Chief Cabinet Secretary did say decommissioning the reactor would be unavoidable. But this came at the worst timing possible, when the crisis had already occurred and his comments had little impact. Furthermore, it dampened the morale of those risking their lives on-site to recover the reactor and spread the seeds of pessimism among evacuees from neighboring regions that they will never again be able to return to their homes. Considering that the comment was made by a government spokesman who may otherwise be commended for his cool and collected behavior, one can imagine the serious lack of human resources among the top echelon.
Order has been maintained under the circumstances only because the government has been supplemented by the high morale of on-site staff and the high level of awareness among ordinary people. Furthermore, behind this Japanese mentality lies the trust felt in the support of colleagues and fellow Japanese, and a strong sense of responsibility towards them.
Therein lies the greatest difference between Japanese society and Western society, which in turn makes Japan difficult to understand from the outside world. At times of a crisis, Western societies tend to depend solely on top leadership. In Japanese society, responsibility is more dispersed.
Therefore, while Western societies may be better adapted to normal crisis situations, any event that greatly exceeds anticipation tends to result in great confusion. This is because mankind is helpless against major natural disasters and events of great magnitude, and the combined power of each individual remains the ultimate fail-safe that supplements the limitations of a fully automated system, or a modern civilization trapped in the illusion that anything can be pre-planned.
At the macro-level, Japanese society is thrown into confusion whenever events exceed anticipated limits. However, confusion beyond that point is restrained through the combined efforts of each individual at the micro-level. This was also confirmed at the time of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.
Even so, recovery efforts at the micro-level will be far from sufficient in dealing with the latest disaster. To provide security to the Japanese people as a whole and to avoid confusion from spreading to the international society, we must reconstruct Japan as a macrocosm. And doing that will require powerful Western-style leadership. In that sense, the current state of Japan is far from reassuring.
My conclusion is that while it would be premature to entertain optimism as long as details of the reactor core remain unknown, I firmly believe that Japan will be able to overcome the current crisis. However, whether we will succeed or fail in our national reconstruction effort depends on the emergence of a powerful leader.
The writer is Professor Emeritus at Saitama University.
The media has been providing us with a variety of overseas commentary, including criticism against the lack of information disclosure by the Japanese government and the collapse of Japan’s technological safety myth, to accolades for the composure shown by the Japanese people amid a disaster of such magnitude and the courage demonstrated by on-site staff in the face of extreme danger. The Japanese response to criticism has been either objection or self-deprecation, while accolades have more or less been taken at face value. Aside from trying to determine the truth in such comments from abroad, responding subjectively will have no positive consequences either inside or outside Japan.
Taking an objective point of view as a Japanese national, I have begun to realize the true strength of Japan and my fellow Japanese people that emerged in the latest crisis. The negative aspects include the lack of leadership in politics and industry, tendency to avoid responsibility and conceal information in some circles, precedence of detail caused by sectionalism within organizations and specialized experts, and the blind spot created by massive automated systems. The positive aspects include Japan’s importance in the global economy, high level of awareness among individual Japanese and advanced capability of responding to unanticipated problems. Fully expecting objections, I would also like to add to this the high safety standards of Japanese nuclear power plants.
While I have been an opponent of nuclear power, I have had the experience of visiting experimental facilities for antiseismic nuclear reactors and nuclear power plants in operation in my past capacity as the head of general administration at a municipal trade bureau, where my duty included alleviating the anxiety of citizens opposed to nuclear power. I was also the first non-engineer to enter the reactor core during regular safety inspections. At the time, I was able to confirm the advanced level of Japanese antiseismic design for nuclear power systems, though I also became concerned about the extent of automation. I urged industry insiders of the need for a response policy against unanticipated events, but my warning went unanswered as “non-expert opinion.”
It is now clear from the latest accident that my impressions at the time were correct. While antiseismic capacity at the primary level proved sufficient against an earthquake of unanticipated scale, it was useless against a tsunami of unanticipated scale. That is why I wrote on my website immediately after learning of the accident that what we need was a decision to decommission the reactor and place priority on preventing radiation, instead of seeking to recover the reactor.
