Stop Being Appalled at the Trump Presidency and His Abusive Tweets; It’s Time to Bolster Asian Policy through “Supplementary Diplomacy”
MURATA Koji / Professor, Doshisha University
July 6, 2017
Roughly four months have passed since US President Donald Trump formed his government. During this time, the issues and challenges of the Trump administration, in both domestic policy and foreign affairs, have become more or less apparent.
In domestic policy, his attention-grabbing campaign pledges such as limiting entry of Muslim immigrants into the country and building a wall along the Mexican border have yet to come true. As I pointed out in my previous commentary, there are various restrictions to the institutional authority of the US President. Several of the presidential orders issued by President Trump were blocked by court injunctions. He has been unable to include the cost of building the wall into the budget due to opposition in Congress. He has even had to postpone the abolition of Obamacare because of differences among the ranks of the governing Republican Party.
Tax cuts aside, the President’s plan to spend a trillion dollars on public projects in the next ten years will likely lead to a bloody battle in Congress over individual items of expenditure. Moreover, midterm election looms ahead in November 2018. Should the Republicans lose their majority in either of the two Houses, running the government will become an even more daunting task. And while the President continues to lock horns with the media, his sudden dismissal of FBI Director Comey in the midst of investigations over Russian involvement could, with one misstep, blow up into another Watergate scandal.
In the area of foreign affairs, President Trump made a hasty decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP). However, there are realists in his administration such as Secretary of State Tillerson, Secretary of Defense Mattis and National Security Advisor McMaster, and the Japan-US relationship has remained stable. In April, the United States struck out at Syria just before the summit meeting with China to the astonishment of General Secretary Xi Jinping and the world, while notifying Russia beforehand to avoid an escalation in the situation and persuading China to express its understanding.
Similarly with regard to North Korea, the United States has demonstrated a hardline stance, while skillfully using China to give itself some leeway for negotiation. Considering that initial expectations were low, the administration has given off the impression that it has actually been quite adept at handling matters.
Even so, no matter how quick the government may be at taking military action and displaying military might, these are nevertheless ad hoc actions that do not point to any overall strategy for the future. For one, while the Trump administration may have interests to pursue, it has no principles and ideals to speak of. Second, the posts of major political appointees have remained vacant, and with the exception of the military, there is an absence of experts on diplomacy, security or regional affairs at the working level.
That said, the time for being appalled by Mr. Trump’s electoral victory and for simply denouncing his abusive utterings is now over. Japan must determine the weaknesses and challenges of the Trump administration and seek to supplement and collaborate with US foreign policy.
US policy on North Korea is of particular concern. What this writer fears most is not the risky action that may be taken by the Trump administration, but lethargic inaction. Despite his vociferous opposition to the “strategic patience” adopted by his predecessor, President Trump may yet revert to the multinational framework of negotiations. Eventually, he may succumb to the pressures of domestic politics and let the deadline pass without properly addressing the issue. That would be the most dangerous scenario. What can Japan do to prevent such an outcome?
For a start, Japan must increase its defense spending and reexamine the amount allocated to such areas as missile defense. it should also play a more active role in consistently promoting nuclear nonproliferation in the international community, now that American diplomacy has become less of a model.
And although it may be difficult to mend our relationship with South Korea any time soon, the Japanese side should at least refrain from making matters worse. Instead of labeling the new administration of President Moon Je-in as “anti-Japan” or “pro-North” – that would only reciprocate what they have been doing – we should calmly proceed to cooperate at the working level wherever possible. Cybersecurity maybe a good example.
South Korea must also be struggling to understand and respond to the Trump administration’s foreign policy and to changes in American society that gave rise to his presidency. There should be ample opportunity and necessity for policy makers and intellectuals in Japan and South Korea to collaborate in deepening our understanding of America.
In November, President Trump is scheduled to attend a meeting of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders and the East Asia Summit meeting. While in Asia, he is expected to call on Tokyo, Beijing and Seoul. He is also likely to reveal a somewhat more coherent policy on Asia around that time. Until then, Japan and South Korea must fully utilize all available networks and together play a constructive role in shaping US policy on Asia.
Furthermore, there are numerous occasions in which opposition parties played a significant role in the past, during difficult periods in Japan’s relationships with China and South Korea. In view of the challenging strategic environment in which Japan finds itself, one hopes that the opposition parties would show their mettle by pursuing a supplementary role to government in Asian diplomacy, instead of engaging in a heated debate over the Moritomo issue or scrutinizing the Prime Minister’s choice of words.
These days, power, interests and values have all become diversified. The need for supplementary diplomacy has never been greater, for Japan and the United States, Japan and South Korea, as well as for the opposition parties.
