The Trump Diplomacy and the Fragmentation of the Postwar International Order
SAHASHI Ryo / Associate Professor, Kanagawa University
February 1, 2018
The foreign policy of the Trump administration is changing the post-WWII international order, heretofore led by the United States, at a faster pace than anticipated. EU, burdened with the Brexit negotiations and the domestic political turmoil in Germany, is in no position to take the helm in lieu of the United States. On the other hand, China and Russia are conducting shrewd diplomacy and expanding their spheres of influence through various means short of resorting to large-scale war.
The U.S. National Security Strategy 2017 announced at the end of last year was taken by some to be a source of relief. The document does address head on the problems posed by China and Russia, and gives concrete expressions to the idea of “peace through strength”. Its consistent tone rejects the weak-kneed approach of the Obama administration, dismissing as false the assumption that continued engagement with rivals would turn them into benign actors. The defense budget is being increased, and the National Defense Strategy 2018 issued in January and the Nuclear Posture Review, soon to come out, all point to the strengthening of the military might of the United States.
But it would be rash to gather from all this that the United States is returning to internationalism. The National Security Strategy was compiled by the White House, but President Trump’s commments in his press conference were seen to be somewhat at variance with the analysis in the document. A considerable body of skeptics in the United States feels that the Review is long on rhetoric and short on practicality. The defense budget increase in fact is nothing more than the recouping by the military, now placed in a position of advantage in the decision-making process, of the sequestered portion of the pie. Further, under the banner of “America First”, the pursuit of fair and reciprocal trade is paraded as a priority. In late January President Trump spoke at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, and gave the State of the Union Address, neither of which showed any willingness on his part to return to the free trade agreements that had been concluded.
There is no doubt that the biggest element of uncertainty in the foreign policy of the Trump administration is Donald Trump himself. As was evident at the time of his visit to Europe in spring last year, he has very limited understanding of the alliances that have sustained the U.S. global leadership for more than 70 years since the end of WWII. Not only does he take a transactional approach to the allies of the United States but also has he made only inadequate references to defense commitments entailed by alliances. His abrupt mention of a military option in Venezuela, for example, seems to indicate his lack of prudence required for the use of military force.
Presidential speeches, which in the past served to convey America’s vision of the world as it should be, now seem to be used as a vehicle to propagate Trumpism at home. His speech to the United Nations General Assembly last September was a strange mixture of extolling “America First” to the world and provoking North Korea and Iran.
There is no longer ground for optimistically hoping that experienced presidential advisers and cabinet ministers can educate the president and surely change his ideas and behaviors. Despite the concerted opposition by the cabinet ministers concerned, President Trump and his close advisors apparently forced the decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and move the U.S. embassy to the city. The decision to suspend security aid to Pakistan was also made all of a sudden. On the other hand, as was the case with the reinforcement of the troops dispatched to Afghanistan and the transfer of arms to the Ukranian government, the military and the bureaucracy are trying to persuade the president to take actions that would mean a return to the internationalism and interventionism of the past. This policy rivalry lies at the core of the Trump administration. In the coming months, there may well be resignations or dismissals of those high officials who belong to the latter camp such as Secretary of State Tillerson, but President Trump will stay on. The resignation of Steve Bannon, the Chief Strategist, has diluted the ideological color of the administration, but President Trump will likely remain opportunistic and prone to reckless, impulsive actions.
Complaints and concerns about the Trump diplomacy are stronger in countries other than Japan. The Chairman’s Statement of the ASEAN Summit, issued following the East Asian Summit which President Trump had left midway to go home, reflected the situation in which the ASEAN countries felt unable to cope with China on such issues as the South China Sea without the engagement of the United States.
It makes sense for Japan to cultivate personal relationships with President Trump and solidify the foundation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement. It is also important to work in tandem with the internationalists in and outside the U.S. administration, who are going through a rough patch. From this point of view, the concept of the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy needs to be fleshed out through active dialogue with the mid-level executives of the government, the military and the policy community in the United States.
