The Outlook for North Korea’s Denuclearization and Japan’s Lack of a Long-Term Strategy
ISHIGOOKA Ken / Journalist
September 14, 2018
Division and confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, which had marked the postwar era, took a dramatic turn this year that led to the first ever summit meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean Workers’ Party Chairman Kim Jong-un. It was indeed a historic meeting, though the jury is still out concerning its content. In particular, there has been persistent criticism in Japan and the United States concerning the ambiguous and nebulous nature of their agreement on “denuclearization.”
“Nobody saw it coming” – the rapid rapprochement between the U.S. and North Korea was frequently described in these words. But earlier this year at a meeting with reporters, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin predicted just such a rapprochement. According to Putin, “Chairman Kim has clearly won the game. He is in possession of nuclear warheads and has also acquired missiles that can reach the U.S. mainland. (Chairman Kim) has now shifted his attention to sorting out and defusing the situation.” Putin also said prolonged negotiations would be needed to settle the issue.
And at a time when the U.S. and North Korean leaders were still firing salvoes at each other, Russian experts generally shared the view that: one, U.S. and North Korean comments that they “won’t rule out nuclear war” was a bluff, and that neither side wanted a nuclear war; and two, North Korea will cling on to its nuclear weapons to the very end.
North Korea will agree to a complete denuclearization only when the country’s current regime and the wellbeing of the Kim family are guaranteed. Locked in a bitter quarrel, the two sides have been bickering at each other for nearly seventy years, and there was no way they would suddenly decide to trust each other.
It would be difficult to verify even a single small nuclear warhead, if it lies hidden in the underground tunnels that are said to span several tens of kilometers across North Korea. And it would be next to impossible to force North Korea to fully comply with the provisions of “irreversible denuclearization,” when in all likelihood it already owns nuclear weapons technology. North Korea will continue to retain the ability to produce nuclear weapons should the need arise.
In the end, complete denuclearization will never be possible unless the two sides develop a sense of trust that the agreement will be honored by either side. In reality, the U.S. and North Korea have only just begun to build such trust, and are second guessing each other. If that is so, some kind of assurance will be needed to sustain mutual trust, and the only option is to have a third party provide backing for the agreement. The primary candidates would be China and South Korea, which would bring together all four countries involved in the Korean War. And if that were not enough, Japan and Russia would be called to the scene, signifying the resurgence of the six-party talks.
Consequently, this could be upgraded to a security conference for Northeast Asia. And as we expand the scope of the talks to ensuring security for East Asia as a whole, it would lead to broader issues including what should be the future of the Korean Peninsula, whether North-South unification is necessary, and whether North Korea will open its doors and be accepted by the international community.
Finally, the major focal point will be the position adopted by China, which has shown remarkable economic growth, and whether all of East Asia will fall under the shadow of China’s sphere of influence. In other words, there is a fair chance that the issue of denuclearizing North Korea may provoke a power struggle between the U.S. and China. We should bear in mind that members of the six-party talks – with the exception of Japan – are constantly exploring ways to reshape the post-Cold War order on the Korean Peninsula.
President Putin has already proposed plans for a trans-Korean railway, a North-South gas pipeline and a wide-area power grid. The plans reflect Russia’s long-term strategy, aimed at checking Chinese domination of the Korean Peninsula.
What will Japan do? Caught up in its principles of seeking early denuclearization and resolving the abductee issue, Japan has been unable to take a long-term approach rooted in reality. “What is Japan’s ultimate goal?” – While this question is being asked in countries around the world, it appears as though Japanese society isn’t listening.
Ken Ishigooka is a journalist and former special editor of the Mainichi Shimbun newspaper.
“Nobody saw it coming” – the rapid rapprochement between the U.S. and North Korea was frequently described in these words. But earlier this year at a meeting with reporters, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin predicted just such a rapprochement. According to Putin, “Chairman Kim has clearly won the game. He is in possession of nuclear warheads and has also acquired missiles that can reach the U.S. mainland. (Chairman Kim) has now shifted his attention to sorting out and defusing the situation.” Putin also said prolonged negotiations would be needed to settle the issue.
And at a time when the U.S. and North Korean leaders were still firing salvoes at each other, Russian experts generally shared the view that: one, U.S. and North Korean comments that they “won’t rule out nuclear war” was a bluff, and that neither side wanted a nuclear war; and two, North Korea will cling on to its nuclear weapons to the very end.
