Japan, China returning to mutually beneficial strategic relationship
Ryosei Kokubun / Chairman of the Asian Affairs Research Council
January 23, 2025
"A mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests" is a phrase that has often been used in recent Japan-China relations. This term carries a complicated history, and understanding it is important to grasp the current situation and challenges of the bilateral ties.
The term was first used in 2006 between then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and concurrent Chinese President Hu Jintao. Its contents were afterward specified in the Japan-China Joint Statement exchanged between later Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and Hu during the Chinese leader's state visit to Japan in 2008.
The 2008 statement is one of the four important political documents in Japan-China relations, along with the 1972 Joint Communique, the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the Joint Declaration of 1998.
When President Xi Jinping's visit to Japan was considered before the coronavirus pandemic, a fifth political document was rumored to be in the making with the advent of the Xi era. However, it never materialized amid deteriorating relations between Tokyo and Beijing.
Perhaps due to that, Xi has long tended to avoid using the term "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests." The expression, however, was recently revived at a summit between the president and former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in November 2023, and was also used in Xi's meeting with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba this year.
The two countries apparently first agreed on the use of the term around the inauguration of the first Abe administration, during a comprehensive, strategic policy dialogue between Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Shotaro Yachi and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of China Dai Bingguo in 2006. The term is said to have been created with two senior Japanese Foreign Ministry officials playing major roles: Kenichiro Sasae, Director General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, and Takeo Akiba, Director of the China Division.
There were various issues in the bilateral negotiation process to select the term to describe Japan-China ties. At first, the Foreign Ministry was worried that the word "strategic" would provoke the United States. Also, "mutually beneficial" was selected because the Chinese word for "win-win " does not have a direct Japanese equivalent.
At the time, I was a member of the New Japan-China Friendship Committee for the 21st Century, and the secretary general of the Japan side. The bilateral relationship was going through considerable turbulence triggered by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's official visit to Yasukuni Shrine, which is considered by some as a symbol of Japan's prewar militarism. In these circumstances, the committee was established in 2003 as a dialogue mechanism to make recommendations from the private sector to the two governments.
Transition from 'friendship'
Prior to the establishment of this committee, I asked if the word "friendship " could be removed to broaden the significance of Japan-China relations, but the Chinese side did not agree and left it as it was. In the committee, there were many opinions that the current situation between the two countries, which was all about historically thorny issues, could be pictured so as to be more positive, long-term and broad. From the panel's beginning, the need for a strategic perspective was agreed upon. In other words, there was a current to shift from "friendship" to "strategic relationship."
Abe, who succeeded Koizumi in 2006, chose China and South Korea instead of the United States as his first destinations for foreign visits. In China, he declared the establishment of the "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests" with President Hu.
The joint statement said this: "The Japanese side emphasized that Japan more than 60 years after the War, has been consistently following the path of a peaceful country, and would continue to follow this, and the Chinese side positively appreciated this." This announcement was an attempt to break away from the historical issues rooted in Japan's invasion of China.
The statement even mentioned the issue of the East China Sea, saying, "Both sides reaffirmed that, in order to make the East China Sea a 'Sea of Peace, Cooperation and Friendship,' each should firmly maintain dialogue and consultation, ... and confirmed that they would adhere to the broad direction of joint development and seek a resolution acceptable for both parties." Incidentally, this expression on the East China Sea was also raised by the 21st Century Committee.
The 2008 statement went further than the 2006 document and described in more detail the content of the earlier document. It held that Japan-China relations should not be merely bilateral, but "strategic" and broadly positioned in the world, that Japan has contributed to world peace and stability as a peaceful nation after WWII, and that China agreed to "attach importance" to Japan's position in the United Nations.
Flexible stance of the Hu era
Moreover, the document even stated that the two sides will "engage in close cooperation to develop greater understanding and pursuit of basic and universal values that are commonly accepted by the international community." At that time, there was discussion in China over "universal values." Later, "universal values" were replaced by "Chinese values," but this sentence in the joint statement shows that at this stage Hu was committed to "universal values" that respect human rights and democracy.
