2013 – Japanese Politics at the Crossroads
IIZUKA Keiko / Senior Political Writer, Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper
January 31, 2013
Last December, some time before the Lower House elections, I got a glimpse at a chart that left a powerful impression on me. As a newspaper reporter with eyes trained on the political scene, I immediately sensed it would signify something that would unfold in the Japanese politics 2013.
It was a political calendar secretly compiled by aides of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) President Abe Shinzo in anticipation of electoral victory. The calendar laid out major political and diplomatic events for 2013, complete with a concrete schedule based on how the new administration will handle the political agenda and parliamentary proceedings as envisaged up to July, when Upper House elections will be held.
The all-important goal at hand for the new coalition government of the LDP and New Komeito is to win this summer's elections and secure a majority in the Upper House, thereby resolving the current political "twis" in which contradictory decisions are being made by the Upper and Lower Houses. That will mark a major step away from the "politics of indecision" that has gripped Japan. The Abe administration will focus first on the economic agenda, including measures for stimulating the economy and casting off deflation, energy policy and participation in talks for the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP). In particular, to achieve its biggest goal of victory in the Upper House elections, the LDP considers it essential to implement a sizeable economic stimulus package exceeding 10 trillion yen and to follow it up by formulating a flexible budget for fiscal 2013.
The calendar contained a detailed schedule for realizing such an agenda. It had been some time since I last witnessed the LDP's "natural habit" or "instinct," honed over more than half a century at the helm of national government, at work. And while I am by no means an enthusiastic LDP supporter, it was a moving moment that made me realize for the first time that the LDP was about to make a genuine comeback to government.
During the three years and three months of government under the Democratic Party (DPJ), I was constantly frustrated by the DPJ's lack of personnel who were capable of arranging the specifics for realizing various policy goals and conducting preliminary negotiations in line with such arrangements to test the waters with those concerned. The adverse effects of this deficiency were particularly evident under the governments of Hatoyama Yukio and Kan Naoto.
In the last DPJ administration under Prime Minister Noda Yukihiko, it was a tacit understanding that bureaucrats at the Ministry of Finance were writing the calendar for the consumption tax issue. Among the core members of the DPJ, politicians who could design such "arrangements" and take action were virtually non-existent. This state of affairs, more than the actual policy content, was the main reason behind Japan's continuously erratic behavior under the DPJ.
The euphoric mood that has since prevailed within the bureaucracy and the business community is due for the most part to a sense of relief that the "state of political irresponsibility" has ended with the "return of a group of politicians who at least know how to design the arrangements." The dysfunctional government of the DPJ, which lacked even the most elementary skill of making such arrangements, gave rise to a sense of lethargy that smothered the country and had also become a factor that drained vitality from the economy.
Then again, a look at the specific policies set forth by the Abe administration reveals that many of them involve methods that had been the traditional forte of the LDP, such as an economic stimulus based on an expansion in large-scale public works projects. It is questionable whether pursuing growth by stimulating the economy in the same fashion as the high-growth '70s is appropriate for today's Japan. Achieving future economic growth in a super-aging society with a reduced workforce would also require new initiatives based on a long-term perspective, such as sweeping deregulation aimed at creating an environment conducive to corporate competition.
However, before he can set to work on the long-term agenda, Prime Minister Abe must patiently tackle the immediate task of revitalizing the economy and steadily accomplish those goals. By accumulating such minor achievements and recovering trust in politics, it may be possible to turn the air of euphoria that spread throughout the country at the turn of the year into a "valid hope." While mood alone cannot save a country, a bright outlook does contribute to revitalizing the economy, as indicated by the rise in Japanese stock prices since the start of the new year.
The first half of 2013 under the Abe administration will be six crucial months that could decide whether or not Japan will follow a path of genuine decline. If deftly handled, it could provide Japan with a chance to reverse the tide of decline. If not, the depth of despair among its people will pale in comparison with that experienced during the three years or so under the DPJ government.
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Keiko Iizuka is Senior Political Writer at the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper.
It was a political calendar secretly compiled by aides of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) President Abe Shinzo in anticipation of electoral victory. The calendar laid out major political and diplomatic events for 2013, complete with a concrete schedule based on how the new administration will handle the political agenda and parliamentary proceedings as envisaged up to July, when Upper House elections will be held.
The all-important goal at hand for the new coalition government of the LDP and New Komeito is to win this summer's elections and secure a majority in the Upper House, thereby resolving the current political "twis" in which contradictory decisions are being made by the Upper and Lower Houses. That will mark a major step away from the "politics of indecision" that has gripped Japan. The Abe administration will focus first on the economic agenda, including measures for stimulating the economy and casting off deflation, energy policy and participation in talks for the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP). In particular, to achieve its biggest goal of victory in the Upper House elections, the LDP considers it essential to implement a sizeable economic stimulus package exceeding 10 trillion yen and to follow it up by formulating a flexible budget for fiscal 2013.