North Korea will agree to a complete denuclearization only when the country’s current regime and the wellbeing of the Kim family are guaranteed. Locked in a bitter quarrel, the two sides have been bickering at each other for nearly seventy years, and there was no way they would suddenly decide to trust each other.
It would be difficult to verify even a single small nuclear warhead, if it lies hidden in the underground tunnels that are said to span several tens of kilometers across North Korea. And it would be next to impossible to force North Korea to fully comply with the provisions of “irreversible denuclearization,” when in all likelihood it already owns nuclear weapons technology. North Korea will continue to retain the ability to produce nuclear weapons should the need arise.
In the end, complete denuclearization will never be possible unless the two sides develop a sense of trust that the agreement will be honored by either side. In reality, the U.S. and North Korea have only just begun to build such trust, and are second guessing each other. If that is so, some kind of assurance will be needed to sustain mutual trust, and the only option is to have a third party provide backing for the agreement. The primary candidates would be China and South Korea, which would bring together all four countries involved in the Korean War. And if that were not enough, Japan and Russia would be called to the scene, signifying the resurgence of the six-party talks.
Consequently, this could be upgraded to a security conference for Northeast Asia. And as we expand the scope of the talks to ensuring security for East Asia as a whole, it would lead to broader issues including what should be the future of the Korean Peninsula, whether North-South unification is necessary, and whether North Korea will open its doors and be accepted by the international community.
Finally, the major focal point will be the position adopted by China, which has shown remarkable economic growth, and whether all of East Asia will fall under the shadow of China’s sphere of influence. In other words, there is a fair chance that the issue of denuclearizing North Korea may provoke a power struggle between the U.S. and China. We should bear in mind that members of the six-party talks – with the exception of Japan – are constantly exploring ways to reshape the post-Cold War order on the Korean Peninsula.
President Putin has already proposed plans for a trans-Korean railway, a North-South gas pipeline and a wide-area power grid. The plans reflect Russia’s long-term strategy, aimed at checking Chinese domination of the Korean Peninsula.
What will Japan do? Caught up in its principles of seeking early denuclearization and resolving the abductee issue, Japan has been unable to take a long-term approach rooted in reality. “What is Japan’s ultimate goal?” – While this question is being asked in countries around the world, it appears as though Japanese society isn’t listening.
