TPP As a Part of Industrial Policy and National Security Policy
ONO Goro / Professor Emeritus, Saitama University
January 16, 2012
The Trans-Pacific Partnership, or TPP, is not about opening Japan to the world or liberalization as argued by some of its proponents, but is merely a part of the industrial policy of participating countries that include the United States. Being a closed regional union, TPP is obviously not about "opening up to the world." While liberalization is the goal in terms of tangible aspects such as goods, money and people, when it comes to intangible aspects such as intellectual property rights the general direction is towards tighter regulation.
Let me offer a simple review of history. In the past, advanced nations that led the global economy sought to expand their economic interests by first advocating liberalization of trade in goods and services. As they lost their supremacy to newcomers they added liberalization of capital to the list. And as they began to feel pressured in this area as well, they came up with stronger protection of intellectual property rights and financial engineering. This is a pattern that has been followed not just by contemporary America, but one that has been in place ever since the British began to champion the "free economy" after Adam Smith. In either case, it has been an industrial policy adopted by the economic superpower of the day.
For this reason, there is persistent opposition from those who claim that TPP is no more than a design to benefit the United States. However, we shouldn't be too quick to jump to the conclusion that Japan should therefore not participate. From a policy perspective, we can put perfectly well the logics aside and do whatever it takes as long as it is in Japan's national interests to do so.
In another vein, most would agree that participating in TPP offers Japan an effective tool for transforming its social structure to meet the needs of a maturing society. Japan is suffering under the double burden of having lost its growth potential as it enters an era of declining birth rates and an aging population. We have been further battered by the great earthquake disaster and nuclear accident. However, even against this backdrop the Japanese continue to cling on to vested interests and remain trapped in conventional ideas. A sense of impotence permeates the country and people seem too disheartened to bring down the wall on their own. In view of this state, it wouldn’t be inappropriate to entertain the idea of using "external pressure" - as in the past - to proceed with structural reforms that are badly needed.
Needless to say, although Japan may have lost its growth potential on a macroeconomic scale, that doesn't mean there is no room for growth on the micro scale of individual industries and corporations. It is also essential to significantly enhance our productivity on a macro scale to address the declining birth rate and aging population.
These two points lead us to a single conclusion – Japan must give priority to developing promising sectors while engineering a gradual retreat in the remaining sectors. Of course, in some areas vital to social stability and thus related to security in the broad sense of the term, such as social welfare and natural resources, it would be difficult to raise productivity on their own and supplementary policies would be required. And precisely for that reason, it becomes even more important to generate excess resources from the promising sectors.
In other words, if TPP is indeed to benefit the United States alone, it would only be natural for agriculture protectionists, etc. to oppose it. However, their grounds for opposition would disappear if participating in TPP was presented as a necessary step to ensure that Japan raises its productivity by implementing structural reforms and avoid losing the excess resources to protect those sectors in need. On the other hand, industries that currently lead the Japanese economy do not necessarily represent the promising sectors of the future, so participation in TPP would not go their way, either. For example, the auto industry has been able to maintain its competitiveness thanks to the weak yen policy introduced during the Koizumi administration, and its productivity is not exactly high. At this rate, the auto industry might join the ranks of sectors marked for a gradual retreat.
Let us now move away from domestic considerations and turn to TPP and its implications for Japan's foreign policy. We have been faced with "Japan-passing" by the United States and its move to forge closer ties with China and South Korea. Declaring participation in TPP would be effective as an eye-opener that reminds the Americans of the vital position Japan holds within their strategy for Asia and China in particular. That said, Japan should also break from the past and assert itself, rather than compromising to placate the United States. By doing so Japan would gain greater recognition from other countries participating in TPP, and the United States itself would be forced to recognize Japan's strategic importance anew.
This paradoxical viewpoint is also useful in considering our relationship with China. Japan's participation in TPP will be interpreted by China as part of the effort to encircle China, leading to a "deepening of the Japan-U.S. alliance" as advocated by the current administration of Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko. While a deepening of the alliance is a welcome development for both Japan and the United States, growing tensions with China is an outcome that both countries would wish to avoid. And in view of recent developments in North Korea, matters could take a turn for the worst should a power struggle erupt between the United States and China over the Korean Peninsula. Such an outcome would pose a greater threat to Japan than to the United States.
Thus the signing of a FTA (Free Trade Agreement) between Japan, China and South Korea will become significantly important. It is hoped that the FTA would serve as a conduit through which Japan and South Korea can bridge the gap between the United States and China and thereby avoid the emergence of any dangerous flashpoints between the two military powers.
