Five Reasons to Take Putin’s Suggestion Seriously
HANABUSA Masamichi / Former Ambassador to Italy
September 28, 2018
President Putin’s seemingly offhand suggestion to conclude a Japan-Russia Peace Treaty without any preconditions by the end of this year seems to have met overwhelming opposition or, at best, skepticism in Japan. This writer, however, considers that his suggestion is worth some serious thinking over. Of course, this is on the assumption that the Habomai Islands and Shikotan would be returned to Japan upon the conclusions of the Peace Treaty.
The following are my five reasons for taking his suggestion seriously.
Firstly, in all candor and braving criticism, I venture to say that this territorial issue has in fact become a matter of “face” for Japan, which is anxious not to lose the legal position it has held up to the present. Is Putin’s suggestion designed to make Japan give up its irredentism legally through the conclusion of the Peace Treaty? As a litmus test to gauge Putin’s intention, I wish to propose a possible Japanese response. It is to include in the Peace Treaty a clause stipulating that the final status of Kunashiri and Etorofu should be decided by a referendum of the inhabitants after say 50(or 100?) years and that, in case the two governments fail to agree on the holding of such a referendum, the clause shall be automatically renewed. The normalization of the relations between Japan and Russia based on this compromise would usher in a better economic and political relationship, since apart from this territorial issue no serious conflict of national interests exists between the two countries. It would also be politically significant as rapprochement between Japan and Russia might put a brake on further deepening of the Russia-China partnership.
Secondly, the present situation in the two islands seems to resemble that of Japan’s marginalized remote islands, exacerbated by the cold and harsh climatic conditions. How would rational economic development of the islands be conceivable? When Japan itself is faced with increasing labor shortage due to declining birth rates, would many Japanese be interested in moving to the islands for some viable economic activities? On the Japanese side, these questions should be considered a little more realistically and judiciously.
Thirdly, the writer cannot agree to the view that the conclusion of the Peace Treaty would deprive Japan of whatever little negotiating leverage left towards the return of these islands. It must be pointed out, in this connection, that Prime Minister Abe changed the negotiation tack from the traditional insistence of Japan’s righteous legal position to the one seeking the return of the islands through the betterment of the bilateral relations following the conclusion of the Peace Treaty. In my view, this reflected the realistic realization on the Japanese side that its single leverage of refusing to conclude the peace treaty in the absence of the return of the islands had not brought about the change of the Soviet/Russian attitude. If President Putin were to regard the conclusion of the Peace Treaty as “the objective fully achieved”, I would say that there had not existed from the beginning any concrete basis for good Japan-Russia relations. As Russia needs to shift its gravity from Europe to Asia, such a judgment, which would negate the possible benefits accruing from mutually beneficial Japan-Russia relations, would not be in the interest of Russia.
Fourthly, Russia is on the demanding side as to Japan’s active participation in the development of the Northern Islands and Siberia. It would be more realistic to expect that once Japan plays the card of signing the Peace Treaty, the Russian side must come up with more attractive conditions to woo the reluctant Japanese business community.
Fifthly, if Japan’s relations with Russia are stabilized due to the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, Japan may be more dynamically involved with the economic activities in these islands, which may mean more Japanese moving into these islands and the present inhabitants of the islands becoming more favorably disposed towards Japan. The new situation may bring about a change in the composition of islands’ inhabitants over a long span of time like 50 or 100 years in the future, which in turn may affect their preference regarding the islands’ future.
Prime Minister Abe and President Putin, who have built good personal rapport, are sure to stay in power for a few years to come. If they fail to conclude a Peace Treaty because of various domestic oppositions, Japan and Russia will be disappointing themselves as two nations incapable of conceiving a grand future design together. I hope that President Putin would be forthcoming to accept a compromise formula which saves Japan’s face. In the same vein, I earnestly hope that the Japanese people would overcome their emotional repulsion against Russia and dispassionately see the balance of interests as mentioned above.
Masamichi Hanabusa is Emeritus Chairman of ESUJ.
The following are my five reasons for taking his suggestion seriously.
Firstly, in all candor and braving criticism, I venture to say that this territorial issue has in fact become a matter of “face” for Japan, which is anxious not to lose the legal position it has held up to the present. Is Putin’s suggestion designed to make Japan give up its irredentism legally through the conclusion of the Peace Treaty? As a litmus test to gauge Putin’s intention, I wish to propose a possible Japanese response. It is to include in the Peace Treaty a clause stipulating that the final status of Kunashiri and Etorofu should be decided by a referendum of the inhabitants after say 50(or 100?) years and that, in case the two governments fail to agree on the holding of such a referendum, the clause shall be automatically renewed. The normalization of the relations between Japan and Russia based on this compromise would usher in a better economic and political relationship, since apart from this territorial issue no serious conflict of national interests exists between the two countries. It would also be politically significant as rapprochement between Japan and Russia might put a brake on further deepening of the Russia-China partnership.