In case of an unanticipated event, a decision must be made at the top. The crisis would not have reached this level if top management at Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) had quickly decided to decommission the reactor instead of repeating the excuse that this was an unanticipated incident. As a private enterprise, TEPCO would have certainly wanted to avoid decommissioning the reactor, which would mean losing its massive financial investments. But if radioactive contamination occurs as a result, secondary damage would exceed such investments by a different order of magnitude. Putting economic calculations aside, it would more importantly save precious human lives.
If TEPCO did not have the decision-making capacity, the government should have made the decision instead. Unfortunately, Japan presently lacks both powerful leadership required at times of an emergency and competent generalists who can resolve complex issues. True, the Chief Cabinet Secretary did say decommissioning the reactor would be unavoidable. But this came at the worst timing possible, when the crisis had already occurred and his comments had little impact. Furthermore, it dampened the morale of those risking their lives on-site to recover the reactor and spread the seeds of pessimism among evacuees from neighboring regions that they will never again be able to return to their homes. Considering that the comment was made by a government spokesman who may otherwise be commended for his cool and collected behavior, one can imagine the serious lack of human resources among the top echelon.
Order has been maintained under the circumstances only because the government has been supplemented by the high morale of on-site staff and the high level of awareness among ordinary people. Furthermore, behind this Japanese mentality lies the trust felt in the support of colleagues and fellow Japanese, and a strong sense of responsibility towards them.
Therein lies the greatest difference between Japanese society and Western society, which in turn makes Japan difficult to understand from the outside world. At times of a crisis, Western societies tend to depend solely on top leadership. In Japanese society, responsibility is more dispersed.
Therefore, while Western societies may be better adapted to normal crisis situations, any event that greatly exceeds anticipation tends to result in great confusion. This is because mankind is helpless against major natural disasters and events of great magnitude, and the combined power of each individual remains the ultimate fail-safe that supplements the limitations of a fully automated system, or a modern civilization trapped in the illusion that anything can be pre-planned.
