Growth Strategy Must Not be Impeded by Agriculture that Contributes Only 1% to GDP
TANAKA Hitoshi / Chairman, JRI Institute for International Strategy
January 10, 2012
I would like to examine the significance of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) from a comprehensive viewpoint including its political, economic and security implications for Japan.
Let us start with TPP’s strategic significance. The most important issue for the future of East Asia and indeed for the world is our approach to China, which has risen dramatically to become the second largest economy in the world. The basic idea is to incorporate China into the framework of rules governing the international community and encourage compliance by further developing its domestic legal system. In that sense, it would have been best if China were involved in the rule-making process. However, at this stage China lacks the political and legal systems for meeting sophisticated rules envisioned by TPP, such as protection of intellectual property rights and transparency of government procurement. Thus China is unlikely to participate any time soon. It is nevertheless important to establish rules under TPP that will serve as goals for China. For the time being, it would be wise for developed countries like the United States, Japan and Australia to take the initiative of rule making and to lay the path for Chinese participation in future.
Mindful of its relationship with China, over the past year the United States has moved towards a diplomatic strategy that gives greater weight to the Asia-Pacific region. In terms of security, it has been steadily strengthening its East Asian network in the wake of the Senkaku Islands incident in 2010. The United States has significantly expanded its presence in East Asia, beyond allies such as Japan, to include joint military exercises with Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam, planned deployment of the Marines to Darwin in the Northern Territory of Australia and deployment of two battleships to Singapore.
In terms of an economic framework, U.S. participation had been limited to APEC alone. Any progress made towards an economic framework for the growth center of East Asia without U.S. involvement must be an unwelcome development for the country. It created TPP by taking advantage of the P4 (Pacific 4), a small framework of four countries including Singapore. If such is the U.S. intention, the strategic significance of TPP will be greatly diminished without Japanese participation.
Japan is an Asia-Pacific power. It lies in the middle of Pacific countries in Asia, the United States and Australia, and is also the only country that can build a bridge between Asia and the Pacific from the viewpoint of an advanced democracy. Furthermore, absorbing growth from East Asia is a life and death matter for Japan, where the workforce is being depleted by the lower birthrate and aging population. Today, trade with China greatly exceeds trade with the United States. As such, Japan should actively participate in setting the rules for a free economic system and concurrently play a leading role in advancing East Asian economic integration. Japan should actively promote the Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia under the “ASEAN Plus 6” framework, as well as the economic partnership agreement among Japan, China and South Korea. Our ultimate goal will be to combine these with TPP and realize the framework of the Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). Japanese interests would be best served by taking advantage of its alliance with the United States to enlarge and integrate the market into one that will cover the broad expanse of East Asia.
Let us turn to the economic implications of TPP. Japan has conducted negotiations with the United States on more issues than in its negotiations with the WTO. In addition to our dependence on the United States for our national security, talks with the United States are punctuated by the threat of retaliatory measures such as the “Super 301” clause. For this reason, at times it may have seemed as though we had bowed to pressure and compromised Japanese interests. However, in most cases such talks have led to expanding Japan’s markets and raising demand for its products. I was myself involved in numerous negotiations in my capacity as the division director in charge at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1985 through 1987, when the economic friction between the United States had reached its peak, and again from 2000 and 2001 as the Director General of the Economic Affairs Bureau. Through these negotiations, Japan’s telecommunications market was liberalized under strong U.S. pressure, introducing the principle of free competition. As a result, access fees came down and today there are more than 15,000 telecommunications companies. The size of the market also expanded from 5 trillion yen to 15 trillion yen. We also overcame the resistance of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations to create a system for registered foreign lawyers that allowed U.S. attorneys to operate in Japan. The system led to a dramatic rise in the activities of Japanese international lawyers instead. Likewise, talks to liberalize trade of oranges and beef did not spell death and destruction for Japanese mandarin orange growers and dairy farmers but rather increased the demand for branded domestic beef. On each occasion, the Japanese government signed agreements with the United States by heeding the political necessity of “preventing economic frictions from damaging the alliance”. And while such agreements may have had a detrimental impact on vested interests over the short term, Japan’s long-term economic interests were never compromised.