Finally, there is one thing Japan can do right now to prevent political uncertainty in North Korea from accelerating tensions throughout East Asia. Japan should declare its willingness to accept a certain portion of the massive number of North Koreans who are expected to flee the country, and to pay a certain amount of the cost required for restoring stability to the Korean Peninsula. Shouldering part of this burden would change China's stance towards Japan on the North Korean issue. Seen from another angle, lending a helping hand to a former colony in confusion is a natural responsibility of a former colonial master recognized under international law.
The write is Professor Emeritus at Saitama University.
Let me offer a simple review of history. In the past, advanced nations that led the global economy sought to expand their economic interests by first advocating liberalization of trade in goods and services. As they lost their supremacy to newcomers they added liberalization of capital to the list. And as they began to feel pressured in this area as well, they came up with stronger protection of intellectual property rights and financial engineering. This is a pattern that has been followed not just by contemporary America, but one that has been in place ever since the British began to champion the "free economy" after Adam Smith. In either case, it has been an industrial policy adopted by the economic superpower of the day.
For this reason, there is persistent opposition from those who claim that TPP is no more than a design to benefit the United States. However, we shouldn't be too quick to jump to the conclusion that Japan should therefore not participate. From a policy perspective, we can put perfectly well the logics aside and do whatever it takes as long as it is in Japan's national interests to do so.
In another vein, most would agree that participating in TPP offers Japan an effective tool for transforming its social structure to meet the needs of a maturing society. Japan is suffering under the double burden of having lost its growth potential as it enters an era of declining birth rates and an aging population. We have been further battered by the great earthquake disaster and nuclear accident. However, even against this backdrop the Japanese continue to cling on to vested interests and remain trapped in conventional ideas. A sense of impotence permeates the country and people seem too disheartened to bring down the wall on their own. In view of this state, it wouldn’t be inappropriate to entertain the idea of using "external pressure" - as in the past - to proceed with structural reforms that are badly needed.
Needless to say, although Japan may have lost its growth potential on a macroeconomic scale, that doesn't mean there is no room for growth on the micro scale of individual industries and corporations. It is also essential to significantly enhance our productivity on a macro scale to address the declining birth rate and aging population.
These two points lead us to a single conclusion – Japan must give priority to developing promising sectors while engineering a gradual retreat in the remaining sectors. Of course, in some areas vital to social stability and thus related to security in the broad sense of the term, such as social welfare and natural resources, it would be difficult to raise productivity on their own and supplementary policies would be required. And precisely for that reason, it becomes even more important to generate excess resources from the promising sectors.
In other words, if TPP is indeed to benefit the United States alone, it would only be natural for agriculture protectionists, etc. to oppose it. However, their grounds for opposition would disappear if participating in TPP was presented as a necessary step to ensure that Japan raises its productivity by implementing structural reforms and avoid losing the excess resources to protect those sectors in need. On the other hand, industries that currently lead the Japanese economy do not necessarily represent the promising sectors of the future, so participation in TPP would not go their way, either. For example, the auto industry has been able to maintain its competitiveness thanks to the weak yen policy introduced during the Koizumi administration, and its productivity is not exactly high. At this rate, the auto industry might join the ranks of sectors marked for a gradual retreat.
Let us now move away from domestic considerations and turn to TPP and its implications for Japan's foreign policy. We have been faced with "Japan-passing" by the United States and its move to forge closer ties with China and South Korea. Declaring participation in TPP would be effective as an eye-opener that reminds the Americans of the vital position Japan holds within their strategy for Asia and China in particular. That said, Japan should also break from the past and assert itself, rather than compromising to placate the United States. By doing so Japan would gain greater recognition from other countries participating in TPP, and the United States itself would be forced to recognize Japan's strategic importance anew.
This paradoxical viewpoint is also useful in considering our relationship with China. Japan's participation in TPP will be interpreted by China as part of the effort to encircle China, leading to a "deepening of the Japan-U.S. alliance" as advocated by the current administration of Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko. While a deepening of the alliance is a welcome development for both Japan and the United States, growing tensions with China is an outcome that both countries would wish to avoid. And in view of recent developments in North Korea, matters could take a turn for the worst should a power struggle erupt between the United States and China over the Korean Peninsula. Such an outcome would pose a greater threat to Japan than to the United States.
Thus the signing of a FTA (Free Trade Agreement) between Japan, China and South Korea will become significantly important. It is hoped that the FTA would serve as a conduit through which Japan and South Korea can bridge the gap between the United States and China and thereby avoid the emergence of any dangerous flashpoints between the two military powers.
Finally, there is one thing Japan can do right now to prevent political uncertainty in North Korea from accelerating tensions throughout East Asia. Japan should declare its willingness to accept a certain portion of the massive number of North Koreans who are expected to flee the country, and to pay a certain amount of the cost required for restoring stability to the Korean Peninsula. Shouldering part of this burden would change China's stance towards Japan on the North Korean issue. Seen from another angle, lending a helping hand to a former colony in confusion is a natural responsibility of a former colonial master recognized under international law.
