Why Abe Will Not Get a Third Term
KURASHIGE Atsuro / Journalist
March 20, 2018
Suppose we gathered political reporters in Japan and asked them to fill in a questionnaire.
The questions are twofold: “Will Prime Minister Abe Shinzo win a third term as head of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the upcoming election in September?” and “Will he be able to revise Article 9 of the Constitution during his term as Prime Minister?”
As for Abe getting re-elected for a third term, most reporters would probably answer “Yes.” After all, numbers are what matters in politics, and judging from the relative influence of the factions within the LDP, Abe supporters currently make up a comfortable majority in the 408-member parliament.
How about his chances of revising Article 9? Here, we would see a sudden drop in the number of reporters who answers “Yes” with confidence. The common perception is that the hurdle against such a revision remains formidable. Consequently, most of the reporters are likely to say that while Prime Minister Abe may get his third term, it would be difficult for him to revise Article 9.
By contrast, my answer to both questions are “No.” I believe that Abe’s third term and the constitutional revision are inseparably linked.
If elected to a third term in addition to his two previous terms, Abe will be in office for a total of ten years, making him the longest serving Prime Minister since the Meiji era, which ended in 1912. It also means he would need an accomplishment commensurate with the length of his tenure. The revision of Article 9 certainly fits the bill, except for the fact that Abe’s proposal doesn’t seem anywhere close to becoming a reality.
Abe is proposing to add a clause to Article 9 that legitimizes the Self Defense Forces (SDF) without revising the existing first clause that renounces war, or the second clause that forbids Japan from maintaining a military force and denies the right of belligerency of the state. While the proposal may seem moderate enough at first glance, there are numerous holes in its logic that become apparent upon closer scrutiny. The political stakes for overcoming its shortcomings are too high.
The proposed revision would further aggravate the inconsistency of having to define the SDF as a non-military force under the current Constitution. And that’s not all. Abe has stressed that the significance of his proposal lies in recognizing the SDF, and that there will be no change whatsoever in its role. Such an explanation might work at an emotional level, but with no underlying fact warranting legal action, it casts doubt on the very need for revising the Constitution, and thus fails to stand up to the principle of law.
On the political front, Abe faces four more hurdles. First of all, building a consensus within the LDP will be no easy feat. Ishiba Shigeru, the party’s former Secretary-General who is expected to run for the LDP presidency, is unlikely to withdraw his own argument of deleting the second clause from Article 9 and positioning the SDF as a military force. Ishiba is likely to challenge Abe in the election by making this a major issue. Does Abe have any chance of winning this battle of logic?
Meanwhile, the Komeito party – the LDP’s coalition partner – has reservations about the very idea of tampering with Article 9. As a party that has long advertised itself as an advocate of peace, the Komeito must feel it has already kept its part of the bargain by supporting the government’s new national security law of 2015, which gave Japan partial approval to exercise the right of collective self-defense. From the standpoint of the Komeito, that was tantamount to revising Article 9, and anything more would violate the terms of the coalition.
Then there is the Constitutional Democratic Party. The leading opposition party considers the new national security law itself as unconstitutional and seeks its repeal, leaving absolutely no room for compromise.
Even if Abe were to overcome the hurdles posed by the LDP and Komeito, it seems unlikely that a constitutional reform proposal facing do-or-die resistance from the opposition could win a majority of the votes in a national referendum. This fourth hurdle is risky in that once rejected by a “No” vote, Abe and his government would be forced to stand down.
Abe’s proposal is not only impossible to implement, but may spell the end of the administration if he insists too strongly on pursuing it. In other words, it is a major headache that could hardly be a cause for justifying a third term. However, it can’t be thrown out the window, either. At most, Abe could flash the proposal from time to time in the way of a pocket square. But a pocket square would hardly qualify as a prop for playing out a third term scenario. Even LDP legislators must come around to that view. Thus, according to my analysis, there will be no third term for Abe.
There are other reasons to doubt he will get a third term, namely the self-conceit and weariness that have emerged from Abe’s prolonged grip on power.
The Prime Minister has been dogged by two scandals - the Moritomo case surrounding the sale of state-owned land and the Kake case involving government approval for a veterinary medicine school. While the circumstances may be different, both of them are influence-peddling scandals in which the most powerful man in Japan is seen to have granted favors to his close friends. It was the result of self-conceit, and has delivered a body blow that will continue to sap the strength of the administration.
