Japan Will Not Turn Hawkish—Despite a Landslide for the Takaichi LDP
KAWATO Akio / Former ambassador to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, Newsweek Japan Columnist
February 20, 2026
On February 8, Japan held a general election for the House of Representatives. Although the chamber still had nearly three years left in its term, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi—who had herself been chosen by the Diet only last October—declared that she wanted to seek a direct mandate from the public and dissolved the lower house. Under Japan’s Constitution, the prime minister is generally understood to hold effective control over dissolution of the House of Representatives.
The result was a political earthquake. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won 68 percent of the seats—316 in total—marking the first time in Japanese history that a single party has secured a two-thirds supermajority. The Constitutional Democratic Party, which had held 32 percent of the seats before the election, and Komeito, which had held about 5 percent, chose to merge for this election under the name Centrist Reform Alliance. Even so, the combined bloc ended up with only 10.5 percent of the seats, a humiliating collapse. The remaining 21.5 percent were split among seven old and new parties.
Compared with the previous general election in 2024, the LDP increased its vote share by roughly ten percentage points in both single-member districts and proportional representation. In single-member districts, it captured just under 50 percent of the vote. Yet that translated into a stunning 86 percent of district seats—an effect of what Japanese voters often call the “magic” of the single-member district system, where only one candidate wins per district.
This “magic” reflected two main factors: Prime Minister Takaichi’s popularity—she is seen as upbeat, clear-spoken, and committed to proactive fiscal policy that would improve the economy and everyday life, much like former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe—and the opposition’s strategic missteps at a time when it was already in decline.
Since losing power in 2012 (when it was still known as the Democratic Party of Japan), the Constitutional Democratic Party has struggled with falling support and the weakening of labor unions that once sustained its grassroots operations. Komeito, meanwhile, long a coalition partner of the LDP, has faced aging and shrinking membership in Soka Gakkai, the Buddhist organization that underpins its electoral strength. Relations between Komeito and Ms. Takaichi had never been particularly warm, and after she became prime minister, Komeito withdrew from the governing coalition.
Just before the election, the two parties merged for the lower house races under the Centrist Reform Alliance banner (while remaining separate parties in the upper house). Under their deal, former Constitutional Democratic candidates monopolized single-member districts, while former Komeito politicians dominated the top spots on the proportional lists.
In the era of the LDP–Komeito coalition, LDP candidates typically relied on around 10,000 Komeito votes in each district to secure victory. This time, those votes were gone—and in theory could even have swung to the opposition. Yet the outcome was striking: while all former Komeito candidates won their proportional seats, only seven former Constitutional Democratic candidates prevailed in single-member districts. Together, the two parties saw their combined strength plunge from 172 seats before the election to just 49.
A Government That Can “Do Anything”
A two-thirds majority effectively enables single-party rule by the LDP. As long as legislation does not violate the Constitution, the LDP can now pass whatever laws it wishes. Bills can easily clear the lower house, and even if rejected by the upper house—where the LDP holds just over 40 percent of the seats and must rely on support from its coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party, to reach a bare majority of 56%—they can still become law if the lower house overrides the rejection with a two-thirds vote.
The only exception is constitutional revision, which requires a two-thirds majority in both chambers. Even there, however, the ruling party could theoretically reach that threshold in the upper house by peeling off part of the opposition. The LDP has long advocated constitutional revision, partly reflecting the postwar sentiment that the current constitution had been imposed by the U.S. occupation authorities. That said, its goal is not a return to prewar authoritarianism or imperialism. Rather, it seeks to give explicit constitutional status to the Self-Defense Forces—renaming them a military—and to clearly authorize the use of force for self-defense, something taken for granted in most sovereign states.
It is also worth noting that Japan’s so-called “Three Non-Nuclear Principles”—not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, and not allowing them to be brought into Japan—are not statutory law but merely a resolution of the lower house. The third principle, “not allowing introduction,” may gradually be relaxed, limited to permitting port calls by U.S. vessels carrying nuclear weapons rather than any land-based deployment. Even so, this is not an immediate issue: the United States is still developing nuclear systems that could be deployed in Japan, having previously withdrawn nuclear-armed Tomahawk missiles entirely.