On liberalizing rice imports, Japan avoided bilateral talks with the United States and the issue was resolved in 1993 during the Uruguay Round through multilateral negotiations under the GATT framework. However, this resulted in protecting rice with taxpayers’ money rather than liberalizing the domestic market. To this day, Japan imports about 700,000 tons of foreign rice in exchange for the prohibitive tariff of 700%. However, instead of being sold in the domestic market, imported rice is used as cattle feed, processed products and food aid. A lot of it ends up being disposed of. At the time the issue was finally resolved, the government used 6 trillion yen in subsidies, in addition to paying the massive cost of storage. Such money has been used to dig hot springs in some cases and the overall assessment is that it has not contributed to strengthening Japanese agriculture.
Regardless of joining or not joining TPP, Japanese agriculture is in need of a fundamental reform. The farming population has dropped by roughly 50% over the past 20 years and farmers aged 60 and above constitute over 70% of the total. We must promote large-scale agriculture and participation of stock companies in farming, foster younger farmers and revitalize agriculture as an export industry. We must introduce competition and shift to a system of direct income guarantee as needed. Such a fundamental reform of agriculture would not only raise productivity but also enable FTAs with farming countries that had until now been hampered by the opposition of vested farming interests. Japan must not allow an industry that accounts for a mere 1% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to impede its growth strategy of promoting economic partnerships with other countries.
.
The write is a former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. This is a summary of an article that first appeared in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun newspaper on December 14, 2011, published with the writer's approval.
Let us start with TPP’s strategic significance. The most important issue for the future of East Asia and indeed for the world is our approach to China, which has risen dramatically to become the second largest economy in the world. The basic idea is to incorporate China into the framework of rules governing the international community and encourage compliance by further developing its domestic legal system. In that sense, it would have been best if China were involved in the rule-making process. However, at this stage China lacks the political and legal systems for meeting sophisticated rules envisioned by TPP, such as protection of intellectual property rights and transparency of government procurement. Thus China is unlikely to participate any time soon. It is nevertheless important to establish rules under TPP that will serve as goals for China. For the time being, it would be wise for developed countries like the United States, Japan and Australia to take the initiative of rule making and to lay the path for Chinese participation in future.
Mindful of its relationship with China, over the past year the United States has moved towards a diplomatic strategy that gives greater weight to the Asia-Pacific region. In terms of security, it has been steadily strengthening its East Asian network in the wake of the Senkaku Islands incident in 2010. The United States has significantly expanded its presence in East Asia, beyond allies such as Japan, to include joint military exercises with Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam, planned deployment of the Marines to Darwin in the Northern Territory of Australia and deployment of two battleships to Singapore.
In terms of an economic framework, U.S. participation had been limited to APEC alone. Any progress made towards an economic framework for the growth center of East Asia without U.S. involvement must be an unwelcome development for the country. It created TPP by taking advantage of the P4 (Pacific 4), a small framework of four countries including Singapore. If such is the U.S. intention, the strategic significance of TPP will be greatly diminished without Japanese participation.
Japan is an Asia-Pacific power. It lies in the middle of Pacific countries in Asia, the United States and Australia, and is also the only country that can build a bridge between Asia and the Pacific from the viewpoint of an advanced democracy. Furthermore, absorbing growth from East Asia is a life and death matter for Japan, where the workforce is being depleted by the lower birthrate and aging population. Today, trade with China greatly exceeds trade with the United States. As such, Japan should actively participate in setting the rules for a free economic system and concurrently play a leading role in advancing East Asian economic integration. Japan should actively promote the Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia under the “ASEAN Plus 6” framework, as well as the economic partnership agreement among Japan, China and South Korea. Our ultimate goal will be to combine these with TPP and realize the framework of the Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). Japanese interests would be best served by taking advantage of its alliance with the United States to enlarge and integrate the market into one that will cover the broad expanse of East Asia.
Let us turn to the economic implications of TPP. Japan has conducted negotiations with the United States on more issues than in its negotiations with the WTO. In addition to our dependence on the United States for our national security, talks with the United States are punctuated by the threat of retaliatory measures such as the “Super 301” clause. For this reason, at times it may have seemed as though we had bowed to pressure and compromised Japanese interests. However, in most cases such talks have led to expanding Japan’s markets and raising demand for its products. I was myself involved in numerous negotiations in my capacity as the division director in charge at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1985 through 1987, when the economic friction between the United States had reached its peak, and again from 2000 and 2001 as the Director General of the Economic Affairs Bureau. Through these negotiations, Japan’s telecommunications market was liberalized under strong U.S. pressure, introducing the principle of free competition. As a result, access fees came down and today there are more than 15,000 telecommunications companies. The size of the market also expanded from 5 trillion yen to 15 trillion yen. We also overcame the resistance of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations to create a system for registered foreign lawyers that allowed U.S. attorneys to operate in Japan. The system led to a dramatic rise in the activities of Japanese international lawyers instead. Likewise, talks to liberalize trade of oranges and beef did not spell death and destruction for Japanese mandarin orange growers and dairy farmers but rather increased the demand for branded domestic beef. On each occasion, the Japanese government signed agreements with the United States by heeding the political necessity of “preventing economic frictions from damaging the alliance”. And while such agreements may have had a detrimental impact on vested interests over the short term, Japan’s long-term economic interests were never compromised.