During the Hu period, there were several anti-Japanese demonstrations over history and territory. Demonstrations in China generally have some kind of organization behind them. Back then, I argued that it was an attempt by the Jiang Zemin faction to destabilize the Hu regime under the guise of anti-Japan movement, but this view was not widely held. Now, however, such an interpretation is rather common.
As for the issue of Taiwan, which China regards as a renegade province, the 2008 Joint Statement contains only a short sentence that does not even mention "One China." It goes like this: "Regarding the Taiwan issue, the Japanese side again expressed its adherence to the position enunciated in the Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China." Considering today's tense international situation, China's flexible stance back then is astonishing.
These documents should not be viewed solely as the achievements of Japan's diplomacy. If China never had the idea of moving toward international cooperation, the joint statement would not have been so flexible. It can be said that the document contained the stance of President Hu, who in 2022 had to leave the venue of the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of China on the closing day as if he were being chased away.
Xi not simply 'anti-Japanese'
Naturally, Xi Jinping must have closely read these sentences. He has sometimes used the term "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests" and at other times avoided it. Now, he has returned to using the phrase. In Japan, there is a strong tendency to view Xi's excessively authoritarian posture as a constant and to see him as an anti-Japanese activist who stays firm on issues involving history and sovereignty, but his thinking also fluctuates according to circumstance.
Xi frequently interacted with local politicians and business people in Japan during his time working in the countryside, and his wife Peng Liyuan is said to have visited Japan frequently. There is also word that his only daughter was enrolled in a university in Japan before studying in the United States. Xi is not simply "anti-Japanese."
I have been a consistent critic of the authoritarian Xi regime, but I can also see that his political position seems to be quite difficult given the terrible economic situation, the inauguration of the Trump administration and a chaotic military personnel reshuffle. In this sense, we need to firmly determine that the return to a mutually beneficial, strategic relationship with Japan is not a temporary one.
Ryosei Kokubun is a former President of National Defense Academy and Chairman of the Asian Affairs Research Council. This is a reposting of the article that appeared in the morning edition of Mainichi Shimbun on 12 December 2024.
The term was first used in 2006 between then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and concurrent Chinese President Hu Jintao. Its contents were afterward specified in the Japan-China Joint Statement exchanged between later Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and Hu during the Chinese leader's state visit to Japan in 2008.
The 2008 statement is one of the four important political documents in Japan-China relations, along with the 1972 Joint Communique, the 1978 Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the Joint Declaration of 1998.
When President Xi Jinping's visit to Japan was considered before the coronavirus pandemic, a fifth political document was rumored to be in the making with the advent of the Xi era. However, it never materialized amid deteriorating relations between Tokyo and Beijing.
Perhaps due to that, Xi has long tended to avoid using the term "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests." The expression, however, was recently revived at a summit between the president and former Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in November 2023, and was also used in Xi's meeting with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba this year.
The two countries apparently first agreed on the use of the term around the inauguration of the first Abe administration, during a comprehensive, strategic policy dialogue between Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Shotaro Yachi and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of China Dai Bingguo in 2006. The term is said to have been created with two senior Japanese Foreign Ministry officials playing major roles: Kenichiro Sasae, Director General of the Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, and Takeo Akiba, Director of the China Division.
There were various issues in the bilateral negotiation process to select the term to describe Japan-China ties. At first, the Foreign Ministry was worried that the word "strategic" would provoke the United States. Also, "mutually beneficial" was selected because the Chinese word for "win-win " does not have a direct Japanese equivalent.
At the time, I was a member of the New Japan-China Friendship Committee for the 21st Century, and the secretary general of the Japan side. The bilateral relationship was going through considerable turbulence triggered by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's official visit to Yasukuni Shrine, which is considered by some as a symbol of Japan's prewar militarism. In these circumstances, the committee was established in 2003 as a dialogue mechanism to make recommendations from the private sector to the two governments.
