Overseas Criticism of Japanese Investigation Techniques in the Case of Ex-Nissan Chairman Carlos Ghosn
TAKAO Yoshihiko / Journalist
January 22, 2019
Carlos Ghosn, former Chairman of Nissan Motor Corporation, was arrested for the second time on suspicion of aggravated breach of trust, and spent the start of 2019 locked in a cell at the Tokyo Detention Center in Kosuge. He was originally arrested on November 19 last year by the special investigation unit of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutor’s Office for allegedly violating the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act by failing to report approximately 5 billion yen in earnings. Since then, he has remained in detention for more than fifty days.
The shock of the arrest immediately gave way to criticism, primarily from outside Japan, which can be summarized into two points – the method adopted by Japanese investigators of grilling suspects over an extended period of detention, and the Japanese system of not allowing lawyers to be present during questioning. There are historical and other differences between the judicial systems in Japan on the one hand and the United States and Western Europe on the other. With respect to taking suspects into custody, the Japanese system provides oversight by having the courts decide whether or not to allow detention, so unilateral criticism seems unreasonable. However, questions raised here serve as valuable pointers to inherent issues in the Japanese system that should be addressed by those in the legal profession.
Here is a quick review of how things developed. The special investigation unit arrested former Chairman Ghosn and former Nissan executive Greg Kelly on November 19 for allegedly submitting an annual securities report stating that Mr. Ghosn had received around 4.987 billion yen in compensation for the period between 2011 and 2015, when the actual amount was around 9.998 billion yen. On December 10, they were re-arrested for under-reporting about 4.2 billion yen more in compensation for the nearest three years. The Tokyo District Court denied the prosecution’s request to keep the two detained for another ten days based on this allegation, and on December 21, only former Chairman Ghosn was arrested yet again for aggravated breach of trust, while Mr. Kelly was granted bail and released on December 25.
Under the Japanese legal system, the prosecution can file a request for ten days of detention within 48 hours of arresting a suspect, and an additional ten days as needed. In the current case, the prosecutors and the court had played by the book, but the charges for the first and second arrests were the same except for the period cited, and the court may have denied the second extension also in consideration of criticism from overseas. Meanwhile, the third arrest was based on a completely new charge, so the court granted a total detention period of twenty days until January 11.
As for judicial systems in other countries, in France for example, suspects can be detained without a warrant, for a period of one day in principle to a maximum of four days, while a maximum of six days’ detention is granted for terrorist charges. The difference with Japan is that in France investigations are also conducted by a magistrate, in which case the suspect can be detained for as long as four years and eight months. In the United States, the maximum period of detention is thirty days from arrest to indictment by a grand jury, and an extension of another thirty days may be granted as an exception. As in France, arrests are mostly made without a warrant. In any case, no simple comparisons can be made with the Japanese system.
Considering this premise, why then has this case been criticized as a “human rights violation” and “bizarre inquisition” by the foreign media? Such criticism has been extended even to the way Japanese suspects are treated during detention. As a journalist with a longstanding interest in the judicial system, when I come across criticism of Japan’s extensive detention periods, my thoughts turn to the evils of “hostage justice.”
Usually, a suspect can seek bail after being charged. But when a suspect denies the charges, the prosecution can submit its opinion against granting bail, which is often accepted by the court. In recent cases, the former chairman of school operator Moritomo Gakuen and his wife remained in detention for 299 days. Suzuki Muneo, who was a member of the House of Representative when he was accused of influence peddling, was detained for 437 days from 2002 to 2003, while Horie Takafumi, former CEO of Livedoor, spent 95 days in detention.
And there was Muraki Atsuko, a former bureau chief at the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, who was arrested in 2009 in connection to a postal abuse scandal. Before being acquitted, she spent 164 days in detention, and during this time the special investigation unit of the Osaka District Public Prosecutors Office went so far as to fabricate evidence against her, which subsequently came to light and led to the arrest of public prosecutors.
In the Lockheed Scandal I covered in 1976, the special investigation unit of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office arrested former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei on July 27 for allegedly violating the Foreign Exchange Control Law. Tanaka was slapped with an additional charge of taking bribes and released after only 20 days in detention. The former prime minister denied receiving 500 million yen in bribes, but his denial had been factored in by the special investigation unit. The term “hostage justice” didn’t exist at the time I was reporting this scandal, and it wouldn’t be completely inaccurate to say that that the Japanese judiciary became tainted by corrupt practices deserving of criticism from around the turn of the 20th century.