On liberalizing rice imports, Japan avoided bilateral talks with the United States and the issue was resolved in 1993 during the Uruguay Round through multilateral negotiations under the GATT framework. However, this resulted in protecting rice with taxpayers’ money rather than liberalizing the domestic market. To this day, Japan imports about 700,000 tons of foreign rice in exchange for the prohibitive tariff of 700%. However, instead of being sold in the domestic market, imported rice is used as cattle feed, processed products and food aid. A lot of it ends up being disposed of. At the time the issue was finally resolved, the government used 6 trillion yen in subsidies, in addition to paying the massive cost of storage. Such money has been used to dig hot springs in some cases and the overall assessment is that it has not contributed to strengthening Japanese agriculture.
Regardless of joining or not joining TPP, Japanese agriculture is in need of a fundamental reform. The farming population has dropped by roughly 50% over the past 20 years and farmers aged 60 and above constitute over 70% of the total. We must promote large-scale agriculture and participation of stock companies in farming, foster younger farmers and revitalize agriculture as an export industry. We must introduce competition and shift to a system of direct income guarantee as needed. Such a fundamental reform of agriculture would not only raise productivity but also enable FTAs with farming countries that had until now been hampered by the opposition of vested farming interests. Japan must not allow an industry that accounts for a mere 1% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to impede its growth strategy of promoting economic partnerships with other countries.
.
The write is a former Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. This is a summary of an article that first appeared in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun newspaper on December 14, 2011, published with the writer's approval.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
GDP寄与率１％の農業が成長戦略を妨げてはならない
田中 均 / 日本総合研究所 国際戦略研究所理事長
2012年 1月 10日
政治・経済・安全保障といった包括的観点からＴＰＰの意味合いを捉えてみたい。