Meanwhile, weariness towards the Abe administration has been voiced by elder politicians in the conservative camp. Former Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro is among those who have changed their tune on Abe. Since retiring as a legislator, Koizumi has led a “zero-nuclear power plant” campaign, and has claimed in the past that “Japan can realize a zero-nuke agenda if Prime Minister Abe embraces change.” Now, he says he “expects nothing from Prime Minister Abe,” and has begun to turn his back, describing Abe’s chances of getting a third term as “too close to call.” This has come from the very man who had promoted Abe in his own government, who may well be considered the godfather of the Abe administration.
Kamei Shizuka, the former head of the LDP’s Policy Research Council who calls himself Abe’s “big brother” in politics, has also made a point of Abe’s self-conceit. Kamei predicts that a warning signal will begin to flash over Abe’s prospects for a third term, if Ishiba and another candidate, Kishida Fumio - who currently heads the Policy Research Council – both enter the race, thereby forming a first and second runners-up alliance against Abe. In an election for the LDP presidency, a second round of voting takes place if the first round fails to produce a clear winner, and there have been numerous instances in the past where candidates who came in second and third in the initial round joined forces to defeat the leading candidate. This was the case in the 2012 contest for the LDP presidency, in which Abe - who was the runner-up in the first round of voting - overturned Ishiba’s lead in the second round to become Prime Minister.
Undeniably, Abe still has the upper hand. Politics depends on the numbers. Yet, there is a real possibility that the numbers may shift over the course of the next seven months. Here, we should be reminded of yet another hard-and-fast rule of politics - you never know what’s around the corner.
Atsuro Kurashige is Expert Senior Writer at Mainichi Shimbun newspaper.
The questions are twofold: “Will Prime Minister Abe Shinzo win a third term as head of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the upcoming election in September?” and “Will he be able to revise Article 9 of the Constitution during his term as Prime Minister?”
As for Abe getting re-elected for a third term, most reporters would probably answer “Yes.” After all, numbers are what matters in politics, and judging from the relative influence of the factions within the LDP, Abe supporters currently make up a comfortable majority in the 408-member parliament.
How about his chances of revising Article 9? Here, we would see a sudden drop in the number of reporters who answers “Yes” with confidence. The common perception is that the hurdle against such a revision remains formidable. Consequently, most of the reporters are likely to say that while Prime Minister Abe may get his third term, it would be difficult for him to revise Article 9.
By contrast, my answer to both questions are “No.” I believe that Abe’s third term and the constitutional revision are inseparably linked.
If elected to a third term in addition to his two previous terms, Abe will be in office for a total of ten years, making him the longest serving Prime Minister since the Meiji era, which ended in 1912. It also means he would need an accomplishment commensurate with the length of his tenure. The revision of Article 9 certainly fits the bill, except for the fact that Abe’s proposal doesn’t seem anywhere close to becoming a reality.
Abe is proposing to add a clause to Article 9 that legitimizes the Self Defense Forces (SDF) without revising the existing first clause that renounces war, or the second clause that forbids Japan from maintaining a military force and denies the right of belligerency of the state. While the proposal may seem moderate enough at first glance, there are numerous holes in its logic that become apparent upon closer scrutiny. The political stakes for overcoming its shortcomings are too high.
The proposed revision would further aggravate the inconsistency of having to define the SDF as a non-military force under the current Constitution. And that’s not all. Abe has stressed that the significance of his proposal lies in recognizing the SDF, and that there will be no change whatsoever in its role. Such an explanation might work at an emotional level, but with no underlying fact warranting legal action, it casts doubt on the very need for revising the Constitution, and thus fails to stand up to the principle of law.
On the political front, Abe faces four more hurdles. First of all, building a consensus within the LDP will be no easy feat. Ishiba Shigeru, the party’s former Secretary-General who is expected to run for the LDP presidency, is unlikely to withdraw his own argument of deleting the second clause from Article 9 and positioning the SDF as a military force. Ishiba is likely to challenge Abe in the election by making this a major issue. Does Abe have any chance of winning this battle of logic?
Meanwhile, the Komeito party – the LDP’s coalition partner – has reservations about the very idea of tampering with Article 9. As a party that has long advertised itself as an advocate of peace, the Komeito must feel it has already kept its part of the bargain by supporting the government’s new national security law of 2015, which gave Japan partial approval to exercise the right of collective self-defense. From the standpoint of the Komeito, that was tantamount to revising Article 9, and anything more would violate the terms of the coalition.
Then there is the Constitutional Democratic Party. The leading opposition party considers the new national security law itself as unconstitutional and seeks its repeal, leaving absolutely no room for compromise.