In financial cases such as bribery scandals and the latest case involving Nissan, it was customary for the special investigation unit to collect enough incriminating evidence before detaining major suspects for questioning. “Hostage justice” became rampant as the nature of the special investigation unit within the prosecution changed from that of a low-profile group of professionals sniffing after the trail of evidence to that of a gateway to promotion for prosecutors. In the current case, prosecutors have turned to the use of plea bargaining, but even with this new weapon in hand, I am concerned that their investigative capabilities are on the decline.
Japanese Bar Associations and others have strongly demanded reforms against the practice of “hostage justice.” The courts have also come under fire for acting in unison with prosecutors by giving consent in favor of the prosecution’s intentions.
It is doubtful if observers outside voicing their criticism are fully aware of the issues faced by the Japanese judicial system. Even so, we should recognize the gravity of the fact that the Tokyo District Court’s unusual decision to deny a further extension to Mr. Ghosn’s detention was hailed as epoch-making by some. Regardless of the validity of foreign criticism, as a country with such a judicial system, I hope Japan will take this opportunity to return to the basics of democracy and give consideration to the human rights of suspects.
On a further note, current issues raised by denying the presence of a lawyer during questioning offer an opportunity to address the criticism against questioning suspects behind closed doors. Since writing my book “Tsuyoki wo Kujiki – Shiho Kaikaku eno Michi (Breaking the Powerful – The Road to Judicial Reform, Mainichi Shimbun, 1999),” I have followed the actions taken by Nakabo Kohei, the former chairman of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations. Nakabo was instrumental in establishing the Justice System Reform Council, which eventually led to the introduction of a jury system in 2009. Concurrently, measures were implemented to increase the number of applicants who pass the bar exam as a means to expand the role of lawyers in Japanese society.
The rise in the number of lawyers was mostly limited to the area of civil law and had little effect on criminal law. However, work is under way to ensure transparency as an alternative measure; in major cases, audiovisual recordings are being required to check the process of questioning by prosecutors. It has taken a long time for the Japanese judiciary to get here. And while lawyers are not expected to be allowed to sit in on questioning any time soon, we must continue to seek a better way as we struggle between uncovering the truth and ensuring suspects’ human rights.
Yoshihiko Takao is a former legal affairs reporter for the Mainichi Shimbun newspaper, and has written books including “Yoki na Piero-tachi - Tanaka Kakuei Genso no Genba kensho (Cheerful Clowns – On-site Investigation of the Illusion of Tanaka Kakuei, Shakai Shishousha) and “Nakabo Kohei no Shura ni Iru (Nakabo Kohei – Into the Scene of Carnage, Mainichi Shibun).
The shock of the arrest immediately gave way to criticism, primarily from outside Japan, which can be summarized into two points – the method adopted by Japanese investigators of grilling suspects over an extended period of detention, and the Japanese system of not allowing lawyers to be present during questioning. There are historical and other differences between the judicial systems in Japan on the one hand and the United States and Western Europe on the other. With respect to taking suspects into custody, the Japanese system provides oversight by having the courts decide whether or not to allow detention, so unilateral criticism seems unreasonable. However, questions raised here serve as valuable pointers to inherent issues in the Japanese system that should be addressed by those in the legal profession.
Here is a quick review of how things developed. The special investigation unit arrested former Chairman Ghosn and former Nissan executive Greg Kelly on November 19 for allegedly submitting an annual securities report stating that Mr. Ghosn had received around 4.987 billion yen in compensation for the period between 2011 and 2015, when the actual amount was around 9.998 billion yen. On December 10, they were re-arrested for under-reporting about 4.2 billion yen more in compensation for the nearest three years. The Tokyo District Court denied the prosecution’s request to keep the two detained for another ten days based on this allegation, and on December 21, only former Chairman Ghosn was arrested yet again for aggravated breach of trust, while Mr. Kelly was granted bail and released on December 25.
Under the Japanese legal system, the prosecution can file a request for ten days of detention within 48 hours of arresting a suspect, and an additional ten days as needed. In the current case, the prosecutors and the court had played by the book, but the charges for the first and second arrests were the same except for the period cited, and the court may have denied the second extension also in consideration of criticism from overseas. Meanwhile, the third arrest was based on a completely new charge, so the court granted a total detention period of twenty days until January 11.
