Can Trilateral Cooperation Open a New Era for Japan, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea?
CHINO Keiko / Journalist
September 12, 2023
There has been a rapid progress in the trilateral cooperation between Japan, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea. It is not known yet whether the first trilateral summit meeting last August in Camp David near Washington, D.C. really heralded a historic beginning of the new era for Japan, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea. However, the summit was epoch-making at least in the following two senses.
Firstly, President Joe Biden invited the leaders of Japan and the Republic of Korea, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and President Yoon Suk Yeol, to his country residence where a number of historic meetings had taken place.
Secondly, this meeting, held for the first time as a stand-alone summit not in conjunction with any international meeting, became the first of the regular summit meetings to be held annually.
This shows how the tension has increased in the security environment in the Indo-Pacific, especially in East Asia. Or, to put it bluntly, the summit came about thanks to the confrontation between the U.S. and China. It is a case of the proverbial “fear strengthening alliance.”
Japan and the Republic of Korea have not had an alliance relationship. They have only been linked through their respective alliances with the United States. But there is no doubt that their trilateral ties will be strengthened both in name and substance.
We cannot disregard two other factors that have contributed to this development. One is President Biden’s strong will and his active approach to Japan and the Republic of Korea, and another is the remarkable improvement in Japan-ROK relationship since President Yoon came into power. Lacking either of these two factors, the progress in the Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation would not have been possible.
It was President Biden’s determination to make this summit “historical” that prompted him to choose his country residence Camp David, which had not been in use for some time. In recent years, the public focus has been on Mar-a-Lago, President Trump’s Florida residence, and Camp David has really become history.
When President Carter mediated the Camp David Accords (a framework leading to the peace treaty concluded between Israel and Egypt) in 1978, the leaders concerned shut themselves up in the cottages for days until they managed to reach the historical accords.
In comparison, this Japan-U.S.-R.O.K. summit took only one day, which could possibly be dismissed as nothing more than a ceremony. But the ceremony itself was important, because Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea sent out clear messages addressed to China and North Korea.
Since its inauguration, the Biden administration has prioritized multilateral cooperation in its foreign policy. Given that East Asia lacks an organization like NATO in Europe, there is no choice but for Japan and the Republic of Korea to act as the axis. Such a strategic thinking apparently motivated the then Vice President Biden to push eagerly for the agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea on the issue of the comfort women.
That being said, the United States may have found the Japan-R.O.K. relationship intractable beyond words. The Park Geun Hye administration at the time overrode the domestic opposition to the comfort women agreement, and the foreign ministers of Japan and the R.O.K. confirmed at their joint press conference that “this issue is resolved finally and irreversibly with this announcement”. Then the Moon Jae In administration came in and reversed the course by effectively reneging on the agreement, and the Japan-R.O.K. relationship plunged to what was described as the rock bottom.
No matter how hard the United States might try, there is a limit to how far the tripartite cooperation between Japan, the U.S. and the R.O.K. can go without improvement in the Japan-R.O.K. relationship. China and North Korea are always on the look-out for a chance to drive a wedge between Japan and the Republic of Korea. For example, concerning the R.O.K.’s response to the issue of “treated water” from the Fukushima Daichi Nuclear Power Plant of TEPCO, how would the Moon Jae In administration have acted if they had still been in power? China and North Korea might well have joined forces to grab the opportunity to launch a campaign of “Japan Bashing” with strident calls of “nuclear-contaminated water”.
In that sense, it is no exaggeration at all to say that the appearance of President Yoon Suk Yeol on stage is of immeasurable significance. Let me cite one symbolic example of how our bilateral relationship has improved. It was the joint laying of the wreath by Prime Mister Kishida and his wife and President Yoon and his wife at the Memorial Cenotaph of Korean Atomic Bomb Victims on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit.
I felt that the event was quietly appealing and left in our mind something to ponder, though its media coverage was more restrained and low-key than the G7 Leaders’ visit and laying of the wreath at the Peace Memorial Park Cenotaph. I first came to know about the Korean Atomic Bomb victims in the early 1970s, through an A-bomb survivor (hibakusha) who was actively appealing to the Japanese and Korean government for understanding about the Korean hibakusha and medical and other support to them. At that time, the presence of these hibakusha and their activities were hardly known to either the Japanese or the Korean side. Apart from meager support from a handful of people, they found themselves isolated and unaided.