Secondly, the present situation in the two islands seems to resemble that of Japan’s marginalized remote islands, exacerbated by the cold and harsh climatic conditions. How would rational economic development of the islands be conceivable? When Japan itself is faced with increasing labor shortage due to declining birth rates, would many Japanese be interested in moving to the islands for some viable economic activities? On the Japanese side, these questions should be considered a little more realistically and judiciously.
Thirdly, the writer cannot agree to the view that the conclusion of the Peace Treaty would deprive Japan of whatever little negotiating leverage left towards the return of these islands. It must be pointed out, in this connection, that Prime Minister Abe changed the negotiation tack from the traditional insistence of Japan’s righteous legal position to the one seeking the return of the islands through the betterment of the bilateral relations following the conclusion of the Peace Treaty. In my view, this reflected the realistic realization on the Japanese side that its single leverage of refusing to conclude the peace treaty in the absence of the return of the islands had not brought about the change of the Soviet/Russian attitude. If President Putin were to regard the conclusion of the Peace Treaty as “the objective fully achieved”, I would say that there had not existed from the beginning any concrete basis for good Japan-Russia relations. As Russia needs to shift its gravity from Europe to Asia, such a judgment, which would negate the possible benefits accruing from mutually beneficial Japan-Russia relations, would not be in the interest of Russia.
Fourthly, Russia is on the demanding side as to Japan’s active participation in the development of the Northern Islands and Siberia. It would be more realistic to expect that once Japan plays the card of signing the Peace Treaty, the Russian side must come up with more attractive conditions to woo the reluctant Japanese business community.
Fifthly, if Japan’s relations with Russia are stabilized due to the conclusion of the Peace Treaty, Japan may be more dynamically involved with the economic activities in these islands, which may mean more Japanese moving into these islands and the present inhabitants of the islands becoming more favorably disposed towards Japan. The new situation may bring about a change in the composition of islands’ inhabitants over a long span of time like 50 or 100 years in the future, which in turn may affect their preference regarding the islands’ future.
Prime Minister Abe and President Putin, who have built good personal rapport, are sure to stay in power for a few years to come. If they fail to conclude a Peace Treaty because of various domestic oppositions, Japan and Russia will be disappointing themselves as two nations incapable of conceiving a grand future design together. I hope that President Putin would be forthcoming to accept a compromise formula which saves Japan’s face. In the same vein, I earnestly hope that the Japanese people would overcome their emotional repulsion against Russia and dispassionately see the balance of interests as mentioned above.