Koji Murata is a Professor at Doshisha University. This article was originally published on May 22 in the Seiron (sound argument) column of Sankei Shimbun newspaper.
In domestic policy, his attention-grabbing campaign pledges such as limiting entry of Muslim immigrants into the country and building a wall along the Mexican border have yet to come true. As I pointed out in my previous commentary, there are various restrictions to the institutional authority of the US President. Several of the presidential orders issued by President Trump were blocked by court injunctions. He has been unable to include the cost of building the wall into the budget due to opposition in Congress. He has even had to postpone the abolition of Obamacare because of differences among the ranks of the governing Republican Party.
Tax cuts aside, the President’s plan to spend a trillion dollars on public projects in the next ten years will likely lead to a bloody battle in Congress over individual items of expenditure. Moreover, midterm election looms ahead in November 2018. Should the Republicans lose their majority in either of the two Houses, running the government will become an even more daunting task. And while the President continues to lock horns with the media, his sudden dismissal of FBI Director Comey in the midst of investigations over Russian involvement could, with one misstep, blow up into another Watergate scandal.
In the area of foreign affairs, President Trump made a hasty decision to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP). However, there are realists in his administration such as Secretary of State Tillerson, Secretary of Defense Mattis and National Security Advisor McMaster, and the Japan-US relationship has remained stable. In April, the United States struck out at Syria just before the summit meeting with China to the astonishment of General Secretary Xi Jinping and the world, while notifying Russia beforehand to avoid an escalation in the situation and persuading China to express its understanding.
Similarly with regard to North Korea, the United States has demonstrated a hardline stance, while skillfully using China to give itself some leeway for negotiation. Considering that initial expectations were low, the administration has given off the impression that it has actually been quite adept at handling matters.
Even so, no matter how quick the government may be at taking military action and displaying military might, these are nevertheless ad hoc actions that do not point to any overall strategy for the future. For one, while the Trump administration may have interests to pursue, it has no principles and ideals to speak of. Second, the posts of major political appointees have remained vacant, and with the exception of the military, there is an absence of experts on diplomacy, security or regional affairs at the working level.
That said, the time for being appalled by Mr. Trump’s electoral victory and for simply denouncing his abusive utterings is now over. Japan must determine the weaknesses and challenges of the Trump administration and seek to supplement and collaborate with US foreign policy.
US policy on North Korea is of particular concern. What this writer fears most is not the risky action that may be taken by the Trump administration, but lethargic inaction. Despite his vociferous opposition to the “strategic patience” adopted by his predecessor, President Trump may yet revert to the multinational framework of negotiations. Eventually, he may succumb to the pressures of domestic politics and let the deadline pass without properly addressing the issue. That would be the most dangerous scenario. What can Japan do to prevent such an outcome?
For a start, Japan must increase its defense spending and reexamine the amount allocated to such areas as missile defense. it should also play a more active role in consistently promoting nuclear nonproliferation in the international community, now that American diplomacy has become less of a model.
And although it may be difficult to mend our relationship with South Korea any time soon, the Japanese side should at least refrain from making matters worse. Instead of labeling the new administration of President Moon Je-in as “anti-Japan” or “pro-North” – that would only reciprocate what they have been doing – we should calmly proceed to cooperate at the working level wherever possible. Cybersecurity maybe a good example.
South Korea must also be struggling to understand and respond to the Trump administration’s foreign policy and to changes in American society that gave rise to his presidency. There should be ample opportunity and necessity for policy makers and intellectuals in Japan and South Korea to collaborate in deepening our understanding of America.
In November, President Trump is scheduled to attend a meeting of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders and the East Asia Summit meeting. While in Asia, he is expected to call on Tokyo, Beijing and Seoul. He is also likely to reveal a somewhat more coherent policy on Asia around that time. Until then, Japan and South Korea must fully utilize all available networks and together play a constructive role in shaping US policy on Asia.
Furthermore, there are numerous occasions in which opposition parties played a significant role in the past, during difficult periods in Japan’s relationships with China and South Korea. In view of the challenging strategic environment in which Japan finds itself, one hopes that the opposition parties would show their mettle by pursuing a supplementary role to government in Asian diplomacy, instead of engaging in a heated debate over the Moritomo issue or scrutinizing the Prime Minister’s choice of words.
These days, power, interests and values have all become diversified. The need for supplementary diplomacy has never been greater, for Japan and the United States, Japan and South Korea, as well as for the opposition parties.