Now, more than 50 years since the era of deafening apathy, the day has come for the Korean President and his wife to visit the memorial honoring these Korean victims, accompanied by the Japanese Prime Minister and his wife, to offer their silent prayers. This scene would not have come about without improved Japan-R.O.K. relations and the bold decision by the two leaders. This can be the starting point that we should come back to if our two countries are faced with difficulties in the future.
I wrote at the outset that it is not known yet whether the first trilateral summit meeting really heralded a historic beginning of the new era for Japan, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea. This is because there are not a few uncertainties and causes for concern. Firstly, the United States. What would happen if the presidential election next year ends up in a transition from the Democratic to Republican administration, and if former President Trump should come back? Then the Republic of Korea. The domestic support for the Yoon administration that has taken steps after steps to improve the relationship with Japan is woefully low. With a minority in the National Assembly, the government seems to be engaged in a lone, arduous battle. There is no guarantee that the next President will pursue the course of the current administration.
However, it would not be very constructive to dwell too much on the uncertainties and causes for concern. What Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea should do respectively is clear. They should each implement sincerely and steadily the three documents announced as a result of the trilateral summit, namely, (1) Camp David Principles, (2) The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea, and (3) Commitment to Consult Among Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States.
Document (1) sets out the principles for advancing the trilateral partnership, including a free and open Indo-Pacific. Based on these principles, we should translate into action the steps for cooperation in all areas, including the holding at least annually of meetings at the level of the leaders, foreign and defense ministers and national security advisors. Both (1) and (2) endorse the centrality and unity of ASEAN, and look out to the Pacific islands, aiming to work closely with them. It is also important to translate these into reality.
These are also designed to ensure that there will be no turning back if there are changes of administration in Japan, the United States or the Republic of Korea. It can be called the institutionalization of regular consultations. This may in fact be the greatest outcome of the trilateral summit.
The trilateral cooperation between Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea has the potential to become a framework of cooperation indispensable to the Indo-Pacific, together with the Quad (Japan, U.S., Australia and India) and AUKUS (U.S., U.K. and Australia).
CHINO Keiko is a freelance journalist and a guest editorial writer for Sankei Shimbun.
Firstly, President Joe Biden invited the leaders of Japan and the Republic of Korea, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and President Yoon Suk Yeol, to his country residence where a number of historic meetings had taken place.
Secondly, this meeting, held for the first time as a stand-alone summit not in conjunction with any international meeting, became the first of the regular summit meetings to be held annually.
This shows how the tension has increased in the security environment in the Indo-Pacific, especially in East Asia. Or, to put it bluntly, the summit came about thanks to the confrontation between the U.S. and China. It is a case of the proverbial “fear strengthening alliance.”
Japan and the Republic of Korea have not had an alliance relationship. They have only been linked through their respective alliances with the United States. But there is no doubt that their trilateral ties will be strengthened both in name and substance.
We cannot disregard two other factors that have contributed to this development. One is President Biden’s strong will and his active approach to Japan and the Republic of Korea, and another is the remarkable improvement in Japan-ROK relationship since President Yoon came into power. Lacking either of these two factors, the progress in the Japan-U.S.-ROK cooperation would not have been possible.
It was President Biden’s determination to make this summit “historical” that prompted him to choose his country residence Camp David, which had not been in use for some time. In recent years, the public focus has been on Mar-a-Lago, President Trump’s Florida residence, and Camp David has really become history.
When President Carter mediated the Camp David Accords (a framework leading to the peace treaty concluded between Israel and Egypt) in 1978, the leaders concerned shut themselves up in the cottages for days until they managed to reach the historical accords.
In comparison, this Japan-U.S.-R.O.K. summit took only one day, which could possibly be dismissed as nothing more than a ceremony. But the ceremony itself was important, because Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea sent out clear messages addressed to China and North Korea.
Since its inauguration, the Biden administration has prioritized multilateral cooperation in its foreign policy. Given that East Asia lacks an organization like NATO in Europe, there is no choice but for Japan and the Republic of Korea to act as the axis. Such a strategic thinking apparently motivated the then Vice President Biden to push eagerly for the agreement between Japan and the Republic of Korea on the issue of the comfort women.