Even if Abe were to overcome the hurdles posed by the LDP and Komeito, it seems unlikely that a constitutional reform proposal facing do-or-die resistance from the opposition could win a majority of the votes in a national referendum. This fourth hurdle is risky in that once rejected by a “No” vote, Abe and his government would be forced to stand down.
Abe’s proposal is not only impossible to implement, but may spell the end of the administration if he insists too strongly on pursuing it. In other words, it is a major headache that could hardly be a cause for justifying a third term. However, it can’t be thrown out the window, either. At most, Abe could flash the proposal from time to time in the way of a pocket square. But a pocket square would hardly qualify as a prop for playing out a third term scenario. Even LDP legislators must come around to that view. Thus, according to my analysis, there will be no third term for Abe.
There are other reasons to doubt he will get a third term, namely the self-conceit and weariness that have emerged from Abe’s prolonged grip on power.
The Prime Minister has been dogged by two scandals - the Moritomo case surrounding the sale of state-owned land and the Kake case involving government approval for a veterinary medicine school. While the circumstances may be different, both of them are influence-peddling scandals in which the most powerful man in Japan is seen to have granted favors to his close friends. It was the result of self-conceit, and has delivered a body blow that will continue to sap the strength of the administration.
Meanwhile, weariness towards the Abe administration has been voiced by elder politicians in the conservative camp. Former Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiro is among those who have changed their tune on Abe. Since retiring as a legislator, Koizumi has led a “zero-nuclear power plant” campaign, and has claimed in the past that “Japan can realize a zero-nuke agenda if Prime Minister Abe embraces change.” Now, he says he “expects nothing from Prime Minister Abe,” and has begun to turn his back, describing Abe’s chances of getting a third term as “too close to call.” This has come from the very man who had promoted Abe in his own government, who may well be considered the godfather of the Abe administration.