That said, we need to establish new pillars as follows to cope with the disintegrating international order.
Firstly, we should explore collaborative steps with Britain, EU, Australian and some Asian countries with whom we share a common interest in preserving the international order. This is the case not only with respect to the promotion of free trade through the early coming into force of TPP and the Japan-EU EPA (Economic Partnership Agreement), but also with respect to security as well as promotion of democracy and protection of human rights. On democracy and human rights, the lack of interest on the part of the Trump administration may signal the loss of leadership for advancing these causes. Lest it should happen, it would seem appropriate to contemplate the possibility that Japan and other advanced democracies might step in to take the helm at least for the foreseeable future.
Secondly, China’s hubris regarding its own strength should be held in check. It is important to improve the Japan-China relations and create the opportunities to put on the right track China’s view of the international order and its diplomacy towards its immediate neighbors, through, for example, cooperating with its BRI (Belt and Road Initiative).
Thus, higher expectations than ever before are placed on Japan’s leadership in rebuilding the international order. Prime Minister Abe and Foreign Minister Kono should lead Japan’s diplomacy with these broad perspectives in mind.
The writer is Associate Professor, Kanagawa University. This is an abridged and adapted version of the article that appeared in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun newspaper of January 17, 2018.
The U.S. National Security Strategy 2017 announced at the end of last year was taken by some to be a source of relief. The document does address head on the problems posed by China and Russia, and gives concrete expressions to the idea of “peace through strength”. Its consistent tone rejects the weak-kneed approach of the Obama administration, dismissing as false the assumption that continued engagement with rivals would turn them into benign actors. The defense budget is being increased, and the National Defense Strategy 2018 issued in January and the Nuclear Posture Review, soon to come out, all point to the strengthening of the military might of the United States.
But it would be rash to gather from all this that the United States is returning to internationalism. The National Security Strategy was compiled by the White House, but President Trump’s commments in his press conference were seen to be somewhat at variance with the analysis in the document. A considerable body of skeptics in the United States feels that the Review is long on rhetoric and short on practicality. The defense budget increase in fact is nothing more than the recouping by the military, now placed in a position of advantage in the decision-making process, of the sequestered portion of the pie. Further, under the banner of “America First”, the pursuit of fair and reciprocal trade is paraded as a priority. In late January President Trump spoke at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, and gave the State of the Union Address, neither of which showed any willingness on his part to return to the free trade agreements that had been concluded.
There is no doubt that the biggest element of uncertainty in the foreign policy of the Trump administration is Donald Trump himself. As was evident at the time of his visit to Europe in spring last year, he has very limited understanding of the alliances that have sustained the U.S. global leadership for more than 70 years since the end of WWII. Not only does he take a transactional approach to the allies of the United States but also has he made only inadequate references to defense commitments entailed by alliances. His abrupt mention of a military option in Venezuela, for example, seems to indicate his lack of prudence required for the use of military force.
Presidential speeches, which in the past served to convey America’s vision of the world as it should be, now seem to be used as a vehicle to propagate Trumpism at home. His speech to the United Nations General Assembly last September was a strange mixture of extolling “America First” to the world and provoking North Korea and Iran.
There is no longer ground for optimistically hoping that experienced presidential advisers and cabinet ministers can educate the president and surely change his ideas and behaviors. Despite the concerted opposition by the cabinet ministers concerned, President Trump and his close advisors apparently forced the decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and move the U.S. embassy to the city. The decision to suspend security aid to Pakistan was also made all of a sudden. On the other hand, as was the case with the reinforcement of the troops dispatched to Afghanistan and the transfer of arms to the Ukranian government, the military and the bureaucracy are trying to persuade the president to take actions that would mean a return to the internationalism and interventionism of the past. This policy rivalry lies at the core of the Trump administration. In the coming months, there may well be resignations or dismissals of those high officials who belong to the latter camp such as Secretary of State Tillerson, but President Trump will stay on. The resignation of Steve Bannon, the Chief Strategist, has diluted the ideological color of the administration, but President Trump will likely remain opportunistic and prone to reckless, impulsive actions.