As for judicial systems in other countries, in France for example, suspects can be detained without a warrant, for a period of one day in principle to a maximum of four days, while a maximum of six days’ detention is granted for terrorist charges. The difference with Japan is that in France investigations are also conducted by a magistrate, in which case the suspect can be detained for as long as four years and eight months. In the United States, the maximum period of detention is thirty days from arrest to indictment by a grand jury, and an extension of another thirty days may be granted as an exception. As in France, arrests are mostly made without a warrant. In any case, no simple comparisons can be made with the Japanese system.
Considering this premise, why then has this case been criticized as a “human rights violation” and “bizarre inquisition” by the foreign media? Such criticism has been extended even to the way Japanese suspects are treated during detention. As a journalist with a longstanding interest in the judicial system, when I come across criticism of Japan’s extensive detention periods, my thoughts turn to the evils of “hostage justice.”
Usually, a suspect can seek bail after being charged. But when a suspect denies the charges, the prosecution can submit its opinion against granting bail, which is often accepted by the court. In recent cases, the former chairman of school operator Moritomo Gakuen and his wife remained in detention for 299 days. Suzuki Muneo, who was a member of the House of Representative when he was accused of influence peddling, was detained for 437 days from 2002 to 2003, while Horie Takafumi, former CEO of Livedoor, spent 95 days in detention.
And there was Muraki Atsuko, a former bureau chief at the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, who was arrested in 2009 in connection to a postal abuse scandal. Before being acquitted, she spent 164 days in detention, and during this time the special investigation unit of the Osaka District Public Prosecutors Office went so far as to fabricate evidence against her, which subsequently came to light and led to the arrest of public prosecutors.
In the Lockheed Scandal I covered in 1976, the special investigation unit of the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office arrested former Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei on July 27 for allegedly violating the Foreign Exchange Control Law. Tanaka was slapped with an additional charge of taking bribes and released after only 20 days in detention. The former prime minister denied receiving 500 million yen in bribes, but his denial had been factored in by the special investigation unit. The term “hostage justice” didn’t exist at the time I was reporting this scandal, and it wouldn’t be completely inaccurate to say that that the Japanese judiciary became tainted by corrupt practices deserving of criticism from around the turn of the 20th century.
In financial cases such as bribery scandals and the latest case involving Nissan, it was customary for the special investigation unit to collect enough incriminating evidence before detaining major suspects for questioning. “Hostage justice” became rampant as the nature of the special investigation unit within the prosecution changed from that of a low-profile group of professionals sniffing after the trail of evidence to that of a gateway to promotion for prosecutors. In the current case, prosecutors have turned to the use of plea bargaining, but even with this new weapon in hand, I am concerned that their investigative capabilities are on the decline.
Japanese Bar Associations and others have strongly demanded reforms against the practice of “hostage justice.” The courts have also come under fire for acting in unison with prosecutors by giving consent in favor of the prosecution’s intentions.
It is doubtful if observers outside voicing their criticism are fully aware of the issues faced by the Japanese judicial system. Even so, we should recognize the gravity of the fact that the Tokyo District Court’s unusual decision to deny a further extension to Mr. Ghosn’s detention was hailed as epoch-making by some. Regardless of the validity of foreign criticism, as a country with such a judicial system, I hope Japan will take this opportunity to return to the basics of democracy and give consideration to the human rights of suspects.
On a further note, current issues raised by denying the presence of a lawyer during questioning offer an opportunity to address the criticism against questioning suspects behind closed doors. Since writing my book “Tsuyoki wo Kujiki – Shiho Kaikaku eno Michi (Breaking the Powerful – The Road to Judicial Reform, Mainichi Shimbun, 1999),” I have followed the actions taken by Nakabo Kohei, the former chairman of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations. Nakabo was instrumental in establishing the Justice System Reform Council, which eventually led to the introduction of a jury system in 2009. Concurrently, measures were implemented to increase the number of applicants who pass the bar exam as a means to expand the role of lawyers in Japanese society.
The rise in the number of lawyers was mostly limited to the area of civil law and had little effect on criminal law. However, work is under way to ensure transparency as an alternative measure; in major cases, audiovisual recordings are being required to check the process of questioning by prosecutors. It has taken a long time for the Japanese judiciary to get here. And while lawyers are not expected to be allowed to sit in on questioning any time soon, we must continue to seek a better way as we struggle between uncovering the truth and ensuring suspects’ human rights.
