Before Trying to Improve Japan-Korea Relations
CHINO Keiko / Journalist
November 21, 2019
South Korea has gutted the Japan-Korea “comfort women” agreement. Its navy vessel has directed a fire control radar at a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force patrol plane. Its Supreme Court has ordered Japanese companies to compensate Korean wartime forced laborers. And it has announced the termination of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). In response to this series of moves, Japan has removed South Korea from its export control “white list.”
No end is in sight to the deterioration of Japan–South Korea relations. Moreover, the South Korean government shows no signs of having taken any concrete measures or steps toward improving the situation. From where Japan stands, the administration of President Moon Jae-in does not appear to have any interest in rectifying matters. If that is an overstatement, suffice it say that the administration places a very low foreign policy priority on improving bilateral relations.
Foremost on President Moon’s mind must be the promotion of inter-Korean relations and conciliation with North Korea, as well as a peaceful future for the Korean Peninsula. South Korea’s once-critical alliance with the United States has lately faded in importance, due in part to the emergence of US President Donald Trump. Meanwhile, interestingly enough, China—which until a short while ago would have sided with South Korea—has been sitting tight without pitching in with the latter’s anti-Japanese rhetoric.
The souring of Japan-Korea relations is not unrelated to fundamental changes in the East Asian fabric exemplified by China’s recent attitude. This may be something of a chicken-or-egg situation, but whether it was the worsening of relations or the aforementioned changes that came first, any improvement in relations must take into account such changes in the political fabric of East Asia.
It goes without saying that it is better for neighboring countries to be on good terms. That said, improving relations should not be the be-all and end-all. Looking back on the history of Japan-Korea relations, it is evident that superficial improvements have not benefited either country. The current state of bilateral ties could be seen as a consequence of these past choices. Toughing out periods of poor relations is at times necessary.
“The 1965 system will no longer work”—it was early on in the 2000s that I heard South Korean scholars express this view at the Korea-Japan Forum for private-sector dialogue between Japan and South Korea. At the time, I could not quite make sense of it and simply wondered if some ideological debate was taking place in South Korea. But now, after the South Korean claims regarding the issues of comfort women and wartime forced labor, I realize what it was about; it was a domestic debate regarding the Park Chung-hee administration, which had been an embodiment of the 1965 system, as well as an alarm call signaling a reset of Japan-Korea relations.
Following domestic protests in both countries and other twists and turns, Japan and South Korea signed and ratified the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea in 1965, thereby normalizing diplomatic relations. Also signed at this time was the Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning the Settlement of Problems in Regard to Property and Claims and Economic Cooperation. Article II of the agreement confirms that problems regarding property and claims “have been settled completely and finally.” That is why Japan has consistently asserted that the issues, whether of comfort women or of forced laborers, have already been resolved and has urged South Korea to comply with international law, of which its claims are in violation.
Japan’s behavior is only to be expected, not merely from a domestic perspective but also from an international one. It would be a different story if the counterpart were a rogue country that had no qualms about ignoring international law. But South Korea is no such country, and yet it has not only refused to respond to Japan’s assertions; with regard to wartime forced labor, for instance, it has instead astonished Japan by stating, “Japan continued to ignore us in a clear affront to our national pride and a breach of diplomatic etiquette” (Deputy National Security Advisor Hyun Chong Kim). It is doubtful whether South Korea would use such excessive terms as “national pride” and “breach of diplomatic etiquette” toward any country other than Japan.
What I sense from South Korea’s behavior over the course of this affair is that the Moon administration takes international law lightly and views extralegal constructions like “correct perception of history” and “historical truths”—which it frequently cites—as being more important and more desirable. These notions, moreover, are where the basis for its value judgments lie. Evident in the Moon administration’s behavior is a self-pride that might be described as follows: Past administrations may have accepted (or been made to accept) the 1965 system without protesting against Japan, but South Korea today is no longer the same country, and it must engage in diplomacy befitting a middle power that occupies a key position in the Group of 20.
