Building a New Japan-ASEAN Relationship within the “Indo-Pacific” Context
CHINO Keiko / Journalist
December 26, 2017
Japan’s popularity rating within ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) has reached new heights, according to an opinion poll of ten ASEAN countries published recently by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The poll surveyed 3,017 men and women aged 18 to 59, mainly via the internet. The results, for example, showed that a combined 89% of respondents felt their relationship with Japan was either “friendly” or “relatively friendly” – up from 75% in the previous poll, and that a combined 91% saw Japan as being either “extremely trustworthy” or “relatively trustworthy” – up from 73% in the last poll. These are high ratings indeed, which allow us to reconfirm the broadening of Japan’s positive image within ASEAN.
2017 marked the 40th anniversary of the Fukuda Doctrine, which championed “heart to heart” relations and “equal partnership” between Japan and ASEAN, as well as the 50th anniversary of the creation of ASEAN itself, so the results certainly give us reason to celebrate. Nevertheless, in view of the current international climate surrounding Japan and ASEAN, they give us no cause for complacency, either. How should Japan and ASEAN ensure peace and stability in our shared region to attain continued prosperity? It is not too much to say that 2017 was a year that raised fundamental questions with respect to this point.
For more than seventy years after World War II, the region had existed under an international order led by the United States. And yet, it was not until November that US President Donald Trump paid his first visit to the region since his inauguration, touring Japan, South Korea, China, Vietnam and the Philippines to coincide with the meetings of ASEAN and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). The visit revealed that President Trump’s sole interest lay in clinching profitable deals to achieve a trade surplus for his country, and offered little hope that the United States would place a priority on its responsibility and role in ensuring the peace, stability and prosperity of the region.
We should not rush to conclusions about whether to view this as an anomaly owing to the unorthodox nature of the Trump administration, or as part of the ongoing US withdrawal from this region. But there was yet another revelation in 2017 - China was now openly demonstrating its intentions of seizing this opportunity to reorganize the international order.
This was symbolized by the Chinese vision of a “new model of great power relations.” During the previous Obama Presidency, China had sought on numerous occasions to win US recognition for the idea and had failed. However, through his insensitive behavior, President Trump had created the impression that the United States now gave de facto approval to the idea, disappointing Japan and other countries. On his part, General Secretary Xi Jinping had the audacity to openly declare that “the Pacific is big enough to accommodate both China and the United States” during his meeting with President Trump.
China is a country of words, but we should never be insensitive to its deeds. It is certain that beyond these words lie its vision of a divided Asia-Pacific ruled by the United States and China. It is reminiscent of an episode from the past, in which a senior official of the Chinese Navy – while premising his remarks by saying it was only a joke - suggested dividing control over the West Pacific to the former head of the US Pacific Command. China had meant it; the “joke” part had been a camouflage for its true intentions.
Japan and ASEAN are now confronted with the common agenda of coming to terms with a resolute China that had stopped “joking.” Here, we should note that during his speech at the APEC meeting, President Trump referred to sharing the “Indo-Pacific” vision, and it will be important for Japan and ASEAN to firmly share this vision in the years ahead.
“Indo-Pacific” was a concept intended to replace “Asia-Pacific” that was originally proposed by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo during his previous administration, in a policy speech titled “Confluence of the Two Seas,” which he presented while visiting India in August 2007. The two seas being the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, the idea focused on the respective roles and strategic alliance between Japan and India, two democratic countries situated at either end of the two seas.
The concept was followed up by the second Abe administration, and reference was made to it in the policy speech titled “The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy,” which Abe gave during his first overseas visit to Southeast Asia – Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia – in January 2013. In one of the principles, Abe upheld “protecting freedom of thought, expression, and speech in this region where two oceans meet,” stating that “these are universal values that humanity has gained and they must be allowed to flower to the fullest.” The “region” mentioned here was Indonesia, the scheduled location where the speech was to be made. In other words, this was a strategy for a free and open Indo-Pacific.