At the macro-level, Japanese society is thrown into confusion whenever events exceed anticipated limits. However, confusion beyond that point is restrained through the combined efforts of each individual at the micro-level. This was also confirmed at the time of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.
Even so, recovery efforts at the micro-level will be far from sufficient in dealing with the latest disaster. To provide security to the Japanese people as a whole and to avoid confusion from spreading to the international society, we must reconstruct Japan as a macrocosm. And doing that will require powerful Western-style leadership. In that sense, the current state of Japan is far from reassuring.
My conclusion is that while it would be premature to entertain optimism as long as details of the reactor core remain unknown, I firmly believe that Japan will be able to overcome the current crisis. However, whether we will succeed or fail in our national reconstruction effort depends on the emergence of a powerful leader.
The writer is Professor Emeritus at Saitama University.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
原発事故が明かした本当の力
小野 五郎 / 埼玉大学名誉教授
2011年 4月 6日
福島第一原発事故後、外国の教え子たちから我々日本人に対する温かい励ましのメールが入ってきた。まずはそうした海外からの励ましや支援に対してお礼を申し上げたい。
一方、メディアでは「日本政府の情報開示不足」「日本の安全技術神話崩壊」といった否定的なものから「あれだけの災害に遭いながら冷静に行動する日本人」「危険に対して勇敢に立ち向かう現場要員」という称賛まで様々なコメントが紹介されている。それに対する日本側の対応は、否定的見解に対しては反発あるいは逆に自虐的な声が上がり、肯定的見解に対しては鵜呑みにする傾向が強い。しかし、海外からの発信内容の吟味はさておき、そうした主観的な受け止め方は、対外的のならず対内的にもプラスにはならない。
日本人の一人として客観的に見つめ直すと、今回のことで日本ないし同胞の本当の力が分かってきた。否定的な点としては「政財界におけるリーダーシップ欠如」「一部における責任回避・情報隠蔽体質」「縦割り組織と局部的専門家による各論先行」「全自動化巨大システムの盲点」、肯定的な点としては「世界経済における日本の存在感の高さ」「個々人の高い意識」「想定外問題への高度な適応力」である。さらに、反発覚悟で言うと「日本製原子炉の安全性の高さ」も挙げたい。
筆者は本来原発反対論者であるが、地方通産局総務部長時代に職務上接する市民の対原発不安を和らげるため原子炉耐震実験設備や稼動原発を訪れ、非エンジニアでは初めて定期点検時の炉心部にも入っている。その時「日本の原発の高度耐震設計」を確認した反面、あまりに自動化されたシステムに疑念も抱いた。そこで「想定外の事態発生における対処方針の必要性」について関係者に伝えたが、「素人発言」と受け流されてしまった。
しかし、この筆者の印象は今次事故から見てほぼ正しかった。「想定外」に強い地震にも第一義的な耐震性能はほぼ耐えたが、「想定外」の津波には無力だった。このため事故判明直後には「復旧作業より放射能防止対策優先で廃炉の決断を」とホームページで発信した。
「想定外」の問題ではトップの決断が求められる。仮に東京電力トップが「想定外」を繰り返さず逸早く「廃炉」を決断していれば、ここまでの危機には陥らなかったろう。もちろん私企業としては巨額の投資資金放棄となる廃炉は避けたいにちがいない。だが結果として放射能汚染が生じれば、その二次的被害は投資資金を桁違いに上回る。というより、そんな経済計算はともかく尊い人的被害を招かずに済む。
東電が当事者能力を欠くのであれば、政府が代わって決断すべきだった。しかし現代日本には「非常時に求められる強いリーダーシップ」も「複合的問題を解決しうる高度のジェネラリスト」も不在なのだ。なるほど官房長官は「廃炉は不可避」とのコメントを発した。しかしタイミングとしては、すでに危機発生後で発言効果がほとんど無い上、逆に現場で必死に復旧に努力している人たちの士気を挫き、疎開している近隣被災者に「もはや故郷には戻れない」との悲観論を植えつけたという意味で最悪だった。事故発生以来、沈着冷静な政府スポークスマンだと評価しうる彼をしてそうなのだから、いかに上層部に人材を欠いていたか分かる。