The write is Professor Emeritus at Saitama University.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
産業政策そして安全保障としてのTPP
小野 五郎 / 埼玉大学名誉教授
2012年 1月 16日
TPPというのは、一部推進派が理屈付けに使う「開国」「自由化」などではなく、米国等参加国にとっての産業政策の一つにすぎない。そもそも閉ざされた地域内連合であるTPPが「開国」でないことは自明である。また「自由化」にしても、なるほど「物・金・人」という有形物についてはその方向を目指しているが、「知的財産権」という無形物についてはむしろ規制強化に向かっているではないか。
端的に言えば、これまで世界経済を主導してきた先進国が、かつて「（財・サービスの）貿易自由化」を唱えて経済権益を拡大し、後発国に追い上げられその地位を奪われた末に追加したのが「資本自由化」であり、それもまた怪しくなると出してきたのが「知的財産権強化」と「金融工学」だった。これは何も近代米国のみならず、かつて英国がアダム・スミス流「自由経済」を主導して以来の構図であり、いずれも時の経済覇権国の「産業政策」だと言える。
このため逆の「TPPというのは米国のためになされるものにすぎない」という反対論も根強いが、しかしだからといって直ちに「日本は参加すべきではない」とはならない。なぜなら、政策論としては「『日本の国益』になることであれば、後は理屈抜きで何でもやればいい」だけのことだからである。
ところで、TPP参加が日本にとって「成熟社会に合った社会構造転換」へ向け有用なツールの一つであることには論を待たない。少なくとも「もはや成長余力を喪失した」ところで「少子高齢化を迎える」という二重苦に悩みながら、ましてそれに加うるに大震災・原発事故に見舞われながら、なお既得権に固執し既成概念から抜け出せずにいる今の日本国内の閉塞感、自ら壁を打ち破る覇気など無い状況に鑑みると、「求められる構造改革を進めるためには以前同様『外圧』を利用するほかはない」との発想があってもおかしくない。
元よりマクロで見て「成長余力を喪失した」ということは、ミクロ個別産業・個別企業の成長性まで否定するものではない。また、「少子高齢化」に備えるためにはマクロで見た大幅な生産性向上が不可欠である。
この二つから導かれる結論は、「将来性ある部門を重点的に育て上げ、それ以外は段階的に撤退させていく」ことにほかならない。ただし、社会的安定に不可欠な広義の安全保障関連分野（社会福祉・資源等を含む）の中には、独自に生産性を引き上げることが困難であり、政策的補完が求められるものもある。逆にだからこそ、それだけの余剰を有望分野から生み出させることが必要となるのである。
すなわち「TPPは米国のため」だとすれば農業保護派等が反対するのは当然であるが、逆に「構造改革により国家としての生産性向上を図らねば保護すべき分野を保護する余力も失われるから、それを避けるためにTPP参加が必要だ」とすれば保護派の反対理由も消滅する。逆に現経済界を主導する業界が必ずしもここで言う「有望分野」ではないから、TPP参加による構造改革の方向は彼らの思惑どおりとはならない。例えば、小泉政権時代の円安誘導によって競争力を保っていた自動車産業は、生産性が決して高くはないから、現状のままでは「段階的に撤退させていく」側に入りかねないのである。
さらに、そうした対内的理由から離れても、米国によるジャパン・パッシング、対中・対韓接近を目前にして「米国のアジア戦略、特に対中戦略上、いかに日本が重要なポジションを占めているか」を再認識させる端緒としても、TPP参加表明が有用となる。ただし、それは今までのように米国に合わせて譲歩していくのではなく、むしろ日本独自の主張を展開すべきであり、その方が他の参加国の対日評価は高まるし、当の米国自身も日本の重要性を再認識せざるをえないことになろう。
また、こうした逆説的な見方は対中関係でも必要である。なぜなら、中国からすれば日本のTPP参加は野田政権の謳う「日米同盟の深化」に通じる対中包囲網の一環と解せるからである。日米両国にとって「日米同盟の深化」そのものは好ましいとしても、その結果中国との間で緊張が高まることは好ましいことではない。まして直近の北朝鮮情勢に絡んで米中が半島をめぐる勢力争いを始めることは、当の米国以上に日本にとっては脅威となる。
そこで重要度が高まるのが日中韓ＦＴＡの締結である。それを通じ日韓両国が米中間のブリッジ役を果たすことによって、両軍事大国の一触即発を避けることが期待できる。