Yoshihiko Takao is a former legal affairs reporter for the Mainichi Shimbun newspaper, and has written books including “Yoki na Piero-tachi - Tanaka Kakuei Genso no Genba kensho (Cheerful Clowns – On-site Investigation of the Illusion of Tanaka Kakuei, Shakai Shishousha) and “Nakabo Kohei no Shura ni Iru (Nakabo Kohei – Into the Scene of Carnage, Mainichi Shibun).
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
カルロス・ゴーン日産前会長事件 —日本の捜査手法に対する海外の批判を考える
高尾義彦 / ジャーナリスト
2019年 1月 22日
特別背任容疑で再々逮捕された日産のゴーン前会長は２０１９年の正月を小菅の東京拘置所で迎えた。前年の１１月１９日、公表すべき報酬 約５０億円を隠ぺいしたとして金融商品取引法違反容疑で東京地検特捜部に逮捕されて以来、勾留日数は５０日を超えた。
衝撃的な逮捕直後から主に海外メディアで展開された批判は、集約すれば、日本の捜査当局が取り入れている長期勾留による取り調べと、取り調べに弁護士が立ち会うことが出来ない日本的制度の二点に絞られる。日本の司法制度と欧米の制度の間には、歴史的な成り立ちからも、異なる部分がある。被疑者の身柄拘束の問題では、勾留を許可するかどうか、裁判所が判断するチェック機能が存在し、この日本的システムに対する一方的な司法批判は妥当ではないと考えるが、貴重な問題提起として司法関係者が考えるべき課題は潜在している。
事件の経過を簡単に振り返ると、特捜部はゴーン前会長とグレッグ・ケリー前取締役を１９日に逮捕、容疑は１１～１５年までの前会長の報酬が約９億９８００万円だったのに約４９億８７００万円と記載した有価証券報告書を提出した、とされる。１２月１０日には直近３年間についても約４２億円を過少申告したとして再逮捕。同容疑による勾留延長請求（１０日間）が裁判所により却下されたため、翌２１日、特別背任容疑で前会長のみを再々逮捕、ケリー前取締役は保釈が認められて２５日に釈放された。
日本の司法制度によれば、検察は被疑者逮捕から４８時間以内に１０日間の勾留を請求、必要があればさらに１０日間の勾留を請求することが出来る。今回の事件では、検察と裁判所の間で、ルール通りに当たり前の手続きが取られたが、二度目の逮捕容疑については最初の逮捕容疑と時期が異なるだけで内容は同様であることや海外からの批判に裁判所が配慮した可能性が考えられる。三度目の逮捕では、容疑が全く異なることから、１月１１日まで計２０日間の勾留が認められた。
海外の司法制度をみると、例えばフランスでは令状なしで身柄拘束が出来るが、拘束は原則１日、最長で４日（テロ関係で６日）となっている。だが、日本にはない予審判事による捜査があり、その場合は最長４年８か月の拘束が認められている。米国では逮捕から大陪審による起訴まで最長３０日、例外的にさらに３０日以内で延長が可能だが、こちらも令状なしの逮捕が多い。いずれにしても、日本の制度と単純に比較することは出来ない。
こうした前提を考えてもなお、「人権侵害」「宗教裁判だ」「奇妙な異端審問」などの批判が海外メディアを登場したのはなぜだろうか。批判は、日本人被疑者を対象とした拘置所内の処遇にも及ぶが、長期勾留への批判を聞くと、永年、司法制度に関心を抱いてきたジャーナリストの立場としては、「人質司法」と呼ばれる悪弊に思い至ることになる。
一般に被疑者は起訴された後は、保釈を申請することが出来る。ところが、被疑者が起訴事実を否認している場合、検察は保釈請求に反対の意見を提示し、裁判所もこれを認めることが多い。最近では森友学園の前理事長夫妻が２９９日も身柄を拘束された。あっせん収賄罪の鈴木宗男衆議院議員（当時）は２００２～０３年に４３７日間、拘置され、ライブドア社長だった堀江貴文被告も９５日間、拘置所にいた。