Complaints and concerns about the Trump diplomacy are stronger in countries other than Japan. The Chairman’s Statement of the ASEAN Summit, issued following the East Asian Summit which President Trump had left midway to go home, reflected the situation in which the ASEAN countries felt unable to cope with China on such issues as the South China Sea without the engagement of the United States.
It makes sense for Japan to cultivate personal relationships with President Trump and solidify the foundation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangement. It is also important to work in tandem with the internationalists in and outside the U.S. administration, who are going through a rough patch. From this point of view, the concept of the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy needs to be fleshed out through active dialogue with the mid-level executives of the government, the military and the policy community in the United States.
That said, we need to establish new pillars as follows to cope with the disintegrating international order.
Firstly, we should explore collaborative steps with Britain, EU, Australian and some Asian countries with whom we share a common interest in preserving the international order. This is the case not only with respect to the promotion of free trade through the early coming into force of TPP and the Japan-EU EPA (Economic Partnership Agreement), but also with respect to security as well as promotion of democracy and protection of human rights. On democracy and human rights, the lack of interest on the part of the Trump administration may signal the loss of leadership for advancing these causes. Lest it should happen, it would seem appropriate to contemplate the possibility that Japan and other advanced democracies might step in to take the helm at least for the foreseeable future.
Secondly, China’s hubris regarding its own strength should be held in check. It is important to improve the Japan-China relations and create the opportunities to put on the right track China’s view of the international order and its diplomacy towards its immediate neighbors, through, for example, cooperating with its BRI (Belt and Road Initiative).