That being said, the United States may have found the Japan-R.O.K. relationship intractable beyond words. The Park Geun Hye administration at the time overrode the domestic opposition to the comfort women agreement, and the foreign ministers of Japan and the R.O.K. confirmed at their joint press conference that “this issue is resolved finally and irreversibly with this announcement”. Then the Moon Jae In administration came in and reversed the course by effectively reneging on the agreement, and the Japan-R.O.K. relationship plunged to what was described as the rock bottom.
No matter how hard the United States might try, there is a limit to how far the tripartite cooperation between Japan, the U.S. and the R.O.K. can go without improvement in the Japan-R.O.K. relationship. China and North Korea are always on the look-out for a chance to drive a wedge between Japan and the Republic of Korea. For example, concerning the R.O.K.’s response to the issue of “treated water” from the Fukushima Daichi Nuclear Power Plant of TEPCO, how would the Moon Jae In administration have acted if they had still been in power? China and North Korea might well have joined forces to grab the opportunity to launch a campaign of “Japan Bashing” with strident calls of “nuclear-contaminated water”.
In that sense, it is no exaggeration at all to say that the appearance of President Yoon Suk Yeol on stage is of immeasurable significance. Let me cite one symbolic example of how our bilateral relationship has improved. It was the joint laying of the wreath by Prime Mister Kishida and his wife and President Yoon and his wife at the Memorial Cenotaph of Korean Atomic Bomb Victims on the occasion of the G7 Hiroshima Summit.
I felt that the event was quietly appealing and left in our mind something to ponder, though its media coverage was more restrained and low-key than the G7 Leaders’ visit and laying of the wreath at the Peace Memorial Park Cenotaph. I first came to know about the Korean Atomic Bomb victims in the early 1970s, through an A-bomb survivor (hibakusha) who was actively appealing to the Japanese and Korean government for understanding about the Korean hibakusha and medical and other support to them. At that time, the presence of these hibakusha and their activities were hardly known to either the Japanese or the Korean side. Apart from meager support from a handful of people, they found themselves isolated and unaided.
Now, more than 50 years since the era of deafening apathy, the day has come for the Korean President and his wife to visit the memorial honoring these Korean victims, accompanied by the Japanese Prime Minister and his wife, to offer their silent prayers. This scene would not have come about without improved Japan-R.O.K. relations and the bold decision by the two leaders. This can be the starting point that we should come back to if our two countries are faced with difficulties in the future.
I wrote at the outset that it is not known yet whether the first trilateral summit meeting really heralded a historic beginning of the new era for Japan, the U.S. and the Republic of Korea. This is because there are not a few uncertainties and causes for concern. Firstly, the United States. What would happen if the presidential election next year ends up in a transition from the Democratic to Republican administration, and if former President Trump should come back? Then the Republic of Korea. The domestic support for the Yoon administration that has taken steps after steps to improve the relationship with Japan is woefully low. With a minority in the National Assembly, the government seems to be engaged in a lone, arduous battle. There is no guarantee that the next President will pursue the course of the current administration.
However, it would not be very constructive to dwell too much on the uncertainties and causes for concern. What Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea should do respectively is clear. They should each implement sincerely and steadily the three documents announced as a result of the trilateral summit, namely, (1) Camp David Principles, (2) The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea, and (3) Commitment to Consult Among Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States.
Document (1) sets out the principles for advancing the trilateral partnership, including a free and open Indo-Pacific. Based on these principles, we should translate into action the steps for cooperation in all areas, including the holding at least annually of meetings at the level of the leaders, foreign and defense ministers and national security advisors. Both (1) and (2) endorse the centrality and unity of ASEAN, and look out to the Pacific islands, aiming to work closely with them. It is also important to translate these into reality.
These are also designed to ensure that there will be no turning back if there are changes of administration in Japan, the United States or the Republic of Korea. It can be called the institutionalization of regular consultations. This may in fact be the greatest outcome of the trilateral summit.
The trilateral cooperation between Japan, the United States and the Republic of Korea has the potential to become a framework of cooperation indispensable to the Indo-Pacific, together with the Quad (Japan, U.S., Australia and India) and AUKUS (U.S., U.K. and Australia).
