9・11 and Palestine
HIRAYAMA Kentaro / Journalist
September 7, 2011
It was 7 October, 2001, 26 days after the 9・11 incident, when Al Jazeera, a Doha-based Arab TV station, broadcasted a video message that could have been Osama bin Laden's first "claim of responsibility" for the attack. Bin Laden was the suspected ringleader of the conspiracy. It was also the day when the United States started bombarding Afghanistan. Bin Laden, who made an appearance with the Afghan wilderness in the background, started out as saying, "What the United States tasted today is a very small thing compared to what we have tasted for tens of years." Then, after expressing various resentments, he spent much time condemning Israel for continuing the occupation of Palestine and accusing the United States of allowing Israel to do so. He referred to Jenin and other location names on the West Bank of the Jordan River where fierce gun battles took place during the second (Al Aqsa) intifada against the Israeli security forces. It is said that bin Laden was advised by Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian medical doctor known at the time as the No. 2 leader, to emphasize the Palestinian question to appeal to the Islamic world in general.
Ten years have since passed. The U.S. Special Forces succeeded in killing bin Laden in the suburbs of Islamabad in Pakistani territory. President Obama said in late August that the "war on terrorism" was coming to an end. While the Afghan and Iraqi wars brought about due changes in these countries, in spite of quite a few victims and a rise of anti-American feelings there, the Palestinian issue remains unsolved.
American initiatives like the first recognition by the Bush administration of a state of Palestine and a statement by President Obama this May that the boundaries of this state should based on those of the pre-1967 war when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, have not produced any fruit, although in appearance both were said to be epoch-making. There were only words and no progress has been made toward their realization. In conservatively inclined Israel, maybe because of the "sense of security" gained after the construction of the "separation wall" in the West Bank which has clearly reduced the number of suicide bomb attacks, an indifferent mood seems to be prevailing against peace that would inevitably require territorial concessions. On the Palestinian side also, internal conflicts lowered their competence in dealing with Israel, as is shown by Hamas'' take over of the Gaza strip. In addition, the stance of the United States, the mediator, and the framework of mediation itself are questionable. One of the problems is the American fixed idea that an "agreement should be reached through direct negotiations between the parties concerned." The United States has not been able to refute the Israeli claim that "the boundaries before the '67 war were merely cease-fire lines during the time when the Arabs did not recognize Israel as a state, and not the border between two states. The areas at issue beyond the boundaries, therefore, are not occupied territories." The Security Council resolution 242 which constitutes the basis of peace negotiations after the '67 war is one-sidedly favorable to Israel, because it demands that Israel withdraw from (unspecified) "territories" with the understanding of "co-existence within agreed upon boundaries." The text is decidedly favorable to the party which actually controls the disputed land. This is a problem, too. In the case of the Suez war in 1956, the Eisenhower administration asked Israel for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and forced Israel to comply. The Security Council resolution that demanded Iraqi (Saddam's) forces leave Kuwait did the same.
The Palestinian (Abbas) side is making preparations for a resolution to be adopted during the United Nations General Assembly in late September, calling for the establishment of a state whose capital will be Jerusalem and boundaries will be those before the '67 war. Such action will be rather second best for them because the United States is expected to exercise its veto at the Security Council. The voting on this resolution must be a litmus test, or rather, a verdict to show the extent of isolation of the United States and Israel in the international world community as many countries, including those in the European Union, will vote for the resolution. Obama who wants to be re-elected as president next year must make a hard decision. It is sincerely hoped that he will clearly present his unique vision that will overcome the ambiguity about the occupied territories, including Jerusalem. Eradication of the sources of anti-American feelings may be difficult, but attenuation should be possible with effort. The new "citizens" who have brought about the "Arab spring," as well as we Japanese who aspire for a further "deepening" of the U.S.-Japan relations on the global scale, are closely watching President Obama, hoping that he will make a definite and courageous decision.
The writer is a former NHK executive commentator and professor at Hakuoh University.
Ten years have since passed. The U.S. Special Forces succeeded in killing bin Laden in the suburbs of Islamabad in Pakistani territory. President Obama said in late August that the "war on terrorism" was coming to an end. While the Afghan and Iraqi wars brought about due changes in these countries, in spite of quite a few victims and a rise of anti-American feelings there, the Palestinian issue remains unsolved.