それでも何とか秩序が保たれているのは、「現場要員の高い士気」と「普通の人々の高い意識」が補っているからである。さらに、そうした日本人の意識の背景には、自分たちをパックアップしてくれる同僚さらには同胞たちへの信頼感と使命感が存在する。
その辺が日本社会と欧米社会との最大の相違点であり、海外からは分かりにくい一因である。欧米社会では非常事態には「トップのリーダーシップ」に一元的に依存するのに対して、日本社会はもっと分散型となっている。このため、欧米社会は通常の非常事態対応には優れているが、想定を大幅に超えた場合には大混乱を引き起こしかねない。なぜなら、巨大自然災害等に対しては人間は極めて弱く、そこから生ずる何もかも想定可能という錯覚に捉われた現代文明ないし自動システムの限界を補完する究極のフェイルセーフは、個々の力の結集だからである。ゆえに日本社会では想定を少しでも超えるとマクロ的混乱が起きるが、それ以上の混乱は局部系ごとの個々人の力の結集によって何とか抑制される。そうした点は、阪神淡路地震でも認められたことである。
とはいえ、今回の災害は局部系の復旧だけでは不十分であり、全国民に安心感を与え国際社会の混乱回避のためには全体系としての日本再建が求められる以上、これからは欧米型の強いリーダーシップが不可欠となる。そうした意味では日本の現状は心もとない。
結論 炉心部の詳細が把握できない今、まだ予断は許されないが日本は現下の苦境を乗り切ることはできると確信する反面、その後の国家再建の成否については強力なリーダーシップが出現するかどうかにかかっている。
（筆者は埼玉大学名誉教授。）
一方、メディアでは「日本政府の情報開示不足」「日本の安全技術神話崩壊」といった否定的なものから「あれだけの災害に遭いながら冷静に行動する日本人」「危険に対して勇敢に立ち向かう現場要員」という称賛まで様々なコメントが紹介されている。それに対する日本側の対応は、否定的見解に対しては反発あるいは逆に自虐的な声が上がり、肯定的見解に対しては鵜呑みにする傾向が強い。しかし、海外からの発信内容の吟味はさておき、そうした主観的な受け止め方は、対外的のならず対内的にもプラスにはならない。
日本人の一人として客観的に見つめ直すと、今回のことで日本ないし同胞の本当の力が分かってきた。否定的な点としては「政財界におけるリーダーシップ欠如」「一部における責任回避・情報隠蔽体質」「縦割り組織と局部的専門家による各論先行」「全自動化巨大システムの盲点」、肯定的な点としては「世界経済における日本の存在感の高さ」「個々人の高い意識」「想定外問題への高度な適応力」である。さらに、反発覚悟で言うと「日本製原子炉の安全性の高さ」も挙げたい。
筆者は本来原発反対論者であるが、地方通産局総務部長時代に職務上接する市民の対原発不安を和らげるため原子炉耐震実験設備や稼動原発を訪れ、非エンジニアでは初めて定期点検時の炉心部にも入っている。その時「日本の原発の高度耐震設計」を確認した反面、あまりに自動化されたシステムに疑念も抱いた。そこで「想定外の事態発生における対処方針の必要性」について関係者に伝えたが、「素人発言」と受け流されてしまった。
しかし、この筆者の印象は今次事故から見てほぼ正しかった。「想定外」に強い地震にも第一義的な耐震性能はほぼ耐えたが、「想定外」の津波には無力だった。このため事故判明直後には「復旧作業より放射能防止対策優先で廃炉の決断を」とホームページで発信した。
「想定外」の問題ではトップの決断が求められる。仮に東京電力トップが「想定外」を繰り返さず逸早く「廃炉」を決断していれば、ここまでの危機には陥らなかったろう。もちろん私企業としては巨額の投資資金放棄となる廃炉は避けたいにちがいない。だが結果として放射能汚染が生じれば、その二次的被害は投資資金を桁違いに上回る。というより、そんな経済計算はともかく尊い人的被害を招かずに済む。
東電が当事者能力を欠くのであれば、政府が代わって決断すべきだった。しかし現代日本には「非常時に求められる強いリーダーシップ」も「複合的問題を解決しうる高度のジェネラリスト」も不在なのだ。なるほど官房長官は「廃炉は不可避」とのコメントを発した。しかしタイミングとしては、すでに危機発生後で発言効果がほとんど無い上、逆に現場で必死に復旧に努力している人たちの士気を挫き、疎開している近隣被災者に「もはや故郷には戻れない」との悲観論を植えつけたという意味で最悪だった。事故発生以来、沈着冷静な政府スポークスマンだと評価しうる彼をしてそうなのだから、いかに上層部に人材を欠いていたか分かる。
それでも何とか秩序が保たれているのは、「現場要員の高い士気」と「普通の人々の高い意識」が補っているからである。さらに、そうした日本人の意識の背景には、自分たちをパックアップしてくれる同僚さらには同胞たちへの信頼感と使命感が存在する。
その辺が日本社会と欧米社会との最大の相違点であり、海外からは分かりにくい一因である。欧米社会では非常事態には「トップのリーダーシップ」に一元的に依存するのに対して、日本社会はもっと分散型となっている。このため、欧米社会は通常の非常事態対応には優れているが、想定を大幅に超えた場合には大混乱を引き起こしかねない。なぜなら、巨大自然災害等に対しては人間は極めて弱く、そこから生ずる何もかも想定可能という錯覚に捉われた現代文明ないし自動システムの限界を補完する究極のフェイルセーフは、個々の力の結集だからである。ゆえに日本社会では想定を少しでも超えるとマクロ的混乱が起きるが、それ以上の混乱は局部系ごとの個々人の力の結集によって何とか抑制される。そうした点は、阪神淡路地震でも認められたことである。
とはいえ、今回の災害は局部系の復旧だけでは不十分であり、全国民に安心感を与え国際社会の混乱回避のためには全体系としての日本再建が求められる以上、これからは欧米型の強いリーダーシップが不可欠となる。そうした意味では日本の現状は心もとない。
結論 炉心部の詳細が把握できない今、まだ予断は許されないが日本は現下の苦境を乗り切ることはできると確信する反面、その後の国家再建の成否については強力なリーダーシップが出現するかどうかにかかっている。
（筆者は埼玉大学名誉教授。）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