郵便不正事件で２００９年に逮捕され、後に無罪になった村木厚子元厚生省局長の拘置期間は１６４日だった。この間、大阪地検特捜部は証拠を偽造してまで元局長の有罪立証を図ったが、その事実が明るみに出て特捜検事らが逮捕される事態になった。
１９７６年に取材したロッキード事件で東京地検特捜部は７月２７日、外為法違反で田中角栄元首相を逮捕し、２０日間の勾留期間のみで受託収賄罪を加えて起訴、釈放している。元首相は５億円授受などを否認したが、特捜部としては織り込み済みだった。この取材体験当時、「人質司法」という言葉はなく、２０世紀末から２１世紀にかけて、批判されるべき悪習が司法界を汚染していったといっても過言ではない。
政治家による贈収賄事件や日産の事例のような経済事件では、主要な被疑者の身柄を拘束して取り調べる段階では、被疑者が否認しても有罪を立証できるだけの証拠を揃えるのが、特捜部の本来の手法だった。「人質司法」が横行するようになった背景には、検察内部で、特捜部が地を這うように証拠を追う地味な職人集団から、出世のための検事の関門といった位置づけに変質したことがあげられる。今回は「司法取引」を利用した捜査となったが、新たな武器を導入してもなお、捜査能力が低下しているのでは、と懸念を抱かざるを得ない。
「人質司法」に対して弁護士会などは強く改善を求めてきた。検察の意向を追認する形で検察と一体となった裁判所にも批判の矢は向けられる。
海外からの批判は、日本の司法が抱える問題を認識したうえでの言葉とは思えない。しかし、東京地裁が前会長の勾留延長を認めなかった異例の判断が一部で画期的と評価された事実は重い意味を持つ。海外からの批判の当否はともかくとして、こうした司法制度を持つ日本が、改めて民主主義の原点に立ち返って、被疑者の人権を考える機会にしてほしいと希望する。
もう一点、被疑者の取り調べに弁護士が立ち会えないことに対する問題提起では、密室での取り調べに対する批判を考える契機になる。拙著『強きをくじき 司法改革への道』（毎日新聞社、１９９９年）以来、その活動をフォローしてきた中坊公平・元日弁連会長らが提唱して司法制度改革審議会が発足、その成果として裁判員制度が導入された（２００９年）。並行して弁護士の社会的役割を広げるため司法試験合格者の人数を増やす施策がとられた。
弁護士増員は民事の分野が中心で、刑事事件では有効性を発揮していないが、それに代わる手法として「取り調べ段階の可視化」が進められている。主要な事件では、取り調べを録画、録音して検事の取り調べをチェックすることが求められている。ここに至るまでに、日本の司法は長い時間を要している。取り調べに対する弁護士の立ち合いはただちに実現するとは考えにくいが、真実の探求と被疑者の人権というせめぎ合う課題の中で、ベターな道への模索が求められる。
筆者は元毎日新聞司法記者。著書は『陽気なピエロたち 田中角栄幻想の現場検証』（社会思想社）『中坊公平の 修羅に入る』（毎日新聞社）など。
衝撃的な逮捕直後から主に海外メディアで展開された批判は、集約すれば、日本の捜査当局が取り入れている長期勾留による取り調べと、取り調べに弁護士が立ち会うことが出来ない日本的制度の二点に絞られる。日本の司法制度と欧米の制度の間には、歴史的な成り立ちからも、異なる部分がある。被疑者の身柄拘束の問題では、勾留を許可するかどうか、裁判所が判断するチェック機能が存在し、この日本的システムに対する一方的な司法批判は妥当ではないと考えるが、貴重な問題提起として司法関係者が考えるべき課題は潜在している。
事件の経過を簡単に振り返ると、特捜部はゴーン前会長とグレッグ・ケリー前取締役を１９日に逮捕、容疑は１１～１５年までの前会長の報酬が約９億９８００万円だったのに約４９億８７００万円と記載した有価証券報告書を提出した、とされる。１２月１０日には直近３年間についても約４２億円を過少申告したとして再逮捕。同容疑による勾留延長請求（１０日間）が裁判所により却下されたため、翌２１日、特別背任容疑で前会長のみを再々逮捕、ケリー前取締役は保釈が認められて２５日に釈放された。
日本の司法制度によれば、検察は被疑者逮捕から４８時間以内に１０日間の勾留を請求、必要があればさらに１０日間の勾留を請求することが出来る。今回の事件では、検察と裁判所の間で、ルール通りに当たり前の手続きが取られたが、二度目の逮捕容疑については最初の逮捕容疑と時期が異なるだけで内容は同様であることや海外からの批判に裁判所が配慮した可能性が考えられる。三度目の逮捕では、容疑が全く異なることから、１月１１日まで計２０日間の勾留が認められた。