Transition from 'friendship'
Prior to the establishment of this committee, I asked if the word "friendship " could be removed to broaden the significance of Japan-China relations, but the Chinese side did not agree and left it as it was. In the committee, there were many opinions that the current situation between the two countries, which was all about historically thorny issues, could be pictured so as to be more positive, long-term and broad. From the panel's beginning, the need for a strategic perspective was agreed upon. In other words, there was a current to shift from "friendship" to "strategic relationship."
Abe, who succeeded Koizumi in 2006, chose China and South Korea instead of the United States as his first destinations for foreign visits. In China, he declared the establishment of the "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests" with President Hu.
The joint statement said this: "The Japanese side emphasized that Japan more than 60 years after the War, has been consistently following the path of a peaceful country, and would continue to follow this, and the Chinese side positively appreciated this." This announcement was an attempt to break away from the historical issues rooted in Japan's invasion of China.
The statement even mentioned the issue of the East China Sea, saying, "Both sides reaffirmed that, in order to make the East China Sea a 'Sea of Peace, Cooperation and Friendship,' each should firmly maintain dialogue and consultation, ... and confirmed that they would adhere to the broad direction of joint development and seek a resolution acceptable for both parties." Incidentally, this expression on the East China Sea was also raised by the 21st Century Committee.
The 2008 statement went further than the 2006 document and described in more detail the content of the earlier document. It held that Japan-China relations should not be merely bilateral, but "strategic" and broadly positioned in the world, that Japan has contributed to world peace and stability as a peaceful nation after WWII, and that China agreed to "attach importance" to Japan's position in the United Nations.
Flexible stance of the Hu era
Moreover, the document even stated that the two sides will "engage in close cooperation to develop greater understanding and pursuit of basic and universal values that are commonly accepted by the international community." At that time, there was discussion in China over "universal values." Later, "universal values" were replaced by "Chinese values," but this sentence in the joint statement shows that at this stage Hu was committed to "universal values" that respect human rights and democracy.
During the Hu period, there were several anti-Japanese demonstrations over history and territory. Demonstrations in China generally have some kind of organization behind them. Back then, I argued that it was an attempt by the Jiang Zemin faction to destabilize the Hu regime under the guise of anti-Japan movement, but this view was not widely held. Now, however, such an interpretation is rather common.
As for the issue of Taiwan, which China regards as a renegade province, the 2008 Joint Statement contains only a short sentence that does not even mention "One China." It goes like this: "Regarding the Taiwan issue, the Japanese side again expressed its adherence to the position enunciated in the Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China." Considering today's tense international situation, China's flexible stance back then is astonishing.
These documents should not be viewed solely as the achievements of Japan's diplomacy. If China never had the idea of moving toward international cooperation, the joint statement would not have been so flexible. It can be said that the document contained the stance of President Hu, who in 2022 had to leave the venue of the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of China on the closing day as if he were being chased away.
Xi not simply 'anti-Japanese'
Naturally, Xi Jinping must have closely read these sentences. He has sometimes used the term "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests" and at other times avoided it. Now, he has returned to using the phrase. In Japan, there is a strong tendency to view Xi's excessively authoritarian posture as a constant and to see him as an anti-Japanese activist who stays firm on issues involving history and sovereignty, but his thinking also fluctuates according to circumstance.
Xi frequently interacted with local politicians and business people in Japan during his time working in the countryside, and his wife Peng Liyuan is said to have visited Japan frequently. There is also word that his only daughter was enrolled in a university in Japan before studying in the United States. Xi is not simply "anti-Japanese."
I have been a consistent critic of the authoritarian Xi regime, but I can also see that his political position seems to be quite difficult given the terrible economic situation, the inauguration of the Trump administration and a chaotic military personnel reshuffle. In this sense, we need to firmly determine that the return to a mutually beneficial, strategic relationship with Japan is not a temporary one.