Koji Murata is a Professor at Doshisha University. This article was originally published on May 22 in the Seiron (sound argument) column of Sankei Shimbun newspaper.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
トランプ氏の当選にあきれ、暴言を批判する時期は終わった
「補完外交」でアジア政策の強化図れ
村田晃嗣 / 同志社大学教授
2017年 7月 6日
アメリカのトランプ政権発足から約４カ月が経過した。この間に、同政権の内政と外交双方での問題点や課題が、かなり明らかになってきたように思われる。
まず内政では、イスラム移民の入国を制限し、メキシコとの国境に壁を設置するといった選挙期間中に耳目を集めた政策は実現していない。前回も指摘したように、アメリカ大統領の制度的な権限には、さまざまな制約がある。トランプ大統領が発した大統領令のいくつかには、裁判所が差し止め命令を下した。壁の建設に要する費用も、議会の反対で予算に盛り込めていない。オバマケアの廃止すら与党・共和党内で足元がまとまらず、見送らざるを得なかった。
減税はともかく、１０年間に１兆ドルの公共事業投資となると、個別の費目をめぐって議会と血みどろの戦いとなろう。しかも２０１８年１１月には中間選挙が待っている。上下両院のどちらかでも多数を失えば、政権の運営は一層困難になる。メディアとの確執も続いているが、ロシア疑惑をめぐるコミー米連邦捜査局（ＦＢＩ）長官の突然の解任は、一歩間違えばウォーターゲート事件に匹敵するスキャンダルになりかねない。
他方、外交では環太平洋戦略的経済連携協定（ＴＰＰ）からの離脱を早々に決めたものの、ティラーソン国務長官、マティス国防長官、マクマスター国家安全保障問題担当大統領補佐官らはきわめて現実的で、日米関係も安定している。４月には、米中首脳会談の直前にシリア攻撃を行い、習近平・国家主席をはじめ世界を驚かせながら、ロシアには事前通告して事態のエスカレーションを避け、中国にも理解を表明させた。
北朝鮮問題でも、強硬姿勢を示す一方で、中国を巧みに利用し、北朝鮮との交渉の余地も残している。初期の期待値が低かったこともあり、それなりによくやっているという印象さえ与える。
ただし、軍事行動や軍事示威行動は迅速でも、やはり状況対応的であり、その後の総合戦略が見えてこない。一つには、トランプ政権には追求すべき利益はあっても、語るべき理念や理想がないからであり、次に、主要な政治任用ポストが空席で、軍を除けば、実務レベルでも外交や安全保障、地域の専門家が不在だからである。
とはいえ、われわれがトランプ氏の当選に呆（あき）れ、彼の暴言を批判するだけの時期は既に終わった。トランプ政権の弱点や課題を見極めつつ、アメリカ外交と協働し補完していかなければならない。
とりわけ、気になるのがアメリカの対北朝鮮政策である。筆者が最も恐れるのは、トランプ政権の危険な作為ではなく、怠惰な不作為である。オバマ前政権の「戦略的忍耐」を声高に批判しながら、トランプ政権も多国間交渉の枠組みを再び模索し、やがて内政上の重圧から十分対処できなくなって時間切れを迎える－これが最も危険であろう。
そうさせないために、日本は何をすべきか。
まず、防衛費の増額や、どこまでミサイル防衛に投資するのかを含めて、その配分を再検討する必要があろう。核不拡散についても、アメリカ外交の規範性が弱まった分、日本がより積極的に国際社会に働きかけ続けなければならない。
また、日韓関係の改善は当面困難としても、少なくとも日本側からこれ以上、悪化させないようにしなければならない。文在寅新政権を「反日」「親北」とレッテルを貼って決めつけず（それでは相手と同じようなことをしていることになる）、実務レベルで協力できる分野は粛々と協力を進めるべきであろう。サイバー・セキュリティーなどは一例かもしれない。
また、韓国もトランプ政権の外交とトランプ大統領を生んだアメリカ社会の変化をどう理解し、どのように対応するか戸惑っているはずである。日韓の政策当局や知的コミュニティーが協力して、アメリカ研究を深め、理解を広げる可能性と必要性は十分にあろう。
１１月に、トランプ大統領はアジア太平洋経済協力会議（ＡＰＥＣ）首脳会議と東アジアサミットに出席するという。おそらく、それに合わせてトランプ氏は東京や北京、ソウルを歴訪するだろう。その時期にある程度体系的なアジア政策を披瀝（ひれき）するのではあるまいか。それまでに、日韓両国は持てるネットワークを動員し、アメリカのアジア政策の形成に建設的な役割を果たさなければならない。
また、かつて日中関係や日韓関係がむずかしかった時期に、野党が重要な役割を果たした例がいくつもある。日本を取り巻く厳しい戦略環境を考えると、森友問題や「そもそも」の語義で白熱する以上に、アジアで政府の補完外交を担ってみせるというぐらいの矜持（きょうじ）を示してもらいたいものである。