海外の司法制度をみると、例えばフランスでは令状なしで身柄拘束が出来るが、拘束は原則１日、最長で４日（テロ関係で６日）となっている。だが、日本にはない予審判事による捜査があり、その場合は最長４年８か月の拘束が認められている。米国では逮捕から大陪審による起訴まで最長３０日、例外的にさらに３０日以内で延長が可能だが、こちらも令状なしの逮捕が多い。いずれにしても、日本の制度と単純に比較することは出来ない。
こうした前提を考えてもなお、「人権侵害」「宗教裁判だ」「奇妙な異端審問」などの批判が海外メディアを登場したのはなぜだろうか。批判は、日本人被疑者を対象とした拘置所内の処遇にも及ぶが、長期勾留への批判を聞くと、永年、司法制度に関心を抱いてきたジャーナリストの立場としては、「人質司法」と呼ばれる悪弊に思い至ることになる。
一般に被疑者は起訴された後は、保釈を申請することが出来る。ところが、被疑者が起訴事実を否認している場合、検察は保釈請求に反対の意見を提示し、裁判所もこれを認めることが多い。最近では森友学園の前理事長夫妻が２９９日も身柄を拘束された。あっせん収賄罪の鈴木宗男衆議院議員（当時）は２００２～０３年に４３７日間、拘置され、ライブドア社長だった堀江貴文被告も９５日間、拘置所にいた。
郵便不正事件で２００９年に逮捕され、後に無罪になった村木厚子元厚生省局長の拘置期間は１６４日だった。この間、大阪地検特捜部は証拠を偽造してまで元局長の有罪立証を図ったが、その事実が明るみに出て特捜検事らが逮捕される事態になった。
１９７６年に取材したロッキード事件で東京地検特捜部は７月２７日、外為法違反で田中角栄元首相を逮捕し、２０日間の勾留期間のみで受託収賄罪を加えて起訴、釈放している。元首相は５億円授受などを否認したが、特捜部としては織り込み済みだった。この取材体験当時、「人質司法」という言葉はなく、２０世紀末から２１世紀にかけて、批判されるべき悪習が司法界を汚染していったといっても過言ではない。
政治家による贈収賄事件や日産の事例のような経済事件では、主要な被疑者の身柄を拘束して取り調べる段階では、被疑者が否認しても有罪を立証できるだけの証拠を揃えるのが、特捜部の本来の手法だった。「人質司法」が横行するようになった背景には、検察内部で、特捜部が地を這うように証拠を追う地味な職人集団から、出世のための検事の関門といった位置づけに変質したことがあげられる。今回は「司法取引」を利用した捜査となったが、新たな武器を導入してもなお、捜査能力が低下しているのでは、と懸念を抱かざるを得ない。
「人質司法」に対して弁護士会などは強く改善を求めてきた。検察の意向を追認する形で検察と一体となった裁判所にも批判の矢は向けられる。
海外からの批判は、日本の司法が抱える問題を認識したうえでの言葉とは思えない。しかし、東京地裁が前会長の勾留延長を認めなかった異例の判断が一部で画期的と評価された事実は重い意味を持つ。海外からの批判の当否はともかくとして、こうした司法制度を持つ日本が、改めて民主主義の原点に立ち返って、被疑者の人権を考える機会にしてほしいと希望する。
もう一点、被疑者の取り調べに弁護士が立ち会えないことに対する問題提起では、密室での取り調べに対する批判を考える契機になる。拙著『強きをくじき 司法改革への道』（毎日新聞社、１９９９年）以来、その活動をフォローしてきた中坊公平・元日弁連会長らが提唱して司法制度改革審議会が発足、その成果として裁判員制度が導入された（２００９年）。並行して弁護士の社会的役割を広げるため司法試験合格者の人数を増やす施策がとられた。
弁護士増員は民事の分野が中心で、刑事事件では有効性を発揮していないが、それに代わる手法として「取り調べ段階の可視化」が進められている。主要な事件では、取り調べを録画、録音して検事の取り調べをチェックすることが求められている。ここに至るまでに、日本の司法は長い時間を要している。取り調べに対する弁護士の立ち合いはただちに実現するとは考えにくいが、真実の探求と被疑者の人権というせめぎ合う課題の中で、ベターな道への模索が求められる。
筆者は元毎日新聞司法記者。著書は『陽気なピエロたち 田中角栄幻想の現場検証』（社会思想社）『中坊公平の 修羅に入る』（毎日新聞社）など。
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