The “Indo-Pacific” concept clearly positions India - which was barely recognized in the “Asia-Pacific” context - as an actor in the region, and reconfirms the role of Australia at the same time. Yet, we must not forget that ASEAN is in fact the region that lies in the middle of the two seas, and has the potential to play a pivotal role in the strategy.
Unfortunately, within ASEAN there is currently little interest in the Indo-Pacific vision. ASEAN’s relationship with India is not nearly as strong as its relations with Japan, China or South Korea, and neither is it particularly motivated to seek closer ties with India. On the other hand, ASEAN now stands at the crossroads of whether it can continue to retain its central role after spending half a century in the driver’s seat providing forward momentum as the cornerstone of multilateral diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific. ASEAN itself is facing challenging times that demand change.
Without overreacting to the words and deeds of President Trump, Japan must firmly recognize its position as a stakeholder and realize the Indo-Pacific vision through active engagement with ASEAN. Japan should not just satisfy itself with the sense of amity and trust with which it is regarded by ASEAN. What actions Japan and ASEAN will take to build upon this relationship of trust is of greater importance and need.
Keiko Chino is a freelance journalist and Guest Columnist of the Sankei Shimbun.
The poll surveyed 3,017 men and women aged 18 to 59, mainly via the internet. The results, for example, showed that a combined 89% of respondents felt their relationship with Japan was either “friendly” or “relatively friendly” – up from 75% in the previous poll, and that a combined 91% saw Japan as being either “extremely trustworthy” or “relatively trustworthy” – up from 73% in the last poll. These are high ratings indeed, which allow us to reconfirm the broadening of Japan’s positive image within ASEAN.
2017 marked the 40th anniversary of the Fukuda Doctrine, which championed “heart to heart” relations and “equal partnership” between Japan and ASEAN, as well as the 50th anniversary of the creation of ASEAN itself, so the results certainly give us reason to celebrate. Nevertheless, in view of the current international climate surrounding Japan and ASEAN, they give us no cause for complacency, either. How should Japan and ASEAN ensure peace and stability in our shared region to attain continued prosperity? It is not too much to say that 2017 was a year that raised fundamental questions with respect to this point.
For more than seventy years after World War II, the region had existed under an international order led by the United States. And yet, it was not until November that US President Donald Trump paid his first visit to the region since his inauguration, touring Japan, South Korea, China, Vietnam and the Philippines to coincide with the meetings of ASEAN and APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation). The visit revealed that President Trump’s sole interest lay in clinching profitable deals to achieve a trade surplus for his country, and offered little hope that the United States would place a priority on its responsibility and role in ensuring the peace, stability and prosperity of the region.
We should not rush to conclusions about whether to view this as an anomaly owing to the unorthodox nature of the Trump administration, or as part of the ongoing US withdrawal from this region. But there was yet another revelation in 2017 - China was now openly demonstrating its intentions of seizing this opportunity to reorganize the international order.
This was symbolized by the Chinese vision of a “new model of great power relations.” During the previous Obama Presidency, China had sought on numerous occasions to win US recognition for the idea and had failed. However, through his insensitive behavior, President Trump had created the impression that the United States now gave de facto approval to the idea, disappointing Japan and other countries. On his part, General Secretary Xi Jinping had the audacity to openly declare that “the Pacific is big enough to accommodate both China and the United States” during his meeting with President Trump.
China is a country of words, but we should never be insensitive to its deeds. It is certain that beyond these words lie its vision of a divided Asia-Pacific ruled by the United States and China. It is reminiscent of an episode from the past, in which a senior official of the Chinese Navy – while premising his remarks by saying it was only a joke - suggested dividing control over the West Pacific to the former head of the US Pacific Command. China had meant it; the “joke” part had been a camouflage for its true intentions.
Japan and ASEAN are now confronted with the common agenda of coming to terms with a resolute China that had stopped “joking.” Here, we should note that during his speech at the APEC meeting, President Trump referred to sharing the “Indo-Pacific” vision, and it will be important for Japan and ASEAN to firmly share this vision in the years ahead.