In short, Japan and South Korea are at complete odds with each other, arguing on two different planes. For all its efforts to stress international law, Japan might as well be preaching to deaf ears when it comes to the Moon administration, which is intent on sacking the 1965 system.
Calling on South Korea to observe international law and asserting the legitimacy of the claims settlement agreement are not enough for Japan to expect a détente with South Korea; that would be a tall order. The claims settlement agreement may certainly be the foundation on which the current bilateral relations were built, but even for the Japanese, they have become a thing of the past. Many Japanese today have likely never even heard of the agreement.
South Korea dwells on the past because doing so gives it an edge over Japan. The same is not true for the latter. While I would not say that Japan should not discuss the past, it is the future that the country should be talking more about—about what sort of order it envisions for East Asia as the region undergoes structural change. There is excellent fodder for that: the vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. In addition to the core countries of Japan, Australia, India, and the United States, support for such a plan is steadily expanding to Africa, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Pacific island countries. Japan would also do well to talk more about the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP11).
South Korea, which is concerned about China and North Korea, is not included in either framework. Precisely for that reason, Japan’s articulation of a grand plan for multilateral cooperation in East Asia and its leadership in the region by promoting the plan would contribute—if by a circuitous route—to a future-oriented relationship between Japan and South Korea.
Chino Keiko is a freelance journalist and Guest Columnist of the Sankei Shimbun.
No end is in sight to the deterioration of Japan–South Korea relations. Moreover, the South Korean government shows no signs of having taken any concrete measures or steps toward improving the situation. From where Japan stands, the administration of President Moon Jae-in does not appear to have any interest in rectifying matters. If that is an overstatement, suffice it say that the administration places a very low foreign policy priority on improving bilateral relations.
Foremost on President Moon’s mind must be the promotion of inter-Korean relations and conciliation with North Korea, as well as a peaceful future for the Korean Peninsula. South Korea’s once-critical alliance with the United States has lately faded in importance, due in part to the emergence of US President Donald Trump. Meanwhile, interestingly enough, China—which until a short while ago would have sided with South Korea—has been sitting tight without pitching in with the latter’s anti-Japanese rhetoric.
The souring of Japan-Korea relations is not unrelated to fundamental changes in the East Asian fabric exemplified by China’s recent attitude. This may be something of a chicken-or-egg situation, but whether it was the worsening of relations or the aforementioned changes that came first, any improvement in relations must take into account such changes in the political fabric of East Asia.
It goes without saying that it is better for neighboring countries to be on good terms. That said, improving relations should not be the be-all and end-all. Looking back on the history of Japan-Korea relations, it is evident that superficial improvements have not benefited either country. The current state of bilateral ties could be seen as a consequence of these past choices. Toughing out periods of poor relations is at times necessary.
“The 1965 system will no longer work”—it was early on in the 2000s that I heard South Korean scholars express this view at the Korea-Japan Forum for private-sector dialogue between Japan and South Korea. At the time, I could not quite make sense of it and simply wondered if some ideological debate was taking place in South Korea. But now, after the South Korean claims regarding the issues of comfort women and wartime forced labor, I realize what it was about; it was a domestic debate regarding the Park Chung-hee administration, which had been an embodiment of the 1965 system, as well as an alarm call signaling a reset of Japan-Korea relations.
Following domestic protests in both countries and other twists and turns, Japan and South Korea signed and ratified the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea in 1965, thereby normalizing diplomatic relations. Also signed at this time was the Agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea Concerning the Settlement of Problems in Regard to Property and Claims and Economic Cooperation. Article II of the agreement confirms that problems regarding property and claims “have been settled completely and finally.” That is why Japan has consistently asserted that the issues, whether of comfort women or of forced laborers, have already been resolved and has urged South Korea to comply with international law, of which its claims are in violation.
Japan’s behavior is only to be expected, not merely from a domestic perspective but also from an international one. It would be a different story if the counterpart were a rogue country that had no qualms about ignoring international law. But South Korea is no such country, and yet it has not only refused to respond to Japan’s assertions; with regard to wartime forced labor, for instance, it has instead astonished Japan by stating, “Japan continued to ignore us in a clear affront to our national pride and a breach of diplomatic etiquette” (Deputy National Security Advisor Hyun Chong Kim). It is doubtful whether South Korea would use such excessive terms as “national pride” and “breach of diplomatic etiquette” toward any country other than Japan.
