March 9, 2018

The Ukraine crisis began in the autumn of 2013, meaning that we are well into its fifth year. There remains no solution in sight, however, and the international community’s interest in the issue is waning. The time has come to explore just what this crisis in Ukraine has been all about.

In the countries of the West, one explanation holds considerable sway: When Ukraine, aiming for eventual inclusion in the European Union, moved a step closer to this end by seeking to forge an Association Agreement with the EU, Russia reacted by pressuring the Ukraine government to walk back this progress; as Viktor Yanukovych, then Ukrainian president, changed course and aligned his administration’s policies more closely to Russia’s desires, public dissatisfaction among the population of his country reached a boiling point, tipping the situation into conflict.

In 2012, a year before this crisis erupted, the administration of Russian President Vladimir Putin had announced its intent to create a Eurasian Economic Union. The Western view of this, however, was that it was little more than an attempt to prevent EU expansion to the east and to revive and bolster the former Soviet economic bloc as a bulwark against the European Union. At the core of this proposed alliance were Russia and Ukraine. This power game placed Ukraine at the center of an economic integration tug-of-war between Russia and Europe, triggering civil strife in turn.

The Russian perspective on the situation, needless to say, is different. In 2012, immediately before launching his third administration as president of Russia, Putin announced a new national strategy that he described as “moving Russia from the West to the East,” namely toward a more Asia-centered presence. Underpinning this decision was the Russian desire to push back against the explosive development seen in the Asian economy centered on China, or alternatively to make Russia itself an integral part of this growth.

This was the thinking behind Putin’s decision to include Eurasia in the name of his proposed economic alliance—signifying the joining of the European and Asian sides—and to declare that Russia’s future lay to the East. At the core of this economic alliance, however, was not Ukraine, but rather the petroleum powers of Russia and Kazakhstan.

Russia and Ukraine are, of course, closely connected in terms of their history, their geography, their culture, and the genealogy of their people. It would have been ideal to see Ukraine also take part in the Eurasian Economic Union. But it was not viewed as a vital country to include in the agreement at the time.

There is a fundamental gap between the positions of Russia, which has fixed its gaze on Asia’s economic development, and Ukraine, which looks instead to the wealth enjoyed by Europe. This gap prompted Russia to explain that so long as Ukraine was pursuing eventual membership in the EU, it would be able to take part in the Eurasian arrangement as an observer only. The Yanukovych administration, meanwhile, having received an offer of considerable Russian financial assistance, decided to delay its Association Agreement with the European side and proposed talks including both Russia and the EU toward a broader agreement.

The European response to this overture was cold. José Manuel Barroso, then president of the European Commission, noted on February 25, 2013, that Ukraine could not hope to join both the EU and the Eurasian Customs Union (the predecessor to the Eurasian Economic Union) at the same time.

In November 2017, the EU took part in the Eastern Partnership Summit with six states from the former Soviet sphere (Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, and Armenia). At this gathering, which aimed to knit together a regional cooperation organization, talks were held toward strengthening ties between Europe and the states to the east. One outcome of the meeting was a statement that confirmed the pro-Europe, pro-EU-accession stances of three of these states that had already signed Association Agreements with the EU: Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.

This statement was actually accompanied by a separate factsheet, “Myths about the Eastern Partnership,” that presented explanations on 10 areas where, it stated, mistaken views were spreading in the international community.

Two of the myths likely to draw particular Russian attention were “Participation in the Eastern Partnership leads to EU membership” and “Membership of the Eastern Partnership means that those countries can’t be members of the Eurasian Economic Union.” These items stated that the new agreement represented no promise of eventual EU membership and that it would be possible for a state to be a part of both the West- and East-facing agreements concurrently.

Most of the former Soviet bloc states entering the Eastern Partnership see this as a stepping-stone toward eventual accession to the EU. For Ukraine, which sees EU membership as a particularly urgent matter, these myths seemed little more than a gentle rejection—a statement that while joining the EU will be difficult, the country is welcome to be part of the Eurasian arrangement instead. Indeed, this is the interpretation that most former Soviet states are likely to take away.

Russian analysts, meanwhile, decided that this marked an end to the era where EU had posed to these countries a stark choice between Europe or Russia and the beginning of a new period when they could take a more flexible tack, choosing to approach both Europe and Russia at the same time. This, they wrote, signified an improving climate for Europe-Russia relations.

Europe currently has its hands full dealing with issues including Brexit and waves of immigrants and refugees, leaving Europeans in a situation where they are not particularly eager to take on the task of discussing whether to admit new members to the EU. It is doubtful that the European side was giving serious thought to Ukraine’s accession in the first place. And it is now apparent that the fundamental divisions that existed between Europe and Russia on the question of economic integration have largely been effaced in any case.

The Ukraine crisis, which killed tens of thousands and created hundreds of thousands of refugees, was in the end a tragedy befalling a nation that fell into the midst of the Europe-Russia power struggle. From where we view it today, it can only be called a civil war that held no significance whatsoever.