“Indo-Pacific” was a concept intended to replace “Asia-Pacific” that was originally proposed by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo during his previous administration, in a policy speech titled “Confluence of the Two Seas,” which he presented while visiting India in August 2007. The two seas being the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, the idea focused on the respective roles and strategic alliance between Japan and India, two democratic countries situated at either end of the two seas.
The concept was followed up by the second Abe administration, and reference was made to it in the policy speech titled “The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy,” which Abe gave during his first overseas visit to Southeast Asia – Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia – in January 2013. In one of the principles, Abe upheld “protecting freedom of thought, expression, and speech in this region where two oceans meet,” stating that “these are universal values that humanity has gained and they must be allowed to flower to the fullest.” The “region” mentioned here was Indonesia, the scheduled location where the speech was to be made. In other words, this was a strategy for a free and open Indo-Pacific.
The “Indo-Pacific” concept clearly positions India - which was barely recognized in the “Asia-Pacific” context - as an actor in the region, and reconfirms the role of Australia at the same time. Yet, we must not forget that ASEAN is in fact the region that lies in the middle of the two seas, and has the potential to play a pivotal role in the strategy.
Unfortunately, within ASEAN there is currently little interest in the Indo-Pacific vision. ASEAN’s relationship with India is not nearly as strong as its relations with Japan, China or South Korea, and neither is it particularly motivated to seek closer ties with India. On the other hand, ASEAN now stands at the crossroads of whether it can continue to retain its central role after spending half a century in the driver’s seat providing forward momentum as the cornerstone of multilateral diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific. ASEAN itself is facing challenging times that demand change.