CHINO Keiko is a freelance journalist and a guest editorial writer for Sankei Shimbun.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
3カ国連携は日米韓新時代を開けるか
千野 境子 / ジャーナリスト
2023年 9月 12日
日本、米国、韓国の連携体制が急進展している。8月にワシントン郊外のキャンプ・デービッド山荘で行われた初の日米韓首脳会談が、歴史的で日米韓新時代の真の始まりとなるかどうかは未だ分からない。しかし会談が少なくとも2つの点で画期的だったことは確かだ。
第1はバイデン米大統領が初めて岸田文雄首相と尹錫悦（ユン・ソンニョル）大統領の日韓首脳を、数々の歴史的会談を生んで来た大統領山荘に招いたこと、第2は国際会議に付随する形でなく単独で初めて開かれた日米韓首脳会談が、今後毎年1回は開催する定期首脳会談となったことである。
インド太平洋とりわけ東アジアの安全保障環境が厳しさを増していることの証左であり、単刀直入に言えば米中対立の「おかげ」だ。まさに「恐怖は同盟を強化する」の例え通りである。
もちろん日韓はこれまで同盟関係にはなく、それぞれが対米同盟を通して連携する形だ。ただこれを機に3カ国の結びつきが名実ともに強まるのは間違いないだろう。
これには以下の要因も無視出来ない。一つはバイデン大統領と米政権の日米韓連携への強い意志と日韓への働きかけ、もう一つは尹錫悦大統領就任以来の日韓関係の顕著な改善だ。どちらを欠いても日米韓連携のここまでの進展は望めなかった。
そもそもバイデン大統領がこの間あまり使われていなかったキャンプ・デービッド山荘を舞台に選んだこと自体、会談を「歴史的」にしたいとの意気込みの表れだ。近年は「マー・ア・ラゴ」（トランプ前大統領のフロリダの別荘）に目が集まり、キャンプ・デービッドは文字通り歴史となっていた。
カーター大統領（当時）の仲介による1978年の「キャンプ・デービッド合意（エジプトとイスラエルの平和条約締結のための枠組み）」では、首脳らは何日も山荘に籠った末に歴史的合意に漕ぎ着けた。
それに対して日米韓首脳会談はたった1日だけ、セレモニーに過ぎないと言えなくもない。しかし今回は、そのセレモニーが重要だったのだ。対中、対北朝鮮へ日米韓による明確なメッセージだったからである。
バイデン外交は発足以来、多国間協調主義を優先して来た。東アジアには欧州における北大西洋条約機構（ＮＡＴＯ）のような機構がない以上、日韓が軸になるほかない。バイデン氏がオバマ政権での副大統領時代の2015年、日韓慰安婦合意に熱心だったのもそうした戦略があってのことだった。
しかし日韓関係は米国にとって厄介この上ないものだったかもしれない。慰安婦合意で当時の朴槿恵政権は国内の反対を押し切り、日韓外相による共同記者会見で「最終的かつ不可逆的に解決されることを確認」したのに、次の文在寅政権はこれを事実上反古にするなどして、日韓関係は最悪と言われるほど落ち込んだ。
いくら米国が頑張っても日韓関係の改善なしには日米韓の連携も限界がある。中国も北朝鮮も隙あらば日韓離間を狙っている。例えば東京電力福島第一原子力発電所からの「処理水」を巡る韓国の対応で、これが文在寅前政権だったらどうか。中韓連携で、ここぞとばかりに「核汚染水」と「日本叩き」に邁進していたかもしれない。
その意味で尹錫悦大統領の登場の意義は計り知れないと書いても決して大袈裟ではない。象徴的とも言える関係改善の事例を記しておきたい。Ｇ７広島サミットの際の岸田首相と尹大統領両夫妻による韓国人原爆犠牲者慰霊碑への献花である。
Ｇ７首脳らによる平和記念公園慰霊碑への参拝と献花に比べてメディアの扱いは地味で目立たなかったが、しみじみとして心に残る出来事と感じた。私が韓国人原爆犠牲者の存在を知ったのは1970年代前半、日韓両政府に韓国人被爆者への理解と医療など支援を求め、活動をしていた元被爆者を通してだった。当時は被爆者の存在もその活動も日韓双方でほとんど知られておらず、少数の人々が支える以外は孤立無援の存在だった。