Ken Ishigooka is a journalist and former special editor of the Mainichi Shimbun newspaper.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
北朝鮮の核廃棄の行方――日本の長期戦略は何か？
石郷岡 建 / ジャーナリスト
2018年 9月 14日
戦後の南北朝鮮の分断と対立が、今年に入り急速に変化へと動き出し、米国のトランプ大統領と北朝鮮の金正恩・労働党委員長の初の首脳会談開催へとつながった。歴史的会談だったと思うが、その評価を巡っては様々に分かれている。特に、「核放棄」という合意内容があいまいで不透明だという批判が、日本や米国でくすぶっている。
この米朝急接近の動きについては「誰も予想していなかった」と語られることが多い。実はロシアのプーチン大統領は、今年初めの記者団相手の新春懇談で、米朝接近を予告し、「金正恩委員長は明らかにゲームに勝った。彼は核弾頭を持っており、米本土に到達するミサイルも獲得した。いまでは状況を整理し、沈静化させることに（金正恩委員長は）関心を持っている」と説明し、問題解決には長い交渉が必要だと語っていた。
ロシアの専門家たちも、まだ米朝の応酬が続いていた時点で、①米朝の「核戦争も辞さない」との発言は脅しであり、双方とも核戦争をする意志はない②北朝鮮は最後の最後まで核兵器を放さない――の２点でほぼ一致していた。
北朝鮮が核兵器の全面廃棄に応ずるのは、北朝鮮の現体制と金一族の生命が保証された時だけで、約７０年間、いがみ合い、憎悪をぶつけ合ってきた双方が簡単に相手を信ずることはあり得ない。
小さな核爆弾一つでも、北朝鮮国内に張り巡らされた数十キロ以上とも言われる地下道に隠された場合、検証は難しい。またすでに核兵器技術を習得したと見られる北朝鮮に「不可逆的な非核化」を１００％順守させることは不可能に近い。いざとなれば、いつでも核兵器を生産する技術は残っている。
結局、双方の間に、「合意したことは守る」という信頼が構築されない限り、完全な非核化などあり得ない。米朝は信頼構築に歩み始めたばかりで、疑心暗鬼に陥っているのが現実だ。そうなると双方の信頼を支える担保が必要であり、米朝に代わる第三者が合意の保証をするしかないだろう。その第三者とは、まず中国と韓国で、これで朝鮮戦争の４当事者国が揃う。それでも不十分であれば日露の登場となる。六者協議の再浮上である。
とどのつまり、東北アジア安全保障会議の設置へと格上げされるかもしれない。さらに東アジア全体の安全保障を考えると、朝鮮半島をどうするのか、南北統一は必要か、北朝鮮は門戸を開き、世界に受け入れるのか、という問題へと広がっていく。
最後に、大きな焦点となるのは経済発展が著しい中国の立ち位置で、東アジア全体が中国の影響圏下に入るのかという話になる。つまり北朝鮮の核廃棄問題は米中の覇権争いを呼び起こす可能性が十分にある。日本を除く６者協議の関係国は「朝鮮半島の冷戦構造が溶解した後の秩序をどうするか」を常に頭に置いていると考えたほうが良い。
プーチン大統領は、すでに朝鮮半島縦断鉄道、南北ガスパイプライン、広域電力網設置の三構想を提案している。南北朝鮮の和解を見越し、中国の朝鮮半島支配を牽制するロシアの長期的戦略がにじむ。
日本はどうするのか。核の早期放棄と拉致事件の解決という理念に縛られて、現実を踏まえた長期戦略へのアプローチができていないと思う。「結局、日本は何をしたいのか」。世界各国で語られている疑問が、日本の社会には届いていないように思える。
筆者は元毎日新聞社専門編集委員
この米朝急接近の動きについては「誰も予想していなかった」と語られることが多い。実はロシアのプーチン大統領は、今年初めの記者団相手の新春懇談で、米朝接近を予告し、「金正恩委員長は明らかにゲームに勝った。彼は核弾頭を持っており、米本土に到達するミサイルも獲得した。いまでは状況を整理し、沈静化させることに（金正恩委員長は）関心を持っている」と説明し、問題解決には長い交渉が必要だと語っていた。
ロシアの専門家たちも、まだ米朝の応酬が続いていた時点で、①米朝の「核戦争も辞さない」との発言は脅しであり、双方とも核戦争をする意志はない②北朝鮮は最後の最後まで核兵器を放さない――の２点でほぼ一致していた。
北朝鮮が核兵器の全面廃棄に応ずるのは、北朝鮮の現体制と金一族の生命が保証された時だけで、約７０年間、いがみ合い、憎悪をぶつけ合ってきた双方が簡単に相手を信ずることはあり得ない。
小さな核爆弾一つでも、北朝鮮国内に張り巡らされた数十キロ以上とも言われる地下道に隠された場合、検証は難しい。またすでに核兵器技術を習得したと見られる北朝鮮に「不可逆的な非核化」を１００％順守させることは不可能に近い。いざとなれば、いつでも核兵器を生産する技術は残っている。
結局、双方の間に、「合意したことは守る」という信頼が構築されない限り、完全な非核化などあり得ない。米朝は信頼構築に歩み始めたばかりで、疑心暗鬼に陥っているのが現実だ。そうなると双方の信頼を支える担保が必要であり、米朝に代わる第三者が合意の保証をするしかないだろう。その第三者とは、まず中国と韓国で、これで朝鮮戦争の４当事者国が揃う。それでも不十分であれば日露の登場となる。六者協議の再浮上である。
とどのつまり、東北アジア安全保障会議の設置へと格上げされるかもしれない。さらに東アジア全体の安全保障を考えると、朝鮮半島をどうするのか、南北統一は必要か、北朝鮮は門戸を開き、世界に受け入れるのか、という問題へと広がっていく。
最後に、大きな焦点となるのは経済発展が著しい中国の立ち位置で、東アジア全体が中国の影響圏下に入るのかという話になる。つまり北朝鮮の核廃棄問題は米中の覇権争いを呼び起こす可能性が十分にある。日本を除く６者協議の関係国は「朝鮮半島の冷戦構造が溶解した後の秩序をどうするか」を常に頭に置いていると考えたほうが良い。
プーチン大統領は、すでに朝鮮半島縦断鉄道、南北ガスパイプライン、広域電力網設置の三構想を提案している。南北朝鮮の和解を見越し、中国の朝鮮半島支配を牽制するロシアの長期的戦略がにじむ。
日本はどうするのか。核の早期放棄と拉致事件の解決という理念に縛られて、現実を踏まえた長期戦略へのアプローチができていないと思う。「結局、日本は何をしたいのか」。世界各国で語られている疑問が、日本の社会には届いていないように思える。
筆者は元毎日新聞社専門編集委員
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