What I sense from South Korea’s behavior over the course of this affair is that the Moon administration takes international law lightly and views extralegal constructions like “correct perception of history” and “historical truths”—which it frequently cites—as being more important and more desirable. These notions, moreover, are where the basis for its value judgments lie. Evident in the Moon administration’s behavior is a self-pride that might be described as follows: Past administrations may have accepted (or been made to accept) the 1965 system without protesting against Japan, but South Korea today is no longer the same country, and it must engage in diplomacy befitting a middle power that occupies a key position in the Group of 20.
In short, Japan and South Korea are at complete odds with each other, arguing on two different planes. For all its efforts to stress international law, Japan might as well be preaching to deaf ears when it comes to the Moon administration, which is intent on sacking the 1965 system.
Calling on South Korea to observe international law and asserting the legitimacy of the claims settlement agreement are not enough for Japan to expect a détente with South Korea; that would be a tall order. The claims settlement agreement may certainly be the foundation on which the current bilateral relations were built, but even for the Japanese, they have become a thing of the past. Many Japanese today have likely never even heard of the agreement.
South Korea dwells on the past because doing so gives it an edge over Japan. The same is not true for the latter. While I would not say that Japan should not discuss the past, it is the future that the country should be talking more about—about what sort of order it envisions for East Asia as the region undergoes structural change. There is excellent fodder for that: the vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific. In addition to the core countries of Japan, Australia, India, and the United States, support for such a plan is steadily expanding to Africa, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and Pacific island countries. Japan would also do well to talk more about the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP11).