Ryosei Kokubun is a former President of National Defense Academy and Chairman of the Asian Affairs Research Council. This is a reposting of the article that appeared in the morning edition of Mainichi Shimbun on 12 December 2024.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
日中「戦略的互恵関係」 一時的便法ではない回帰
国分 良成 / アジア調査会会長
2025年 1月 23日
「戦略的互恵関係」。最近の日中関係でよく使われる言い回しだ。この言葉には複雑な経緯がある。それを知ることは日中関係の現状と課題を理解するうえでも重要だ。
この言葉は2006年に当時の安倍晋三首相と胡錦濤国家主席の間で使われたのが最初だ。08年の胡氏の国賓来日のさい、福田康夫首相との間で交わされた「日中共同声明」でその内容を具体化させた。
08年の共同声明は1972年の日中共同声明、78年の日中平和友好条約、98年の日中共同宣言と並んで、日中関係における四つの重要な政治文書の一つに位置づけられる。
コロナ禍以前に習近平主席の来日が検討された際、第5の政治文書が取り沙汰された。習時代に入り新たな文書が作られると思われたが、悪化を重ねる日中関係のなかで頓挫した。
そうした事情もあってか、習氏は「戦略的互恵関係」という言葉の使用を避ける時期も長くあった。最近では昨年11月の岸田文雄首相との首脳会談で復活し、今年の石破茂首相との首脳会談でも使われた。
「戦略的互恵関係」の使用はもともと第1次安倍政権誕生の前後、谷内正太郎外務次官と中国の戴秉国外務次官との総合政策対話（戦略対話）のなかで合意されたという。外務省では佐々江賢一郎アジア大洋州局長と秋葉剛男中国課長がその作成に大きな役割を果たしたと言われる。
交渉過程ではさまざまな課題もあった。当初外務省は「戦略」の言葉が米国を刺激するのではと心配したらしい。また「ウィンウィン」の中国語訳は「双贏」だが、日本語にないので最後は「互恵」になったという。
私はこの頃、新日中友好21世紀委員会委員で日本側秘書長。当時、小泉純一郎首相の靖国神社公式参拝によって日中関係はかなり荒れていた。同委員会はこうした背景もあって、民間から両政府に提言する対話組織として03年に設立された。
「友好」からの移行
この委員会の設立に先立って、私は日中関係の意義を広げるために「友好」の2文字を削除できないか打診したが、中国側が同調せずにそのまま残った。委員会では歴史問題に終始する両国間の現状をより前向きかつ長期的、そして大局的なものにできないかとの意見が多く、発足当初から「戦略的視点」の必要性が合意されていた。つまり「友好」から「戦略関係」への移行は時代の流れでもあった。
06年に小泉首相の後を受けて就任した安倍首相は、最初の外国訪問先として米国でなく中国と韓国を選んだ。中国では胡錦濤氏との間で「戦略的互恵関係」の成立を宣言した。
合意された共同プレス発表は「日本側は、戦後60年余、一貫して平和国家として歩んできたこと、そして引き続き平和国家として歩み続けていくことを強調した。中国側は、これを積極的に評価した」と述べ、いわゆる歴史問題一辺倒からの脱却を図ったのであった。
加えて「双方は、東シナ海を平和・協力・友好の海とするため、双方が対話と協議を堅持し、（中略）共同開発という大きな方向を堅持し、双方が受け入れ可能な解決の方法を模索することを確認した」との一文まで入った。ちなみに東シナ海に関するこの表現は21世紀委員会でも提起されたものであった。
08年の日中共同声明では、戦略的互恵関係について06年の共同プレス発表をより具体的な内容に昇華させた。それによれば、日中関係は単なる2国間関係ではなく広く世界の中で位置づけられる「戦略性」を持つべきこと、また日本が戦後平和国家として世界平和に貢献しており、国連における日本の地位向上に中国も同意することを明らかにしている。