Masamichi Hanabusa is Emeritus Chairman of ESUJ.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
プーチン提案を真剣に検討するべき5つの理由
英 正道 / 元駐伊大使
2018年 9月 28日
年末までに日露両国が無条件で平和条約を締結しようと思いつきのように言うプーチン提案については、日本国内に反対論ないし懐疑論が圧倒的である。にも拘わらず、筆者はこの考えを進めて見る価値があると考える。勿論平和条約の締結とともに、歯舞諸島と色丹島が日本に引き渡されるとの前提である。以下に五つの理由を述べる。
第一に、非難を恐れず率直に言って、今や北方領土問題は、日本のこれまでの立場を如何に失わないかの、いわば面子の問題に近くなっている。プーチン提案の目的が、かかる平和条約の締結で日本に失地回復を法的に断念させることにあるかどうか、次のような対案でリトマス試験に掛けて見てはどうか。それは平和条約の中に、国後、択捉両島の帰属については、50年ないし100年後の住民投票での決定(両国間で投票実施に合意できない場合は更に自動延長する)に委ねるという条項を盛り込むと言う案である。日露両国間には領土問題以外には対立する国益は存在しないから、この妥協に基づく日ロ関係の正常化で、両国関係が緊密化することは明らかである。今以上の中ロ提携を牽制する政治的意義も大きいであろう。
第二に、両島は日本本土の過疎地のような限界状況にあるのみならず、寒冷で居住環境は劣っている。日本側はもう少し現実的に、そもそも両島の合理的な経済開発が可能か、少子化で日本で求人難が生まれつつある現状で、多くの日本人が開発のために両島に移住するかどうか、冷静に判断する必要がある。
第三に、筆者は平和条約の締結はさなきだに少ない日本の交渉材料を失う結果を招くとの議論には与しない。戦後70年間四島返還無くして平和条約を締結することを拒否するとの梃子だけではソ連／ロシアの態度変更をもたらすことが出来なかったと現実的に考えたからこそ、安倍内閣に至り、それまでの日本の正当な法的立場の主張から日露友好優先、結果としての領土問題解決へと交渉態度を変えたのである。もし平和条約の締結で、ロシアが「事成れり」と考えるのであれば、当初から日露友好関係の基礎は存在しないと言って良いであろう。しかしアジアに重心を移さねばならないロシアにとり、互恵的な日ロ関係のもたらす利益を否定することとなるそのような判断は自己の利益に反することとなろう。
第四に北方諸島、更にはシベリアに於ける日本の経済活動の積極化については、求めているのはロシア側である。日本が平和条約締結のカードを切った後、むしろロシア側の方が、消極的な日本の経済界に対して従来より魅力的な条件を示さざるを得なくなると見る方が、現実的であろう。
第五に、日ロ関係の安定化の結果、日本の経済力が長期的に両島に浸透し、日露間の経済協力が合理的な基盤の元に発展するなら、日本人の移住も進むかもしれないし、少なくとも現在の住民の日本観が好転することは明らかであろう。その進展は５０年先、１００年先の両島の住民構成を変えるかもしれないし、住民の意向にも影響を与えることもあり得よう。
これまでに個人的な接触を深めて来た安倍総理とプーチン大統領は、今後更に数年間は、両国の国政を担うことが見込まれる。この基盤の上で平和条約が締結出来ないとしたら、日露両国民は百年の計を立てられない民族であると言わざるを得ない。プーチン大統領が、領土問題で日本の面子を損なわないフォーミュラに前向きに臨むことを期待する。日本国民も上述の長期的な損得勘定を一度虚心に考えて、感情に支配されないで貰いたいと切望する。
筆者は本連盟の名誉会長である。
第一に、非難を恐れず率直に言って、今や北方領土問題は、日本のこれまでの立場を如何に失わないかの、いわば面子の問題に近くなっている。プーチン提案の目的が、かかる平和条約の締結で日本に失地回復を法的に断念させることにあるかどうか、次のような対案でリトマス試験に掛けて見てはどうか。それは平和条約の中に、国後、択捉両島の帰属については、50年ないし100年後の住民投票での決定(両国間で投票実施に合意できない場合は更に自動延長する)に委ねるという条項を盛り込むと言う案である。日露両国間には領土問題以外には対立する国益は存在しないから、この妥協に基づく日ロ関係の正常化で、両国関係が緊密化することは明らかである。今以上の中ロ提携を牽制する政治的意義も大きいであろう。
第二に、両島は日本本土の過疎地のような限界状況にあるのみならず、寒冷で居住環境は劣っている。日本側はもう少し現実的に、そもそも両島の合理的な経済開発が可能か、少子化で日本で求人難が生まれつつある現状で、多くの日本人が開発のために両島に移住するかどうか、冷静に判断する必要がある。
第三に、筆者は平和条約の締結はさなきだに少ない日本の交渉材料を失う結果を招くとの議論には与しない。戦後70年間四島返還無くして平和条約を締結することを拒否するとの梃子だけではソ連／ロシアの態度変更をもたらすことが出来なかったと現実的に考えたからこそ、安倍内閣に至り、それまでの日本の正当な法的立場の主張から日露友好優先、結果としての領土問題解決へと交渉態度を変えたのである。もし平和条約の締結で、ロシアが「事成れり」と考えるのであれば、当初から日露友好関係の基礎は存在しないと言って良いであろう。しかしアジアに重心を移さねばならないロシアにとり、互恵的な日ロ関係のもたらす利益を否定することとなるそのような判断は自己の利益に反することとなろう。
第四に北方諸島、更にはシベリアに於ける日本の経済活動の積極化については、求めているのはロシア側である。日本が平和条約締結のカードを切った後、むしろロシア側の方が、消極的な日本の経済界に対して従来より魅力的な条件を示さざるを得なくなると見る方が、現実的であろう。
第五に、日ロ関係の安定化の結果、日本の経済力が長期的に両島に浸透し、日露間の経済協力が合理的な基盤の元に発展するなら、日本人の移住も進むかもしれないし、少なくとも現在の住民の日本観が好転することは明らかであろう。その進展は５０年先、１００年先の両島の住民構成を変えるかもしれないし、住民の意向にも影響を与えることもあり得よう。
これまでに個人的な接触を深めて来た安倍総理とプーチン大統領は、今後更に数年間は、両国の国政を担うことが見込まれる。この基盤の上で平和条約が締結出来ないとしたら、日露両国民は百年の計を立てられない民族であると言わざるを得ない。プーチン大統領が、領土問題で日本の面子を損なわないフォーミュラに前向きに臨むことを期待する。日本国民も上述の長期的な損得勘定を一度虚心に考えて、感情に支配されないで貰いたいと切望する。
筆者は本連盟の名誉会長である。
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