South Korea, which is concerned about China and North Korea, is not included in either framework. Precisely for that reason, Japan’s articulation of a grand plan for multilateral cooperation in East Asia and its leadership in the region by promoting the plan would contribute—if by a circuitous route—to a future-oriented relationship between Japan and South Korea.
Chino Keiko is a freelance journalist and Guest Columnist of the Sankei Shimbun.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
日韓関係改善を目指す前に
千野 境子 / ジャーナリスト
2019年 11月 21日
日韓慰安婦合意の破棄、自衛隊機へのレーダー照射、元徴用工への賠償金支払い命令、ＧＳＯＭＩＡ（軍事情報包括保護協定）終了通告…と韓国が繰り出せば、日本も韓国を輸出管理上の優遇措置「ホワイト国」から外す。
日韓関係の悪化に出口が見えない。しかも韓国政府には改善への具体策や行動を取った形跡もない。日本から見ると、文在寅政権には改善する意思がないのではないかとさえ思える。これが言い過ぎなら、関係改善の外交的優先度が極めて低いと言い換えてもよい。
今、文在寅大統領の頭にあるのは、一にも二にも南北関係の促進、北朝鮮との融和、さらには朝鮮半島の平和的未来といったものだろう。かつては死活的に重要だった米韓同盟も、トランプ米大統領の登場と相まって、存在感は低下した。一方、少し前なら韓国にエールを送りそうな中国はこれまた興味深いことに、反日に与せず静観している。
日韓関係の悪化は東アジアのこのような根本的変容と無関係ではない。鶏と卵ではないが、悪化と変化のどちらが先であれ、関係改善もこうした構造的変化を踏まえたものであるべきだろう。
隣国同士はもちろん仲が良い方が良い。しかし改善ありきではない。日韓関係史を見れば、小手先の改善は互いのためにならなかったことが分かる。その帰結として今の関係悪化があると見ることも可能だ。時には悪化に耐えることも必要なのである。
「もう六五年体制ではやっていられない」。そんな主張を日韓の民間対話の場である「日韓フォーラム」で韓国の学者から聞いたのは、二〇〇〇年代も前半の頃だった。その時は意味するところがもう一つ判然とせず、イデオロギー的な国内論争が起きているのか程度の認識だった。しかしその後、慰安婦、徴用工と一連の異議申し立てが韓国側から出されて、今にしてああこのことかと思う。それは六五年体制の体現であった朴正煕政権を巡る国内論争であると同時に、日韓関係のリセットを告げる警報でもあったのである。
周知のように日韓は両国内での反対運動や紆余曲折の後、一九六五年に日韓基本条約に調印・批准し国交を正常化した。この時、一緒に結ばれたのが「日韓請求権並びに経済協力協定」で、その第二条には、日韓間の請求権問題は「完全かつ最終的に解決されたことを確認する」とある。だから日本は慰安婦でも徴用工でも「問題は解決済み」として「韓国の主張は国際法違反」であり、「国際法を守ってほしい」と終始一貫主張してきたわけだ。
国際法を歯牙にもかけない、ならず者国家ならいざ知らず、これは何も日本に限らず国際的にも当たり前の話だ。ところがならず者国家でもない韓国が日本側の主張には一切応じず、逆に例えば徴用工では「（日本は）われわれの『国家的自尊心』まで傷つけるほどの無視で一貫し、『外交的欠礼』を犯した」（金鉉宗・国家安保室２次長）と述べて日本を唖然とさせた。国家的自尊心と言い、外交的欠礼と言い、こんな過剰な表現を韓国は日本以外に使うだろうか。
韓国側のこの間の一連の対応から感じるのは、文在寅政権にとって国際法は軽く、頻繁に使う「正しい歴史認識」や「歴史の真実」と言った超法規の方が重いし、好ましいということである。価値判断の基準もそこにある。ところが過去の政権は、六五年体制を日本に異議申し立てすることなく受け入れて（受け入れさせられて）来てしまった。韓国はもはや当時の韓国ではない。Ｇ２０の一角を占めるミドル・パワーに相応しい外交をするのだ…。
文政権の対応にはこのような自負も伺える。つまり日韓の主張は完全にスレ違っており噛み合わない。日本が国際法をいくら強調しても、六五年体制を壊したい文在寅政権にはさしずめ馬の耳に念仏なのである。
私は日韓関係の改善に日本が国際法の遵守や日韓請求権協定の正当性を主張するだけでは不十分だし、無理だと思っている。確かに日韓請求権協定は今日の日韓関係の存立基盤ではある。しかし日本人にさえもはや過去の話だ。日韓請求権協定など聞いたこともない日本人は多いだろう。