Ken Ishigooka is a journalist and former special editor of the Mainichi Shimbun newspaper.

2018年 3月 9日

　２０１３年秋に始まったウクライナ危機は５年目に入るが、解決の見通しはなく、国際社会の関心は薄らいでいる。そもそもウクライナ危機とは何だったのか、改めて問わざるを得ない。

　欧米では、ウクライナが欧州連合（ＥＵ）加盟を目指して、これに一歩近づく「連合協定」締結へと動いたことにロシアが反発して圧力をかけ、当時のヤヌコーヴィッチ大統領が路線転換してロシアへとすり寄り、国民の不満が爆発したと説明されることが多い。

　ロシアのプーチン政権は、ウクライナ危機前年の２０１２年、「ユーラシア経済同盟」創設構想を発表していたが、欧米では、この経済同盟について、「ＥＵの東方拡大を阻止し、旧ソ連経済圏の強化・復活を図るＥＵ対抗組織」との解釈がもっぱらだった。そして、経済同盟の中心はロシアとウクライナであると言われた。この構図の中で、ウクライナはロシアとＥＵ間の経済統合の綱引きに巻き込まれ、内戦騒ぎへと突き進んだことになる。

　しかし、ロシアから見ると、まったく別のアングルが見えてくる。プーチン大統領は２０１２年、三期目の政権就任直前、新国家戦略を発表し、「西（欧州）から東（アジア）へ」の戦略シフトを説明していた。背景には中国を中心とするアジア経済圏の爆発的発展への対抗、もしくはアジアの発展を取り込んでいく狙いがあった。

　だから、経済同盟にユーラシア（ヨーロッパ＋アジア）という名称をわざわざ冠し、ロシアの未来は「東」にあると叫んだのだ。この経済同盟の中核はロシアとカザフスタンの二大石油産出国で、ウクライナではない。

　もちろん歴史的にも，地理的にも、文化的にも、血縁関係からも、ロシアとウクライナ関係は密接なものがある。できればウクライナもこの経済同盟に参加して欲しい。しかし、ぜひとも必要な国ではなかった。

　アジアの発展を視野に入れるロシアと、欧州の豊かさを見つめるウクライナの立ち位置は根本的に違う。だから、ロシアは「ウクライナがＥＵへの加盟を目指しても、経済同盟へのオブザバー参加を認める」と説明していた。ヤヌコーヴィッチ政権も、ロシアからの多額援助の申し入れを受け、ＥＵとの連合協定締結を遅らせ、欧州、ロシアを交えた三者協議を提唱していた。

　しかし、当時のバローゾＥＵ欧州委員会委員長は「ＥＵと関税同盟（ユーラシア経済同盟の前身）への同時参加はあり得ない」（２０１３年２月２５日）と、にべもなかった。

　昨年１１月、ＥＵと旧ソ連６カ国（ウクライナ、グルジア、アゼルバイジャン、ベラルーシ、モルドバ、アルメニア）の地域提携組織「東方パートナーシップ」の首脳会談が開かれ、ＥＵとの連携強化を巡る話し合いが行われた。同会議では、ＥＵと「連合協定」に、すでに調印していたウクライナ、ジョージア、モルドバ３カ国の「欧州選択、欧州熱望」の立場を確認するとの声明が出された。

　実は、これとは別に「東方パートナーシップについての神話」と題された文書も発表された。「“誤った神話”が広がっている」という１０項目の説明文書だった。

　ロシアから見て、特に関心を引くのは「東方パートナーシップ協定はＥＵ加盟へとつながる」「同協定参加国は、ユーラシア経済同盟との同時参加はできない」の２項目が“神話”として否定されたことだ。つまり、「ＥＵ加盟は必ずしも約束されていない」「ユーラシア経済同盟との同時参加は可能」との説明になる。

　東方パートナーシップに加わっている旧ソ連６カ国の多くは「同パートナーシップ参加はＥＵ加盟へのステップ」と考えている。ＥＵ加盟を焦るウクライナにとっては、「ＥＵ加盟は難しい。ユーラシア経済同盟に参加していてもいいですよ」と、やんわりと断られたに等しい。少なくとも、旧ソ連諸国の多くは、そう考えざるを得ない。

　ロシアの専門家は、ＥＵは「欧州か、ロシアか」という二者択一から、「欧州も、ロシアも」という二者同時選択の柔軟路線へと転換したとの論評を掲げ、「欧州はロシアとの関係修復に動いている」と書いた。

　ＥＵは、英国のＥＵ離脱、移民・難民問題などで手一杯だ。新規加盟協議どころではないのが本音だろう。ウクライナの加盟を本気に考えていたかどうかも疑わしい。そして気が付くと、欧州とロシアの双方は経済統合政策について、基本的な対立点を解消していた。

　数万人の死者と数十万人以上の難民を生み出したウクライナ危機とは、結局、ＥＵとロシアの勢力圏争いに巻き込まれた悲劇であり、今となると意味のない内戦だったといわざるを得ない。

筆者は元毎日新聞社専門編集委員