なお、北朝鮮の政情不安が東アジア情勢を一挙に緊迫化させないため今一つ日本ができることに、大量発生が予想される難民のうち相当数を日本国内に引き受け、朝鮮半島の安定に要する費用のうち相当額を日本が出損すると宣言することがある。これらの重荷を日本が一部肩代わりすれば、中国の北朝鮮問題に関する対日姿勢を転じさせることができよう。もっとも、旧植民地の混乱に手を差し伸べることは、旧宗主国としての日本の当然の国際的責務であるが。
（筆者は埼玉大学名誉教授。）
端的に言えば、これまで世界経済を主導してきた先進国が、かつて「（財・サービスの）貿易自由化」を唱えて経済権益を拡大し、後発国に追い上げられその地位を奪われた末に追加したのが「資本自由化」であり、それもまた怪しくなると出してきたのが「知的財産権強化」と「金融工学」だった。これは何も近代米国のみならず、かつて英国がアダム・スミス流「自由経済」を主導して以来の構図であり、いずれも時の経済覇権国の「産業政策」だと言える。
このため逆の「TPPというのは米国のためになされるものにすぎない」という反対論も根強いが、しかしだからといって直ちに「日本は参加すべきではない」とはならない。なぜなら、政策論としては「『日本の国益』になることであれば、後は理屈抜きで何でもやればいい」だけのことだからである。
ところで、TPP参加が日本にとって「成熟社会に合った社会構造転換」へ向け有用なツールの一つであることには論を待たない。少なくとも「もはや成長余力を喪失した」ところで「少子高齢化を迎える」という二重苦に悩みながら、ましてそれに加うるに大震災・原発事故に見舞われながら、なお既得権に固執し既成概念から抜け出せずにいる今の日本国内の閉塞感、自ら壁を打ち破る覇気など無い状況に鑑みると、「求められる構造改革を進めるためには以前同様『外圧』を利用するほかはない」との発想があってもおかしくない。
元よりマクロで見て「成長余力を喪失した」ということは、ミクロ個別産業・個別企業の成長性まで否定するものではない。また、「少子高齢化」に備えるためにはマクロで見た大幅な生産性向上が不可欠である。
この二つから導かれる結論は、「将来性ある部門を重点的に育て上げ、それ以外は段階的に撤退させていく」ことにほかならない。ただし、社会的安定に不可欠な広義の安全保障関連分野（社会福祉・資源等を含む）の中には、独自に生産性を引き上げることが困難であり、政策的補完が求められるものもある。逆にだからこそ、それだけの余剰を有望分野から生み出させることが必要となるのである。
すなわち「TPPは米国のため」だとすれば農業保護派等が反対するのは当然であるが、逆に「構造改革により国家としての生産性向上を図らねば保護すべき分野を保護する余力も失われるから、それを避けるためにTPP参加が必要だ」とすれば保護派の反対理由も消滅する。逆に現経済界を主導する業界が必ずしもここで言う「有望分野」ではないから、TPP参加による構造改革の方向は彼らの思惑どおりとはならない。例えば、小泉政権時代の円安誘導によって競争力を保っていた自動車産業は、生産性が決して高くはないから、現状のままでは「段階的に撤退させていく」側に入りかねないのである。
さらに、そうした対内的理由から離れても、米国によるジャパン・パッシング、対中・対韓接近を目前にして「米国のアジア戦略、特に対中戦略上、いかに日本が重要なポジションを占めているか」を再認識させる端緒としても、TPP参加表明が有用となる。ただし、それは今までのように米国に合わせて譲歩していくのではなく、むしろ日本独自の主張を展開すべきであり、その方が他の参加国の対日評価は高まるし、当の米国自身も日本の重要性を再認識せざるをえないことになろう。
また、こうした逆説的な見方は対中関係でも必要である。なぜなら、中国からすれば日本のTPP参加は野田政権の謳う「日米同盟の深化」に通じる対中包囲網の一環と解せるからである。日米両国にとって「日米同盟の深化」そのものは好ましいとしても、その結果中国との間で緊張が高まることは好ましいことではない。まして直近の北朝鮮情勢に絡んで米中が半島をめぐる勢力争いを始めることは、当の米国以上に日本にとっては脅威となる。
そこで重要度が高まるのが日中韓ＦＴＡの締結である。それを通じ日韓両国が米中間のブリッジ役を果たすことによって、両軍事大国の一触即発を避けることが期待できる。
なお、北朝鮮の政情不安が東アジア情勢を一挙に緊迫化させないため今一つ日本ができることに、大量発生が予想される難民のうち相当数を日本国内に引き受け、朝鮮半島の安定に要する費用のうち相当額を日本が出損すると宣言することがある。これらの重荷を日本が一部肩代わりすれば、中国の北朝鮮問題に関する対日姿勢を転じさせることができよう。もっとも、旧植民地の混乱に手を差し伸べることは、旧宗主国としての日本の当然の国際的責務であるが。
（筆者は埼玉大学名誉教授。）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