胡時代の柔軟姿勢
それだけではない。ここには「国際社会が共に認める基本的かつ普遍的価値の一層の理解と追求のために緊密に協力する（以下略）」という一文も埋め込まれている。当時中国では「普遍的（普世）価値」論争が起こっていた。その後「普世価値」は「中国的価値」に取って代わられるが、共同声明のこの一文は、胡氏がこの段階で人権や民主を尊重する「普世」にくみしていたことを示している。
胡時代には歴史や領土をめぐって反日デモが何度か起こった。中国におけるデモには、一般的に背後に何らかの組織がある。当時私はこれが江沢民派による反日を装った胡体制への揺さぶりではないかと論じたが、この見方が大勢を占めることはなかった。が、今ではそうした解釈はむしろ普通だ。
08年の共同声明は台湾問題について「一つの中国」への言及すらない短い一文があるだけだ。「台湾問題に関し、日本側は、日中共同声明において表明した立場を引き続き堅持する旨改めて表明した」と。今日の国際情勢から考えれば、驚くべき中国側の柔軟姿勢である。
これらを日本外交の成果としてだけで見るべきではない。中国側に、国際協調に寄り添う発想が根底になければ、共同声明もこれほど柔軟にならなかったはずである。中国共産党の第20回党大会の最後に、追われるように退場した胡氏の主張が、そこにあるとも言えよう。
揺れる習氏の思考
習近平氏は当然にこれらの文章を読み込んでいるはずである。彼は時に「戦略的互恵関係」を使い、時にこの言葉を避けてきた。そして現在ではこの言葉に戻っている。日本では習氏の過度な強権体質を不変ととらえ、彼を歴史と主権に固執する反日主義者と見る傾向が強いが、彼の思考も状況に応じて揺れていることがわかる。
習氏は地方勤務の時代に日本の地方政治家やビジネス関係者と頻繁に交流し、彭麗媛夫人もしばしば日本を訪れていたと言われる。一人娘も米国留学前に日本の大学に在籍していたとの情報もある。習氏も単純な「反日」ではなかった。
私は強権的な習体制に一貫して批判的だが、最悪の経済状況と米トランプ政権の誕生、それに軍人事の混乱など、彼の政治的立場が相当に苦しそうなこともわかる。その意味で、日本に対する戦略的互恵関係への回帰が中国の一時的便法でないことを、我々はしっかり見極める必要がある。
筆者は防衛大学校の前校長で、アジア調査会会長。本稿は2024年12月12日の毎日新聞朝刊に掲載された寄稿の再掲である
この言葉は2006年に当時の安倍晋三首相と胡錦濤国家主席の間で使われたのが最初だ。08年の胡氏の国賓来日のさい、福田康夫首相との間で交わされた「日中共同声明」でその内容を具体化させた。
08年の共同声明は1972年の日中共同声明、78年の日中平和友好条約、98年の日中共同宣言と並んで、日中関係における四つの重要な政治文書の一つに位置づけられる。
コロナ禍以前に習近平主席の来日が検討された際、第5の政治文書が取り沙汰された。習時代に入り新たな文書が作られると思われたが、悪化を重ねる日中関係のなかで頓挫した。
そうした事情もあってか、習氏は「戦略的互恵関係」という言葉の使用を避ける時期も長くあった。最近では昨年11月の岸田文雄首相との首脳会談で復活し、今年の石破茂首相との首脳会談でも使われた。
「戦略的互恵関係」の使用はもともと第1次安倍政権誕生の前後、谷内正太郎外務次官と中国の戴秉国外務次官との総合政策対話（戦略対話）のなかで合意されたという。外務省では佐々江賢一郎アジア大洋州局長と秋葉剛男中国課長がその作成に大きな役割を果たしたと言われる。
交渉過程ではさまざまな課題もあった。当初外務省は「戦略」の言葉が米国を刺激するのではと心配したらしい。また「ウィンウィン」の中国語訳は「双贏」だが、日本語にないので最後は「互恵」になったという。
私はこの頃、新日中友好21世紀委員会委員で日本側秘書長。当時、小泉純一郎首相の靖国神社公式参拝によって日中関係はかなり荒れていた。同委員会はこうした背景もあって、民間から両政府に提言する対話組織として03年に設立された。
「友好」からの移行