Without overreacting to the words and deeds of President Trump, Japan must firmly recognize its position as a stakeholder and realize the Indo-Pacific vision through active engagement with ASEAN. Japan should not just satisfy itself with the sense of amity and trust with which it is regarded by ASEAN. What actions Japan and ASEAN will take to build upon this relationship of trust is of greater importance and need.
Keiko Chino is a freelance journalist and Guest Columnist of the Sankei Shimbun.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
新たな日・ASEAN関係を「インド太平洋」の文脈で
千野境子 / ジャーナリスト
2017年 12月 26日
先ごろ発表された外務省のASEAN（東南アジア諸国連合）10か国における対日世論調査によると、ASEANの日本への好感度が以前にもまして上がっている。
18歳から59歳までの男女3017人を対象とした主にインターネットによる調査だが、例えば日本と「友好関係にある」「どちらかと言えば友好関係にある」とする回答は89％（前回75％）、対日信頼度も「とても信頼できる」「どちらかというと信頼できる」が91％（前回73％）といずれも高率の上に、ASEANにおける肯定的な対日イメージの広がりを改めて感じさせる。
2017年は東南アジアとの「心と心」の関係や「対等のパートナーシップ」を謳った福田ドクトリンから40年、ASEANも創設50年という記念の年だっただけにこの結果をまずは喜びたいが、日本とASEANを取り巻く現在の国際情勢を考えると、結果に安住してもいられない。今後、日本とASEANは共にする地域で平和と安定を如何に確保し繁栄していくのか。2017年はむしろそのことが根本から問われた年であったと言っても過言ではないからである。
戦後70年余、アメリカ主導の国際秩序の下にあったこの地域を、トランプ米大統領が11月、一連のASEAN/APEC（アジア太平洋経済協力会議）の会合に合わせてようやく行った就任後初の歴訪（日韓中越比5か国）で明らかになったのは、同大統領の関心が結局のところ商売で儲け、自国の貿易を黒字にすることに尽き、地域の平和・安定・繁栄に対する米国の責任や役割へのプライオリティはあまり期待出来そうにないということだった。
これを特異なトランプ政権ゆえの例外と見るか、米国がこの地域から撤退しつつある趨勢の一環と捉えるべきか、結論を性急に出す必要はないとは言え、もう1つ2017年に明らかになったことは、これに乗じる中国が国際秩序再編への意思をいよいよ明白にしたことだろう。
象徴的だったのが、オバマ前政権時代に中国が幾度となく米国に認めさせようとして叶わなかった「新型の大国（米中）関係」をトランプ大統領が事実上受け入れたと解釈されても仕方ないような無神経ぶりで対応し、日本などの失望を買ったこと、他方習近平国家主席と言えば「太平洋には中国と米国が受け入れるには十分な広さがある」と米中首脳会談で堂々と言って憚らなかったことだ。
言葉の国・中国の言動に無神経であってはならない。この文言の先に「米中によるアジア太平洋の分割支配」構想があるのは確実だ。かつて訪中した元米太平洋軍司令官に中国海軍高官が西太平洋の「分割管理」を「冗談だが」との前置き付きで持ち掛けたエピソードが思い出される。心は本気、冗談は本気のカモフラージュだったのである。
日本とASEANは、このようにもはや「冗談ではない本気の」中国とどう向き合い、折り合いをつけていくか共通の課題に直面している。その点で留意したいのは、トランプ大統領がAPEC会合の演説で「インド太平洋のビジョンの共有」に言及したことで、日本とASEANは今後、このビジョンの共有を確かにしてゆくことが重要となるだろう。
もともと「インド太平洋」は「アジア太平洋」に代わる概念として、安倍晋三首相が第1次政権のインド訪問（2007年8月）の際に政策演説「2つの海の交わり」で提唱した。2つの海とはインド洋と太平洋であり、この両端に位置する民主主義国家日本とインドの役割や日印の戦略的連携に注目したのである。
同概念は第2次安倍政権にも継承され、初の外国訪問（2013年1月）となった東南アジア3カ国（越タイ・インドネシア）歴訪の政策演説「開かれた、海の恵みー日本外交の新たな5原則」で言及された。5原則の第1は「2つの海が結びあうこの地（演説の予定地インドネシア）において、思想、表現、言論の自由と言う人類が獲得した普遍的価値を広く浸透させ、万全にすること」を謳っている。つまり自由で開かれたインド太平洋戦略である。
「インド太平洋」は「アジア太平洋」で意識されることの薄かったインドをアクターとして明確に位置づけ、同時に豪州の役割を再確認する。しかしここで忘れてはならないのは、ASEANこそこの2つの海の真ん中に位置し、戦略的要にもなり得るということだ。
残念ながら、現状ではASEANのインド太平洋ビジョンへの関心は薄い。インドとの関係も日中韓と比べると格段に弱いし、それほど積極的でもない。しかし他方で、アジア太平洋の多国間外交の要として、車に例えれば運転席に座り、推進力を果たし、半世紀を刻んだASEANは、果たして今後もこのような中心性を維持できるか岐路にある。ASEANも試練の時であり、変革を迫られている。