This Is Not a Hawkish Turn in Public Opinion
The election result should not be interpreted as evidence that Japanese public opinion has turned hawkish. Young people in Japan are deeply averse to war, and the number of people applying to join the Self-Defense Forces is declining. Any revival of conscription would be utterly unrealistic.
What voters want above all is economic stability and cleaner politics. In this election, they placed their bets on Prime Minister Takaichi, who openly emphasized her lineage from the Abe political tradition and spoke clearly about proactive fiscal policy, stronger defense capabilities, political funding reform, and orderly immigration policy.
Landslide victories often carry the seeds of future crises. Prime Minister Takaichi is known to make bold statements and decisions on her own authority, and a single misstep could quickly trigger criticism both inside and outside the LDP. Media outlets hostile to the party—and especially to Ms. Takaichi—are likely to dig aggressively for scandals involving government personalities. Among women, while many welcome the emergence of Japan’s first female prime minister /, many others strongly dislike her.
Takaichi’s Diplomacy Is Not Hawkish
Prime Minister Takaichi has long been labeled a hawk—too close to the U.S.–Japan alliance and overly tough on China and South Korea. Some of her supporters openly wave anti-China and anti-Korea banners. She herself, however, is likely far more flexible. She has already built a close relationship of trust with South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, and as both societies change, mutual affinity between Japan and South Korea is growing.
On Taiwan, Prime Minister Takaichi recently made an overly assertive statement in parliament after being provoked by the opposition. In reality, no one in Japan believes the country could defend Taiwan on its own. With China, her position has not deviated in the slightest from the framework of “strategic mutual benefit,” as she told President Xi Jinping at their November meeting. Her upcoming visit to Washington—ahead of former President Trump’s planned April visit to China—should make this clear. Ideally, Japan and the United States will jointly signal a strategy of engaging China as a partner in maintaining regional stability.
At present, Prime Minister Takaichi arguably enjoys the strongest domestic political base of any leader in the “West.” In that sense, she resembles Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who was once labeled “far-right” but consolidated a strong domestic base before adopting a largely mainstream EU stance. One might say: Takaichi in the East, Meloni in the West. One can only hope that both Japan and Italy will avoid returning to their old habit of short-lived governments.
Akio Kawato is a former ambassador to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and a Newsweek Japan columnist.
The result was a political earthquake. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) won 68 percent of the seats—316 in total—marking the first time in Japanese history that a single party has secured a two-thirds supermajority. The Constitutional Democratic Party, which had held 32 percent of the seats before the election, and Komeito, which had held about 5 percent, chose to merge for this election under the name Centrist Reform Alliance. Even so, the combined bloc ended up with only 10.5 percent of the seats, a humiliating collapse. The remaining 21.5 percent were split among seven old and new parties.
Compared with the previous general election in 2024, the LDP increased its vote share by roughly ten percentage points in both single-member districts and proportional representation. In single-member districts, it captured just under 50 percent of the vote. Yet that translated into a stunning 86 percent of district seats—an effect of what Japanese voters often call the “magic” of the single-member district system, where only one candidate wins per district.
This “magic” reflected two main factors: Prime Minister Takaichi’s popularity—she is seen as upbeat, clear-spoken, and committed to proactive fiscal policy that would improve the economy and everyday life, much like former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe—and the opposition’s strategic missteps at a time when it was already in decline.
Since losing power in 2012 (when it was still known as the Democratic Party of Japan), the Constitutional Democratic Party has struggled with falling support and the weakening of labor unions that once sustained its grassroots operations. Komeito, meanwhile, long a coalition partner of the LDP, has faced aging and shrinking membership in Soka Gakkai, the Buddhist organization that underpins its electoral strength. Relations between Komeito and Ms. Takaichi had never been particularly warm, and after she became prime minister, Komeito withdrew from the governing coalition.
Just before the election, the two parties merged for the lower house races under the Centrist Reform Alliance banner (while remaining separate parties in the upper house). Under their deal, former Constitutional Democratic candidates monopolized single-member districts, while former Komeito politicians dominated the top spots on the proportional lists.