Thus, higher expectations than ever before are placed on Japan’s leadership in rebuilding the international order. Prime Minister Abe and Foreign Minister Kono should lead Japan’s diplomacy with these broad perspectives in mind.
The writer is Associate Professor, Kanagawa University. This is an abridged and adapted version of the article that appeared in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun newspaper of January 17, 2018.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
トランプ外交の前に融解しつつある国際秩序
佐 橋 亮 / 神奈川大学准教授
2018年 2月 1日
トランプ外交により米主導の戦後国際秩序は想定以上の速さで変容しつつある。英国との離脱交渉やドイツ内政の混乱を抱える欧州連合（ＥＵ）に、米国にとって代わる見込みはない。一方、中ロは巧みな外交を展開し、大規模戦争に至らない程度の手段を用いて影響圏を拡大している。
昨年末に発表された『国家安全保障戦略』を安心材料と見なす向きもある。たしかに、この文章は、中国、ロシアが国際秩序に投げかける問題を正面から捉え、「力による平和」を具体化した。オバマ政権の弱腰姿勢を払拭するかのような文面で貫かれており、関与をつづければ相手が変わるという幻想を捨て去るべきとの主張もあった。国防予算も増額の方向であり、1月に発表された『国家防衛戦略』、これからでる『核態勢見直し』など、軍事力の強化は言われている。
しかし、これらからアメリカの国際主義回帰を読み取ることは早計に過ぎよう。国家安全保障戦略はホワイトハウスがまとめたものだが、トランプ大統領は発表会見で異なった説明をしており、机上の空論との懐疑論が米国でも根強い。国防予算増も、政策形成において有利な位置を得た軍がオバマ政権期に強制削減されたパイを取り戻しつつあるにすぎない。そして米国第一の名のもと、公正で互恵的な貿易の追求もことさらに掲げられている。1月後半にはトランプはダボス会議で演説、続いて一般教書演説もあったが、すでに合意された自由貿易協定にそのまま戻る気がないことは明らかだった。
トランプ外交の最大の不確定要素が大統領であることは言うまでも無い。昨年春の欧州訪問でも明らかだったが、トランプ氏は戦後七〇年以上にわたって米国の指導力の源泉であり続けた同盟にあまりに理解がない。同盟国にも取引主義で臨むだけでなく、同盟の防衛義務への言及も不十分だ。唐突にベネズエラへの軍事攻撃に言及するなど、軍事力行使に伴うべき慎重さもない。
かつてアメリカがあるべき世界を訴えた演説は、いまはトランプらしさを国内向けに演出するために用意されているかのようだ。昨年九月の国連総会演説も、米国第一を世界に説いた後に北朝鮮やイランへの挑発を行う、奇妙なものだった。
経験豊かな大統領補佐官や閣僚たちが大統領を教育できればきっと変わるとの楽観に、もはや根拠はない。閣僚がこぞって反対してもエルサレムへの「首都移転」発表は大統領とその周辺に押し切られたようだ。パキスタンへの援助停止も唐突に決定された。他方でアフガニスタンへの増派、ウクライナ政府への武器供与にみられるように、軍や官僚機構は大統領を説得しながら従前の国際主義、介入主義への回帰を狙っている。この対立構造こそ、トランプ外交の本質であろう。そして今後ティラーソン国務長官をはじめ、後者に属する高官の辞任や更迭はあり得るが、大統領は居座ることになる。バノン主席戦略官の辞任によってイデオロギー色は薄れたが、トランプ大統領の機会主義、浅慮傾向は変わらない。
トランプ外交への不満と不安は日本以外の国ではるかに強い。トランプ氏が途中で帰国した東アジア首脳会議後に発出された東南アジア諸国連合（ＡＳＥＡＮ）首脳会議の議長声明も、米国の関与なしには南シナ海問題などで中国と対峙できない状況を反映していた。
日本がトランプ氏との個人的関係を構築し安全保障体制の基盤を固めることは良い。政権内外で苦しむ国際主義者との連携も重要だ。この観点からは、自由で開かれたインド太平洋戦略の具体的な内容について、米政府の中堅幹部や軍、また政策コミュニティとの活発な対話が求められよう。
だが融解する国際秩序の前に、新たな柱を立てておく必要がある。