まず、ＴＰＰの戦略的意味合いである。東アジア地域ひいては今後の世界にとっての最大の問題は飛躍的に台頭し、世界第二の経済大国となった中国とどう向き合うのか、ということである。対中政策の基本は中国を国際社会のルールに取り込み、中国国内の法制を一層整備する方向に仕向けることであろう。その意味では本来、中国も巻き込んだルールづくりが好ましい。しかし現段階で中国は、知的所有権の保護や透明な政府調達制度などＴＰＰが想定するような高度なルールに対応できる政治や法体系の準備がない。すぐには中国は参加できないであろうが、ＴＰＰという形で中国にとっても目標となるようなルールを構築しておくのは重要だ。当面米国や日本、豪州といった先進国を中心にルール作りを行い、将来中国の加盟に道を開くことが賢明といえる。
米国はこの一年、対中関係を意識し、アジア太平洋重視の外交戦略に踏み出した。安全保障面では昨年の尖閣諸島問題以降、着々と東アジアのネットワークを強化してきた。日本などの同盟国にとどまらず、フィリピンやベトナムとなど東南アジア諸国との共同軍事演習、豪州北部ダーウィンへの海兵隊の展開、シンガポールへの戦艦２隻の配備など米国の東アジアでのプレゼンスの拡大は顕著である。
一方、経済的な枠組みについては米国が関与する枠組みとしてＡＰＥＣ以外は想定されていなかった。米国は、成長センターである東アジアの経済的枠組みが米国の関与なく進むことは歓迎していないのであろう。シンガポールなど4カ国が参加するＰ４（パシフィック４）という小国の枠組みに乗る形でＴＰＰを構築した。米国の意図がそうであるなら、ＴＰＰに日本が参加しないと、米国にとってのＴＰＰの戦略的意味合いは大きく減ずる。
日本は「アジア太平洋国家（アジアパシフィックパワー）」である。アジア諸国と米国、豪州といった太平洋国家の間にあり、また先進民主主義国の見地からアジアと太平洋に橋をかけられる唯一の国である。さらに少子高齢化で労働人口が減っていく日本にとって、東アジアの成長を取り込むことは死活的に重要だ。今や貿易面でも対中貿易は対米貿易を大きく上回る。だとすれば日本はＴＰＰに積極的に参加し自由経済体制のルールづくりを進め、同時に東アジアで経済統合を進めることに旗を振るべきだろう。日本は「ＡＳＥＡＮプラス６」での東アジア多国間経済連携協定や日中韓経済連携協定に積極的に取り組むべきである。最終的にはＴＰＰとあわせアジア太平洋自由貿易圏（ＦＴＡＡＰ）構想につなげていくということだ。日米同盟を活用し、東アジアを面として市場の拡大統合を図っていくことこそが日本の国益に資すると考える。
次にＴＰＰの経済的意味合いである。日本は米国とＷＴＯ交渉よりも多い分野で交渉をしてきた。米国との交渉は、日本が安全保障を依存することに加えて、通商法３０１条といった報復措置もちらつくため、力に屈して国益を損なったかのような見方をされることもある。しかし、実は多くの場合、日本のマーケットは広がり需要拡大につながった。筆者自身１９８５年から８７年まで日米経済摩擦が最も激しい時の外務省担当課長として、２０００年から０１年まで経済局長として米国との数多くの交渉を担当した。その際に米国の強い圧力の下で実現した電気通信市場の自由化の結果、競争原理が導入された。接続料が下がり、電気通信事業者は今や１万５千を超える。市場の規模は５兆円から１５兆円に拡大した。また、日本弁護士連合会の反対を説得し、米国の弁護士の活動を日本で認める外国法事務弁護士の制度を創設したが、むしろ日本の渉外弁護士の活動が飛躍的に拡大した。オレンジ・牛肉の自由化でも、ミカン農家や酪農家が壊滅したわけではなく、牛肉もむしろブランド国内牛の需要が拡大した。その都度、日本政府は「同盟関係を経済摩擦で傷つけてはならない」という政治的考慮をしながら日米合意をつくったわけだが、短期的な既得権益を壊すことはあっても長期的な経済的国益を損なったことはなかった。
コメの開放については米国との２国間交渉を避け、ウルグアイ・ラウンドというガット多国間交渉の中で９３年に決着したが、自由化というより、納税者の負担でコメ市場を守ったというべきであろう。７００％を超える禁止関税の代償として現在でも７０万トン弱の外国米を輸入しているが、これらのコメは市場に出回ることはなく飼料、加工用、援助米に供され、多くは結果的には廃棄される。保管などにかかる多額の財政負担に加え、政府は決着時に６兆円もの補助金を使った。補助金は温泉を掘る資金にも使われ、農業の体質強化にはつながらなかったと評価されている。
ＴＰＰに参加するか否かを問わず、日本の農業は抜本的に改革しなければいけない。農業人口はこの２０年でほぼ半減し、６０歳以上の高齢農業従事者は現在７０％を超える。農業の大規模化・株式会社化、若年農業労働者の育成、輸出産業としての農業の活性化に取り組まなければならない。競争を導入し、必要に応じて直接所得保障をする方式に転換せざるを得ない。農業の抜本的改革は単に農業生産性を高めるだけではなく、農業既得権益の抵抗で実現してこなかった農業国とのFTAを可能にする。国内総生産（ＧＤＰ）寄与率１％の産業が、諸外国との経済連携協定の促進という成長戦略を妨げるようなことがあってはならない。
（筆者は元外務審議官。本稿は２０１１年１２月１４日の日本経済新聞に掲載された記事の、筆者の了承を得た要約である。）