The calendar contained a detailed schedule for realizing such an agenda. It had been some time since I last witnessed the LDP's "natural habit" or "instinct," honed over more than half a century at the helm of national government, at work. And while I am by no means an enthusiastic LDP supporter, it was a moving moment that made me realize for the first time that the LDP was about to make a genuine comeback to government.
During the three years and three months of government under the Democratic Party (DPJ), I was constantly frustrated by the DPJ's lack of personnel who were capable of arranging the specifics for realizing various policy goals and conducting preliminary negotiations in line with such arrangements to test the waters with those concerned. The adverse effects of this deficiency were particularly evident under the governments of Hatoyama Yukio and Kan Naoto.
In the last DPJ administration under Prime Minister Noda Yukihiko, it was a tacit understanding that bureaucrats at the Ministry of Finance were writing the calendar for the consumption tax issue. Among the core members of the DPJ, politicians who could design such "arrangements" and take action were virtually non-existent. This state of affairs, more than the actual policy content, was the main reason behind Japan's continuously erratic behavior under the DPJ.
The euphoric mood that has since prevailed within the bureaucracy and the business community is due for the most part to a sense of relief that the "state of political irresponsibility" has ended with the "return of a group of politicians who at least know how to design the arrangements." The dysfunctional government of the DPJ, which lacked even the most elementary skill of making such arrangements, gave rise to a sense of lethargy that smothered the country and had also become a factor that drained vitality from the economy.
Then again, a look at the specific policies set forth by the Abe administration reveals that many of them involve methods that had been the traditional forte of the LDP, such as an economic stimulus based on an expansion in large-scale public works projects. It is questionable whether pursuing growth by stimulating the economy in the same fashion as the high-growth '70s is appropriate for today's Japan. Achieving future economic growth in a super-aging society with a reduced workforce would also require new initiatives based on a long-term perspective, such as sweeping deregulation aimed at creating an environment conducive to corporate competition.
However, before he can set to work on the long-term agenda, Prime Minister Abe must patiently tackle the immediate task of revitalizing the economy and steadily accomplish those goals. By accumulating such minor achievements and recovering trust in politics, it may be possible to turn the air of euphoria that spread throughout the country at the turn of the year into a "valid hope." While mood alone cannot save a country, a bright outlook does contribute to revitalizing the economy, as indicated by the rise in Japanese stock prices since the start of the new year.
The first half of 2013 under the Abe administration will be six crucial months that could decide whether or not Japan will follow a path of genuine decline. If deftly handled, it could provide Japan with a chance to reverse the tide of decline. If not, the depth of despair among its people will pale in comparison with that experienced during the three years or so under the DPJ government.