Kamei Shizuka, the former head of the LDP’s Policy Research Council who calls himself Abe’s “big brother” in politics, has also made a point of Abe’s self-conceit. Kamei predicts that a warning signal will begin to flash over Abe’s prospects for a third term, if Ishiba and another candidate, Kishida Fumio - who currently heads the Policy Research Council – both enter the race, thereby forming a first and second runners-up alliance against Abe. In an election for the LDP presidency, a second round of voting takes place if the first round fails to produce a clear winner, and there have been numerous instances in the past where candidates who came in second and third in the initial round joined forces to defeat the leading candidate. This was the case in the 2012 contest for the LDP presidency, in which Abe - who was the runner-up in the first round of voting - overturned Ishiba’s lead in the second round to become Prime Minister.
Undeniably, Abe still has the upper hand. Politics depends on the numbers. Yet, there is a real possibility that the numbers may shift over the course of the next seven months. Here, we should be reminded of yet another hard-and-fast rule of politics - you never know what’s around the corner.
Atsuro Kurashige is Expert Senior Writer at Mainichi Shimbun newspaper.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
なぜ安倍三選はないと思うのか？
倉重篤郎 / ジャーナリスト
2018年 3月 20日
日本の政治記者を集めてアンケートを取ったらどうなるか。
設問は２つ。安倍晋三首相は９月に行われる自民党総裁選で３選するか否か。そして、安倍首相は任期中に憲法９条改正を実現できるか否か。
多分、「３選」に対しては、大方の記者が「イエス」と答えるのではなかろうか。政治は数が意味を持つからだ。自民党内の派閥の勢力分野を見る限り、全国会議員４０８人のうち現時点では安倍支持勢力がゆうに過半数を超えそうだ。
では、９条改憲の方はどうか。これに対しては「イエス」と自信を持って言える記者は急に少なくなる。９条改憲の壁はまだ厚い、という認識があるからだ。そうすると、記者の多くは９条改憲は難しいかもしれないが、３選は果たすであろう、ということになる。
これに対して、私の回答はいずれも「ノー」である。
３選と改憲はワンセット、不可分の関係にあると思うからである。３選すれば安倍政権は第一期、二期合わせ１０年という明治以降の歴代首相として最長任期を手にすることになるが、同時にそれにふさわしい業績を上げるためのものでなくてはならない。９条改憲は、まさにそれに匹敵する大仕事であろうが、問題は安倍氏の言う９条改憲案がとても実現可能とは思えない点にある。
というのも、安倍案、つまり、９条の第一項（戦争放棄）と第二項（戦力不保持と交戦権の否定）を変えずに自衛隊の存在を追記するという案は、一見穏便な案に見えるが、詰めていくと理論的には欠陥が多すぎ、政治的にはハードルが高すぎる。
それは、戦力ではない自衛隊とは何か、という現行憲法の矛盾をさらに深刻化させるばかりか、自衛隊を明記することに意義があるのであってその役割は一切変わらないという安倍氏の説明は、感情論には訴えるが、立法事実がないのになぜ改憲が必要なのか、という法理に耐えるものではない。
政治的にも４つの壁がある。まずは自民党内がすんなりまとまるとは思えない。総裁選出馬予定の石破茂氏（自民党元幹事長）は２項を削除、自衛隊を戦力と位置付けるというスジ論を撤回しないだろうし、それを総裁選の争点に安倍氏と戦おうとするだろう。理論闘争で安倍氏が勝てるだろうか。連立を組む公明党は９条に手を付けること自体に消極的だ。もともと平和を売り物にしてきた同党からすると、集団的自衛権行使を一部容認する新安保法制に賛成（１５年成立）したことで、９条改憲に匹敵する仕事はした、それ以上は約束違反というのが本音である。
野党第一党の立憲民主党は、新安保法制自体を違憲、撤回すべき、としており、全く妥協の余地はない。たとえ、自民、公明の壁を超えることができたとしても、野党第一党が徹底抗戦する改憲案を国民投票が過半数を与えるとは思えない。この第４の壁の恐さは「ノー」と跳ね返されたとたんに政権が退陣に追い込まれる、というところにある。
つまり、安倍案は実現不能なうえ、こだわると政権自体をつぶしかねない厄介者なのである。とても３選を支える大義にはならない。かといって捨て去るわけにもいかない。せめてポケットチーフ的にちらつかせるのが精一杯ではなかろうか。ただ、ポケットチーフでは３選の道具立てとしては落第だ。さしもの自民党国会議員たちもそう判断するだろう。ゆえに３選もありえない、というのが私の見立てである。
安倍３選を疑うのは、別の理由もある。
長期政権化から出て来た慢心と飽きである。
森友・加計問題という安倍首相をめぐる２つのスキャンダルがある。森友は国有地払い下げ、加計は獣医学部設置認可、と態様は異なるが、いずれも最高権力者が結果的に自分の友達を優遇するという行政私物化不祥事である。慢心の結果であるが、それがボディーブローとなって政権脆弱化の原因となっていく。