In the era of the LDP–Komeito coalition, LDP candidates typically relied on around 10,000 Komeito votes in each district to secure victory. This time, those votes were gone—and in theory could even have swung to the opposition. Yet the outcome was striking: while all former Komeito candidates won their proportional seats, only seven former Constitutional Democratic candidates prevailed in single-member districts. Together, the two parties saw their combined strength plunge from 172 seats before the election to just 49.
A Government That Can “Do Anything”
A two-thirds majority effectively enables single-party rule by the LDP. As long as legislation does not violate the Constitution, the LDP can now pass whatever laws it wishes. Bills can easily clear the lower house, and even if rejected by the upper house—where the LDP holds just over 40 percent of the seats and must rely on support from its coalition partner, the Japan Innovation Party, to reach a bare majority of 56%—they can still become law if the lower house overrides the rejection with a two-thirds vote.
The only exception is constitutional revision, which requires a two-thirds majority in both chambers. Even there, however, the ruling party could theoretically reach that threshold in the upper house by peeling off part of the opposition. The LDP has long advocated constitutional revision, partly reflecting the postwar sentiment that the current constitution had been imposed by the U.S. occupation authorities. That said, its goal is not a return to prewar authoritarianism or imperialism. Rather, it seeks to give explicit constitutional status to the Self-Defense Forces—renaming them a military—and to clearly authorize the use of force for self-defense, something taken for granted in most sovereign states.
It is also worth noting that Japan’s so-called “Three Non-Nuclear Principles”—not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them, and not allowing them to be brought into Japan—are not statutory law but merely a resolution of the lower house. The third principle, “not allowing introduction,” may gradually be relaxed, limited to permitting port calls by U.S. vessels carrying nuclear weapons rather than any land-based deployment. Even so, this is not an immediate issue: the United States is still developing nuclear systems that could be deployed in Japan, having previously withdrawn nuclear-armed Tomahawk missiles entirely.
This Is Not a Hawkish Turn in Public Opinion
The election result should not be interpreted as evidence that Japanese public opinion has turned hawkish. Young people in Japan are deeply averse to war, and the number of people applying to join the Self-Defense Forces is declining. Any revival of conscription would be utterly unrealistic.
What voters want above all is economic stability and cleaner politics. In this election, they placed their bets on Prime Minister Takaichi, who openly emphasized her lineage from the Abe political tradition and spoke clearly about proactive fiscal policy, stronger defense capabilities, political funding reform, and orderly immigration policy.
Landslide victories often carry the seeds of future crises. Prime Minister Takaichi is known to make bold statements and decisions on her own authority, and a single misstep could quickly trigger criticism both inside and outside the LDP. Media outlets hostile to the party—and especially to Ms. Takaichi—are likely to dig aggressively for scandals involving government personalities. Among women, while many welcome the emergence of Japan’s first female prime minister /, many others strongly dislike her.
Takaichi’s Diplomacy Is Not Hawkish
Prime Minister Takaichi has long been labeled a hawk—too close to the U.S.–Japan alliance and overly tough on China and South Korea. Some of her supporters openly wave anti-China and anti-Korea banners. She herself, however, is likely far more flexible. She has already built a close relationship of trust with South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, and as both societies change, mutual affinity between Japan and South Korea is growing.
On Taiwan, Prime Minister Takaichi recently made an overly assertive statement in parliament after being provoked by the opposition. In reality, no one in Japan believes the country could defend Taiwan on its own. With China, her position has not deviated in the slightest from the framework of “strategic mutual benefit,” as she told President Xi Jinping at their November meeting. Her upcoming visit to Washington—ahead of former President Trump’s planned April visit to China—should make this clear. Ideally, Japan and the United States will jointly signal a strategy of engaging China as a partner in maintaining regional stability.
At present, Prime Minister Takaichi arguably enjoys the strongest domestic political base of any leader in the “West.” In that sense, she resembles Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, who was once labeled “far-right” but consolidated a strong domestic base before adopting a largely mainstream EU stance. One might say: Takaichi in the East, Meloni in the West. One can only hope that both Japan and Italy will avoid returning to their old habit of short-lived governments.
Akio Kawato is a former ambassador to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and a Newsweek Japan columnist.