そんな無関心が圧倒的な時代から50年余り、大統領夫妻が慰霊碑に足を運ぶ日が訪れたばかりか、日本の首相夫妻も一緒に黙祷を捧げた。日韓の関係改善と両首脳の決断なしにはあり得なかった光景である。今後、日韓が困難な問題に直面した時には、これこそ立ち返るべき原点ではないかとも思う。
冒頭、首脳会談が歴史的で日米韓新時代の真の始まりとなるかどうかは未だ分からないと書いたのは、不確定要素や懸念材料が少なくないからである。まず米国。来年の大統領選挙で民主党から共和党へ政権交代し、仮にトランプ前大統領がカムバックしたらどうなるか。そして韓国。次々と日韓改善を進める尹政権の支持率はあまりに低く、国会では少数与党、まさに孤軍奮闘の感がある。次期大統領がこの路線を踏襲する保証はない。
しかし今、この段階で不確定要素や懸念を強調しすぎるのも、あまり建設的とは言えないだろう。それよりも日米韓が為すべきは、先の首脳会談で発出された①「キャンプデービッド原則」②「キャンプデービッドの精神：日米韓首脳共同声明」③「日米韓の協議のコミットメント」の3つの成果文書を、それぞれが誠実に着実に履行することに尽きる。
自由で開かれたインド太平洋の推進をはじめ、3カ国がパートナーシップを進める際の原則を謳った①を踏まえ、少なくとも年に1度の首脳、外務、防衛、国家安全保障局長間会合の開催はじめ、あらゆる分野での協力の具体策を盛り込んだ②を具体化して行くことが求められている。①も②も東南アジア諸国連合（ASEAN）の中心性・一体性を支持し、太平洋島嶼国にも目を向け、連携を目指している。これらの具体化も極めて重要だ。
それはまた日米韓のどこで政権が交代しても、全体として後戻り出来ないようにする仕掛けでもある。言わば定期協議の制度化であり、今回の首脳会談の最大の成果と言っても良いだろう。
日米韓3カ国連携は、クアッド（日米豪印）、AUKUS（米英豪）と並ぶインド太平洋に欠かせない協力の枠組みになる可能性を秘めている。
筆者はフリーランスジャーナリスト、産経新聞客員論説委員
第1はバイデン米大統領が初めて岸田文雄首相と尹錫悦（ユン・ソンニョル）大統領の日韓首脳を、数々の歴史的会談を生んで来た大統領山荘に招いたこと、第2は国際会議に付随する形でなく単独で初めて開かれた日米韓首脳会談が、今後毎年1回は開催する定期首脳会談となったことである。
インド太平洋とりわけ東アジアの安全保障環境が厳しさを増していることの証左であり、単刀直入に言えば米中対立の「おかげ」だ。まさに「恐怖は同盟を強化する」の例え通りである。
もちろん日韓はこれまで同盟関係にはなく、それぞれが対米同盟を通して連携する形だ。ただこれを機に3カ国の結びつきが名実ともに強まるのは間違いないだろう。
これには以下の要因も無視出来ない。一つはバイデン大統領と米政権の日米韓連携への強い意志と日韓への働きかけ、もう一つは尹錫悦大統領就任以来の日韓関係の顕著な改善だ。どちらを欠いても日米韓連携のここまでの進展は望めなかった。
そもそもバイデン大統領がこの間あまり使われていなかったキャンプ・デービッド山荘を舞台に選んだこと自体、会談を「歴史的」にしたいとの意気込みの表れだ。近年は「マー・ア・ラゴ」（トランプ前大統領のフロリダの別荘）に目が集まり、キャンプ・デービッドは文字通り歴史となっていた。
カーター大統領（当時）の仲介による1978年の「キャンプ・デービッド合意（エジプトとイスラエルの平和条約締結のための枠組み）」では、首脳らは何日も山荘に籠った末に歴史的合意に漕ぎ着けた。
それに対して日米韓首脳会談はたった1日だけ、セレモニーに過ぎないと言えなくもない。しかし今回は、そのセレモニーが重要だったのだ。対中、対北朝鮮へ日米韓による明確なメッセージだったからである。