安倍政権への飽きは、保守政界の長老たちの口から出始めた。小泉純一郎元首相は、議員引退後は原発ゼロ運動を進めてきたが、従来の「安倍首相が変われば日本は原発ゼロを実現できる」という主張を「もう安倍首相には期待しない」に変え、３選についても「ギリギリまでわからない」と突き放し始めた。小泉氏は安倍氏を自らの政権で重用、安倍政権の生みの親ともいう人物である。
また、安倍氏の政治家としての兄貴分を自任する亀井静香氏（元自民党政調会長）も安倍氏の慢心を指摘し、総裁選で石破茂氏の他、もう一人の候補である岸田文雄氏（現自民党政調会長）が出馬すれば、２位、３位連合が出来、安倍３選に赤信号が灯るだろうと、予測している。自民党総裁選は、１回目の投票で過半数を獲得する者がない場合２回目の決選投票をする仕組みになっており、１回目に２位、３位だった者同士が連携し、１位を逆転することが過去に何度もあったからだ。２０１２年の総裁選もまた、１回目２位の安倍氏が１位の石破氏を逆転して、首相になっている。
もちろん、今なお安倍氏が優勢なのは認めざるを得ない。政治は数であるからだ。ただ、その数があと７カ月のうちに変化することは十分ありうる。一寸先が闇である、というのもまた政治の鉄則だからだ。
筆者は毎日新聞専門編集委員
設問は２つ。安倍晋三首相は９月に行われる自民党総裁選で３選するか否か。そして、安倍首相は任期中に憲法９条改正を実現できるか否か。
多分、「３選」に対しては、大方の記者が「イエス」と答えるのではなかろうか。政治は数が意味を持つからだ。自民党内の派閥の勢力分野を見る限り、全国会議員４０８人のうち現時点では安倍支持勢力がゆうに過半数を超えそうだ。
では、９条改憲の方はどうか。これに対しては「イエス」と自信を持って言える記者は急に少なくなる。９条改憲の壁はまだ厚い、という認識があるからだ。そうすると、記者の多くは９条改憲は難しいかもしれないが、３選は果たすであろう、ということになる。
これに対して、私の回答はいずれも「ノー」である。
３選と改憲はワンセット、不可分の関係にあると思うからである。３選すれば安倍政権は第一期、二期合わせ１０年という明治以降の歴代首相として最長任期を手にすることになるが、同時にそれにふさわしい業績を上げるためのものでなくてはならない。９条改憲は、まさにそれに匹敵する大仕事であろうが、問題は安倍氏の言う９条改憲案がとても実現可能とは思えない点にある。
というのも、安倍案、つまり、９条の第一項（戦争放棄）と第二項（戦力不保持と交戦権の否定）を変えずに自衛隊の存在を追記するという案は、一見穏便な案に見えるが、詰めていくと理論的には欠陥が多すぎ、政治的にはハードルが高すぎる。
それは、戦力ではない自衛隊とは何か、という現行憲法の矛盾をさらに深刻化させるばかりか、自衛隊を明記することに意義があるのであってその役割は一切変わらないという安倍氏の説明は、感情論には訴えるが、立法事実がないのになぜ改憲が必要なのか、という法理に耐えるものではない。
政治的にも４つの壁がある。まずは自民党内がすんなりまとまるとは思えない。総裁選出馬予定の石破茂氏（自民党元幹事長）は２項を削除、自衛隊を戦力と位置付けるというスジ論を撤回しないだろうし、それを総裁選の争点に安倍氏と戦おうとするだろう。理論闘争で安倍氏が勝てるだろうか。連立を組む公明党は９条に手を付けること自体に消極的だ。もともと平和を売り物にしてきた同党からすると、集団的自衛権行使を一部容認する新安保法制に賛成（１５年成立）したことで、９条改憲に匹敵する仕事はした、それ以上は約束違反というのが本音である。
野党第一党の立憲民主党は、新安保法制自体を違憲、撤回すべき、としており、全く妥協の余地はない。たとえ、自民、公明の壁を超えることができたとしても、野党第一党が徹底抗戦する改憲案を国民投票が過半数を与えるとは思えない。この第４の壁の恐さは「ノー」と跳ね返されたとたんに政権が退陣に追い込まれる、というところにある。
つまり、安倍案は実現不能なうえ、こだわると政権自体をつぶしかねない厄介者なのである。とても３選を支える大義にはならない。かといって捨て去るわけにもいかない。せめてポケットチーフ的にちらつかせるのが精一杯ではなかろうか。ただ、ポケットチーフでは３選の道具立てとしては落第だ。さしもの自民党国会議員たちもそう判断するだろう。ゆえに３選もありえない、というのが私の見立てである。
安倍３選を疑うのは、別の理由もある。
長期政権化から出て来た慢心と飽きである。
森友・加計問題という安倍首相をめぐる２つのスキャンダルがある。森友は国有地払い下げ、加計は獣医学部設置認可、と態様は異なるが、いずれも最高権力者が結果的に自分の友達を優遇するという行政私物化不祥事である。慢心の結果であるが、それがボディーブローとなって政権脆弱化の原因となっていく。
安倍政権への飽きは、保守政界の長老たちの口から出始めた。小泉純一郎元首相は、議員引退後は原発ゼロ運動を進めてきたが、従来の「安倍首相が変われば日本は原発ゼロを実現できる」という主張を「もう安倍首相には期待しない」に変え、３選についても「ギリギリまでわからない」と突き放し始めた。小泉氏は安倍氏を自らの政権で重用、安倍政権の生みの親ともいう人物である。
また、安倍氏の政治家としての兄貴分を自任する亀井静香氏（元自民党政調会長）も安倍氏の慢心を指摘し、総裁選で石破茂氏の他、もう一人の候補である岸田文雄氏（現自民党政調会長）が出馬すれば、２位、３位連合が出来、安倍３選に赤信号が灯るだろうと、予測している。自民党総裁選は、１回目の投票で過半数を獲得する者がない場合２回目の決選投票をする仕組みになっており、１回目に２位、３位だった者同士が連携し、１位を逆転することが過去に何度もあったからだ。２０１２年の総裁選もまた、１回目２位の安倍氏が１位の石破氏を逆転して、首相になっている。
もちろん、今なお安倍氏が優勢なのは認めざるを得ない。政治は数であるからだ。ただ、その数があと７カ月のうちに変化することは十分ありうる。一寸先が闇である、というのもまた政治の鉄則だからだ。
筆者は毎日新聞専門編集委員
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