.
Keiko Iizuka is Senior Political Writer at the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
２０１３ 岐路にある日本の政治
飯塚 恵子 / 読売新聞編集委員
2013年 1月 31日
私は日々の政治の動きを追う新聞記者だが、昨年12月の衆院選の少し前に目にした一枚の図が強く印象に残っている。それは自民党の安倍晋三総裁の側近たちが、衆院選での勝利を想定してひそかにまとめた２０１３年７月までの政治カレンダーだった。今年７月には参院選が行われるが、そのカレンダーには、７月までの主な政治・外交日程が書き込まれ、選挙までに政治課題や国会審議をそれぞれどうこなすか、新政権が想定するスケジュールがすでに具体的にまとめられていた。
新たな自公連立政権にとって、当面の最大の目標は、夏の参院選で勝利して過半数の議席を獲得し、衆院と参院の結論が異なる「ねじれ」状況を解消することだ。それがまず、日本の「決められない政治」から踏み出す大きなステップとなる。安倍政権が当面重視するのは、景気対策やデフレ脱却、エネルギー政策、環太平洋経済連携協定（ＴＰＰ）交渉参加問題など――の経済政策だ。中でも最大目標の参院選の勝利のためには、10兆円を超える大規模な景気対策と、その後に続く機動的な２０１３年度予算の編成が不可欠だ、ととらえている。
カレンダーには、それを具体化するための細かい日程が書き込まれていた。私は、日本の国家運営を半世紀以上担ってきた自民党という政党の「習い性」というか、「本能」を、久しぶりに見た思いがした。私は決して熱烈な自民党支持者ではないが、その時初めて、自民党は本当に政権に復帰するのだ、と感慨がわいた。
これまでの３年３カ月の民主党政権のもとで、私が常に感じていた不満は、様々な政策目標を具体化するための段取りを作ったり、それをもとに関係者に事前交渉したり、瀬踏みしたりする人がほとんど民主党内にいなかったことだ。特に、鳩山、菅両政権ではその弊害が顕著だった。
最後の野田政権では、消費増税に関しては、主に財務省の官僚がカレンダーを書いていたが、民主党中枢には、そうした「段取り」をデザインし、実際に動く政治家はほとんどいないに等しい状態だった。この状況は、政策の内容以前に、民主党政権下の日本が迷走を続けた大きな原因だったと思う。
今、官界や財界に一種の楽観が漂っているのは、この「政治の無責任状態」から、「少なくとも段取りのデザインの仕方を知る政治家の集団が戻ってきた」という安堵感も大きいのだろう。極めて初歩的なことだが、段取りすら立てられなかった民主党政権の機能不全がもたらしていた精神的な沈滞ムードは、日本全体を覆い、経済が活気を失う一因にもなっていたと思う。
ただし、今、安倍政権が掲げる政策の内容を具体的に見ると、大幅な公共事業拡大による景気対策など、自民党が伝統的に得意だった手法が多い。高度成長期の１９７０年代のような形で景気を刺激して経済成長を図るやり方は、果たして今の日本に合っているのだろうか。超高齢化社会で働き手が減る今後の日本経済が成長するためには、例えば、規制緩和などをぐんと進めて企業が競争しやすい環境を作るなど、長期的視野に基づく新たな施策も必要だ。
そうした長期的な課題に着手するためにも、安倍首相はまず、目前の経済再生の課題に辛抱強く取り組み、着実に目標を達成していかねばならない。そのように小さな実績を積み上げ、政治への信頼を取り戻していければ、この年末年始の楽観を「根拠のある希望」に変えていくこともできるだろう。ムードだけで国家は救えないが、明るい展望が経済の活性化に資することは、すでに年明けの日本の株価などが実証している。
安倍政権が担う２０１３年前半は、日本が本格的に衰退していくかどうかを方向づけるほど重要な半年になるだろう。うまくやれば、日本の衰退の流れを反転させるきっかけにつながるかもしれない。逆にだめなら、国民の失望の深さは、３年余の民主党政権の比ではなくなる。
（筆者は読売新聞編集委員。）
新たな自公連立政権にとって、当面の最大の目標は、夏の参院選で勝利して過半数の議席を獲得し、衆院と参院の結論が異なる「ねじれ」状況を解消することだ。それがまず、日本の「決められない政治」から踏み出す大きなステップとなる。安倍政権が当面重視するのは、景気対策やデフレ脱却、エネルギー政策、環太平洋経済連携協定（ＴＰＰ）交渉参加問題など――の経済政策だ。中でも最大目標の参院選の勝利のためには、10兆円を超える大規模な景気対策と、その後に続く機動的な２０１３年度予算の編成が不可欠だ、ととらえている。
カレンダーには、それを具体化するための細かい日程が書き込まれていた。私は、日本の国家運営を半世紀以上担ってきた自民党という政党の「習い性」というか、「本能」を、久しぶりに見た思いがした。私は決して熱烈な自民党支持者ではないが、その時初めて、自民党は本当に政権に復帰するのだ、と感慨がわいた。
これまでの３年３カ月の民主党政権のもとで、私が常に感じていた不満は、様々な政策目標を具体化するための段取りを作ったり、それをもとに関係者に事前交渉したり、瀬踏みしたりする人がほとんど民主党内にいなかったことだ。特に、鳩山、菅両政権ではその弊害が顕著だった。
最後の野田政権では、消費増税に関しては、主に財務省の官僚がカレンダーを書いていたが、民主党中枢には、そうした「段取り」をデザインし、実際に動く政治家はほとんどいないに等しい状態だった。この状況は、政策の内容以前に、民主党政権下の日本が迷走を続けた大きな原因だったと思う。
今、官界や財界に一種の楽観が漂っているのは、この「政治の無責任状態」から、「少なくとも段取りのデザインの仕方を知る政治家の集団が戻ってきた」という安堵感も大きいのだろう。極めて初歩的なことだが、段取りすら立てられなかった民主党政権の機能不全がもたらしていた精神的な沈滞ムードは、日本全体を覆い、経済が活気を失う一因にもなっていたと思う。
ただし、今、安倍政権が掲げる政策の内容を具体的に見ると、大幅な公共事業拡大による景気対策など、自民党が伝統的に得意だった手法が多い。高度成長期の１９７０年代のような形で景気を刺激して経済成長を図るやり方は、果たして今の日本に合っているのだろうか。超高齢化社会で働き手が減る今後の日本経済が成長するためには、例えば、規制緩和などをぐんと進めて企業が競争しやすい環境を作るなど、長期的視野に基づく新たな施策も必要だ。
そうした長期的な課題に着手するためにも、安倍首相はまず、目前の経済再生の課題に辛抱強く取り組み、着実に目標を達成していかねばならない。そのように小さな実績を積み上げ、政治への信頼を取り戻していければ、この年末年始の楽観を「根拠のある希望」に変えていくこともできるだろう。ムードだけで国家は救えないが、明るい展望が経済の活性化に資することは、すでに年明けの日本の株価などが実証している。
安倍政権が担う２０１３年前半は、日本が本格的に衰退していくかどうかを方向づけるほど重要な半年になるだろう。うまくやれば、日本の衰退の流れを反転させるきっかけにつながるかもしれない。逆にだめなら、国民の失望の深さは、３年余の民主党政権の比ではなくなる。
（筆者は読売新聞編集委員。）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