第１に国際秩序の維持に利益をみいだす英国、ＥＵ、豪州、アジア諸国との間で、環太平洋経済連携協定（ＴＰＰ）や日ＥＵ経済連携協定（ＥＰＡ）の早期発効など自由貿易の推進に加え、安全保障や民主化推進・人権擁護をめぐっても共同歩調を模索すべきだ。とくに、民主化推進・人権擁護に関しては、トランプ政権の無関心によって牽引者が失われてしまうことがないように、日本を始め先進国等の代替的なリーダーシップが、少なくとも当面必要になるという問題意識も必要ではないか。
第２に中国の力への過信をいさめねばならない。日中関係を改善し、一帯一路への協力等を通じて、中国の国際秩序観や周辺外交を正す機会を得ることは重要だ。
秩序構築に向けた日本の指導力への期待は、かつてなく高まっている。そのような大局観を持ったうえで安倍・河野外交は展開されるべきである。
筆者は神奈川大学准教授。本稿は、『日本経済新聞』2018年1月17日に掲載された論考を改訂し、要約したものである。
昨年末に発表された『国家安全保障戦略』を安心材料と見なす向きもある。たしかに、この文章は、中国、ロシアが国際秩序に投げかける問題を正面から捉え、「力による平和」を具体化した。オバマ政権の弱腰姿勢を払拭するかのような文面で貫かれており、関与をつづければ相手が変わるという幻想を捨て去るべきとの主張もあった。国防予算も増額の方向であり、1月に発表された『国家防衛戦略』、これからでる『核態勢見直し』など、軍事力の強化は言われている。
しかし、これらからアメリカの国際主義回帰を読み取ることは早計に過ぎよう。国家安全保障戦略はホワイトハウスがまとめたものだが、トランプ大統領は発表会見で異なった説明をしており、机上の空論との懐疑論が米国でも根強い。国防予算増も、政策形成において有利な位置を得た軍がオバマ政権期に強制削減されたパイを取り戻しつつあるにすぎない。そして米国第一の名のもと、公正で互恵的な貿易の追求もことさらに掲げられている。1月後半にはトランプはダボス会議で演説、続いて一般教書演説もあったが、すでに合意された自由貿易協定にそのまま戻る気がないことは明らかだった。
トランプ外交の最大の不確定要素が大統領であることは言うまでも無い。昨年春の欧州訪問でも明らかだったが、トランプ氏は戦後七〇年以上にわたって米国の指導力の源泉であり続けた同盟にあまりに理解がない。同盟国にも取引主義で臨むだけでなく、同盟の防衛義務への言及も不十分だ。唐突にベネズエラへの軍事攻撃に言及するなど、軍事力行使に伴うべき慎重さもない。
かつてアメリカがあるべき世界を訴えた演説は、いまはトランプらしさを国内向けに演出するために用意されているかのようだ。昨年九月の国連総会演説も、米国第一を世界に説いた後に北朝鮮やイランへの挑発を行う、奇妙なものだった。
経験豊かな大統領補佐官や閣僚たちが大統領を教育できればきっと変わるとの楽観に、もはや根拠はない。閣僚がこぞって反対してもエルサレムへの「首都移転」発表は大統領とその周辺に押し切られたようだ。パキスタンへの援助停止も唐突に決定された。他方でアフガニスタンへの増派、ウクライナ政府への武器供与にみられるように、軍や官僚機構は大統領を説得しながら従前の国際主義、介入主義への回帰を狙っている。この対立構造こそ、トランプ外交の本質であろう。そして今後ティラーソン国務長官をはじめ、後者に属する高官の辞任や更迭はあり得るが、大統領は居座ることになる。バノン主席戦略官の辞任によってイデオロギー色は薄れたが、トランプ大統領の機会主義、浅慮傾向は変わらない。
トランプ外交への不満と不安は日本以外の国ではるかに強い。トランプ氏が途中で帰国した東アジア首脳会議後に発出された東南アジア諸国連合（ＡＳＥＡＮ）首脳会議の議長声明も、米国の関与なしには南シナ海問題などで中国と対峙できない状況を反映していた。
日本がトランプ氏との個人的関係を構築し安全保障体制の基盤を固めることは良い。政権内外で苦しむ国際主義者との連携も重要だ。この観点からは、自由で開かれたインド太平洋戦略の具体的な内容について、米政府の中堅幹部や軍、また政策コミュニティとの活発な対話が求められよう。
だが融解する国際秩序の前に、新たな柱を立てておく必要がある。
第１に国際秩序の維持に利益をみいだす英国、ＥＵ、豪州、アジア諸国との間で、環太平洋経済連携協定（ＴＰＰ）や日ＥＵ経済連携協定（ＥＰＡ）の早期発効など自由貿易の推進に加え、安全保障や民主化推進・人権擁護をめぐっても共同歩調を模索すべきだ。とくに、民主化推進・人権擁護に関しては、トランプ政権の無関心によって牽引者が失われてしまうことがないように、日本を始め先進国等の代替的なリーダーシップが、少なくとも当面必要になるという問題意識も必要ではないか。
第２に中国の力への過信をいさめねばならない。日中関係を改善し、一帯一路への協力等を通じて、中国の国際秩序観や周辺外交を正す機会を得ることは重要だ。
秩序構築に向けた日本の指導力への期待は、かつてなく高まっている。そのような大局観を持ったうえで安倍・河野外交は展開されるべきである。
筆者は神奈川大学准教授。本稿は、『日本経済新聞』2018年1月17日に掲載された論考を改訂し、要約したものである。
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