韓国が過去にこだわるのは、その方が優位に立てるからである。日本はそうではない。過去を語るなとは言わないが、構造的変化の中の東アジアの秩序をどうしたいのか、日本は未来こそもっと語るべきなのだ。そのために格好の素材がある。自由で開かれたインド太平洋構想である。日米豪印のみならず、アフリカ、ＡＳＥＡＮ（東南アジア諸国連合）、太平洋島嶼国にも支持を広げつつある。ＴＰＰ（環太平洋パートナーシップ）１１についてももっと語った方がよい。
中国、北朝鮮が気になる韓国はこのどちらにも入っていない。だからこそ日本が東アジアの多国間協調の大きな構想を語り、それを進め地域をリードすることは、迂遠かもしれないが、未来志向の日韓関係にも寄与するはずだと思う。
筆者はフリーランスジャーナリスト、産経新聞客員論説委員
日韓関係の悪化に出口が見えない。しかも韓国政府には改善への具体策や行動を取った形跡もない。日本から見ると、文在寅政権には改善する意思がないのではないかとさえ思える。これが言い過ぎなら、関係改善の外交的優先度が極めて低いと言い換えてもよい。
今、文在寅大統領の頭にあるのは、一にも二にも南北関係の促進、北朝鮮との融和、さらには朝鮮半島の平和的未来といったものだろう。かつては死活的に重要だった米韓同盟も、トランプ米大統領の登場と相まって、存在感は低下した。一方、少し前なら韓国にエールを送りそうな中国はこれまた興味深いことに、反日に与せず静観している。
日韓関係の悪化は東アジアのこのような根本的変容と無関係ではない。鶏と卵ではないが、悪化と変化のどちらが先であれ、関係改善もこうした構造的変化を踏まえたものであるべきだろう。
隣国同士はもちろん仲が良い方が良い。しかし改善ありきではない。日韓関係史を見れば、小手先の改善は互いのためにならなかったことが分かる。その帰結として今の関係悪化があると見ることも可能だ。時には悪化に耐えることも必要なのである。
「もう六五年体制ではやっていられない」。そんな主張を日韓の民間対話の場である「日韓フォーラム」で韓国の学者から聞いたのは、二〇〇〇年代も前半の頃だった。その時は意味するところがもう一つ判然とせず、イデオロギー的な国内論争が起きているのか程度の認識だった。しかしその後、慰安婦、徴用工と一連の異議申し立てが韓国側から出されて、今にしてああこのことかと思う。それは六五年体制の体現であった朴正煕政権を巡る国内論争であると同時に、日韓関係のリセットを告げる警報でもあったのである。
周知のように日韓は両国内での反対運動や紆余曲折の後、一九六五年に日韓基本条約に調印・批准し国交を正常化した。この時、一緒に結ばれたのが「日韓請求権並びに経済協力協定」で、その第二条には、日韓間の請求権問題は「完全かつ最終的に解決されたことを確認する」とある。だから日本は慰安婦でも徴用工でも「問題は解決済み」として「韓国の主張は国際法違反」であり、「国際法を守ってほしい」と終始一貫主張してきたわけだ。
国際法を歯牙にもかけない、ならず者国家ならいざ知らず、これは何も日本に限らず国際的にも当たり前の話だ。ところがならず者国家でもない韓国が日本側の主張には一切応じず、逆に例えば徴用工では「（日本は）われわれの『国家的自尊心』まで傷つけるほどの無視で一貫し、『外交的欠礼』を犯した」（金鉉宗・国家安保室２次長）と述べて日本を唖然とさせた。国家的自尊心と言い、外交的欠礼と言い、こんな過剰な表現を韓国は日本以外に使うだろうか。
韓国側のこの間の一連の対応から感じるのは、文在寅政権にとって国際法は軽く、頻繁に使う「正しい歴史認識」や「歴史の真実」と言った超法規の方が重いし、好ましいということである。価値判断の基準もそこにある。ところが過去の政権は、六五年体制を日本に異議申し立てすることなく受け入れて（受け入れさせられて）来てしまった。韓国はもはや当時の韓国ではない。Ｇ２０の一角を占めるミドル・パワーに相応しい外交をするのだ…。
文政権の対応にはこのような自負も伺える。つまり日韓の主張は完全にスレ違っており噛み合わない。日本が国際法をいくら強調しても、六五年体制を壊したい文在寅政権にはさしずめ馬の耳に念仏なのである。
私は日韓関係の改善に日本が国際法の遵守や日韓請求権協定の正当性を主張するだけでは不十分だし、無理だと思っている。確かに日韓請求権協定は今日の日韓関係の存立基盤ではある。しかし日本人にさえもはや過去の話だ。日韓請求権協定など聞いたこともない日本人は多いだろう。
韓国が過去にこだわるのは、その方が優位に立てるからである。日本はそうではない。過去を語るなとは言わないが、構造的変化の中の東アジアの秩序をどうしたいのか、日本は未来こそもっと語るべきなのだ。そのために格好の素材がある。自由で開かれたインド太平洋構想である。日米豪印のみならず、アフリカ、ＡＳＥＡＮ（東南アジア諸国連合）、太平洋島嶼国にも支持を広げつつある。ＴＰＰ（環太平洋パートナーシップ）１１についてももっと語った方がよい。
中国、北朝鮮が気になる韓国はこのどちらにも入っていない。だからこそ日本が東アジアの多国間協調の大きな構想を語り、それを進め地域をリードすることは、迂遠かもしれないが、未来志向の日韓関係にも寄与するはずだと思う。
筆者はフリーランスジャーナリスト、産経新聞客員論説委員
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