力も利益も価値も拡散している。日米にも日韓にも、与野党にも今ほど補完外交が必要なときはないのである。
（筆者は同志社大学教授、本稿は産経新聞５月２２日付「正論」に掲載された）
まず内政では、イスラム移民の入国を制限し、メキシコとの国境に壁を設置するといった選挙期間中に耳目を集めた政策は実現していない。前回も指摘したように、アメリカ大統領の制度的な権限には、さまざまな制約がある。トランプ大統領が発した大統領令のいくつかには、裁判所が差し止め命令を下した。壁の建設に要する費用も、議会の反対で予算に盛り込めていない。オバマケアの廃止すら与党・共和党内で足元がまとまらず、見送らざるを得なかった。
減税はともかく、１０年間に１兆ドルの公共事業投資となると、個別の費目をめぐって議会と血みどろの戦いとなろう。しかも２０１８年１１月には中間選挙が待っている。上下両院のどちらかでも多数を失えば、政権の運営は一層困難になる。メディアとの確執も続いているが、ロシア疑惑をめぐるコミー米連邦捜査局（ＦＢＩ）長官の突然の解任は、一歩間違えばウォーターゲート事件に匹敵するスキャンダルになりかねない。
他方、外交では環太平洋戦略的経済連携協定（ＴＰＰ）からの離脱を早々に決めたものの、ティラーソン国務長官、マティス国防長官、マクマスター国家安全保障問題担当大統領補佐官らはきわめて現実的で、日米関係も安定している。４月には、米中首脳会談の直前にシリア攻撃を行い、習近平・国家主席をはじめ世界を驚かせながら、ロシアには事前通告して事態のエスカレーションを避け、中国にも理解を表明させた。
北朝鮮問題でも、強硬姿勢を示す一方で、中国を巧みに利用し、北朝鮮との交渉の余地も残している。初期の期待値が低かったこともあり、それなりによくやっているという印象さえ与える。
ただし、軍事行動や軍事示威行動は迅速でも、やはり状況対応的であり、その後の総合戦略が見えてこない。一つには、トランプ政権には追求すべき利益はあっても、語るべき理念や理想がないからであり、次に、主要な政治任用ポストが空席で、軍を除けば、実務レベルでも外交や安全保障、地域の専門家が不在だからである。
とはいえ、われわれがトランプ氏の当選に呆（あき）れ、彼の暴言を批判するだけの時期は既に終わった。トランプ政権の弱点や課題を見極めつつ、アメリカ外交と協働し補完していかなければならない。
とりわけ、気になるのがアメリカの対北朝鮮政策である。筆者が最も恐れるのは、トランプ政権の危険な作為ではなく、怠惰な不作為である。オバマ前政権の「戦略的忍耐」を声高に批判しながら、トランプ政権も多国間交渉の枠組みを再び模索し、やがて内政上の重圧から十分対処できなくなって時間切れを迎える－これが最も危険であろう。
そうさせないために、日本は何をすべきか。
まず、防衛費の増額や、どこまでミサイル防衛に投資するのかを含めて、その配分を再検討する必要があろう。核不拡散についても、アメリカ外交の規範性が弱まった分、日本がより積極的に国際社会に働きかけ続けなければならない。
また、日韓関係の改善は当面困難としても、少なくとも日本側からこれ以上、悪化させないようにしなければならない。文在寅新政権を「反日」「親北」とレッテルを貼って決めつけず（それでは相手と同じようなことをしていることになる）、実務レベルで協力できる分野は粛々と協力を進めるべきであろう。サイバー・セキュリティーなどは一例かもしれない。
また、韓国もトランプ政権の外交とトランプ大統領を生んだアメリカ社会の変化をどう理解し、どのように対応するか戸惑っているはずである。日韓の政策当局や知的コミュニティーが協力して、アメリカ研究を深め、理解を広げる可能性と必要性は十分にあろう。
１１月に、トランプ大統領はアジア太平洋経済協力会議（ＡＰＥＣ）首脳会議と東アジアサミットに出席するという。おそらく、それに合わせてトランプ氏は東京や北京、ソウルを歴訪するだろう。その時期にある程度体系的なアジア政策を披瀝（ひれき）するのではあるまいか。それまでに、日韓両国は持てるネットワークを動員し、アメリカのアジア政策の形成に建設的な役割を果たさなければならない。
また、かつて日中関係や日韓関係がむずかしかった時期に、野党が重要な役割を果たした例がいくつもある。日本を取り巻く厳しい戦略環境を考えると、森友問題や「そもそも」の語義で白熱する以上に、アジアで政府の補完外交を担ってみせるというぐらいの矜持（きょうじ）を示してもらいたいものである。
力も利益も価値も拡散している。日米にも日韓にも、与野党にも今ほど補完外交が必要なときはないのである。
（筆者は同志社大学教授、本稿は産経新聞５月２２日付「正論」に掲載された）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