バイデン外交は発足以来、多国間協調主義を優先して来た。東アジアには欧州における北大西洋条約機構（ＮＡＴＯ）のような機構がない以上、日韓が軸になるほかない。バイデン氏がオバマ政権での副大統領時代の2015年、日韓慰安婦合意に熱心だったのもそうした戦略があってのことだった。
しかし日韓関係は米国にとって厄介この上ないものだったかもしれない。慰安婦合意で当時の朴槿恵政権は国内の反対を押し切り、日韓外相による共同記者会見で「最終的かつ不可逆的に解決されることを確認」したのに、次の文在寅政権はこれを事実上反古にするなどして、日韓関係は最悪と言われるほど落ち込んだ。
いくら米国が頑張っても日韓関係の改善なしには日米韓の連携も限界がある。中国も北朝鮮も隙あらば日韓離間を狙っている。例えば東京電力福島第一原子力発電所からの「処理水」を巡る韓国の対応で、これが文在寅前政権だったらどうか。中韓連携で、ここぞとばかりに「核汚染水」と「日本叩き」に邁進していたかもしれない。
その意味で尹錫悦大統領の登場の意義は計り知れないと書いても決して大袈裟ではない。象徴的とも言える関係改善の事例を記しておきたい。Ｇ７広島サミットの際の岸田首相と尹大統領両夫妻による韓国人原爆犠牲者慰霊碑への献花である。
Ｇ７首脳らによる平和記念公園慰霊碑への参拝と献花に比べてメディアの扱いは地味で目立たなかったが、しみじみとして心に残る出来事と感じた。私が韓国人原爆犠牲者の存在を知ったのは1970年代前半、日韓両政府に韓国人被爆者への理解と医療など支援を求め、活動をしていた元被爆者を通してだった。当時は被爆者の存在もその活動も日韓双方でほとんど知られておらず、少数の人々が支える以外は孤立無援の存在だった。
そんな無関心が圧倒的な時代から50年余り、大統領夫妻が慰霊碑に足を運ぶ日が訪れたばかりか、日本の首相夫妻も一緒に黙祷を捧げた。日韓の関係改善と両首脳の決断なしにはあり得なかった光景である。今後、日韓が困難な問題に直面した時には、これこそ立ち返るべき原点ではないかとも思う。
冒頭、首脳会談が歴史的で日米韓新時代の真の始まりとなるかどうかは未だ分からないと書いたのは、不確定要素や懸念材料が少なくないからである。まず米国。来年の大統領選挙で民主党から共和党へ政権交代し、仮にトランプ前大統領がカムバックしたらどうなるか。そして韓国。次々と日韓改善を進める尹政権の支持率はあまりに低く、国会では少数与党、まさに孤軍奮闘の感がある。次期大統領がこの路線を踏襲する保証はない。
しかし今、この段階で不確定要素や懸念を強調しすぎるのも、あまり建設的とは言えないだろう。それよりも日米韓が為すべきは、先の首脳会談で発出された①「キャンプデービッド原則」②「キャンプデービッドの精神：日米韓首脳共同声明」③「日米韓の協議のコミットメント」の3つの成果文書を、それぞれが誠実に着実に履行することに尽きる。
自由で開かれたインド太平洋の推進をはじめ、3カ国がパートナーシップを進める際の原則を謳った①を踏まえ、少なくとも年に1度の首脳、外務、防衛、国家安全保障局長間会合の開催はじめ、あらゆる分野での協力の具体策を盛り込んだ②を具体化して行くことが求められている。①も②も東南アジア諸国連合（ASEAN）の中心性・一体性を支持し、太平洋島嶼国にも目を向け、連携を目指している。これらの具体化も極めて重要だ。
それはまた日米韓のどこで政権が交代しても、全体として後戻り出来ないようにする仕掛けでもある。言わば定期協議の制度化であり、今回の首脳会談の最大の成果と言っても良いだろう。
日米韓3カ国連携は、クアッド（日米豪印）、AUKUS（米英豪）と並ぶインド太平洋に欠かせない協力の枠組みになる可能性を秘めている。
筆者はフリーランスジャーナリスト、産経新聞客員論説委員
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