The English-Speaking Union of Japan
高市自民の大勝ちでも、日本はタカ派にならない
河東 哲夫 / 元駐ウズベキスタン・アジキスタン大使、ニューズウィーク日本版コラムニスト
2026年 2月 20日
2月8日、衆議院の総選挙があった。衆議院は任期をまだ3年弱残していたが、昨年10月に議会で選ばれたばかりの高市総理は、「自分が総理でいいのかどうか、国民の審判を仰ぎたい」と宣言した上で、国会を解散（日本の憲法では総理大臣が衆院解散権を実質的に握る、とされてきた）した。
選挙の結果、自民党は議席の68％（316議席）、つまり日本史上初めて一党が議席の3分の2を獲得する快挙を成し遂げた。選挙前の衆院で議席の32％を握っていた立憲民主党、5％を握っていた公明党は、今回選挙では統合して中道改革連合を名乗って臨んだが、合計で議席の10.5％を占めるだけという、惨めな存在に転落してしまった。残りの21.5％の議席は7の新旧政党によって割拠されている。
前回2024年の総選挙と比べてみると、自民党は小選挙区（289議席を獲得）、比例代表（同176議席）とも、得票率を約10％も引き上げ、小選挙区では実に50％弱の得票率を挙げている。しかし得票率50％（比例では38％）で小選挙区の議席の86％もを得たのは、小選挙区の魔法、つまり一区から一名しか選ばれないためである。今回の魔法は、高市総理の人気（明るくて、言うことが明確だ、そして以前の安倍総理と同じく積極財政で経済と暮らしを良くしてくれるだろう、という期待）、そして野党が基本的に退潮している中で、次のように戦術(略を間違えたことにある。
つまり最大野党である立憲民主党は、2012年に政権を失って以来（当時は民主党）、支持率の低下、日常活動を支えている労働組合の衰退に悩み、一方、長年自民党と連立を組んできた公明党は、日常活動を支えている仏教の一派「創価学会」信者の老齢化と減少で悩んでいたのだが、それまで公明党との関係が良好でなかった高市早苗氏が総理に選ばれたのを契機に連立を離脱した。そして総選挙の直前に、両党は統合して中道改革連合を名乗り（参院では別の党のまま）、小選挙区は旧立憲民主党の候補、比例リストの上位は旧公明党の候補が独占することとした。
自公連立の時代には、小選挙区の自民党候補は公明党支持者の票1万票程度を回してもらって当選してきた。今回はこの1万が消えて対抗候補の旧立民に回りかねない、という危機だったのだが、ふたを開けてみると、比例区の旧公明党候補は全員当選したのに比し、小選挙区で旧立民の候補は7名しか当選しなかったのである。右二党は、選挙前の合計172議席を実に49議席に激減させたのである。
「なんでもできる」高市政権
議席の3分の2というのは、自民党独裁を可能にする数字である。憲法に違反していない限り、自民党は自分の望む法案を採択できることになるからである。衆議院では法案を容易に可決できるし、参院で（ここでは自民党は40％強の議席しか持っておらず、連立与党「維新」の助けを得てやっと56％）否決されても、差戻しの衆院での採決で3分の2以上の票を得ることができれば、成立する。
この手が効かないのは憲法改正だけで、これは衆院、参院両方で各々3分の2以上の賛成を必要としている。しかし参院でも、野党の一部を引きこめば、3分の2にぎりぎり届き得る。戦後、米占領軍当局に憲法草案を押し付けられたという意識のある自民党は、憲法改正を党是としている。ただそれは、日本を戦前の専制・帝国主義に戻すというのではなく、自衛隊を軍隊と改称して憲法上の裏付けを与え、かつ自衛のための武力の行使を明文で認めるという、他の独立国では当たり前のものに変えるだけの話しである。
なお、「核兵器を持たない。作らない。持ち込ませない」という、いわゆる非核三原則はもともと法律でさえない（衆議院決議）ので、最後の「持ち込ませない」という点から緩和（但し陸上配備ではなく、核兵器を搭載した米艦船が日本の港に寄港する程度）されていくだろう。ただ、米国は日本に持ち込めるような核兵器を未だ開発中である（一度トマホークを完全に撤退させている）ので、差し迫った問題ではない。