American initiatives like the first recognition by the Bush administration of a state of Palestine and a statement by President Obama this May that the boundaries of this state should based on those of the pre-1967 war when Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza, have not produced any fruit, although in appearance both were said to be epoch-making. There were only words and no progress has been made toward their realization. In conservatively inclined Israel, maybe because of the "sense of security" gained after the construction of the "separation wall" in the West Bank which has clearly reduced the number of suicide bomb attacks, an indifferent mood seems to be prevailing against peace that would inevitably require territorial concessions. On the Palestinian side also, internal conflicts lowered their competence in dealing with Israel, as is shown by Hamas'' take over of the Gaza strip. In addition, the stance of the United States, the mediator, and the framework of mediation itself are questionable. One of the problems is the American fixed idea that an "agreement should be reached through direct negotiations between the parties concerned." The United States has not been able to refute the Israeli claim that "the boundaries before the '67 war were merely cease-fire lines during the time when the Arabs did not recognize Israel as a state, and not the border between two states. The areas at issue beyond the boundaries, therefore, are not occupied territories." The Security Council resolution 242 which constitutes the basis of peace negotiations after the '67 war is one-sidedly favorable to Israel, because it demands that Israel withdraw from (unspecified) "territories" with the understanding of "co-existence within agreed upon boundaries." The text is decidedly favorable to the party which actually controls the disputed land. This is a problem, too. In the case of the Suez war in 1956, the Eisenhower administration asked Israel for an immediate and unconditional withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula and forced Israel to comply. The Security Council resolution that demanded Iraqi (Saddam's) forces leave Kuwait did the same.
The Palestinian (Abbas) side is making preparations for a resolution to be adopted during the United Nations General Assembly in late September, calling for the establishment of a state whose capital will be Jerusalem and boundaries will be those before the '67 war. Such action will be rather second best for them because the United States is expected to exercise its veto at the Security Council. The voting on this resolution must be a litmus test, or rather, a verdict to show the extent of isolation of the United States and Israel in the international world community as many countries, including those in the European Union, will vote for the resolution. Obama who wants to be re-elected as president next year must make a hard decision. It is sincerely hoped that he will clearly present his unique vision that will overcome the ambiguity about the occupied territories, including Jerusalem. Eradication of the sources of anti-American feelings may be difficult, but attenuation should be possible with effort. The new "citizens" who have brought about the "Arab spring," as well as we Japanese who aspire for a further "deepening" of the U.S.-Japan relations on the global scale, are closely watching President Obama, hoping that he will make a definite and courageous decision.