まず、ＴＰＰの戦略的意味合いである。東アジア地域ひいては今後の世界にとっての最大の問題は飛躍的に台頭し、世界第二の経済大国となった中国とどう向き合うのか、ということである。対中政策の基本は中国を国際社会のルールに取り込み、中国国内の法制を一層整備する方向に仕向けることであろう。その意味では本来、中国も巻き込んだルールづくりが好ましい。しかし現段階で中国は、知的所有権の保護や透明な政府調達制度などＴＰＰが想定するような高度なルールに対応できる政治や法体系の準備がない。すぐには中国は参加できないであろうが、ＴＰＰという形で中国にとっても目標となるようなルールを構築しておくのは重要だ。当面米国や日本、豪州といった先進国を中心にルール作りを行い、将来中国の加盟に道を開くことが賢明といえる。
米国はこの一年、対中関係を意識し、アジア太平洋重視の外交戦略に踏み出した。安全保障面では昨年の尖閣諸島問題以降、着々と東アジアのネットワークを強化してきた。日本などの同盟国にとどまらず、フィリピンやベトナムとなど東南アジア諸国との共同軍事演習、豪州北部ダーウィンへの海兵隊の展開、シンガポールへの戦艦２隻の配備など米国の東アジアでのプレゼンスの拡大は顕著である。
一方、経済的な枠組みについては米国が関与する枠組みとしてＡＰＥＣ以外は想定されていなかった。米国は、成長センターである東アジアの経済的枠組みが米国の関与なく進むことは歓迎していないのであろう。シンガポールなど4カ国が参加するＰ４（パシフィック４）という小国の枠組みに乗る形でＴＰＰを構築した。米国の意図がそうであるなら、ＴＰＰに日本が参加しないと、米国にとってのＴＰＰの戦略的意味合いは大きく減ずる。
日本は「アジア太平洋国家（アジアパシフィックパワー）」である。アジア諸国と米国、豪州といった太平洋国家の間にあり、また先進民主主義国の見地からアジアと太平洋に橋をかけられる唯一の国である。さらに少子高齢化で労働人口が減っていく日本にとって、東アジアの成長を取り込むことは死活的に重要だ。今や貿易面でも対中貿易は対米貿易を大きく上回る。だとすれば日本はＴＰＰに積極的に参加し自由経済体制のルールづくりを進め、同時に東アジアで経済統合を進めることに旗を振るべきだろう。日本は「ＡＳＥＡＮプラス６」での東アジア多国間経済連携協定や日中韓経済連携協定に積極的に取り組むべきである。最終的にはＴＰＰとあわせアジア太平洋自由貿易圏（ＦＴＡＡＰ）構想につなげていくということだ。日米同盟を活用し、東アジアを面として市場の拡大統合を図っていくことこそが日本の国益に資すると考える。
次にＴＰＰの経済的意味合いである。日本は米国とＷＴＯ交渉よりも多い分野で交渉をしてきた。米国との交渉は、日本が安全保障を依存することに加えて、通商法３０１条といった報復措置もちらつくため、力に屈して国益を損なったかのような見方をされることもある。しかし、実は多くの場合、日本のマーケットは広がり需要拡大につながった。筆者自身１９８５年から８７年まで日米経済摩擦が最も激しい時の外務省担当課長として、２０００年から０１年まで経済局長として米国との数多くの交渉を担当した。その際に米国の強い圧力の下で実現した電気通信市場の自由化の結果、競争原理が導入された。接続料が下がり、電気通信事業者は今や１万５千を超える。市場の規模は５兆円から１５兆円に拡大した。また、日本弁護士連合会の反対を説得し、米国の弁護士の活動を日本で認める外国法事務弁護士の制度を創設したが、むしろ日本の渉外弁護士の活動が飛躍的に拡大した。オレンジ・牛肉の自由化でも、ミカン農家や酪農家が壊滅したわけではなく、牛肉もむしろブランド国内牛の需要が拡大した。その都度、日本政府は「同盟関係を経済摩擦で傷つけてはならない」という政治的考慮をしながら日米合意をつくったわけだが、短期的な既得権益を壊すことはあっても長期的な経済的国益を損なったことはなかった。
コメの開放については米国との２国間交渉を避け、ウルグアイ・ラウンドというガット多国間交渉の中で９３年に決着したが、自由化というより、納税者の負担でコメ市場を守ったというべきであろう。７００％を超える禁止関税の代償として現在でも７０万トン弱の外国米を輸入しているが、これらのコメは市場に出回ることはなく飼料、加工用、援助米に供され、多くは結果的には廃棄される。保管などにかかる多額の財政負担に加え、政府は決着時に６兆円もの補助金を使った。補助金は温泉を掘る資金にも使われ、農業の体質強化にはつながらなかったと評価されている。
ＴＰＰに参加するか否かを問わず、日本の農業は抜本的に改革しなければいけない。農業人口はこの２０年でほぼ半減し、６０歳以上の高齢農業従事者は現在７０％を超える。農業の大規模化・株式会社化、若年農業労働者の育成、輸出産業としての農業の活性化に取り組まなければならない。競争を導入し、必要に応じて直接所得保障をする方式に転換せざるを得ない。農業の抜本的改革は単に農業生産性を高めるだけではなく、農業既得権益の抵抗で実現してこなかった農業国とのFTAを可能にする。国内総生産（ＧＤＰ）寄与率１％の産業が、諸外国との経済連携協定の促進という成長戦略を妨げるようなことがあってはならない。
（筆者は元外務審議官。本稿は２０１１年１２月１４日の日本経済新聞に掲載された記事の、筆者の了承を得た要約である。）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