日本世論のタカ化ではない
以上、今回選挙の結果は、日本世論のタカ化を意味するものではないことがおわかりいただけたと思う。青年は戦争を嫌い、自衛隊に応募する者は減少している。徴兵制の復活などは、非現実的な話しである。
国民は何より生活の安定と政治の浄化を求めており、今回選挙では、安倍直系であることを強調して積極財政、防衛力強化、政治資金の浄化、秩序ある移民政策等をはっきり言い切る高市総理に賭けたのである。
大勝の後には危機が訪れやすい。高市総理は独断で重要な発言、決定を行うことがあり、それで一度つまずくと自民党内外での批判が広がる。マスコミの中で自民党、特に高市総理に敵対するものは、政権関係者の醜聞を掘り起こしていくだろう。女性の多くは女性宰相の出現を喜んでいるが、高市総理を嫌う女性もまた多い。
高市外交はタカではない
高市総理は以前からタカ派、つまり日米同盟にべったりで中韓には厳しいものと思われている。同総理の支持層の一部には、反中・反韓を旗印にする者がいる。しかし彼女自身は、もっと柔軟だろう。韓国の李在民大統領とは既に、緊密な信頼関係を構築している。韓国の社会も日本の社会も変わってきて、双方への親近感が増大している。
台湾防衛について高市総理は最近、国会で野党に挑発されて勇み足の答弁をしたが（実際には、日本が単独で台湾を防衛できると思っている者は日本にはいない）、中国とは11月の会談で総理が習近平国家主席に言ったように、「戦略的互恵」から一歩も逸脱していない。トランプの4月訪中を前にして行われる高市総理の訪米では、その点が明らかになるだろう。日米双方とも中国を協力、地域の安定維持に目がけて、引き込んでいく姿勢を打ち出すといいと思う。
高市総理は目下、「西側」では最も強い国内政治基盤を持つ指導者となっている。「極右」と言われながら、強い党内・国内基盤を築いた後は、EU正統派の立場を持しているイタリアのメローニ首相にそれは似ている。東の高市、西のメローニと言おうか。願わくは日伊双方ともお家芸の、短期政権の繰り返しには戻らないで欲しい。
筆者は元駐ウズベキスタン・タジキスタン大使、ニューズウィーク日本版コラムニスト
選挙の結果、自民党は議席の68％（316議席）、つまり日本史上初めて一党が議席の3分の2を獲得する快挙を成し遂げた。選挙前の衆院で議席の32％を握っていた立憲民主党、5％を握っていた公明党は、今回選挙では統合して中道改革連合を名乗って臨んだが、合計で議席の10.5％を占めるだけという、惨めな存在に転落してしまった。残りの21.5％の議席は7の新旧政党によって割拠されている。
前回2024年の総選挙と比べてみると、自民党は小選挙区（289議席を獲得）、比例代表（同176議席）とも、得票率を約10％も引き上げ、小選挙区では実に50％弱の得票率を挙げている。しかし得票率50％（比例では38％）で小選挙区の議席の86％もを得たのは、小選挙区の魔法、つまり一区から一名しか選ばれないためである。今回の魔法は、高市総理の人気（明るくて、言うことが明確だ、そして以前の安倍総理と同じく積極財政で経済と暮らしを良くしてくれるだろう、という期待）、そして野党が基本的に退潮している中で、次のように戦術(略を間違えたことにある。
つまり最大野党である立憲民主党は、2012年に政権を失って以来（当時は民主党）、支持率の低下、日常活動を支えている労働組合の衰退に悩み、一方、長年自民党と連立を組んできた公明党は、日常活動を支えている仏教の一派「創価学会」信者の老齢化と減少で悩んでいたのだが、それまで公明党との関係が良好でなかった高市早苗氏が総理に選ばれたのを契機に連立を離脱した。そして総選挙の直前に、両党は統合して中道改革連合を名乗り（参院では別の党のまま）、小選挙区は旧立憲民主党の候補、比例リストの上位は旧公明党の候補が独占することとした。