この委員会の設立に先立って、私は日中関係の意義を広げるために「友好」の2文字を削除できないか打診したが、中国側が同調せずにそのまま残った。委員会では歴史問題に終始する両国間の現状をより前向きかつ長期的、そして大局的なものにできないかとの意見が多く、発足当初から「戦略的視点」の必要性が合意されていた。つまり「友好」から「戦略関係」への移行は時代の流れでもあった。
06年に小泉首相の後を受けて就任した安倍首相は、最初の外国訪問先として米国でなく中国と韓国を選んだ。中国では胡錦濤氏との間で「戦略的互恵関係」の成立を宣言した。
合意された共同プレス発表は「日本側は、戦後60年余、一貫して平和国家として歩んできたこと、そして引き続き平和国家として歩み続けていくことを強調した。中国側は、これを積極的に評価した」と述べ、いわゆる歴史問題一辺倒からの脱却を図ったのであった。
加えて「双方は、東シナ海を平和・協力・友好の海とするため、双方が対話と協議を堅持し、（中略）共同開発という大きな方向を堅持し、双方が受け入れ可能な解決の方法を模索することを確認した」との一文まで入った。ちなみに東シナ海に関するこの表現は21世紀委員会でも提起されたものであった。
08年の日中共同声明では、戦略的互恵関係について06年の共同プレス発表をより具体的な内容に昇華させた。それによれば、日中関係は単なる2国間関係ではなく広く世界の中で位置づけられる「戦略性」を持つべきこと、また日本が戦後平和国家として世界平和に貢献しており、国連における日本の地位向上に中国も同意することを明らかにしている。
胡時代の柔軟姿勢
それだけではない。ここには「国際社会が共に認める基本的かつ普遍的価値の一層の理解と追求のために緊密に協力する（以下略）」という一文も埋め込まれている。当時中国では「普遍的（普世）価値」論争が起こっていた。その後「普世価値」は「中国的価値」に取って代わられるが、共同声明のこの一文は、胡氏がこの段階で人権や民主を尊重する「普世」にくみしていたことを示している。
胡時代には歴史や領土をめぐって反日デモが何度か起こった。中国におけるデモには、一般的に背後に何らかの組織がある。当時私はこれが江沢民派による反日を装った胡体制への揺さぶりではないかと論じたが、この見方が大勢を占めることはなかった。が、今ではそうした解釈はむしろ普通だ。
08年の共同声明は台湾問題について「一つの中国」への言及すらない短い一文があるだけだ。「台湾問題に関し、日本側は、日中共同声明において表明した立場を引き続き堅持する旨改めて表明した」と。今日の国際情勢から考えれば、驚くべき中国側の柔軟姿勢である。
これらを日本外交の成果としてだけで見るべきではない。中国側に、国際協調に寄り添う発想が根底になければ、共同声明もこれほど柔軟にならなかったはずである。中国共産党の第20回党大会の最後に、追われるように退場した胡氏の主張が、そこにあるとも言えよう。
揺れる習氏の思考
習近平氏は当然にこれらの文章を読み込んでいるはずである。彼は時に「戦略的互恵関係」を使い、時にこの言葉を避けてきた。そして現在ではこの言葉に戻っている。日本では習氏の過度な強権体質を不変ととらえ、彼を歴史と主権に固執する反日主義者と見る傾向が強いが、彼の思考も状況に応じて揺れていることがわかる。
習氏は地方勤務の時代に日本の地方政治家やビジネス関係者と頻繁に交流し、彭麗媛夫人もしばしば日本を訪れていたと言われる。一人娘も米国留学前に日本の大学に在籍していたとの情報もある。習氏も単純な「反日」ではなかった。
私は強権的な習体制に一貫して批判的だが、最悪の経済状況と米トランプ政権の誕生、それに軍人事の混乱など、彼の政治的立場が相当に苦しそうなこともわかる。その意味で、日本に対する戦略的互恵関係への回帰が中国の一時的便法でないことを、我々はしっかり見極める必要がある。
筆者は防衛大学校の前校長で、アジア調査会会長。本稿は2024年12月12日の毎日新聞朝刊に掲載された寄稿の再掲である
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