The writer is a former NHK executive commentator and professor at Hakuoh University.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
９．１１とパレスチナ
平山健太郎 / ジャーナリスト
2011年 9月 7日
９．１１事件の首謀者と見られていたウサマ・ビンラディンの最初の「犯行声明」とも受け取られるビデオメッセージを、アルジャジーラ・テレビが放映したのは、事件から２６日後の２００１年１０月７日。米軍のアフガニスタン爆撃が始まった当日だった。アフガニスタンの荒野を背景に登場したビンラディンは「アメリカの体験は、過去８０年あまりにわたるイスラム教徒の屈辱に比べればものの数ではない」とする切り出しに続いて、様々な怨念を吐露したのち、最後に一番多くの時間を使って、パレスチナの占領を続けるイスラエルとそれを容認してきたアメリカを糾弾した。第二次（アルアクサ）インティファーダのさなか、イスラエル治安部隊との激しい銃撃戦の舞台になったヨルダン川西岸のジェニンなど具体的な地名にまで言及している。イスラム圏全域に訴えやすいパレスチナ問題にメッセージの重点を置くよう、当時ナンバー２だったエジプト人医師アイマン・ザワヒリが助言したらしい。
１０年が経過した。米軍特殊部隊は５月、イスラマバド近郊のパキスタン領内で、ビンラディンを殺害。オバマ大統領は、「テロとの戦い」が、終結への節目を迎えていると８月末発言している。アフガニスタンとイラクの戦争では、多くの犠牲者や反米感情の高まりなど新しい問題を引き起こしながら、それなりの変貌を現地にもたらしているが、この間、パレスチナ問題は未解決のままだ。
パレスチナ国家を初めて容認したブッシュ政権、その独立国家は、ヨルダン川西岸やガザがイスラエルに占領された１９６７年戦争以前の境界線を基準にすべきであるというオバマ大統領の５月の発言など一見、「画期的」なアメリカの「イニシアティブ」はあったものの、いずれも言葉だけで、それらの実現に向けた進展はない。「西岸分離壁」によるパレスチナ側の自爆テロの激減がもたらした「安堵感」もあってか、右傾したイスラエル社会では、領土上の譲歩を伴う和平への無関心が広がっている。一方、パレスチナ側もハマスのガザ掌握が示すような内部対立により、当事者能力が低下した。これらの事情に加え、調停に当たるアメリカの姿勢や調停の枠組み自体にも問題がある。「当事者間の交渉による合意」にこだわるアメリカの固定観念もその一つだ。「６７年戦争以前の境界線は、アラブ側がイスラエルを承認していなかった時期の単なる休戦ラインであり、国境線ではない。従って境界線を越えた係争地は、占領地ではない」というイスラエル側の主張を、アメリカは切り崩せずにいる。６７年戦争以後の和平交渉の土台になっている安保理決議２４２号が、イスラエルの撤退の範囲について「合意された国境線での共存」という趣旨の、端的に言えば、奪った土地を現に握っているイスラエルに一方的に有利な表現になっているのも問題だ。１９５６年の「スエズ戦争」では、当時のアイゼンハワー政権が、イスラエルに対しシナイ半島からの即時無条件撤退を求め、実行させているし、イラク（サダム）軍にクウェートからの撤退を求めた安保理決議も同様だった。
パレスチナ側（アバス議長）は、９月下旬の国連総会で、６７年戦争以前の境界線を持ち、エルサレムを首都とする国家の樹立を認める決議が採択されるよう準備を進めている。安保理では、アメリカの拒否権行使が予想されるための、次善の策だろう。ＥＵ諸国を含む多くの国々が、賛成票を投ずるに違いないその票決は、イスラエルとアメリカの国際的な孤立の度合いを占う試金石になる。来年の再選を狙いイスラエルに同情的な議会にも配慮が必要なオバマ大統領も苦しいところだろうが、この際、エルサレムを含む占領地についての致命的な曖昧さを克服する独自のビジョンを示してほしい。反米テロの動機の根絶は不可能であるにせよ、それを希薄にする努力は出来るはずだ。「アラブの春」をもたらした中東の新しい「市民」たちも日米同盟関係のグローバルな舞台での「深化」を志向している私たち日本人も、オバマ氏の勇気ある決断を待っている。
（筆者は元ＮＨＫ解説主幹 元白鴎大学教授。）
１０年が経過した。米軍特殊部隊は５月、イスラマバド近郊のパキスタン領内で、ビンラディンを殺害。オバマ大統領は、「テロとの戦い」が、終結への節目を迎えていると８月末発言している。アフガニスタンとイラクの戦争では、多くの犠牲者や反米感情の高まりなど新しい問題を引き起こしながら、それなりの変貌を現地にもたらしているが、この間、パレスチナ問題は未解決のままだ。
パレスチナ国家を初めて容認したブッシュ政権、その独立国家は、ヨルダン川西岸やガザがイスラエルに占領された１９６７年戦争以前の境界線を基準にすべきであるというオバマ大統領の５月の発言など一見、「画期的」なアメリカの「イニシアティブ」はあったものの、いずれも言葉だけで、それらの実現に向けた進展はない。「西岸分離壁」によるパレスチナ側の自爆テロの激減がもたらした「安堵感」もあってか、右傾したイスラエル社会では、領土上の譲歩を伴う和平への無関心が広がっている。一方、パレスチナ側もハマスのガザ掌握が示すような内部対立により、当事者能力が低下した。これらの事情に加え、調停に当たるアメリカの姿勢や調停の枠組み自体にも問題がある。「当事者間の交渉による合意」にこだわるアメリカの固定観念もその一つだ。「６７年戦争以前の境界線は、アラブ側がイスラエルを承認していなかった時期の単なる休戦ラインであり、国境線ではない。従って境界線を越えた係争地は、占領地ではない」というイスラエル側の主張を、アメリカは切り崩せずにいる。６７年戦争以後の和平交渉の土台になっている安保理決議２４２号が、イスラエルの撤退の範囲について「合意された国境線での共存」という趣旨の、端的に言えば、奪った土地を現に握っているイスラエルに一方的に有利な表現になっているのも問題だ。１９５６年の「スエズ戦争」では、当時のアイゼンハワー政権が、イスラエルに対しシナイ半島からの即時無条件撤退を求め、実行させているし、イラク（サダム）軍にクウェートからの撤退を求めた安保理決議も同様だった。
パレスチナ側（アバス議長）は、９月下旬の国連総会で、６７年戦争以前の境界線を持ち、エルサレムを首都とする国家の樹立を認める決議が採択されるよう準備を進めている。安保理では、アメリカの拒否権行使が予想されるための、次善の策だろう。ＥＵ諸国を含む多くの国々が、賛成票を投ずるに違いないその票決は、イスラエルとアメリカの国際的な孤立の度合いを占う試金石になる。来年の再選を狙いイスラエルに同情的な議会にも配慮が必要なオバマ大統領も苦しいところだろうが、この際、エルサレムを含む占領地についての致命的な曖昧さを克服する独自のビジョンを示してほしい。反米テロの動機の根絶は不可能であるにせよ、それを希薄にする努力は出来るはずだ。「アラブの春」をもたらした中東の新しい「市民」たちも日米同盟関係のグローバルな舞台での「深化」を志向している私たち日本人も、オバマ氏の勇気ある決断を待っている。
（筆者は元ＮＨＫ解説主幹 元白鴎大学教授。）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