日本はトランプ大統領の言動に過剰反応することなく、当事者意識を強く持ってASEANに積極的に働きかけ、ビジョンを実現していくことが求められている。ASEANが日本との関係を友好的に捉え、信頼度を置いていることに満足するだけでなく、この信頼の上に立って日・ASEANが何を行っていくか、がより重要であり、問われていることである。
（筆者はフリーランスジャーナリスト、産経新聞客員論説委員）
18歳から59歳までの男女3017人を対象とした主にインターネットによる調査だが、例えば日本と「友好関係にある」「どちらかと言えば友好関係にある」とする回答は89％（前回75％）、対日信頼度も「とても信頼できる」「どちらかというと信頼できる」が91％（前回73％）といずれも高率の上に、ASEANにおける肯定的な対日イメージの広がりを改めて感じさせる。
2017年は東南アジアとの「心と心」の関係や「対等のパートナーシップ」を謳った福田ドクトリンから40年、ASEANも創設50年という記念の年だっただけにこの結果をまずは喜びたいが、日本とASEANを取り巻く現在の国際情勢を考えると、結果に安住してもいられない。今後、日本とASEANは共にする地域で平和と安定を如何に確保し繁栄していくのか。2017年はむしろそのことが根本から問われた年であったと言っても過言ではないからである。
戦後70年余、アメリカ主導の国際秩序の下にあったこの地域を、トランプ米大統領が11月、一連のASEAN/APEC（アジア太平洋経済協力会議）の会合に合わせてようやく行った就任後初の歴訪（日韓中越比5か国）で明らかになったのは、同大統領の関心が結局のところ商売で儲け、自国の貿易を黒字にすることに尽き、地域の平和・安定・繁栄に対する米国の責任や役割へのプライオリティはあまり期待出来そうにないということだった。
これを特異なトランプ政権ゆえの例外と見るか、米国がこの地域から撤退しつつある趨勢の一環と捉えるべきか、結論を性急に出す必要はないとは言え、もう1つ2017年に明らかになったことは、これに乗じる中国が国際秩序再編への意思をいよいよ明白にしたことだろう。
象徴的だったのが、オバマ前政権時代に中国が幾度となく米国に認めさせようとして叶わなかった「新型の大国（米中）関係」をトランプ大統領が事実上受け入れたと解釈されても仕方ないような無神経ぶりで対応し、日本などの失望を買ったこと、他方習近平国家主席と言えば「太平洋には中国と米国が受け入れるには十分な広さがある」と米中首脳会談で堂々と言って憚らなかったことだ。
言葉の国・中国の言動に無神経であってはならない。この文言の先に「米中によるアジア太平洋の分割支配」構想があるのは確実だ。かつて訪中した元米太平洋軍司令官に中国海軍高官が西太平洋の「分割管理」を「冗談だが」との前置き付きで持ち掛けたエピソードが思い出される。心は本気、冗談は本気のカモフラージュだったのである。
日本とASEANは、このようにもはや「冗談ではない本気の」中国とどう向き合い、折り合いをつけていくか共通の課題に直面している。その点で留意したいのは、トランプ大統領がAPEC会合の演説で「インド太平洋のビジョンの共有」に言及したことで、日本とASEANは今後、このビジョンの共有を確かにしてゆくことが重要となるだろう。
もともと「インド太平洋」は「アジア太平洋」に代わる概念として、安倍晋三首相が第1次政権のインド訪問（2007年8月）の際に政策演説「2つの海の交わり」で提唱した。2つの海とはインド洋と太平洋であり、この両端に位置する民主主義国家日本とインドの役割や日印の戦略的連携に注目したのである。
同概念は第2次安倍政権にも継承され、初の外国訪問（2013年1月）となった東南アジア3カ国（越タイ・インドネシア）歴訪の政策演説「開かれた、海の恵みー日本外交の新たな5原則」で言及された。5原則の第1は「2つの海が結びあうこの地（演説の予定地インドネシア）において、思想、表現、言論の自由と言う人類が獲得した普遍的価値を広く浸透させ、万全にすること」を謳っている。つまり自由で開かれたインド太平洋戦略である。
「インド太平洋」は「アジア太平洋」で意識されることの薄かったインドをアクターとして明確に位置づけ、同時に豪州の役割を再確認する。しかしここで忘れてはならないのは、ASEANこそこの2つの海の真ん中に位置し、戦略的要にもなり得るということだ。
残念ながら、現状ではASEANのインド太平洋ビジョンへの関心は薄い。インドとの関係も日中韓と比べると格段に弱いし、それほど積極的でもない。しかし他方で、アジア太平洋の多国間外交の要として、車に例えれば運転席に座り、推進力を果たし、半世紀を刻んだASEANは、果たして今後もこのような中心性を維持できるか岐路にある。ASEANも試練の時であり、変革を迫られている。
日本はトランプ大統領の言動に過剰反応することなく、当事者意識を強く持ってASEANに積極的に働きかけ、ビジョンを実現していくことが求められている。ASEANが日本との関係を友好的に捉え、信頼度を置いていることに満足するだけでなく、この信頼の上に立って日・ASEANが何を行っていくか、がより重要であり、問われていることである。
（筆者はフリーランスジャーナリスト、産経新聞客員論説委員）
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