自公連立の時代には、小選挙区の自民党候補は公明党支持者の票1万票程度を回してもらって当選してきた。今回はこの1万が消えて対抗候補の旧立民に回りかねない、という危機だったのだが、ふたを開けてみると、比例区の旧公明党候補は全員当選したのに比し、小選挙区で旧立民の候補は7名しか当選しなかったのである。右二党は、選挙前の合計172議席を実に49議席に激減させたのである。
「なんでもできる」高市政権
議席の3分の2というのは、自民党独裁を可能にする数字である。憲法に違反していない限り、自民党は自分の望む法案を採択できることになるからである。衆議院では法案を容易に可決できるし、参院で（ここでは自民党は40％強の議席しか持っておらず、連立与党「維新」の助けを得てやっと56％）否決されても、差戻しの衆院での採決で3分の2以上の票を得ることができれば、成立する。
この手が効かないのは憲法改正だけで、これは衆院、参院両方で各々3分の2以上の賛成を必要としている。しかし参院でも、野党の一部を引きこめば、3分の2にぎりぎり届き得る。戦後、米占領軍当局に憲法草案を押し付けられたという意識のある自民党は、憲法改正を党是としている。ただそれは、日本を戦前の専制・帝国主義に戻すというのではなく、自衛隊を軍隊と改称して憲法上の裏付けを与え、かつ自衛のための武力の行使を明文で認めるという、他の独立国では当たり前のものに変えるだけの話しである。
なお、「核兵器を持たない。作らない。持ち込ませない」という、いわゆる非核三原則はもともと法律でさえない（衆議院決議）ので、最後の「持ち込ませない」という点から緩和（但し陸上配備ではなく、核兵器を搭載した米艦船が日本の港に寄港する程度）されていくだろう。ただ、米国は日本に持ち込めるような核兵器を未だ開発中である（一度トマホークを完全に撤退させている）ので、差し迫った問題ではない。
日本世論のタカ化ではない
以上、今回選挙の結果は、日本世論のタカ化を意味するものではないことがおわかりいただけたと思う。青年は戦争を嫌い、自衛隊に応募する者は減少している。徴兵制の復活などは、非現実的な話しである。
国民は何より生活の安定と政治の浄化を求めており、今回選挙では、安倍直系であることを強調して積極財政、防衛力強化、政治資金の浄化、秩序ある移民政策等をはっきり言い切る高市総理に賭けたのである。
大勝の後には危機が訪れやすい。高市総理は独断で重要な発言、決定を行うことがあり、それで一度つまずくと自民党内外での批判が広がる。マスコミの中で自民党、特に高市総理に敵対するものは、政権関係者の醜聞を掘り起こしていくだろう。女性の多くは女性宰相の出現を喜んでいるが、高市総理を嫌う女性もまた多い。
高市外交はタカではない
高市総理は以前からタカ派、つまり日米同盟にべったりで中韓には厳しいものと思われている。同総理の支持層の一部には、反中・反韓を旗印にする者がいる。しかし彼女自身は、もっと柔軟だろう。韓国の李在民大統領とは既に、緊密な信頼関係を構築している。韓国の社会も日本の社会も変わってきて、双方への親近感が増大している。
台湾防衛について高市総理は最近、国会で野党に挑発されて勇み足の答弁をしたが（実際には、日本が単独で台湾を防衛できると思っている者は日本にはいない）、中国とは11月の会談で総理が習近平国家主席に言ったように、「戦略的互恵」から一歩も逸脱していない。トランプの4月訪中を前にして行われる高市総理の訪米では、その点が明らかになるだろう。日米双方とも中国を協力、地域の安定維持に目がけて、引き込んでいく姿勢を打ち出すといいと思う。
高市総理は目下、「西側」では最も強い国内政治基盤を持つ指導者となっている。「極右」と言われながら、強い党内・国内基盤を築いた後は、EU正統派の立場を持しているイタリアのメローニ首相にそれは似ている。東の高市、西のメローニと言おうか。願わくは日伊双方ともお家芸の、短期政権の繰り返しには戻らないで欲しい。
筆者は元駐ウズベキスタン・タジキスタン大使、ニューズウィーク日本版コラムニスト
一般社団法人 日本英語交流連盟